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Reference	IOR/L/PS/10/112
Title	File 619/1907 Pt 3 'Arms Traffic:- Koweit Trade.'
Date(s)	28 Apr 1900-15 Jun 1914 (CE, Gregorian)
Written in	English and French in Latin
Extent and Format	1 volume (358 folios)
Holding Institution	British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers
Copyright for document	<u>Unknown</u>


About this record


The volume discusses the work of British political and naval authorities in the Persian Gulf in suppressing the trafficking arms and ammunition, particularly from Muscat to Koweit [Kuwait]. Included are reports of searches undertaken on vessels suspected of trafficking of arms, including inventories of seized goods, and records of land attacks undertaken on arms depots and caches along the Gulf coastline.

The later correspondence discusses the discovery of arms and ammunitions being smuggled into Koweit within cases of loaf sugar (sugarloaf), and attempts to identify those responsible for sending and receiving the smuggled goods.

The principal correspondents include the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf (Charles Arnold Kemball, and Percy Zachariah Cox); the Political Agent and Consul at Muscat (William George Grey, and Frank McConaghey); the Political Agent at Kuwait (Stuart George Knox, and William Henry Irvine Shakespear); the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department (Hugh Shakespear Barnes, Sir Louis William Dane, and Spencer Harcourt Butler); the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs (Sir Edward Grey) and India (Lord George Francis Hamilton, William St John Fremantle Brodrick, John Morley, Viscount Morley of Blackburn); the Viceroy of India; the Commander-in-Chief of the East Indies Station (Edmond John Warre Slade, and Richard Henry Peirse); the Secretary to the Government of India in the Marine Department (Malcolm Henry Stanley Grover); the Senior Naval Officer in the Persian Gulf (Victor Gallafent Gurner, Charles Papon Beaty-Pownall, and James C Tancard); and representatives of the Foreign Office, the India Office and the Admiralty.

This is part 3 of 10. Each part includes a divider which gives the subject and part numbers, the year the subject file was opened, the subject heading, and a list of correspondence references contained in that part by year. This is placed at the back of the correspondence.
























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Subject:

Arms Traffic:-Koweit Trade.see also 619 (445) Persian Gulf Naval Blockade

- Part. 1. Muscat Trade (negotiations with France (1909-11))
2. Muscat dhows "ladra".
3. Crucial Chieft v. Kabir Chieft.
7. Betal incident
8. French dhows ("Musaffa" & "Zach-el-Khai")
9. Military operations.
10. Prize Money for captures.

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
1914.

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2291

If any papers are removed from this File, please inform the Political Registry.

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4 20

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Register No. **2291** **Secret Department.**

Minute Paper.

INDIA, FOREIGN SECRETARY'S
No 22 M, dated
28 MAY 1914

Dated
Rec. 13 June, 1914.


Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....		<u>Arms Traffic</u>
Secretary of State.....		
Committee		
Under Secretary.....		
Secretary of State.....		

Copy to C.O. } 15 June.
Adm. }
D.M.O. (sent)

FOR INFORMATION.

Previous Papers:—
2113

15294. I. 864. 2000.-6/1913. [1438/12.]





copy)

CONFIDENTIAL.

"Swiftsure" at Colombo,

13th May 1914.

No. 98/1462 VI-F.

P
2291
1914

15/6
2113

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose for the information of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General of India in Council, the attached copy of my letter No. 1462 VI-F. of the 13th instant to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf on the subject of the searching of Kuwait shows suspected of arms-running.

I have, etc.,


(Sd.) R. H. Peirse,

Rear-Admiral, Naval
Commander-in-Chief.

The Secretary to the Government of India,
Foreign and Political Department.

INDIA, FOREIGN SECRETARY'S
No 22 M. dated
28 MAY 1914

RECEIVED
13 JUN 1914
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT





CONFIDENTIAL.

(Copy)

"Swiftsure" at Colombo,

13th May 1914.

No. 1462 VI-F.

Sir,

(213)
I have the honour to acknowledge with thanks receipt of your letter No. 1202 of 26th April 1914, relative to the search of Kuwait dhows suspected of arms-running.

2. I concur under the circumstances that it is inexpedient to alter the present procedure, and the Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf, has been informed to this effect.


3. A copy of this letter has been forwarded to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department.

I have, etc.,

(Sd.) R. H. Peirse,

Rear-Admiral, Naval
Commander-in-Chief.

His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General,
and Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.





⑦ ⑧

Put away with 3348/12

Minute Paper. Register No. 2113 Secret Department.

INDIA, FOREIGN SECRETARY'S
No. 20M, dated
14 MAY 1914

Dated . 1914.
Rec. 30 May.

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	<u>4 June</u>	<u>AA</u>	<p><u>Arms Traffic</u></p> <p><i>As to record of Koweit shows Attitude of the Sheikh</i></p>
Secretary of State.....	<u>4</u>	<u>LP</u>	
Committee.....	<u>5</u>	<u>E</u>	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			


Copy to FC. and Army. 2 June.
D.M. (P.W.)

FOR INFORMATION.

seen Col. Comtee.,
9 JUN 1914

Previous Papers:—
2660/12

15294. 1. 864. 2000.—6/1913. [1436/12.]



2113
1914



2

No. C-14, dated the 15th April 1914.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL W. G. GREY, I.A., Political Agent, Kuwait,

To—MAJOR S. G. KNOX, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

I have the honour to reply to your endorsement No. 1023, dated the 7th instant. It is presumed that the point upon which my views are invited is whether the time has or has not arrived to resume the systematic search of Kuwait dhows which may be suspected of carrying contraband arms and ammunition.

2. I would first observe that no case for such resumption appears to have been established either from the events reported in the papers sent with your endorsement or from the contents of the Intelligence Officer's diaries to which reference is made by His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief. The names of the Bum and the Nakhuda are not given by the Intelligence Officer, and the most that could be proved against the Nakhuda appears to be that he attempted to sell two rifles from among those that he is permitted to carry for the protection of his vessel and her crew, which, although an offence and one which would doubtless be punishable by the Shaikh were the case brought before him, scarcely amounts to a definite instance of smuggling arms or a contravention of Sir Mubarak's undertakings with His Majesty's Government. In regard to the dhow detained by H. M. S. "Dartmouth", the circumstances in which she was considered to have been suspicious are not fully stated, and they were apparently not sufficiently convincing to enable the Senior Naval Officer to authorise a systematic search on that occasion.

3. H. M. S. "Fox" called at this port on 29th ultimo, and I discussed the Intelligence Officer's reports with the Senior Naval Officer. He informed me that he had no further information in this connection either from the Intelligence Officer or from any other source, and we agreed that it would be sufficient to bring to the notice of the Shaikh that there was reason to suspect that Kuwait dhows were still concerned in this illicit traffic. I did so, and His Excellency assured me that he had given most stringent orders that nothing more of this kind was to be attempted by his subjects. He suggested that in cases of suspicion, which must of necessity now be of rare occurrence, the Captain of His Majesty's ship should either place some person on board the dhow to remain there until she arrives in Kuwait as had formerly been proposed, or that the Captain should inform the Political Agent, Kuwait, at once so that the dhow might be watched for and inspected immediately on arrival by one of the Shaikh's trusted officials accompanied by a representative of this office. His Excellency went on to say that whatever might have been the case formerly he wished us to understand clearly that he was now working hand in hand with His Majesty's Government in everything and hoped that we would take him at his word.

4. Referring to Sir Percy Cox's telegram to His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief, No. 149, dated 7th June 1912, it may be remarked that the majority of the reasons given by him for considering that the alienation of the Shaikh and his community would be particularly undesirable still hold good, and they are strengthened by the addition of our proposed water scheme and the approaching ratification of the Anglo-Turkish agreement in regard to Kuwait. It would obviously be deplorable should the reintroduction of the measure which of all others would tend to produce such alienation synchronise with the event last named.

5. At the same time I do not mean to suggest that any relaxation of vigilance on my part or on that of any one else concerned is to be recommended. I am making continual enquiries in regard to the import and export of arms and ammunition but so far am convinced that with the possible exception of the export of two or three rifles and a small amount of ammunition at rare intervals nothing is at present taking place.

6. In all the circumstances I am of opinion that it would be better to make no change at present in the direction under reference.



3

No. 1202, dated Bushire, the 26th April 1914.

From—MAJOR S. G. KNOX, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—His Excellency Rear-Admiral R. H. PEIRSE, C.B., M.V.O., Commander-in-Chief, His Majesty's Ships and Vessels, East Indies, H. M. S. "Swiftsure."


In continuation of the letter No. 960, dated 1st April 1914, which I had the honour to submit to Your Excellency on the subject of the resumption of the systematic search of Kuwait dhows, I have now the honour to forward herewith the copy of a letter No. C-14, dated 15th April 1914, from the Political Agent, Kuwait, to my address in which he deals with the question.

2. I have the honour to state, (1) that I am in general accord with the views expressed in that letter, (2) that I am by no means convinced that arms smuggling into Kuwait by sea is carried on on a scale that can in any way be regarded as extensive (3) that, although it is possible that Kuwait may from its existing stocks feed the small Persian ports to the north of Bushire, any action by sea would merely drive the trade into the creeks on either side of the Shatt-al-'Arab and therefore be ineffective, and lastly that, although we cannot be indifferent to the arming of the Shatt-al-'Arab riverain tribes and the country between the Karun and the Bushire-Shiraz route, no action by sea is likely to prevent this and I think there is small likelihood of such arms being transferred to Afghanistan or the Baluch frontiers which are, after all, the main objects of interest to us.

3. For these reasons, I would deprecate any resumption of the systematic search of Kuwait dhows.

A copy of this letter is being sent to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department.

C27FD-44-9-5-14-GC 3P Simla





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Register No. **911**

Put away with **3348** *12*

Minute Paper. **Secret Department.**

Secy's
Letter from *India, 8 Mar.*

Dated *20 Feb.*
Rec. *8 Mar.* 1913.

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	<i>11 March</i>	<i>AA</i>	<i>Koweit</i> <i>- Shah's objections</i>
Secretary of State.....	<i>12</i>	<i>P.W.H</i>	
Committee	<i>13</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>Shah's objections to rifles stamped</i> <i>with the Muscat mark.</i>
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			


Copy to *Ad. 10 Mar.*
File 26 Mar. out to DMU


FOR INFORMATION.

Seen Pol Com ea.,
127 MAR 1913

Previous Papers:— *5186*
3348
12

13970. 1. 1436. 2000.—10/1912.







petition for the completion of the six thousand. No mention of this (warehouse) mark was made (at that time)* and I only represented to Your Honour my arrangement in regard to the affixing of my brand on the arms, *vis.*, that those which we

* Not quite accurate. He specifically expressed his readiness to wait until after 1st September and obtain through warehouse.

P. Z. Cox.

distribute amongst our subjects, the townspeople, are marked with their brand as well as mine, and that those which are distributed amongst the tribesmen bear only my mark; and Your Honour approved this. We have acted upon this arrangement since we have used these weapons, for they do not go abroad and are kept only amongst our subjects, and we seize those which bear the mark and which we find with any one besides our subjects. We trusted that the quantity which you would be good enough to sanction for us will be dealt with according to this arrangement. As I told you (above) it is necessary for me to bring our requirement to your august notice, and if you see fit to concur and to agree (well and good), otherwise I am obedient to your order and approval under any circumstances whatever.

As regards our requirements for six thousand weapons per annum, we have already addressed Your Honour on the subject, and it is for you to decide. But as regards that which is intended for trade, I will check it in compliance with your orders and will not consent that it should enter my town at all.

Now I submit two courses to Your Honour :—

While those who require arms for their use notice that they are available at Qatar and that they are thence brought by the Al Bu Ainein whose habitat is adjacent to that of our tribesmen (ranging) from my town to their neighbourhood, he who so desires, will bring 4-5 (weapons) for himself and for his children and relatives; and they will likewise bring for anyone who orders them. If I check them and seize those (weapons) from them, they will contend, saying "we will not bring them; but you should bring for us." I do not wish however, that such articles should enter our town and its environs except with your approval and under your supervision. This is one course, and the second one is this :—

Out of the 2,281 weapons which we had already received 857 bore the mark while the rest were unmarked. Those bearing no marks were distributed amongst the subjects, but they are not sufficient for their number. Those bearing mark have been kept by us in the Customs since their arrival as our subjects do not agree to use them. If you order us to do so, we will return them to Maskat to be sold; or possibly our brother Shaikh Khazal will, owing to his need for arms, accept them at their price and pay their expense if you permit us to do this.

We advised our dependent and your servant, Haji Najaf, to leave Maskat for our side, but a letter was received from him by this mail, stating that with the permission of our friend, Major Knox, he has contracted for twenty-four lakhs and twenty-five thousand cartridges and paid one thousand and five hundred pounds out of the value and that it is necessary for him to remain there for the purpose of making references to the manufacturer and paying the balance of the value. Now it rests with you to order as to whether your said servant should stay there or not.

This is what had to be said and we trust that your sincere regards will continue. May you continue to be preserved.

No. 53, dated Bushire, the 1st February 1913.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SIR PERCY COX, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—HIS EXCELLENCY SHAIKH SIR MUBARAK BIN SUBAH, K.C.I.E., Ruler of Kuwait.

After compliments,

Your esteemed letter of 14th Safar (=22nd January) has duly reached me. Just before receiving it I had despatched to you my letter No. 41 of 29th January explaining the views of Government and their difficulty in complying with your request.




3

The point is that the marking of the arms is not for any special purpose connected with your honoured self or your dependents but is an item of the general rules in force at Maskat, and to waive the rule for you, would be to give rise to numerous applications from other importers of arms ; it is for this reason that Government find it impossible that His Highness the Sultan should make any exception.

I trust that in view of what they explain, you will now see your way to relinquish your objection to the rifles being marked.

As regards Katar and Kasar-es-Subaih, Government are not unmindful of the circumstances, but we are doing what we can in the matter and there seems reason to hope that these sources of illicit supply will soon cease.

C85FD-44-15-2-13-GCBP Simla.





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705/13

(13) ①

Extract from Enclosures in Secretary's Letter
from India, No. 6 M, 6 February 1913.


Copy to P.O. +
Army, 24 Feb/13.

Telegram P, No. 49 C., 23 Jan/13.

From the Secy. to the Govt. of India, Mr. Dept.,
to the Pol. Resident in the Persian Gulf.

(518²/13)

Koweit arms. Govt. of India agree to
the reply suggested in para: 3 of your letter
No. 14, d/- 4th instant. You might explain
that an awkward precedent would be created
by any relaxation of warehouse rules, and
this the Govt. of India cannot countenance.
As proposed in para: 4 of your letter cited
above, the Sheikh's request for annual
permit should be ignored.





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Register No. **5186**

Minute Paper. **Secret Department.**

Scap's Letter from India, 4 m. Dated 23 Jan. } 1913.
Rec. 8 Feb. }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	13 Feb.	J.S.S.	<u>Koweit</u>
Secretary of State.....	14	J.W.H.	Correspondence with the Sheikh of Koweit.
Committee.....	16	E.	Sheikh's objection to the rifles, which he
Under Secretary.....			has received permission to import, being
Secretary of State.....			stamped with the Maskat warehouse
			mark.


Copy to 20 } 10 Feb.
Adm. }
P.M.O. (sent)

FOR INFORMATION.

Seen Pol Com'ee
25 FEB. 1913

Previous Papers:— 4607
3854 / 12
3348

13970. I. 1436. 2000.—10/1912.





518
1913

Enclosure No. 4 Date 23 JAN 1913

75 10/2
4607/2
3894
3268

No. 14, dated Bushire, the 4th (received 15th) January 1913 (*Confidential*).

From—LIEUT.-COL. SIR PERCY COX, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—THE HON'BLE LIEUT.-COL. SIR HENRY McMAHON, G.C.V.O., K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

With reference to the correspondence ending with my letter No. 2895,

Sheikh Mubarak to Resident, dated 7th November 1912.

Resident to Sheikh Mubarak, No. 252, dated 15th November 1912.

Sheikh Mubarak to Resident, dated 12th December 1912.

Resident to Sheikh Mubarak, No. 309, dated 31st December 1912.

dated 3rd November, I have the honour to enclose, for the information of the Government of India, copies of the marginally cited correspondence which has since passed between Sheikh Mubarak and myself, with regard to his desire that the rifles which he has received permission to

import from Maskat should be granted immunity from the warehouse mark.

2. It will be seen that the Sheikh returns to the attack pertinaciously.

The ostensible reason which he now gives for pressing his request is that, as new patterns of rifles appear, his dependents like to get rid of their old ones, but this is one which can only weigh with us as an additional ground for marking all weapons. Captain Shakespear thinks the real reason is that Sheikh Mubarak cannot, as may be expected, guarantee that no weapon will ever go astray, however good his intentions may be, and fears that should this happen he would be held personally responsible and have his personal good faith placed under suspicion.

3. It might be possible to humour him and still serve our own purpose by agreeing to his purchasing direct from England from an approved firm and by our then arranging with the firm in question for the stamping of the weapons with a secret mark which would be known to us but not apparent to the uninitiated; but I think Sheikh Mubarak will in all probability bow to a reply from Government to the effect that they cannot regard his dependent's objections as valid and that as the permit for import was given on the definite understanding that the arms would be supplied bearing the Maskat warehouse mark, they cannot see their way to agree to any other arrangement, and I recommend that such an answer be given.

4. As to his further request for an annual permit for 6,000 weapons, in my opinion it would be greatly in excess of his legitimate requirements, and the existence of a demand for so many annually would seem to presuppose the existence of a habit for their irregular disposal; but in reply to his present letter I would be inclined either to ignore this request, or reply that his requirements would be considered as they arose. I venture to request the favour of a telegraphic reply.

Translation of a letter dated 26th Zilqaadeh 1330 (= 7th November 1912), from Sheikh Sir Mubarak es Subah, K.C.I.E., Ruler of Koweit, to Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Percy Cox, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

After Compliments.—I represented to your honour before this as regards the arms sanctioned for us by the exalted Government owing to our pressing need for them, viz., firstly two thousand five hundred, and then three thousand five hundred, to complete six thousand, according to our request. When Your Honour visited our port in the month of Rajab 1330 (= June-July), I represented to you that I used to put my mark on the weapons since former times; that those which I distributed amongst my subjects, the townspeople, are also marked with their brand along with mine; that those I distributed amongst my subjects, the tribesmen, only bear my mark and that the object in affixing the marks of my subjects, the townspeople, is that I take the weapons from them when need arises and return the same to them when there is no need and any one can distinguish his weapon by his mark because the rifles are all of one pattern. When the consignment of 440 arrived and bore the warehouse inscription, my subjects, the towns-

RECEIVED
8 FEB 1913
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT



people, did not agree to take them over unless they (the rifles) should agree with the previous arrangement and custom, and I represented this to Your Honour and received a good answer. I wished to satisfy them, but they declined and did not agree. I found them frightened by this inscription which was (affixed) on the rifles and they had an argument. I represented their argument to our friend Captain Shakespear and noticed that they (my subjects) were in the right.

What is deemed by me, your sincere friend (to be fit), is that facility should be afforded to them in this their trivial requirement and that you may order that the inscription should be dispensed with. Otherwise, I approve all what you see and order (to be fit) because your commands are all good and advisable, and we have found them to be so.

This is what was necessary and it is hoped that your kind attention will endure and that you will remain preserved and guarded.

No. 252, dated Bushire, the 15th November 1912.

From—LIEUT.-COL. SIR PERCY COX, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—HIS EXCELLENCY SHEIKH SIR MUBARAK ES SUBAH, K.C.I.E., Ruler of Koweit.

After Compliments.—I have received your esteemed letter of 26th Zilkhadah (=7th November 1912), in which you further explain the dislike of your subjects to having the Maskat warehouse mark on the rifles imported by Your Excellency for them.

I am still unable to see any sense or sound motive in their objections and it seems to me that if they continue to object after receiving from you, their Ruler, the explanations which you received from me and which satisfied you, it is evident that they are not in serious need of the arms.

I assure you, my honoured friend, that it is quite impossible for any exception to be made in respect of arms now exported with our concurrence from Maskat, and if your subjects are unable to appreciate the importance of the matter and to accept weapons with the Maskat mark, I can only suggest that you should tell them that they can do without them.

This is what had to be explained.

Translation of a letter dated 2nd Moharrum 1330 (=12th December 1912, from Sheikh Sir Mubarak es Subah, K.C.I.E., Chief of Koweit, to Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Percy Cox, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I had the honour to receive your esteemed letter dated the 5th Zilhijjah 1330=15th November 1912, and what Your Honour had remarked was duly understood by me. I, your sincere friend, am grateful to you for your generosity, and it is necessary for me to adopt two courses, firstly, to obey your orders and (secondly) to obtain your approval.

I beg also to represent to Your Honour that when arms used to arrive at our ports in former times, the Customs duty (thereon) amounted to at least one hundred and fifty to one hundred and sixty thousand dollars per annum. When you ordered their prohibition in accordance with the wishes of the exalted Government, I effected the prohibition with gratitude in compliance with your orders and as your approval is a useful acquisition to me in the present and the future. You have benefited Koweit and its inhabitants by your attentions, may God benefit you. And Koweit has to-day been expanded, its population has increased, the wealth of its people has enhanced and its commerce and the enterprise of its inhabitants have been extended. As Your Honour knows, they (the inhabitants) are devoid of agriculture and industry and one class of them is engaged in diving business while another class is occupied in making voyages to India in steamers calling (at Koweit) at fixed times as well as in other steamers. Merchandise arrives in at least one or two steamers every month in addition to the steamers coming in fixed times, and their vessels also bring miscellaneous goods which they use in trade. They take their commodities to Najd from el Qasim to the last point in Najd on the south, and also to the tribesmen under the care of their brothers, their sons and their agents, who send caravans taking considerable quantities of merchandise and



being accompanied by armed men for the protection of their goods, because, as Your Honour is aware, the land route is not safe; and in addition to those sent by the merchants, I also send a force of at least one hundred men mounted on camels and accompanied by trustworthy persons on my behalf for the purpose of strengthening them, protecting their trade and affording them security, because their protection, their care and their welfare cause me delight. The diving vessels are also increasing every year and all my subjects are in the utmost need of weapons. Of this pattern, which we solicited the exalted Government to sanction, *viz.*, the 6,000, I will take only 600, and 2,600 will be distributed amongst my subjects, the townspeople, whilst the rest will be supplied to the tribesmen.

As to those who are now hesitating to take over the rifles bearing the inscription and about whom you have remarked that you do not find any proper meaning or motive in their hesitation to accept the inscription, I will (now) explain their motive to Your Honour. They only disagree to any objection or suspicion against them, for they are men who behave honestly. They have stated to me and to our friend Captain Shakespear accordingly.

Since firearms came into use we have changed three patterns thereof, and whenever a new pattern was introduced, we used to buy it—when arms were free—using the new one and selling the old ones to our townspeople and tribesmen. Now, several patterns of arms have come into use, one of them being the one firing five shots like the revolver. A few of this have now made their appearance and we have, according to their desire, imported a few thereof, which are included in the number permitted. They wish to obtain from this pattern if it is obtainable.

As regards the arms bearing the inscription, the number we have now received is 857, and they are remaining with me in the Customs and they (the inhabitants) hesitate to take them over. The other we distributed amongst our tribesmen. This is their motive and we have represented it to Your Honour. All are now under your order and if you see fit, in your august opinion, which is the highest, you may grant them 2,600 (rifles) without marks and those which have already been received and which bear marks should remain for me for the sole use of my soldiers. If you do not see any course that there should be no mark on the weapons issued from the warehouse at Maskat, and if you permit me to do so, I will be able to order them from London direct through my friends, so that they may come either direct to our town or we will arrange for them to come up to the Buoy (on the Shatt-al Arab Bar) and there be discharged into vessels. If Your Honour does not conceive this (to be practicable) we will not go beyond your control and order.

We have represented to Your Honour our requirements for arms and in addition to this, we also solicit an annual grant from the good graces of the Government, because, as Your Honour knows, the increase in the population of Koweit, the number of boys leaving schools, the enhanced number of the diving vessels and their extended trade, require number of 6,000 rifles per annum.

Now, your servant and my dependent, Haji Najaf, is at Maskat and has withheld purchase owing to the inscription. If Your Honour's high opinion conceives a course to complete the six thousands without inscription (well and good), otherwise we will advise your servant, Haji Najaf, to hasten to our side, as his detention at Maskat will cause excessive expenses.

This is what was necessary to be stated to Your Honour and we beg to hope that your attentions will endure and you will accept my regards and that you will continue to remain preserved and guarded.

No. 309, dated 31st December 1912.

From—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—SHEIKH SIR MUBARAK BIN SUBAH, K. C. I. E., Ruler of Koweit.

After Compliments.—Your esteemed letter of 2nd Muharrum duly reached me and I have understood all that you wrote.

I had hoped that my previous letter would have made it clear to you how it was really impossible for us to arrange for any relaxation, in favour of your



consignment of arms, of the universal regulations made by the Sultan of Maskat under our advice which require the warehousing and marking of all arms on arrival. At any rate I assure Your Honour that it is beyond my power to accede to your request for permission for the despatch of 2,600 rifles from Maskat without marking.

Indeed the British Government have been the more obliged for your co-operation in suppressing the illegal arms traffic, in that they have realized that your action involved some loss of revenue to yourself, and as you know they are always desirous of giving their earnest consideration to your reasonable views and requirements; and I am as in duty bound submitting to them your request to be allowed to receive arms from Maskat without marking, but I cannot help thinking that they will find the request a very difficult one to comply with. I am also mentioning your desire as an alternative to import direct from London.

It is not hidden from you that the concurrence of Government in your importation of as many as 6,000 rifles with ammunition was only accorded on the specific understanding that they were intended solely for the use of your own tribesmen and dependents, and so long as the arms remain in their possession according to the intention, I cannot see what valid objection your subjects can have to the arms bearing a mark from which they can be identified.

As it is not within my power to comply with your request without first referring to higher authority, and if your subjects will not accept the arms otherwise than with marks, then I think for the present it is of no use for Haji Nejef to remain longer at Maskat. I will let you know directly I receive a reply from Government.

May you be preserved and salaam.

(Copy to 70
Friday 2 Dec
Copy sent to Dave)

87

Telegram P., No. 103, dated the 8th November 1912.


From—His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief, Jask.

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Marine Department (repeated to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf).

I request permission to destroy the ammunition and arms referred to in telegram* No. 953, dated the 12th September 1912, from the Political Resident, Persian Gulf, regarding the capture of arms near Shargah.

* Serial No. 312, Part XI.

P. J. O.



48

90

No. 2895, dated Bushire, the 3rd (received 11th) November 1912 (Confidential).

From—The LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SIR PERCY COX, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

Recent arms traffic reports from Maskat have stated that, according to local information, Shaikh Mubarak was greatly annoyed at his weapons being stamped with the Warehouse mark in Maskat.

When the first instalment of 400 odd rifles arrived at Kuwait from Maskat a short time ago, duly marked, Shaikh Mubarak who was just leaving for Mohammerah demurred at this measure to Captain Shakespear, who endeavoured to explain the position to him; he (the Shaikh) then addressed me from Mohammerah. I have the honour to forward copies of the letters exchanged with him for the information of Government.

Shaikh Mubarak to Resident, dated the 4th October 1912.
Resident to Shaikh Mubarak, No. 221, dated the 16th October 1912.
Shaikh Mubarak to Resident, dated the 26th October 1912.

I am sending copies also to His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief and the Political Agents concerned.

Dated the 22nd Shawal 1330 (4th October 1912.)

From—HIS EXCELLENCY SHAIKH SIR MUBARAK-ES-SUBAH, K.C.I.E., Ruler of Kuwait,


To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

After compliments and enquiries after your health.

My friend, Captain Shakespear, has conveyed to us Government's kindness in giving permission for the satisfaction of our requirements, *viz.*, six thousand rifles with the cartridges accompanying the same as well as ten lacs extra cartridges for our old weapons. I reiterated my thanks, as I am always grateful for your regards and favour. Only my friend, I find that the question of sealing the rifles will tend to suspicion. I, your sincere friend, have verbally represented to Your Honour on several occasions that I will affix my own brand on the iron part of all the weapons remaining with us; and I trust that my brand will suffice. As is proved to Your Honour, my dealings with you shall, God willing, be based on truth and pure friendliness, and I will consent to nothing which may involve suspicion and differ from your approval. I beg of you to order the cancellation of the sealing in the case of those (weapons) which will have to be received by us.

As is understood by Your Honour, I do not oppose what may be deemed fit in your august opinion. God willing I shall see your kindness enhancing daily towards me, your sincere friend and dependent. I have, on this occasion, advised our dependent, Haji Najaf, to satisfy our requirements for rifles and cartridges in accordance with the permission and send them over by the mail steamers under the supervision of our friend Major Knox.

This is what had to be stated and I trust that your generous attention (towards us) will endure. May you remain preserved.



49

No. 221, dated the 15th October 1912.

From—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,

To—His EXCELLENCY SHAIKH SIR MUBARAK-BIN-SUBAH, K.C.I.E., Ruler of Kuwait

I duly received your esteemed letter of 4th October 1912 (=22nd Shawal) acknowledging the intimation of the concurrence of the British Government in your importing 6,000 rifles and 400 rounds per rifle including the 2,500 rifles and 6 lakhs of ammunition for which their concurrence was obtained at the beginning of the year.

In giving this decision Government desired me to inform Your Excellency of their approval of the general correctness of your attitude in matters connected with the Arms Traffic: but to explain to you that in view of the largeness of the present indent it would not be possible for them to consider a further one in the near future; and that the present permit is given on that clear understanding.

Now as regards the stamping of the arms at Maskat, I hope Captain Shakespear's explanations to you have made matters clear.

Rest assured that there is no question of suspicion involved; it is merely a matter of public rules applicable to every one who buys a rifle from Maskat. If I want to buy a rifle from Maskat it must bear the mark and number of the Maskat godown. Clearly the rules at Maskat would be useless if exceptions were made. All such weapons have several marks on them and there is nothing derogatory in their having one more, which is not special but public. So you must free your mind altogether from the idea that this marking at Maskat is intended or considered to be derogatory to any one or originates from suspicion.

As I am not sure where you are, I am sending one copy of this to Kuwait and one to Mohammerah, and if you are with our friend Shaikh Khazal please give him my best compliments.

I hope this will find you both in the best of health.



Dated the 9th Zilkadah 1330 (=20th October 1912.)

From—His EXCELLENCY SHAIKH SIR MUBARAK-BIN-SUBAH, K.C.I.E., Ruler of Kuwait,

To—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SIR PERCY COX, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I had the honour to receive your esteemed letter, dated the 3rd Zilkadah (=15th October 1912). Your Honour had stated that the inscription on the rifles are (affixed) in accordance with your obligatory command and that the object thereof is to show that they are issued from the warehouse and involves no doubt or suspicion. I, your friend and dependent, am firstly obedient to your orders and desires in all circumstances. I only stated this on receipt of the 440 (rifles) that my application was for six thousand, so that I may distribute them amongst the inhabitants and my subjects and tribesmen. I wished to expedite distributing them amongst the inhabitants and to complete their allotments from the first consignments on which no inscription had been affixed. They (the people) disliked the inscription and I satisfied them that the inscription meant no suspicion. They argued, however, saying "the arrangement was that thine mark and our mark should be affixed", and any one who took them used to affix his mark and mine thereon. They asked me therefore to refer to Your Honour, and I agreed to do so with a view to affording them satisfaction. Otherwise I have no doubt that all the orders you issue are calculated (to promote) our interests.

Your letter reached me when I was with the brother Shaikh Khazal and I showed him your greetings. He sends you his best compliments and regards.





911

Register No. **3348**

Secret Department.

Letter from **F.O.** Dated **26 August 1912.**
Rec. **27**

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	26 Aug.	Ata	<u>Koweit</u>
Secretary of State.....			
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....	4 Sep	WZ	Issue of Shell to transport certain arms & ammunition.
Secretary of State.....			F.O. approve

Copy to Adm (of telegram F.O. to) 10 Sept. 1912.
F.O. 3 Sept. 1912.

India (F.O. to) **6 SEP 1912**
SECRETARY'S NO 35

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.



Off. telegram to F. of I. accordingly.


29 August - Telegram to Viceroy

Seen by Col. G. H. G. 4 SEP 1912

Previous Papers:—
2937

11859. I. 1993. 1000.—10/1911. [I. 1992.]





DRAFT TELEGRAM.

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO



VICEROY, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.


(Retamilla)

Despatched 29 August 1912.
(Copy to Pt) 2m.

Foreign secret. Your telegram 27 July.
Arms for Koweit. Your proposals are
approved. In view of recent incidents
you are authorised to unless you see
any objection - to tell Sheikh Abd. H.M. G.
Appreciate general correctness of his
attitude towards arms traffic.

PP






In any further communication
on this subject, please quote

No. 35019/12.

and address—
The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.



FOREIGN OFFICE

August 26th, 1912.

Sir:-

I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 16th. instant (P.2937) relative to the wish of the Sheikh of Koweit to import Six thousand rifles and Four hundred rounds of ammunition per rifle and to state, in reply, that he concurs in the proposal of the Marquess of Crewe to approve the transaction, after the 1st. proximo on the conditions mentioned.

Sir E. Grey further concurs in the suggested instructions to the Government of India relative to the conveyance to the Sheikh of an appreciative message

I am,

Sir,


Your most obedient,



humble Servant,

Ami Mallett



The Under Secretary of State,
India Office.







Mr. W. Graham ³⁰¹⁹ to Sir J. Clarke (Received thro' Sir J. Holden) (74) (22)

*See copy in
miscellaneous papers
encl. under*

Achray,

Callander N.B.

31st July 1912.

Reverting to my letter to you of the 27th, concerning the smuggling of Rifles concealed in Sugar cases, I am now in a position to give you the details of the whole transaction, which I trust will be of interest, and which may enable Government to take such steps as they consider best to safeguard ^{against} any future cases of a similar character.

I will first deal briefly with the transaction up to the time of shipment.

Mr. Louis Dieu - commercial representative - 4 rue Trévise, Paris - bought the sugar from Messrs. Ch. Zuaz, Brussels - who themselves bought it from Messrs. Gevers Bros. Antwerp.

Messrs. Gevers Bros received instructions from Messrs. Ch. Zuaz (who were acting on orders received from M. Dieu) to forward 10 cases of each lot of sugar (25 c) to a certain Mr. Louis de Brus (128 rue Hors Chateau-Liege-Belgium)- and to forward the balance of each lot (15 c) - to Messrs. Reynardt & Co. (Antwerp) forwarding and shipping agents.


This was accordingly done.

In due course, Messrs. Reynardts received the cases from Mr. Louis de Brus under the denomination "sugar". Mr. Louis de Brus (who, as it subsequently transpired is a gunsmith) acting on orders received from Mr. Dieu, packed the Rifles in the Sugar cases.

The rifles were purchased from Messrs. Ludwig Loewe (Spandau) and were forwarded by them to Mr. Louis de Brus.

The cases, on being returned, were found to weigh

600





600 kilos, as against 689 kilos, when they were sent.
Mr. Louis de Brus in his forwarding note acknowledged the difference in weight.

Messrs. Ch. Zuaz were informed of this, and they, no doubt, acquainted Mr. Dieu, as Principal, of the existence of such a difference,

Mr. Dieu then instructed Messrs. Ch. Zuaz (Brussels) to inform the forwarding agents at Antwerp - Messrs. Reynardts & Co, that shipments were to go forward for Koweit.

The first shipment of 25 ¢ per s.s. "C.Fred.Lacisz" on behalf of Messrs. Bertie Richmond & Co. Ltd. and the second shipment of 25 ¢ per s.s. "Moltkefels" on behalf of Messrs. Lewis Crampton & Co.


Messrs. Reynardts being informed of this, tendered the goods to the "Hansa" Line for shipment, and the goods went forward in the usual course - the "Hansa" Line representatives at port of shipment (Antwerp) filling in the names in the shipping Documents, as customary.

This is briefly the history of the transaction up to the time of shipment, and I have put the facts before you to show what an extremely complicated affair it has been, and how Mr. Dieu has endeavoured to cover his tracks by working through various sources.

The facts connected with the detection and confiscation of the Rifles you are already acquainted.

I will, therefore, merely deal briefly with the legal measures taken against the shippers.

The discovery of the Rifles in the shipment per the "Hansa" line "Moltkefels" was made on or about the 7th August last year. A wire was at once sent to
Bremen





Bremen informing the "Hansa" of this.

I wrote also by the outgoing mail to the Managing Director of the "Hansa" line, acquainting him with the full particulars, and at the same time forwarding an official document relating to the confiscation of the Rifles - signed by Mr. Gubbay (as Collector of Customs) and attested by the Belgian Consul.

The "Hansa" line acted promptly on the receipt of the telegram, as the attached letter, forwarded for information will show.


Messrs. Reynardts & Co. being unable at first to give satisfactory information (as they themselves were quite unaware of the circuitous manner in which the shipment had been effected) steps were taken, on receipt of the document mentioned above, to lodge information with the Procureur du Roi at Antwerp. This was done on August 23rd, when it was finally requested that measures should be taken under the Belgian Penal Law (11th January 1907 - 3rd Chamber - Antwerp Court) to deal with the culprits.

A close enquiry was instituted to investigate the facts, which eventually led to the discovery that Mr. L. Dieu, of Paris, was the shipper.

Mr. Maeterlinck (Avocat - rue des Domini Caines 1, Antwerp) the Legal Adviser of the "Hansa" Line, writing on the 5th of June 1912, to the "Hansa" Line:-

"It has been found that Reynardt and Charles Zuaz had no responsibility whatever in the matter. Concerning Mr. de Brus, no stipulation of our Criminal Law forbids putting rifles in sugar cases.

"The only person, who might have been held responsible was Mr. Dieu. However, Mr. Dieu being domiciled in





25 72
"in Paris, and having given orders from Paris, Belgian
"justice cannot touch him.

"Messrs. Reynardt & Co. acting at Mr. Dieu's request
"offered to pay all the costs incurred on account of
"the smuggling of the Rifles, consequently Belgian
"Justice dropped the criminal prosecution, no
"Jurisdiction against Mr. Dieu existing here."

The "Hansa" line representatives at Antwerp, writing
on the 9th July 1912, state -

"The suppliers of the sugar here in Antwerp, Messrs
"Gevers Brothers" are very honest people and had,
"of course, nothing to do with the smuggling.

"As to the firms of Bertie Richmond & Co, Ltd. and
"Lewis Crampton & Co. we could not obtain any inform-
"ation on this side, the only man being able to give
"same being Mr. Dieu, in Paris, who of course would
"not give any. The forwarding agents, Messrs.


"Reynardts & Co, however, suppose that the said Firms
"do not exist in reality, and are only bogus names.
"Messrs. Reynardts also share your and our opinion
"that the only guilty party in this whole matter is
"the firm - L. Dieu in Paris - whom, unfortunately,
"Belgian law cannot touch."

From enquiries which I have instituted on this
side, I have not been able to find any trace of either
Bertie Richmond & Co, or Lewis Crampton & Co. I am,
therefore, of the opinion that these names were merely
used as a blind.

You will notice from the correspondence quoted,
that Mr. Dieu has paid all charges incurred.

He could have evaded this, as there was no juris-
diction against him, but I understand he did so, in
order to hush the matter up.

The







26


The profit to be made in smuggling Rifles is so large, and the risk of getting into serious trouble (provided it is worked in a round-about way) is so small that transactions of this kind must form sufficient inducement to men like Mr. Dieu to try other means to gain their wicked ends.

It is to safeguard Government, as far as possible, against a recurrence of similar frauds and at the same time to enable Liners to bring the pressure of the Law to bear against fraudulent shippers, that I have now put forward the proposal that Liners should obtain a signed Declaration for all shipments for India to the effect that the packages shipped do not contain either arms or ammunition.

I placed this officially before the East India Steam Trade Conference on the 22nd inst. and the matter is now under consideration.









In any further communication on this subject, please quote

No. 31419

and address—

The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents

his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India

and, by direction of the Secretary of

State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,

August 2, 1912.

Reference to previous letter:

India Office, November 6, 1911

Description of Inclosure.


Name and Date.

Subject.

Mr. W. Graham
to Rear Admiral Sir E. J. Stade.


Communicated to Foreign Office,
July 23)

Smuggling of Arms to
Persian Gulf.



(Arms Tr. Permit, July 24, Sec. 2)

[12]





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ARMS TRAFFIC.

[July 24.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 2.

[31419]

No. 1.

Papers communicated to Foreign Office by Sir E. Slade.—(Received July 24.)

(1.)

Dear Sir Edmond,

Achray, Callander, N.B., July 20, 1912.

I HAVE been intending to write to you for some time past to inform you of the further developments which have taken place in following up the cases of rifle smuggling, which were detected last July and August.

I write to enclose herewith a copy of my letter to the governor, who asked me before leaving Bombay to inform him of any further information that came to light, and I feel sure the contents will interest you, showing as they do, what lengths people will go to in the pursuit of illicit trade.

I attach also, for your information, a form of declaration of contents of cargo, which the Hansa line adopted, on my suggestion, and which I put forward with the view of preventing further shipments of a similar nature going forward.

It has been rather a long job running the thing to ground, but the various steps have been quite interesting. We found that Messrs. Reynardts were a thoroughly respectable, *bond fide*, firm of forwarding agents, who had nothing whatever to do with the fraud. Consequently, steps were taken to ascertain the legal position in dealing with the British firms whose names (Bertie Richmond and Co., and Lewis Crampton and Co.) appeared as shippers on the bills of lading.

The Hansa line were advised that it would hardly be possible to convict British shippers in London for an offence apparently committed in Antwerp.

This brought the matter for the time being to a standstill.

I then suggested that steps should be taken to ascertain from Messrs. Reynardts from whom they received the goods, who the packers of the goods were, and who gave them instructions concerning the actual shipment of the goods.

From the information received, and the correspondence I examined at Bremen, when I was there towards the end of last month, I am satisfied that Reynardts acted in a thoroughly *bond fide* manner.

But, of course, we did not know this in the first instance, and it was only step by step that we were able to unravel the whole tangle, purposely complicated by the Paris firm of Dieu and Co. (a good name!), who remained in the back ground.


Having been up the Persian Gulf with the fleet under your command, in connection with the reorganisation of the coal bases, having been at Debal, and having been entrusted with your personal confidence, I naturally felt the keenest interest possible to see that this matter was followed up, so as to endeavour to check or prevent any further shipments of a similar character coming forward.

I am glad that we have been able to get at the bottom of the whole affair. The only points that now require clearing up are the connection the two London firms Bertie Richmond and Co. and Lewis Crampton and Co. had in this affair. This is being now closely investigated, and I hope to have information on this point very shortly.

The Hansa line are now exercising the strictest supervision at Antwerp with regard to all goods for the Gulf, and any doubtful cases are being examined before shipment (this is for your private information), so I think that for the time being, one may take it for granted that any further steps to smuggle rifles, disguised in merchandise will be diverted from shipments by the Hansa line to either the Indian Lloyd (a new Belgian line, who have no such restrictions), or to shipments by British lines.

I would, therefore, suggest that all shipments by the Indian Lloyd should be carefully watched in Bombay by the customs, especially case goods.

Of course, there is such a handsome profit on any shipment that goes through, [2561 aa—2]





that Messrs. Dieu and others of their calibre may still try the same game again, working it in some other way.

It is to safeguard Government against this, that I am now working out an idea, which I mentioned to the governor, of obtaining a declaration of shipment from all shippers to India certifying that the goods shipped do not contain arms or ammunition.

No respectable firm will hesitate to give such an undertaking. It is only the fraudulent firms who will be affected.

I quite admit, of course, that even if such declarations are obtained, it will not entirely prevent fraudulent shippers from pursuing illegal trade, but it will, I hope, be a decisive check so far, that if detected, they will be liable for criminal as well as civil prosecution, and shippers like L. Dieu and Co., of Paris, will not be able to shield themselves in the same round-the-corner way that they have done in this transaction.

I have been busy since I have been at home, personally interviewing the chairman and managing directors of the big lines trading with India, and have now got through all the spade work.

I am writing officially within the next few days to the Bombay liners conference putting the suggestion before them, and I think they will adopt the proposal, which will be a safeguard, not only to Government, but also to themselves.

Hoping that this will find you and Lady Slade in good health.

With kindest regards, &c.

W. GRAHAM.

(2.)

Before leaving Bombay you told me that you would be interested to hear of any further developments concerning the shipment of rifles (concealed in sugar) which was detected last August.

As you will no doubt remember two lots were seized—the first by His Majesty's ship "Fox," near Koweit, ex British India steamer "Palamcottah," transhipped from the steam-ship "C. F. Lacisz" (carrying Hansa line cargo), and the second by the customs authorities in Bombay, ex steam-ship "Molktefels" (Hansa line).

The goods were forwarded by Messrs. Reynardts and Co., of Antwerp, the shippers, according to the bill of lading, being, in the first case Messrs. Bertie Richmond and Co., and in the second Messrs. Lewis Crampton and Co., both apparently British firms.

In order to enable the Hansa line to prosecute Messrs. Reynardts and their principals for false declaration of cargo, I forwarded to them at Bremen, a certificate signed by the collector of customs, and attested by the Belgian consul in Bombay.

The Hansa line on receipt of this, instituted legal proceedings at Antwerp against Messrs. Reynardts, the forwarding agents, but were unable to obtain redress from them, as apparently Messrs. Reynardts had acted in a *bona fide* manner, and had merely forwarded the goods on instructions received.

Nor were the Hansa line able to obtain redress from either of the British firms, since it was not possible to convict them in London of an offence committed in Antwerp.

The Hansa line then instituted further enquiries at Antwerp.

From these it was ascertained that Messrs. Reynardts had received instructions from a Paris firm, Messrs. L. Dieu and Co., to receive certain sugar cases (25 cases in each lot) for shipment.

Of these they were instructed to send 10 cases of each shipment to a Mr. Louis Debru in Luttich (Belgium), for repacking.

This they did.

They noticed on return that the cases weighed 600 kilos., as against 689 kilos., but beyond this difference in weight, they did not notice any difference in the cases.

They consequently shipped them, advising Messrs. L. Dieu of Paris of the difference in weight.

It has subsequently transpired, on further enquiries, that Messrs. L. Dieu of Paris ordered 100 Mauser rifles (1911 pattern) from Messrs. Ludwig Loewe of Spandau, which were forwarded to Mr. Louis Debru at Luttich.

These were packed five in each case of sugar, and returned by Mr. L. Debru to Messrs. Reynardts in Antwerp for shipment.



The whole transaction has purposely been most complicated, and the Paris firm, Messrs. L. Dieu, have covered their tracks in such a way as to make legal conviction most difficult.

I have just returned from Bremen, where I went through all the correspondence connected with the fraud.

I cannot make out how Messrs. Bertie Richmond and Co. or Messrs. Lewis Crampton have come to be implicated in this matter, and I have asked the Hansa line to make further enquiries, which they are doing.

The Hansa line have been most assiduous in prosecuting these enquiries and I trust, sir, that Government will be fully satisfied that the affair had nothing whatever to do with the Hansa line.

Declaration of Persian Gulf Cargo by Shippers.

In order to prevent, or at any rate check any further frauds of this character the Hansa line, on my suggestion, have adopted the attached form of declaration which I forward for information.

I may mention also that the Hansa line have instituted a very strict supervision at Antwerp for all Persian Gulf cargo going forward per Hansa steamers.

Regarding my suggestion for the larger question of obtaining a similar declaration for all shipments to India.

Since my return home I have interviewed the managing directors of all the important lines trading with India (Peninsular and Oriental, Anchor line, City line, Hall line, British India, Hansa line, and Clan line), and hope to formulate a scheme shortly that will be acceptable.

Of course, sir, I realise that the adoption of such a scheme (viz., a signed declaration that shipments do not contain arms or ammunition) would not entirely prevent fraudulent shippers from running the risk of shipping ammunition concealed in merchandise, but I consider that it will form a wholesome check, as fraudulent shippers will realise that if detected they will be liable to be prosecuted criminally.

5, Bishopsgate, London, June 27, 1912.

(3.)

Cargo to the Persian Gulf.

It has occurred of late somewhat frequently that arms have been shipped under false declaration by our steamers via Bombay to Persia. Such goods have been confiscated and the steamers fined. Besides a suit will be filed against shippers and/or receivers, and as a further consequence all packages will now be examined at Bombay with special care. Under the circumstances we are obliged to ask you for signature of the guarantee below before shipment.


We beg to state further that we shall put the following clause into the bills of lading:—


"Steamer not liable for packages opened for examination by the customs at Bombay."


DEUTSCHE DAMPFSCIFFFAHRTS-GESELLSCHAFT "HANSA."


Bremen, September 13, 1911.

We certify herewith that we have precisely and correctly declared the contents in the bills of lading, and will be responsible for all consequences, fines, &c., which may fall on us and/or the steamer because of wrong or insufficient declaration.











P
3019
1912

I then suggested that steps should be taken to ascertain from Messrs. Reynardts, from whom they received the goods, who the Packers of the goods were, and who gave them instructions concerning the actual shipment of the goods.

From the information received, and the correspondence, I examined at Bremen, when I was there towards the end of last month, I am satisfied that Reynardts acted in a thoroughly bona-fide manner.


But, of course, we did not know this in the first instance, and it was only step by step that we were able to unravel the whole tangle, purposely complicated by the Paris firm of Dieu & Co (a good name!) who remained in the background.

Having been up the Persian Gulf with the Fleet under your Command, in connection with the reorganisation of the Coal bases, having been at Debai, and having been entrusted with your personal confidence, I naturally felt the keenest interest possible to see that this matter was followed up, so as to endeavour to check, or prevent, any further shipments of a similar character coming forward.

I am glad that we have been able to get at the bottom of the whole affair. The only points that now require clearing up are the connection the two London firms- Bertie Richmond & Co, and Lewis Cranston & Co - had in this affair. This is being now closely investigated - and I hope to have information on this point very shortly.

The "Hansa" Line are now exercising the strictest supervision at Antwerp with regard to all goods for the Gulf, and any doubtful cases are being examined before shipment. (This is for your private information).

So





3019
1912

So - I think that, for the time being, one may take it for granted that any further steps to smuggle rifles, disguised in merchandise, will be diverted from shipments by the "Hansa" Line to either the Indian Lloyd (a new Belgian Line, who have no such restrictions) or to shipments by British lines.

I would therefore suggest that all shipments by the Indian Lloyd should be carefully watched in Bombay by the Customs, especially case goods.

Of course, there is such a handsome profit on any shipment that goes through, that Messrs. Dieu & Co and others of their calibre, may still try the same game again - working it in some other way.


It is to safeguard Government against this that I am now working out an idea, which I mentioned to the Governor, of obtaining a Declaration of shipment from all shippers to India, certifying that the goods shipped do not contain arms or ammunition.


No respectable firm will hesitate to give such an undertaking. It is only the fraudulent firms who will be affected.


I quite admit, of course, that even if such Declarations are obtained, it will not entirely prevent fraudulent shippers from pursuing illegal trade - but it will, I hope, be a decisive check so far that if detected, they will be liable for criminal as well as civil prosecution, and shippers like L. Dieu & Co of Paris will not be able to shield themselves in the same round-about way that they have done in this transaction.


I have been busy since I have been at home personally interviewing the Chairman and Managing Directors of the big Lines trading with India - and have now got through all the spade work.

I









CARGO TO THE PERSIAN GULF.

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
We beg to state further that we shall put the following clause into the Bs/L:-

"Steamer not liable for packages opened for examination by the Customs at Bombay".

Bremen, 13th September 1911.

DEUTSCHE DAMPSCHIFFFAHRTS-GESELLSCHAFT "HANSA"

We certify herewith that we have precisely and correctly declared the contents in the Bs/L and will be responsible for all consequences, fines, &c., which may fall on us and/or the steamer because of wrong or insufficient declaration.





(37) 3345

Register No. **2937**

Put away with

Secret Department.

Letter from *Kicroy*

Dated *27 July* 1912.
Rec. *29*

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	<i>29 July</i>	<i>ABH</i>	<i>Koweit</i>
+ Secretary of State.....	<i>29</i>	<i>ABH</i>	
Committee.....	<i>30</i>	<i>C.</i>	<i>Desire of the Sheikh to import 6000 rifles & 2,400,000 rounds of ammunition.</i>
Under Secretary.....	<i>kt</i>	<i>ABH</i>	
Secretary of State.....			

COPY TO INDIA
23 AUG 1912
SECRETARY'S NO 34

Copy to *India*
Adm. 22 Aug

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

Off. letter to F.O. preparing to approve.


14 Aug. 1912 - Off. app^d - Pol. Comm^{tee}

16 Aug. 1912 - Letter to F.O.

Previous Papers:—

1501
1576 | *11*
2660/12

11859. I. 1993. 1000.—10/1911. [I. 1902.]





U. S. of S.
F.O.

Book

Sir,

16 Aug. 1912.

(3802/11)

With reference to your letter of 25th of 5th July 1911 respecting the grant of permission to the Sheikh of Koweit to import arms & ammunition for his own use, I am directed by the U. S. of S. for S. to forward, for the information of the U. S. of S. for S. A., copy of a telegram from the U. S. of S. from which it appears that H.E. has decided to import 6000 rifles & 400 pounds of ammunition per rifle.

Approved Pol. Com'co.,
14 AUG 1912

(2660/12)

(1501/1576/11)

The circumstances in which this request is made are described in the correspondence copy of which was forwarded to you on the 10th inst., & the safeguards proposed are indicated in the correspondence which was enclosed in ^{the} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~the~~ letters of the 12th and 25th Sept./11. With



Sir E. Grey's concurrence the Marquess of
 Howe would approve the importation,
 after 1st Sept. next, of the ^{ammunition} arms for
 question (to include the smaller quantities
 previously sanctioned) on the under-
 standing mentioned by the J. of S.

As the Sheikh's feelings appear to
 have been hurt by a recent incident
 in the Gulf, the J. of S. might be
 authorised to say - ^{unless} if they see any
 objection - that H. M. G. appreciate the
 general correctness of his attitude towards
 the arms traffic.

(2660/12)

(Sd) E. RITCHIE.

W. Lewis

Mr.



11199. I. 1382. 10,000.-7/1912

H/2937 (39)

2937

Departments are requested, if they suspect that there is any mistake in this telegram, to communicate immediately with the Private Secretary to the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State.


COPY OF TELEGRAM.

FROM *Viceroy* (+)


DATED *30 July 1912* *Put by act x/1*

RECEIVED AT LONDON OFFICE

*Foreign Secret. My telegram of the 27th July.
Arms Koweit. Reference in above telegram
is to your telegram of the 8th July '11.*







11199. L. 1252. 10,000.—71911
H/1507/1
1576/11


Departments are requested, if they suspect that there is any mistake in this telegram, to communicate immediately with the Private Secretary to the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State.

COPY OF TELEGRAM. +

FROM *Kewin*
 DATED *29th July 1912*
 RECEIVED AT LONDON OFFICE

*Sheikh, Koweit. Your telegram of 28th July Arms for Koweit. Sheikh
 has not yet availed himself of permission. He now asks for permission
 to import 6,000 rifles and 400 rounds per rifle. For passports request.
 I recommend sanction for this amount, including arms already sanctioned,
 on clear understanding that no further indent can be considered in
 near future. For safeguards please see papers sent with Foreign
 Secretary's letter Nos. 35 M of 24th August and 37 M of 7th Sept: 1911.
 (1576/11)
 Sheikh is willing to postpone bringing arms till after
 1st Sept: next, when Koweit Arms Regulation come into force.*







(41) (86)

Register No.
2660

Minute Paper. **Secret Department.**

Secs Letter from India, no. 25 m Dated 20 June 1912.
Rec. 8 July

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	10 July	Atk	<u>Arms Traffic</u> Correspondence from the Gulf
Secretary of State.....	10	At	
Committee.....	12	Σ	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to Secy. 10 July
admy 12

There can be no objection in allowing the Sheikh by unrestricted exercise of the power of search. Σ 12.

FOR INFORMATION.


Pp. 3,7,11-16 The Sheikh of Koweit's trouble. His attitude seems to be not at all unreasonable, & his letter (pp. 15,16) is rather impressive. As regards his wish to import more arms for his own use; he was allowed in July last to import 2000 Martini, 500 magazine rifles, 525,000 Martini Cartridges & 150,000 magazine cartridges. Our proposal (supporting S. of S.) that he should further be allowed 2000 rifles & 250,000 cartridges was objected to by the S.O.


Pp. 4-6 Note that the principal difficulty Mr. S. has foreseen is that of providing for the Sultan's own people.

Previous Papers:—
501

11850. I. 1900. 2000.—10/1911. [2127/10.]

Seen Pol Comm
116 JUL 1912





Telegram P., No. 46, dated the 29th May 1912.

From—His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief, Diyatalawa,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Marine Department.

On the 28th May 1912, the Senior Naval Officer in the Persian Gulf sent me the following message bearing the No. 67 and repeated it to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

On the 23rd and 24th May, two dhows were captured in Charbar Bay by the armed launch "Miner".

The name of the first dhow is "Adetremen" and she was flying British colours. Her Port of Registry is Khairan Bandar and the year 1904. She is owned by a Hindu of Maskat, named Pipi. Cassun-bin-Sahib Dud was the Captain of the dhow. Two hundred rounds of ammunition and one Mauser pistol were concealed under sand in the dhow. It is stated by Murad-bin-Chashi, who was a passenger, that ten baskets of ammunition, six Mauser pistols and eight Lee-Netfords were thrown overboard. The Nakhoda was previously convicted of arms traffic.

An Indian of Charbar owned the second dhow, and Doda-bin-Carsum was her Nakhoda. One Mauser pistol, openly admitted for sale, was discovered under sand.

I submit that the two dhows mentioned above should be destroyed.

Eight hundred and fifty rounds of ammunition, two Mauser pistols, and four Mauser rifles, found in the baggage of a resident of Debai, have been handed over by the British India Steam Navigation Company's steamer "Patiala".

To make an example and to stop the smuggling of arms in small quantities, which is so difficult to deal with and which is now so prevalent, I am of opinion that the dhows in question should be destroyed by fire.

Telegram P., No. 47, dated the 30th May 1912.

From—His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief, Diyatalawa,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Marine Department.

On the 29th May 1912, the Senior Naval Officer in the Persian Gulf sent me the following telegram bearing the No. 69, and forwarded a copy of it to the Political Resident, Maskat.

On the 14th instant, I received information from a reliable source from Line Guard (*sic*) that 300 rounds of ammunition and three rifles had been landed at Tank by Nakhoda Sawluk, who is the Captain of a dhow. The dhow has been identified and towed to Jask. Ali Sohak of Bubali Musna is the name of the owner. The guilt of running three slaves in April last from Bir has also been confessed by the Nakhoda. I have no doubt as to the guilt of the Nakhoda or the identity of the dhow, and I request permission to destroy the vessel by burning.

The above proposal regarding the destruction of the dhow by fire is concurred in by me.

Telegram P., No. S.—287, dated the 5th June 1912.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,
To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

Gun running dhows. Reference telegrams,* No. 67, dated 28th May, and No. 69, dated 29th May 1912, from Senior Naval Officer. Will you kindly furnish

* Serial Nos. 71 and 72.
your views by telegraph on proposals contained in above telegrams.



2

2

Telegram P., No. 136 M., dated (and received) the 5th June 1912.

From—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Maskat,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

A reference is invited to the enclosure to the endorsement* from the Foreign Department No. 514 E-A., dated the 6th March. The parties concerned have been informed by the Sultan that they must accept the settlement offered by us, and they have done so. For some time past the money has been lying here, and the parties are importuning His Highness for payment. I recommend that, as in any case settlement of these claims can hardly be avoided, the payment be not longer delayed and would request sanction to do this. When sending your reply kindly repeat it to the Political Agent at Maskat.

* Serial No. 125, Part XI.

Telegram, dated the 7th (received 8th) June 1912.

From—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Karachi,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

M. 130, Maskat, 5th June. Admiral telegraphed to me on 30th May, with reference to telegram of Senior Naval Officer of 28th instant, that he had

† Serial No. 71.

recommended to Government of India burning of two dhows captured by "Miner" in Charbar Bay. After local enquiry I beg to place my views on record before getting out of telegraphic communication in case they are needed by Government. Please see Craufurd's Diary No. 63 to Chief of Staff for details of all cases. First dhow "Adetremen", four more pistols have since been found on board. I concur in recommending that dhow be burnt. Nakhoda Cassim Bin Sahibdat is an Oman subject but in British employ and arrested in Persian waters. Sultan is not likely to raise question and I recommend that he be imprisoned in India, if possible. Second dhow "Chandan", it seems clear that pistol was smuggled by Nakhoda without knowledge or connivance of owners, and it would be in my opinion too harsh a measure to visit upon latter heavy loss involved by destruction of dhow and cargo. I recommend that punishment be restricted to Nakhoda Doda bin Cassim who is a native of Charbar and that he also be imprisoned in India. The alternative in both cases and in that dealt with in my next telegram‡ is to hand them over to the

‡ Serial No. 83.

Governor of Bushire—a course which leads only to tedious and abortive correspondence while accused remain in detention without trial.

Addressed Foreign; repeated Admiral. Copies to Political Agent, Maskat, and Craufurd, and to Senior Naval Officer and Gregson by mail.

Telegram, dated the 7th (received 8th) June 1912.

From—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Karachi,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

M. 139, Maskat, 5th June. Admiral telegraphed to me on 30th May with reference to telegram§ of Senior Naval Officer, dated 29th May, that he

§ Serial No. 72.

had informed Government of India that he concurred in proposal to burn dhow "Khargosh", Nakhoda Sawluk. I concur and recommend that dhow be burned. The Nakhoda who is a Sidi of Oman is wanted not only for repeated gun-running, but also for slave dealing on Persian Mekran Coast. I would suggest his imprisonment in India, if possible.

Addressed Foreign; repeated Admiral. Copies to Political Agent, Maskat, and Craufurd, and to Senior Naval Officer by post.



3

Telegram, No. M.—148, dated the 7th (received 8th) June 1912.

From—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bandar Abbas,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Dated Bandar Abbas, 6th June. In letters just received but dated 15th May. Political Agent, Kuwait, reports Shaikh exceedingly irritated at treatment recently accorded by H. M. S. ships to dhows of his subjects, especially five large dhows returning fully laden from Malabar and Yamen and belonging to four of his most influential subjects. Shaikh says it was not the search that he objected to in principle, but the absence of all consideration for cargo and vessels and public blow to his own prestige entailed by inconsiderate treatment in spite of his efforts to co-operate with us. He went so far as to speak of forthwith repudiating his arms agreement of 1900. He adumbrated presentation of claim after verification for 4,000 rupees for damage to vessels and further large claim for damage to cargo consigned to merchants in Kuwait and Basrah. Political Agent endeavoured to make him see our side of case and induce him to drop talk of abrogating his arms agreement and Shaikh did so on condition that Government be asked to issue orders to the effect that Kuwait boats loaded up with cargo should not be searched at sea but that in case of there being reason to suspect particular boat, a man should be placed on board by H. M. S. ship and dhow ordered to proceed direct to Kuwait to be unloaded under joint supervision of Shaikh and Political Agent. Shaikh guarantees to make severe example of any dhow or individual detected. I am well aware of great difficulty involved to H. M. S. ships in searching dhows at sea and impossibility of making omelets without breaking eggs, but it would be exceedingly undesirable to alienate Shaikh just now, and I think we need to take a conciliatory line with him. Shaikh awaits definite reply, and I suggest that we regret but explain inevitable incidence of occasional hardship to innocent dhows as in present case, but express our readiness to make good any unintentional damage on being satisfied of its infliction as regards immediate future. Can Senior Naval Officer suggest some practicable course on lines suggested by Shaikh for placing representative on board suspected dhow to accompany her to port? Addressed Admiral; repeated Senior Naval Officer and Foreign.

Telegram P., dated the 7th (received 8th) June 1912.

From—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bandar Abbas,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Please refer to my immediately preceding telegram.* Negotiations with Turkey regarding Kuwait being in progress at the present time and the contemplated installation of a coaling depôt and post office in the near future are my reasons for considering the alienation of the Shaikh of Kuwait and his applicability particularly undesirable just at present.

* Serial No. 84.

No. 589—41 M., dated Simla, the 8th June 1912 (Secret).

From—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Army (Marine) Department,
To—His EXCELLENCY REAR-ADMIRAL THE HON'BLE SIR A. E. BETHELL, K.C.M.G.,
Commander-in-Chief, His Majesty's Ships and Vessels, East Indies Squadron.

In continuation of Marine Department letter No. 589—40 M., dated the 31st May 1912, I am directed to forward, for Your Excellency's information, the accompanying copy of correspondence relating to the apportionment of expenditure on the extension of Naval blockade measures to the Persian Gulf, and to

Memorandum from the Foreign Office to the India Office, No. P.—1686, dated the 3rd May 1912, and enclosures.

Telegram from the Secretary of State for India, dated the 30th May 1912.

† Serial No. 64.

‡ Serial No. 67.

Submitted separately



request that the Government of India may be favoured with Your Excellency's views, by telegraph, on the point mentioned in the marginally-noted telegram from the Most Hon'ble the Secretary of State for India, *viz.*, whether, but for such extension, it would have been possible to dispense with the two additional ships or at least one of them.

Dated 20th May 1912.*

* Serial No. 67.

Telegram P., No. S.—309, dated the 8th June 1912.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,

To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire (repeated to the Political Agent, Maskat).

Compensation for arms seized. Please refer to your telegram† 136 M., dated the 5th June. Claims may be paid as recommended.

† Serial No. 75.

No. 136 M., dated Maskat, the 5th (received 10th) June 1912.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SIR P. Z. COX, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

With reference to the correspondence ending with my telegram;

† Serial No. 73.

No. 135 M., dated 4th June 1912, I have the honour to submit a copy of the letter of assurance which I addressed to the Sultan together with copies and translations of the notification issued by His Highness this day, and of the letter addressed by him in identic terms to the British, French and American Consuls in Maskat.

In doing so I beg to add the following observations with reference to my proceedings in Maskat, and the present state of negotiations for the inception of the special arms warehouse.

2. When I arrived at Maskat nearly a month ago, we had ready a complete set of detailed rules for the institution and working of the warehouse, drawn up according to the ideas of the Political Agent and myself, for discussion with His Highness.

They were necessarily somewhat technical and legal in phraseology and interconnected one with the other, and we realised after several meetings during the first week of my visit that they were too great a task for the Sultan's intellect to tackle *en bloc*. He could not be got to see that if the main issues were settled the unimportant details would easily fall into line, and our time was thus wasted in argument over trivialities which merely delayed settlement of the more important points. A constant difficulty was the fact that often, while convinced that some point needed modification, His Highness was quite unable to devise any alternative. I, therefore, came to the conclusion that the only way to avoid indefinite delay was to clear the road by getting out a primary notification intimating the date of the inauguration of the warehouse, and the principles on which it would work, to be followed up later by a second notice giving the detailed rules. His Highness was able to understand the simplified draft, and accepted it with little further difficulty; it has since been approved by Government and now issued by His Highness. The further step thus taken is valuable as far as it goes: it commits the Sultan *vis-à-vis* his public and the powers with whom he is in treaty relation to definite embarkation on the warehouse scheme (the most trying step for him personally); while during the period of three months law allowed we shall see from which direction we are likely to meet with opposition and how best to counter it. The notification will in any case, I hope, lead to a temporary cessation of fresh orders.



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On the other hand, I should like to make it plain that with the issue of the notification our chief difficulties are by no means over. The Sultan indeed himself seems to feel that he has crossed the Rubicon, and that the rest will be a simple task of adjustment with us, but there is clearly plenty of room left for disagreement in matters of detail, and one cannot say more than that the ground has been further cleared.

3. The point on which, as far as we can see, we shall have most difficulty in coming to an understanding is the manner of the supply of the needs of Oman. In this regard the Sultan is no doubt in a difficulty. His subjects will not unnaturally resent having their freedom to purchase and sell arms curtailed, and he will no doubt earn a good deal of odium for co-operating with us in a scheme from which he received substantial compensation which, however, his subjects do not directly share. Again, there are plenty of interested persons ready to ply him with the argument that our motive in restricting the liberty of the Omani to arm himself is no doubt to reduce the population of Oman to a state of defencelessness, of which we shall take advantage when opportunity offers.

However, I need not anticipate the difficulties which Major Knox or I are likely to meet with—they will develop as the negotiations progress, and we shall do our utmost to subject them locally to a process of gradual elumination before troubling Government. For the present I am leaving Major Knox to pursue single-handed a most difficult task, which, however, I am reasonably sanguine that patience will eventually carry to a satisfactory conclusion.

Translation of vernacular letter from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to the address of His Highness the Sultan of Maskat, No. 124 M., dated the 2nd June 1912.

After compliments.—I have now received an intimation of the approval of the British Government of the notification on the subject of the Maskat arms warehouse, which Your Highness, after consultation with the Political Agent and myself, expressed your readiness to publish forthwith.

A copy of the notification is annexed to this letter.

The British Government have, at the same time, intimated their acceptance of the conditions, which Your Highness attached to the issue of the notification. That is to say, I am authorised to inform you on their behalf—

(1) that the British Government undertake full responsibility to give Your Highness all necessary support to dispose of objections which may ensue from the Government of France or from other Powers;

(2) that it is understood that the institution of the present arrangement does not give the British Government, or its officials, the right to take action in Your Highness's territories in the future beyond what they have in the past;

(3) that they are ready to come to a friendly understanding with Your Highness for the devising of suitable arrangements for the supply of the *bond fide* needs of Your Highness's administration and subjects;

(4) that their undertaking to pay Your Highness compensation on the lines already agreed upon holds good and is confirmed.

In making this communication to Your Highness, I have the honour to express the hope that the said Notification will be issued forthwith in the usual way.

Dated Maskat, the 4th June 1912.

From—His Highness SAIYID SIR FAISAL-BIN-TURKI, G.C.I.E., Sultan of Maskat,
To—The Political Agent and His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Maskat.

After compliments.—With reference to my conversation with you of a few days ago, I have the honour to enclose a copy of a notification which I



have issued this day making known to the public my intention to introduce from the 1st September next a special warehouse in connection with the import of arms into my territories.

It is incumbent on me by way of friendliness to give you and your fellow Consuls in Maskat intimation of this, and in view of the bonds of intimacy existing between your great Government and myself I am confident that I shall have your cordial support, so far as your subjects are concerned, in rendering the measure effective.

Notification by His Highness the Sultan of Maskat and Oman, dated Maskat, the 4th June 1912.

Whereas large quantities of arms and ammunition are at present stored without proper control in private buildings, distributed in this our town of Maskat, and thus exposed to the risk of attack, robbery or fire, we impressed by the serious menace to the safety of our capital arising therefrom, have resolved to remedy this state of affairs, in accordance with the needs of the times and the requirements of our municipal administration, by the construction and establishment of a special customs house magazine or arms warehouse for the storage of arms and ammunition under safe precautions. It is proposed to introduce this warehouse arrangement from on or about 1st September next. It will be conducted on the following general lines:—

Firstly.—On or after 1st September all arms and ammunition or parts thereof imported into my territories will be taken direct from the steamer to the special arms warehouse, to the control of which a special Superintendent will be appointed by us.

Secondly.—Similarly all arms-dealers in my territories will be required to deposit stocks remaining in their hands on 1st September in the said warehouse. Any trader offending against this regulation will, in addition to other penalties, render all future consignments of arms and ammunition arriving in his name liable to confiscation, unless and until he complies with this regulation in full.

Thirdly.—No arms will be allowed to issue from the warehouse until duty has been fully paid thereon to the Customs Superintendent in the usual way.

Fourthly.—The withdrawal of arms from the warehouse will be regulated by the issue of special licenses prepared by the Superintendent and countersigned by myself.

Fifthly.—Such licenses will not be granted to traders but only to approved individual purchasers or their duly authorised agents, on the production of satisfactory proof that the number, quantity and destination of arms, ammunition, &c., to be withdrawn from the warehouse are free from justifiable objection.

Sixthly.—All arms issuing from the warehouse will be marked with a special warehouse mark and serial number.

Seventhly.—Special rules will be drawn up providing for and regulating the issue to approved traders of sample stock for exhibition in their shops.

Eighthly.—Rules providing for the collection of arms warehouse charges, on stocks therein deposited, will be drawn up on the analogy of the present Customs House Regulations for the levy of such fees on general merchandise.

Ninthly.—Special rules will be drawn up governing the transfer between traders' stocks deposited in the arms warehouse.

Tenthly.—Special relaxations will be arranged for in favour of flint-locks, muzzle-loading gun powder and caps in reasonable quantities.

Lastly.—Detailed rules embodying the above principles are under preparation and will be published in due course for the further information of all concerned.

SAIYID FAISAL-BIN-TURKI.

(Vernacular notification not printed.)



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Telegram P., No. 52, dated the 8th June 1912.

From—His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief, Diyatalawa,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Marine Department (repeated
to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf).

Having regard to Sir Percy Cox's statement in his telegram* No. 130,
the action proposed by him with regard
to the dhow "Chandan" is concurred in
by me. This is with reference to my tele-
gram† No. 46, dated the 29th May 1912.

* Serial No. 82.

† Serial No. 71.

Telegram P., No. 53, dated the 8th June 1912.

From—His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief, Diyatalawa,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Marine Department.

I have addressed the following telegram to the Political Resident in the
Persian Gulf and repeated it to the Senior Naval Officer:—

The incidents are regretted, and I agree that until the completion of the
negotiations now in progress measures must be taken to keep the Shaikh
satisfied.


It is suggested that regret be expressed to the Shaikh and that it be
pointed out to him that although arrangements will be made to inconvenience
Kuwait dhows as little as possible, it is difficult to prevent hardship occurring
occasionally to innocent dhows.

Instructions will be issued by me to the Senior Naval Officer that unless
there is grave suspicion, amounting almost to a certainty, of the presence of
ammunition and arms, cargo in Kuwait dhows should not be disturbed.

The Shaikh's proposal that a representative should be placed on board is
not considered by me to be practicable.

‡ Serial No. 84.

The above is with reference to your
telegram‡ No. 148.





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No. 74, dated Maskat, the 5th (received 17th) June 1912 (Confidential).

From—MAJOR S. G. KNOX, C.I.E., Political Agent and His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Maskat,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to forward herewith the copy of letter No. 73, dated the 5th June 1912, that I have addressed to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

No. 73, dated Maskat, the 5th June 1912 (Confidential).

From—MAJOR S. G. KNOX, C.I.E., Political Agent and His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Maskat,

To—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SIR P. Z. COX, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Political Resident and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

I have the honour, with reference to your telegram* No. M.—135, dated the 4th June 1912, to the address of the Hon'ble the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to forward herewith a copy of the acknowledgment of His Highness the Sultan's proclamation by the Consul, United States of America, for Maskat. His Highness was so good as to forward a copy to me this morning. It was accompanied by an Arabic translation giving an accurate rendering of the American original and I have not thought it necessary to forward it.

2. A copy of this report with its enclosure is being forwarded by me direct to the Hon'ble the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

No. N. A. O. 111, dated the 5th June 1912.

From—HOMER BRETT, Esq., American Consul for Maskat,

To—HIS HIGHNESS SEYID FEYSAL BIN TURKI, Sultan of Maskat and Oman.

After greetings and compliments. I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Highness's communication which was sent to me yesterday, in which new regulations governing the trade in arms and ammunition are set forth.

The contents of the papers will be communicated to my Government. With assurances of esteem and best wishes for the continued good health of Your Highness.

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No. 733, dated Maskat, the 11th (received 17th) June 1912.

From—MAJOR S. G. KNOX, C.I.E., Political Agent and His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Maskat,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to forward to you, to save time, the copy of a letter No. 732, dated the 11th June 1912, which I am despatching by the mail of the 17th instant to the address of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.



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No. 732, dated the 11th June 1912.

From—The Political Agent and His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Maskat,
To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

With reference to correspondence ending with Foreign Department telegram* No. 309 S., dated the 8th June 1912, to your address, repeated Maskat, on the subject of compensation for arms and ammunition seized by H.M.S. "Espiegle" from three Maskat dhows sunk near Sohar, I have the honour to report that the sum of Rs. 31,500 was paid over to His Highness the Sultan of Maskat on the 10th June and a receipt for the amount filed in this office.

2. To save time, a copy of this letter has been forwarded direct to the Hon'ble the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

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Telegram P., No. 800—20 M., dated the 15th June 1912.

From—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Marine Department, Simla,
To—His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief.

It is requested that instructions may be issued for the destruction of the dhows "Adetremen" and "Khargosh" by fire, which is agreed to by the Government of India.

The above is in reply to Your Excellency's telegrams,† Nos. 46 and 47, dated 29th and 30th May 1912, respectively.

† Serial Nos. 71 and 72.

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Telegram P., No. 53, dated the 14th June 1912.

From—His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief, Diyatalawa,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Marine Department (repeated to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf).

It is requested that my recommendation regarding the treatment of the dhows may be approved at an early date.

Even in cases of the smuggling of one or two firearms, if punishment is awarded soon after seizure, the moral effect of such a course will greatly aid the Navy in their endeavour to suppress the form arms traffic has assumed at present.

The above is with reference to my telegrams,‡ Nos. 46 and 52, dated 29th May and 8th June 1912, respectively.

‡ Serial Nos. 71 and 94.



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No. 167 M., dated at Sea, the 10th (received 17th) June 1912.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SIR P. Z. COX, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

With reference to my telegram No. 148 M.,* dated the 7th June 1912,

* Serial No. 84.
(1) Political Agent, Kuwait, to Resident, No. 38 C., dated the 15th May 1912.
(2) Political Agent, Kuwait, to Resident, No. 30 C., dated the 15th May 1912.
(3) From Shaikh Mubarak to Resident, dated the 16th May 1912, but withdrawn.

I have the honour to submit, for the information of the Government of India, the following communications received from the Political Agent, Kuwait, forwarding—

- (i) an application from the Shaikh for a permit for the import of a further quantity of arms;
- (ii) a complaint from the Shaikh in regard to the treatment accorded to his dhows;
- (iii) translation of a letter written by the Shaikh to the Resident, complaining of the treatment of his dhows but afterwards withdrawn by the Shaikh on Captain Shakespear's advice.

2. As regards (i), I require further information from Captain Shakespear on one or two points before I can offer useful comment and I am also not sure how far the concluding sentences of the Shaikh's cancelled letter to me [encl. (iii)] are now intended to hold good. I will telegraph my views on receipt of his reply to my enquiries.

3. As regards (ii), I have already telegraphed† to the Government of India and His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief and merely send the

† Serial No. 84.

present papers for further information.

4. Enclosure (iii) is the translation of a letter sent over to the Political Agent by Shaikh Mubarak for despatch to me, but subsequently withdrawn by the Shaikh on Captain Shakespear's advice. Although not now an official document, it seems worth forwarding to Government for information, as indicating the Shaikh's state of mind and the inevitable tendency of our arms traffic operations generally to arouse resentment.

5. The Shaikh's references to the open door at (i) Katar and (ii) Kasr-us-Subaih are no doubt well-founded in the first case and probably in the second, but I shall endeavour to obtain further information on the point.

Perusing all these letters together I cannot avoid the suspicion that the vehemence of the Shaikh's complaint in regard to his treatment may be partly connected with his desire to import more arms, but, in any case, I think the circumstantial details given and Captain Shakespear's reference to the feeling created among the inhabitants of Kuwait generally on learning of the experiences of the five dhows in question, demonstrate that the simultaneous representation of the two matters is more coincidence than design.

No. 38 C., dated Kuwait, the 15th May 1912 (Confidential).

From—CAPTAIN W. H. I. SHAKESPEAR, Political Agent, Kuwait,

To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

I have the honour to forward, attached hereto, copy and translation of a letter received by me yesterday from Shaikh Sir Mubarak-us-Subah explaining his request for permission to import a largely increased number of arms and ammunition.

2. The Shaikh's letter speaks for itself and I need only observe here that the first questions I put in conversation in regard thereto were enquiries as to why the Shaikh had not already taken advantage of the permission accorded six months ago for 2,500 arms and over 6 lakhs of rounds and further how the need for so large a demand had arisen so suddenly.



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3. The Shaikh's replies are, taking the latter question first, that the tribesmen acknowledging his authority have grown in number; that a recent raid has compelled him to put a properly armed force again into the field, that a large number (as many as a hundred) of new diving boats have been put into commission for the present pearling season, and that, owing to the facility with which the southern tribes having access to Katar and Katif have been able to arm themselves, he is compelled in self-defence to arm the Kuwait pearl-boats more heavily than has been customary hitherto. Formerly these boats usually carried about eight to ten rifles apiece, but for the above reason it has now become necessary to arm one-half their complements, whilst the boats carrying the pearl-towashes, who frequently have on board with them over a lakh in either specie or pearls, require to have every man fully armed.

The Shaikh's letter furnishes the reply to my first query—that the arms already accorded permission are so insufficient as to put him to a difficulty in distribution.

4. So far as I can ascertain, the above reasons given by the Shaikh are true in the main. Owing to the comparative scarcity of arms which prohibition of the traffic during the last two-and-half years has produced in Kuwait, the Shaikh has been enabled to draw into his political sphere as more immediately dependent upon him a large number of Bedouin who look to him alone for their weapons and ammunition. The southern tribes, more particularly the Ajman, Bani Hafir and Bani Khalid, have certainly been able to obtain arms cheaply and easily from Katar and the Al-bu-Ainain's settlement at Kasr-us-Sabaih. Consequently, the Shaikh's fear for the safety of the Kuwait pearling-boats and their ability to defend themselves with their former number of weapons is not unfounded. The Kuwait pearling-fleet probably numbers between 700 and 800 boats, which means at a very moderate estimate not less than 20,000 to 25,000 men afloat.

5. Taking these circumstances into consideration, the Shaikh's large figures lose much of their startling aspect. At the same time it must be borne in mind that if the Shaikh desired he would not have much difficulty, presuming that the Naval patrols continue blockading the Persian coast, in importing double or treble the number of arms he mentions in his letter to me. Moreover, for the last two years at least, he has been losing what used to be a very lucrative item of his customs revenue. Taking all these facts into consideration, I venture to submit that, unless Government are prepared to institute a really effective blockade of the Arab coast as well as the Persian which would have to include search of all pearling-boats, it is a mistaken policy on our part to risk alienating the good-will of a Ruler, who, it must be admitted, has for the last two years met our wishes in the suppression of the arms traffic in no ungenerous spirit.

6. The figures previously given by the Shaikh did not anticipate a change in conditions so close to his domains, a change in fact which has taken place within the last nine months, and I confess that, when forwarding his requests last summer, I did not foresee the present state of affairs.

7. In conclusion, I would urge that Shaikh Mubarak's request may be accorded such favourable consideration as may be possible, and beg that I may be furnished with early instructions for a reply to his letter.

Translation of a letter from Shaikh Sir Mubarak-us-Subaih, K.C.I.E., Ruler of Kuwait, to Captain W. H. I. Shakespear, Political Agent, Kuwait, dated the 27th Jamadi-ul-Awal 1330 (14th May 1912).

After compliments, and making enquiry after your health, this is what I would address to Your Honour and ask you that you will explain this my request to His Excellency Colonel Sir Percy Cox, that I, (your) loyal (friend), explain to you the pressure of our necessities for arms from the continual demands of my subjects, all of them, of my own people and the tribesmen, of their requirements for arms, and I, without your order and approval, never



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shall bring arms and will not consent to anyone bringing them, either openly or secretly. The obedience to your approval upon me that is what is necessary. For those who are now wanting weapons, it is not for trading (in them) but that they may be in their hands for the purpose of defence, for other foreign tribesmen oppress our subjects in our trade, people of the south and others. In these days just past a number of camels belonging to the merchants, people of Kuwait, Ahmed-al-Hamaizi and others, amounting to 600 camels sent out in the hands of their men to Egypt for trade, the Ajman and their allies took them and besides this also upon our subjects the tribesmen have been many robberies, and we sent our servants to the headmen of the Ajman with letters for the purpose of their (the camels') restoration; there returned of them a few, and the greater part are with them (the Ajman), and all the B-douin, if they do not see force do not give justice. Now there are in their hands weapons, which they obtain from Katar and from the Al-bu-Ainain at prices of \$15 to \$18 and the ammunition at \$5 a hundred and on our side now weapons are not obtainable and if findable and acceptable one obtains them at \$40 to \$50 and the cartridges one takes at \$12 to \$15 and this is the state; we see in it upon us great damage and it is incumbent upon us that we should explain to you the circumstances and the order is with you. Yesterday came to me of my own people and the heads of the tribesmen and showed me the amount of their wants of arms and of ammunition. Apart from my own necessities, there is required for them at least 6,000 weapons of various kinds, Martinis and others, and with each weapon 400 rounds and our own requirements, especially to us, 1,000 arms and with each weapon 400 rounds. Also there is necessity for extra ammunition for the furnishing of those weapons which are now in the hands of our servants and those which are distributed amongst our tribesmen, to the amount of 4 lakhs, for we have no ammunition (left). In these days we have sent our son Ali-al-Khalifa, prepared for war with 500 men, and we sent with him the Shaikh of the Ajman for the purpose of obtaining the camels of the merchants which are in their possession and those which (belong) to our tribesmen and the limit to which we completed their ammunition (is) 40 cartridges to each man and those who require arms, of our own people and tribesmen, Katar and the Al-bu-Ainain are close to them and press to bring their requirements, but I have forbidden them and I do not permit that, as the divers to the south of them reach to Katar and to the Al-bu-Ainain and these every day meet them and the force upon them of the prohibition (is such that) even if the people of Katar and the Al-bu-Ainain bring them (arms) to them to their boats, they do not accept them (so much so) that even the Subaihat (Bedouin) who spend their spring time in our parts and their summer in Katif have offered (the tribesmen) that they will bring to them (from) the Al-bu-Ainain (arms) and I have prohibited them for obedience to your order that is necessary to me. For we, according to the wants of our subjects, of our own people and tribesmen those arms of which there is permission, will bring them from Maskat to the number of 2,000. Now it is a difficulty upon us that we bring them and to whom we should give them and whom we should leave (without). Therefore we have explained the state to you and the order is to you and may you be preserved.

No. 39 C., dated Kuwait, the 15th May 1912 (Confidential).

From—CAPTAIN W. H. I. SHAKESPEAR, Political Agent, Kuwait,
To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

With reference to the measures in force for prohibition of the arms traffic, I have the honour to report the following complaint communicated to me by Shaikh Sir Mubarak-us-Subaih.

2. The Shaikh complains that, though he has given an undertaking to the British Government that he will prohibit all traffic in arms by his subjects or their vessels, though he has used every endeavour to prevent this traffic by letters to his agent in Maskat and the direct threats to his own subjects, and though no cases have been proved against his subjects (with the exception of a Persian nakhoda caught by H. M. "Philomel" in October last



when the arms were not destined for Kuwait), His Majesty's ships lately insisted on searching five large vessels bound from Malabar and Yemen to Kuwait, causing in the search very serious loss and damage to the cargoes and vessels and merely proving the absence of arms, a fact which he would have been prepared to guarantee personally without any search.

3. The vessels belong to four of the most respectable and substantial merchants of Kuwait, three being personally known to me as unlikely to risk their ships in the arms trade and their arrival in the last two days, with highly-coloured stories of the searches to which they were subjected, has caused a considerable amount of ill-feeling.

4. The Shaikh called on me yesterday and gave me the gist of each complaint. I replied that I had no information as yet, but he must be aware that His Majesty's ships were now employed in a strenuous endeavour to annihilate the traffic that they would not have undertaken the labour of searching large over-sea vessels without some definite information which their experience had shown them could not be verified without a most thorough search. If there had been damage or loss in the process, I was prepared to take detailed statements and, as the vessels had been proved to be innocuous, to forward their claims with recommendations towards compensation. The Shaikh who was exceedingly angry said that it was not the search so much, *quā* search, to which he objected as the apparent absence of all consideration for the cargo and vessels, the callous disregard of all protests made by respectable men in the vessels, and the loss of prestige which he himself, in spite of all his efforts to assist the British Government, suffered. As the Shaikh went so far as to speak of repudiating his obligations under his arms agreement of May 1900, I perceived that argument was useless until his temper had had some time to cool and the interview therefore closed.

5. To-day I visited him in the hope of finding him in a more reasonable frame of mind and on expressing my regret that his people should have been put to any loss drew from him a more lucid account of what is said to have occurred. It appears that one vessel was searched, whilst there was considerable sea-running and a good deal of damage resulted to her, that another had her dinghy broken up, that all were damaged to a more or less extent, to repair which it is estimated will cost Rs. 4,000, that all had their cargo shifted, and returned without regard to stowage, part lost, part damaged, &c., of the extent of which no estimate can be made until the cargoes are discharged and compared with the Bills of Lading. I endeavoured to obtain his recognition of the case for the other side, who were not in a position to differentiate as to the reliability or otherwise of the word of particular owners or nakhodas, who would certainly not have undertaken a very laborious search without what must have appeared to them good reliable information, who could not be responsible for the weather prevailing at the time, and who after all were only acting in virtue of the Shaikh's own agreement with ourselves, and who, so far from showing their want of appreciation of the Shaikh's efforts at assistance in the prohibition of the arms traffic, had hitherto in reliance on his co-operation been able to pass Kuwait dhows with a much less rigorous investigation than others. Eventually the Shaikh admitted grudgingly that there were two sides to the question, and we arranged for the nakhodas to be sent to me to record their statements and a more detailed report will be submitted later in this respect.

6. What has particularly incensed the Shaikh is that the five vessels happen to belong to the most respectable and leading men in the place, that he feels his own word has been doubted, that he is now subject to recriminations for having been (so to speak) deluded by the British Government into assisting them whilst voluntarily making matters difficult for his own subjects in the matter of arms without any compensating *quid pro quo* in the way of securing them from the molestation by British men-of-war to which other craft have to submit, and that his enemies in Basra and elsewhere will seize on the incident to ridicule him for his blind faith in British fair-dealing.

7. I have seldom seen the Shaikh so moved, and the fact that he feels his honour and good faith have been impugned and that he fancies he has



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been made an object of recrimination and ridicule are the main springs of his resentment. It was this sense of injury which made him speak of terminating his arms agreement and permitting the free import and export of arms, leaving it to us to prevent the traffic to and from Kuwait as we thought fit.

8. I was able, however, to induce him to give up this foolish idea, though he asked of me in return that I would represent in detail what had happened, how it damaged his prestige and solicit that Government would issue orders that Kuwait boats loaded up with cargo should not be subjected to a search at sea. He was prepared to make the severest example of any Kuwait owner nakhoda or vessel proved to be carrying arms, and if naval officers received information leading them to suspect any particular boat all he asked was that the cargo should not be interfered with, that a man with a letter to the Political Agent be put on board with orders never to leave the boat and the boat ordered to proceed direct to Kuwait. On arrival the Political Agent could put another reliable man on board if he desired which the Shaikh would also do and the cargo would then be unloaded and searched under the eyes of, and by, the three men in concert. If arms were found he would punish owner, nakhoda and boat, in a way that would be an example to the people of Kuwait for the future. I said I would forward his representations with such recommendations as I could add and ask for an early reply. I was not in a position, however, either to give an undertaking that further searches would not be made at sea, nor to assure him that his plan would be approved as suggested above.

9. The practically coincident arrival of the five boats with similar stories has aroused very considerable resentment, and the Shaikh has been pressed to take the line he has done as much by his leading merchants as by his own wounded *amour propre*. As it appeared to me that any serious rupture in our cordial relations with the Shaikh must be avoided by all possible means at the present time, I endeavoured to conciliate and soothe his pride—in other circumstances I might have inclined to a more unbending attitude, holding to the strict letter of our arms agreement and his proclamation as justification, but this would inevitably have brought about still more resentment and probably led to an *impasse* from which there would have been no way out except by forcibly insisting on the observance of his agreement by the Shaikh.

10. On the same grounds, therefore, I would submit that, if it is possible without impairing the efficiency of naval measures, the procedure suggested in paragraph 8 above may be given a trial. The Shaikh's own prohibition has undoubtedly had a deterrent effect, and if suspected vessels can be treated as suggested, I think it will be possible to ensure that an adequate investigation takes place in Kuwait at the time of discharging cargo. The Shaikh has no objection to more or less empty boats being searched at sea, but where large dhows, full of timber and other merchandise consigned to merchants in Kuwait and Basra, are concerned, the thorough search required must inevitably lead to some damage, for which the nakhoda becomes responsible to the consignee.

11. I would also observe that the loss of the Shaikh's co-operation would materially add to our difficulties in dealing with the arms traffic. At present the Katar ports and Kasr-as-Subaih appear to have developed into regular depôts and a similar situation at Kuwait with the Shaikh's connivance is worth avoiding if avoidance is possible with the Shaikh as co-adjutor.

12. In conclusion, I would beg that I may be favoured with an early reply for communication to the Shaikh.

Dated the 28th Jamadi-ul-Awal 1339 (16th May 1912).

From—His EXCELLENCY SHAIKH MUBARAK-US-SUBAIIH, Ruler of Kuwait,

To—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SIR PERCY COX, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I beg to lay the following before you and request you to treat me in a manner befitting me and my honour, because I listened to your advice owing to your good deportment, justice and the protection you accord to noble



families; but I now see the reverse. The most necessary thing for me in life is to protect my dignity and honour. I most willingly promised to adhere to three conditions, and, thank God, I am doing accordingly. I now see that distrust is shown to me in one of the three, while my subjects are being troubled and their properties, which are shipped by their boats, and have given Bill of Lading, are lost. And I promised that none of my subjects should import arms, though they be given half the value of the arms for freight, especially my Arab subjects. Just as I keep up my dignity, they also keep theirs, and are obedient to my commands.

One of the respectable nobles of Kuwait, who is my neighbour, Khalifa-bin-Shahin Al-Ghanem, has been coming in his "Buglow", his uncle Amad-bin-Muhammad Al-Ghanem in his "Dingiyah", Abdul Latif-bin-Isa's "Buglow", nakhoda Abbas's boat, and that of Naser Al-Bedr, who is one of the greatest men of Kuwait, whose father is Yusof-bin-Bedr, who was well-known to the British Government on account of his good character, had loaded their boats with timber, pepper, tamarind, rope and various goods, each of these being kept in its respective place. Some of these belonged to the merchants of Kuwait and some of them to those of Basra; and they had given Bills of Lading on the numbers of the goods. The men-of-war caught them. The Captains were told by the nakhodas that they do not ship arms, though they be given half their value, in obedience to the orders of their Shaikh and in order to keep up my dignity as well as theirs: but they did not listen to their words and insulted them and kept them three days. They took out all their cargoes on the men-of-war and on the decks of the vessels in which they searched without finding any arms. A big amount of the cargoes has been lost, partly being thrown into the sea and partly being handed from one to the other. These merchandise belong to the merchants of Kuwait and partly to those of Basra.

The nakhodas will be held responsible for the goods which they have shipped according to the Bills of Lading. What should they give for the shortage? I am lowered before you and distrust has been shown to me while I had promised that none of my subjects will ship arms. No faith has been placed in my promise.

As to those who are not my subjects, I have not given undertaking on their account, because I have no right on them. If they import any arms here, you have to check them.

These vessels, *i.e.*, Khalifa-bin-Shahin's boat, Ahmad's "Dingiyah", Naser Al-Bedr's boat, and Abdul Latif's "Buglow", had shipped their cargoes from Malabar. Abbas's boat had shipped her cargo from Yemen and consisted of fish oil and cross bars. The fish oil was taken on board the men-of-war and the cross bars on the deck of the boat. Great quantities of these two substances were destroyed, and the Captains and Lieutenants noticed them. These belong to the merchants who will ask for them according to the weight and numbers shown in the Bills of Lading. The vessels have been injured by colliding with the men-of-war and throwing woods in them. The upper edges, called "Tarrik", have been crushed. Ahmad's small boat, which has been on board, has been broken into pieces by throwing wood on it. Abbas's anchor has been cut and the second one has been crushed. The experts estimate the expenses of the repairs, such as wood, nails, &c., and the carpenter's wages at Rs. 3,400. Price of Ahmad's boat is Rs. 600 and the shortage of the goods will be stated after they have been landed.

I wrote to my friend, Captain Shakespear, yesterday to inform you of my and my subjects' requirements for arms. It is not now necessary. Everybody who wants arms gets them from Katar and Bu-Ainain as the door is open there. I am exceedingly displeased at this proceeding and now beg to lay it before you.

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
Telegram P., No. 340 S., dated the 17th June 1912.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,

To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bandar Abbas (repeated to First Assistant Resident, Bushire).

Kuwait dhows. Reference your telegram,* 148 M., 7th June. Reply proposed by you and Admiral approved.

* Serial No. 84.



105


Telegram P., No. 56, dated the 17th June 1912.

From—His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief, Diyalawa,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Marine Department.

It would not, in my opinion, have been possible to dispense with either of the additional ships. The move of some ships from the Biyaban and Mekran coasts to the coast of Persia was rendered necessary by the extension of the blockade. This move was carried out only by a reduction of the force on the Mekran coast below what is considered necessary in view of the Sohar arms depôt. This is with reference to Marine Department letter* No. 589—41 M., dated the 8th June 1912.

* Serial No 83.

Submitted
24/6/12





(5) (19)

Register No.
501

Minute Paper. **Secret Department.**

Scap Letter from India, no. 4M Dated 25 Jan. 1912.
Rec. 10 Feb.

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	13 Feb.	KK	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Arms Traffic.</u></p> <p>Mail papers from India as to Koweit shw. disposal of Mir Bar. kat & Khalifa Khair Muhammad, & ammunition, etc, for Koweit.</p>
Secretary of State.....			
Committee	1/2	KK	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			


Copy to 20
a.m.f. 12 Feb.


FOR INFORMATION.

sect for com'ee,
20 FEB 1912

Previous Papers:—
2063/11

11856. I. 1990. 2000.—10/1911. [2127/10.]







30

80

No. 168 E.-A., dated Calcutta, the 20th January 1912 (Confidential).

From—The Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department,

To—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SIR PERCY COX, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Calcutta.


I am directed to refer to the correspondence ending with your telegram* No. M.—14, dated the 17th November 1911, regarding Mir Barkat Khan and Khalifa Khair Muhammad.

* Serial No. 27.

2. Mir Barkat desires to make his submission and to be permitted to participate in the administration of his district. You recommend that, before the Government of India acquiesce, Barkat Khan should be required to enter into an agreement first, that he will reside permanently at Jask, secondly, that he will abstain absolutely from all connection with the arms traffic, direct or indirect, and the slave trade; and, thirdly, that for a period of two years he himself or he and his fellow chiefs jointly should deposit a sum of Rs. 10,000 as security for his adherence to the above conditions. In return you recommend that the Telegraph Department might be advised to pay him a telegraph subsidy as they have proposed to do before.

3. As regards the Khalifa you recommend that he be allowed to make the pilgrimage which he is desirous of making to Baghdad (Kerbala?) or Mecca, provided that he can satisfy you that he has severed his connection with the arms traffic and will not help smugglers, will quit Persian Baluchistan, and will keep British officers concerned informed of his movements.

4. The Government of India approve your recommendations, subject to the condition that they meet with the approval of His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran.



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No. 188 E.-A., dated Calcutta, the 23rd January 1912 (Confidential).

From—The Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department,

To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter* No. 3044, dated the 2nd December 1911, regarding the safeguards proposed by the Political Agent, Kuwait, in connection with the import of arms by Shaikh Mubarak.

* Serial No. 53.

2. The Government of India concur in your opinion that the arrangement arrived at is not completely satisfactory, but probably no useful purpose would be achieved by pressing the Shaikh further, and in the circumstances it is approved.

3. I am to add that the estimate of the Shaikh's annual requirements to replace wastage, *viz.*, 3,500 arms with 400 rounds each is considered excessive, and that the desirability of substantially reducing it should be borne in mind when considering the question of future imports into Kuwait territory.



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Memo. No. 779 M., dated Calcutta, the 23rd (received 24th) January 1912
(Confidential).

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India in the Marine Department,

To—The Foreign Department.

* Copy of a letter from His Excellency the
Naval Commander-in-Chief, No. 19-1462 III,
dated the 21st January 1912, and enclosure.

} Forwarded* for information.

No. 19-1462 III, dated H. M. S. "Highflyer" at Calcutta, the 21st January 1912
(Confidential).

From—His EXCELLENCY REAR-ADMIRAL SIR E. J. W. SLADE, K.C.V.O., K.C.I.E.,
Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Squadron,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Marine Department.

I have the honour to forward the attached copy of a telegram, which I have addressed to the Admiralty on the subject of affairs in Persia, for the information of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council.

Telegram No. 6, dated the 20th January 1912.

From—The Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Squadron,
To—The Admiralty.

Affairs in Persia. The unruliness of the tribes in Fars and Laristan is to be greatly accounted for by the facility with which arms and ammunition can be obtained from the Trucial Coast, and Al Bida and Kuwait. It is known that large quantities are going to these places from Maskat, partly by land and partly by sea. The tribes are at present mostly armed with small bore modern rifles the ammunition for which cannot be refilled. The older rifles, the cartridge cases of which could be filled with black powder many times, are mostly sold to tribes further north and east.

The only routes by which the ammunition can be obtained are—

1. Through Russia.
2. Through Turkey *via* Baghdad.
3. Across the Gulf.

The first and second are not practicable at present for large supplies, and if we stop the third, the movement amongst the tribes must come to an end soon for want of ammunition.

At a conference on 20th January at which the general policy to be pursued was discussed, it was decided that the blockade should be made as stringent as possible. At the request of the Viceroy and Governor-General of India I have ordered the "Proserpine" to proceed immediately to the Persian Gulf.

I would further submit that this squadron may be temporarily increased by one additional ship so as to allow the long length of coast from Kishm to the Shatt-el-Arab (500 miles) to be efficiently watched.


Addressed to the Admiralty; repeated to the Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf.

Telegram, No. 13, dated the 20th January 1912.

From—The Commander-in-Chief

To—The Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf ("Fox").

(As above.)





32

85

Memo, No. 779 M., dated Calcutta, the 2
(Confidential)

From—The Assistant Secretary to the Government,

To—The Foreign Department.

* Copy of a letter from His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief, No. 19—1462 III, dated the 21st January 1912, and enclosure. } For

No. 19—1462 III, dated H. M. S. "Highflyer"
(Confidential)

From—His Excellency Rear-Admiral Naval Commander-in-Chief, East

To—The Secretary to the Government of

I have the honour to forward the information have addressed to the Admiralty on the subject of information of His Excellency the Viceroy's Council.

Telegram No. 6, dated the

From—The Commander-in-Chief, East

To—The Admiralty.

Already read m/p
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Addressed to the Admiralty; repeated to the Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf.

Telegram, No. 13, dated the 20th January 1912.

From—The Commander-in-Chief

To—The Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf ("Fox").

(As above.)



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No. 3044, dated Bushire, the 2nd (received 11th) December 1911 (Confidential).

From—The LIEUTENANT-COLONEL P. Z. COX, C.S.I., C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to refer to the correspondence ending with Foreign Department telegram * No. 513 S., dated 1st September 1911, accepting the safe-

* Serial No. 105, Part IX.

guards proposed by the Political Agent, Kuwait, in connection with the import of arms by Shaikh Mubarak.

2. Captain Shakespear in his letter No. C.—68, dated the 4th October 1911, of which I enclose a copy, reported the arrangements finally come to with the Shaikh, but there were one or two points on which I wished to assure myself by reference to Kuwait before sending the papers on to Government.

When Captain Shakespear's reply was received I was much pre-occupied with arrangements for landing the Cavalry and regret that this despatch to Government got overlooked.

3. The arrangement arrived at is not completely satisfactory, but I agree with the Political Agent in thinking that no useful purpose will be achieved by pressing the Shaikh further as to details.

The Political Agent, Maskat, has received the necessary instructions for co-operation, but Shaikh Mubarak had not up to the time I left Maskat made any commencement of shipping the arms.

NOTE.—Office copy was signed by Resident.

No. C.—68, dated Kuwait, the 4th October 1911 (Confidential).

From—CAPTAIN W. H. I. SHAKESPEAR, Political Agent, Kuwait,

To—the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

With reference to the correspondence ending with your endorsement No. 2323, dated the 6th September 1911, I have the honour to enclose herewith copy and translation of a letter received from Shaikh Mubarak on the subject of the arms required by him together with a list of such arms as are actually at present his property, showing their distribution.

2. The Shaikh's registers were very ill-kept and confused and the list furnished herewith was the result achieved by some three days' work on the part of two of his clerks; I trust, therefore, its details will suffice.

3. Shaikh Mubarak informs me that he has not included in the attached list the Magazine arms and ammunition he received under our auspices from Maskat at the end of 1910 and these I calculate to aggregate some 400 weapons with 160,000 rounds of ammunition additional to the figures given by the Shaikh as at present in his ware-house. I believe the figures in the Shaikh's list to be substantially correct, most of the headmen named being personally known to me as employed by the Shaikh.

4. With regard to the arms for which permission to ship from Maskat is about to be granted the Shaikh has undertaken:—

- (a) That in the event of their arrival during the Political Agent's absence, they shall be stored separately and not opened until his return;
- (b) that in the event of their being urgently required the Head Clerk of this Agency will be asked to note numbers and quantities himself of those about to be removed;
- (c) that the Political Agent may examine the consignment on their arrival or on his return to Head-quarters;
- (d) that all subsequent issues will be notified to the Political Agent as made.

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These safeguards will suffice in my opinion for us to maintain an adequate check over the Shaikh's arms.

5. In amplification of the Shaikh's letter to me it may be observed that the Shaikh explains the large expenditure of his ammunition by the fact that the arms trade in Kuwait having been strictly prohibited for the past two years, he is compelled to supply the wants of his townspeople and tribesmen from his own stocks, and as he estimates that his people both in the town and outside possess as their own property some 36,000 weapons, the expenditure of ammunition is certainly likely to be heavy.

6. It will be observed that in his letter the Shaikh states definitely for the first time that he recovers the value of arms he supplies to those of his subjects who can afford to pay for them. I am not sure whether this fact was quite realised originally, though it was not to be expected that the Shaikh would play benevolent god-father to all the youths in Kuwait without extracting a *quid pro quo*. Accordingly in acknowledging the Shaikh's letter, I observed, in order to emphasise the necessity for straight-forward dealing that the point was hitherto unknown to us; and, for the same reason, that the progressive increase of his requirements in each letter was liable to give rise to suspicion.

I am of opinion that though the Shaikh now fully realises the necessity of being perfectly straight-forward with us in the matter of his requirements, it will not be wise to harass him in too inquisitorial a manner, for he can, and probably then would, take steps to supply himself secretly.

7. I have the honour, therefore, to recommend that permission for shipment of the consignment sanctioned may now be given effect to, and the Political Agent, Maskat, directed to furnish this office with copies of the passes as issued to the respective dhows.

Translation of a letter from Shaikh Mubarak-as-Subah, Ruler of Kuwait, to Captain W. H. I. Shakespear, Political Agent, Kuwait, dated the 10th Shawal 1392 (4th October 1911).

After compliments.—Let it not be hidden from Your Honour that when arms used to come to these parts my subjects in the town and the tribesmen used to purchase their requirements for arming themselves, but when the Precious Government forbade, and I, in obedience to the order of the Government, prohibited the bringing of weapons to my town either openly or secretly, and now when my subjects, the towns-people and the tribesmen, owing to the continuance of the regard of the Government and its men (representatives) on all have increased their strength in numbers and property, they require more arms for the arming of their youths who leave school in every year. And as to those capable who can bear the price of a rifle or more and who before the prohibition could buy their requirements now ask from me, I submit their state to the Government and I beg them (the Government) to ease their necessity. It is incumbent on us and all our subjects to use weapons for the safeguarding of our merchandise which goes to Nejd and for our tribesmen and for the protection of our tribesmen for all the tribes, whether people of Nejd or of the north or of the south, all their weapons are firearms and ready in their possession and it is necessary to meet them with the like and so we in these two days have convinced ourselves of their exceeding need in each year and their need allowing for wastage is 3,500 arms and with each gun 400 cartridges, of which 500 rifles will come to us and 3,000 for our people and tribesmen, who will pay for them at the cost price to me and their requirements in cartridges for their old weapons which belong to them themselves and to me, three lakhs of cartridges. These are our requirements and our people's of weapons and the Government's regard is the higher (in our estimation), and we are obedient to the Government's order and its wishes in every circumstance. You requested me to show you the detail of the weapons which are my own. According to your request will be found a sheet with the details of the arms which are our own, 3,600 weapons. This is what was necessary and may you be preserved.

10th Shawal 1329 (4th October 1911).

MUBARAK-AS-SUBAH.



Statement of the arms which are Shaikh's own property.

TRANSLATION.

	Arms
With Saad bin Mathi and his people of the Towatha	860
With the Guards, with the flocks and with the shepherds.	420
With our sons and their servants	130
With our servants in the town	320
With Abdul Karim bin Saced, Chief of Jahra ...	130
With the horse-keepers in the environs and Mahomed-ath-Thafiri.	64
With Matlag bin Masaihin and his people of the Rashaida.	90
With Alyan-ash-Shahri	40
With Fahad Rai-Fahma and his people of the Awazim	140
With Fahad bin Maatiga and Saif bin Saihan and Mubarak al Malaiba and their people.	220
With Ghanim ash-Shahri and his people of the Rashaida.	30
With Tala'a bin Hanaiyah and his people of the Birzan.	45
With the Dushan, Faisal bin Sultan, and Haza and Faisal bin Majid and Haif al Fugam,	85
With Hatab and Saad al Haifi	2
With Ali Dabus and Jasim Dabus	4
With our servants at Fao	320
With Abdur Rahim bin Rashid and brothers at Fao	100
With each weapon 50 rounds. Total 150,000 cartridges.	3,000
With us in our godowns in Kuwait 26,000 „	6,000
Total Cartridges 176,000 Arms	3,600

Translation of a letter from the Captain W. H. I. Shakespear, Political Agent, Kuwait, to Shaikh Mubarak-as-Subab, Ruler of Kuwait, No. 458, dated the 4th October 1911.

After compliments—We have received with the hand of friendship your letters of the 5th and 10th Shawal together with the list and their contents have been understood. But it is incumbent upon me that I should make plain to Your Honour that until it has not become known to the Government in what way will proceed this arrangement between us for the informing of issues and returns of your arms and ammunition it does not profit to discuss of things of the distant future and of what you have mentioned of the necessity for arms for purposes of defence, this Your Honour has explained verbally and in writing to the Resident, to the Admiral and to me and it is known to the Government and it is established with them. But let it not be hidden from Your Honour that the increasing of the numbers of arms and cartridges which you mention in each letter more than in that before it, in my opinion will not profit you because it is possible to become a source of doubt to the Government. And of the portion of those capable of my (your) people of (bearing) the price of



arms that you take from them the cost price to you this was not known up to the present neither to the Government nor to me, but I will inform the Government concerning it and the order is with them. This is what was necessary to write and May you be preserved.

4th October 1911.
10th Shawal 1329.

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No. 3045, dated Bushire, the 2nd (received 11th) December 1911 (Confidential).

From—J. H. BILL, Esq., First Assistant Resident (in the absence of the Resident),
To—The Secretary to the Government of India, in the Foreign Department.

With reference to the current negotiations with Maskat in connection with the arms traffic, I have the honour, under instructions from the Resident, to forward for the information of the Government of India, translations of—

(i) A Memorandum given privately and confidentially by Colonel Cox to His Highness the Sultan, embodying the purport of communications previously made to him verbally.

(ii) A letter, dated 11th November, from His Highness the Sultan to the Resident on which the latter's telegram* No. M.—8 of same date was based.

* Serial No. 17.

Translation of a Memorandum furnished to His Highness the Sultan of Maskat confidentially and privately, for his personal information on the subject of the Arms Traffic, dated the 7th November 1911.

A combination of recent developments appear to Government to have created a juncture which necessitates a fresh and frank discussion of the outlook with Your Highness.

As you well know, the present illicit traffic in arms and ammunition across the Gulfs of Oman and Persia from Maskat constitutes a great menace to vital British interests on the North-West Frontier of India.

It is imperative for the British Government to eradicate this traffic or to keep it down to insignificant proportions by one means or another and His Majesty's Government are determined to maintain measures to that end. As we have informed Your Highness, we have been engaged for a considerable time past in endeavouring to effect the object in view conveniently by inducing the French Government to come to an amicable arrangement with Your Highness and ourselves, which, with Your Highness's co-operation, would render possible the introduction of an absolute prohibition against the free import and export of arms to and from Maskat territory;—we agreeing privately with Your Highness to give you fair compensation in respect of loss of income which might result to you. As long as there was expectation of these negotiations with France being brought to an early and successful conclusion our friendly regard for Your Highness personally prompted us to refrain from taking full advantage of the strict letter of your delegation of authority to His Majesty's Navy and to restrict our operations as far as possible to the high seas and the opposite coast, and thus to avoid taxing you with frequent demands for co-operation or other active measures likely to bring you into difficulties with your own subjects. While well aware that Your Highness has derived a considerable amount of profit from the existence of the contraband traffic in question, nevertheless the British Government judging from the reports of the local Agents, readily believe that the traffic has also been a source of constant worry and anxiety to Your Highness from which you would not be sorry to find relief.



The fresh developments constituting the juncture above referred to are these :—

The negotiations with France, though in progress, have been interrupted and protracted by the incidence of other political events, and it must be some time longer before they reach finality.

Secondly, the British Government notice with great disappointment and concern that Your Highness appears no longer to consider that your obligations to them make it incumbent upon you to maintain even a neutral attitude towards the illicit trade and that you have for some time past unmistakeably identified yourself with the arms dealing fraternity and especially with those who are mainly responsible for the traffic through Mekran which has been so prejudicial to our interests.

In no circumstances will there be any alteration in the determination of the Government of India to cope with the traffic by all means in their power. If, however, the means used continue to be those which are now in force, and if Your Highness perseveres in your present attitude of active countenance to the operations of the arms dealers, then the inevitable result must be the interruption of those cordial relations which have now so long existed between the British Government and Your Highness and your ancestors. This is a prospect which we feel sure you will contemplate with great concern, as do His Majesty's Government, and therefore in your own interests and as the holder of a high British decoration Government have decided to afford Your Highness another opportunity for co-operating with them seriously for bringing about the effective control of the trade by means of certain measures which in the opinion of the Government, will serve to keep an effective check on the illicit traffic, without in any way interfering with the supply of the legitimate wants of Oman or conflicting with Your Highness's obligations under Treaty.

The chief item for which Your Highness's co-operation is asked, is the creation of a bonded warehouse for arms and ammunition under very strict supervision. All arms in Maskat and all those entering in future whether for sale or export would be conducted under a complete system for marking, registration and certified Port Clearance. Government think that such an arrangement would quickly relegate the trade to its legitimate proportions, but recognise that by its introduction Your Highness's income would be reduced to some extent; and although Your Highness must admit that you are not morally entitled to compensation for loss of profit derived from an illicit trade directly hostile to the interests of the Power to which you are most strongly allied and indebted, yet we recognise the difficulty of your position and are prepared to give you reasonable compensation, in the increase of your subsidy by so much per month or per annum, in consideration of your adopting these arrangements, and so long as they are effectively maintained.

As regards the stocks of rifles already lying with dealers in Maskat, Your Highness appears to be entitled, as a matter of municipal administration, and owing to the necessity for ensuring the safety of the town from explosions or raids by Bedouins (as have happened before), to oblige all owners of stocks to deposit them in the bonded magazine, to be sold under the safeguards provided under the arrangement above proposed. In the same way the arms lying with us may be handed over to Your Highness for deposit in the magazine.

It is, of course, well understood between us that, if the arrangement introduced at Maskat results in attempt to import arms to another port in Your Highness's territory, you will be prepared to introduce a similar arrangement there in consultation with us.

Maskat,
7th November 1911.

P. Z. Cox.

Translation of a letter from H. H. Sir Seyyid Faisal bin Turki to Lieutenant-Colonel P. Z. Cox, C.S.I., C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, dated Maskat, 19 Zilkaadeh 1329 (11th November 1911).

After compliments.—I address Your Honour with reference to the conversation we have had on the subject of the Arms Traffic.



It is true that I have found it difficult to understand, and have felt hurt at the non-receipt of final answers of relief from Government or yourself, in connection with certain incidents which have taken place in the course of the operations of British Men-of-War for the suppression of the Arms Traffic, in regard to which it has seemed to me that my rights and losses have been overlooked or made light of. I have likewise, as is not hidden from you, felt injured that Government should have left me so long in the state of difficulty and anxiety into which I have been thrown by the result of the measures taken by them.

But in the course of the frank exchange of views that there has been between us you have explained to me that the delay has not been due to neglect but to other considerations, and in connection with these incidents you have to some extent relieved my feelings. At any rate I trust you will explain to Government that as long as I can count on the endurance of their friendly and considerate attitude towards me and my well-being, it is altogether contrary to my thoughts and wishes to pursue a course opposed to concord between us, and so to disturb these intimate relations between myself and the British Government, which have been of so much importance and assistance to me in the past days.

With regard to the statement which you have communicated to me with the authority of Government, I have understood and thought over what you told me and beg you will inform Government that :—

Firstly.—As I have repeatedly declared to you, provided that the British Government takes upon itself all responsibility to the French Government, both verbally and practically, and makes such intimation to them as may become necessary, I am quite ready to carry out such requisite measures as Government may advise me to take in the direction of the prohibition of the import of arms altogether.

Secondly.—If the Government of Great Britain and France desire to refer the matter to the Hague Tribunal, as they did the case of the flag question, I am quite agreeable, and will entrust my interests in regard to this Arms Traffic question to the British Government.

Thirdly.—As to the local measures which you have indicated to me in connection with the arms traffic : if primarily there be nothing in them incompatible with the provisions of treaties existing between me and other Powers I am ready to co-operate with you on the line which you have indicated, conditionally on terms which you and I will now discuss ; and I trust that we shall arrive at a satisfactory result.

It appears to me, however, that it would not be possible to inaugurate the new measures, to be devised between us, without giving adequate notice of their inception to the public, say, a notice of two or three months. I also hope that you will give me facilities for obtaining such weapons and cartridges as I may need for the ordinary purposes of my administration.

Fourthly.—What I ask from Government in return is that they compensate me for the loss which I have suffered in the past two years, and likewise that they will make good to me the loss and deficit which I shall suffer in the future, in such a manner as may be arranged between us, and that payment of the latter allowance be by monthly instalments.

Lastly.—I would request that in the course of these negotiations Your Honour will adjust the two or three matters affecting my subjects which have not yet been settled up, and about which I have received no final answer.

This is what had to be said.

With my best compliments.

Maskat :

19th Zilkaadeh 1329.

23

FAISAL BIN TURKI.



58 58

Register No.
1817

Minute Paper. **Secret Department.**

Scap's Letter from India, 43 M Dated 19 October 1911.
Rec. 4 November

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	8 Nov.	Atk	Arms Traffic.
Secretary of State			
Committee	10	Wk	Smuggling of arms into Koweit in cases of sugar.
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State			

LA

Copy to
To. } 6 November
Army


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
"Lewis Hampton" & "Berthe Richmond"
are bogus names.

Seen Pol Com'ee,
14 NOV 1911

Previous Papers:— 4440

9549. I. 2127. 2000.—11/1910.





No. 182—1462 XIV K., dated Diyatalawa, the 23rd August 1911 (Confidential).

From—His EXCELLENCY REAR-ADMIRAL SIR EDMOND SLADE, K.C.I.E., M.V.O.,
Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Squadron,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Marine Department.

In continuation of my telegram No. 72, dated 2nd instant, in which the seizure was communicated of rifles on board the British Indian Steam Navigation Company's S.S. "Palameotta" in the Persian Gulf, which took place on the 31st July 1911, be pleased to lay before His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council the annexed copy of a letter, dated 9th instant, that I have received from the Hon'ble Mr. W. Graham of Bombay, reporting the seizure of a further consignment of rifles on board the Hansa line S. S. "Moltkefels" at Bombay.

2. It would seem that this method of smuggling arms is now being employed in a more systematic manner than was generally supposed, and I would, therefore, suggest that instructions should be given to the Customs at Bombay and other ports for a careful scrutiny to be held of all transshipment cargo for the Persian Gulf. I am asking the Governor of Ceylon to give similar instructions with regard to Colombo, in case any rifles, &c., should be passed through that port.

Dated Bombay, the 9th August 1911.

From—W. GRAHAM, Esq., Malabar Hill, Claremont,

To—His EXCELLENCY REAR-ADMIRAL SIR EDMOND SLADE, K.C.I.E., M.V.O., Naval
Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Squadron.

Arms Traffic.

As I felt sure you would be interested to know, I wired you on Monday afternoon to inform you that 56 rifles had been discovered, concealed in a shipment of loaf sugar per one of our Hansa steamers for transshipment to Kuwait.

The discovery of these rifles was rather a piece of luck. A former shipment, which had been transhipped to the B. I. S. N. "Palameotta" had gone forward to Kuwait. During discharge, one of the Arab coolies employed smashed open one of the cases in order to steal some of its contents. In doing so, he discovered that the case contained some rifle barrels concealed in it, and he, therefore, brought the matter to the notice of the tally clerk, who in turn brought the matter to the notice of the Chief Officer of the "Palameotta". The goods were confiscated, and I understand that the rifles are now on board the "Fox".

The Customs received information from Bushire just in time to enable them to detain and search the 29 cases of sugar by the "Moltkefels", with the result that they discovered these rifles. The rifles were very cleverly concealed in middle of the packages, the stocks and barrels being packed separately.

The rifles which are of the latest type of Mauser (1911) are beautiful weapons, and must be worth at least £10 each.

This shipment of sugar by the "Moltkefels" is the third that has come forward. I attach for information particulars of the three shipments. The first shipment by the "Lichtenfels", which was transferred to the B.I. "Madura," I am afraid, got through without detection. As you will notice from the particulars, which I attach the shippers are apparently English firms. The firm in the first two instances being Bertie Richmond & Co., Ltd., and in the third case, Lewis Crampton & Co., which makes it all more disgraceful.

I wired home at once to the Chairman of the Hansa Line to take steps to prosecute the forwarding Agents (H. Reynardts) for false declaration.

I am having a list prepared in my office here of all goods which these Agents (Reynardts & Co.) have forwarded for transshipment to the Coast Ports, Mormugao, Cochin, Tuticorin, &c., so as to enable the Customs to take steps to prevent arms being smuggled into the country in this manner.



As regards transhipment cargo for the Persian Gulf coming out by the Hansa and Hamburg American Line Steamers. Since my return from the Gulf in January, I have myself scrutinized very carefully the list of all such cargo, and have, on several occasions, inspected cases of nails, &c., that were being forwarded to Bahrain, Bushire and Basra. But, though, I was on the look-out for anything of a suspicious nature, I never for a moment thought that an attempt would be made to smuggle rifles concealed in cases of sugar, especially when the shipments were made by English firms.

It is really very disgraceful that any British firm should have acted in this manner.

I am writing fully by the outgoing mail to the Managing Director of the Hansa line, and also to our London firm to make most careful investigations, so as to prevent a repetition of this.

I am in close touch with Mr. Gubbay, the Collector of Customs here, and will keep him closely posted with all goods that come forward either by our Hansa or Hamburg American Boats, so as to prevent further smuggling of rifles in this way.

* * * * *

Previous Consignments.

S.S. "C. Fred Lacisz" (Hamburg American) arrived 30th June 1911.

K.K.B. 1-25—25 cases sugar for Kuwait from Antwerp went forward per British India Steam Navigation Company's S.S. "Palameotta" about 6th July 1911.

2. Rifles seized at Kuwait.

Shippers—Bertie Richmond & Co.

Forwarding Agents—H. Reynardts & Co., Shipping Agency, Antwerp.

S.S. "Lichtenfels" (Hansa Line) arrived 9th March 1911.

K. K. B. 1-25—25 cases sugar for Kuwait from Antwerp went forward per British India Steam Navigation Company's S.S. "Madura".

Voyage 349 about 18th March 1911.

1. Undetected.

Shippers—Bertie Richmond & Co., Ltd.

Forwarding Agents—H. Reynardts & Co., Shipping Agency, Antwerp.

S.S. "Moltkefels" (Hansa Line).

B-L particulars.

Mark—A.B.R. 1-29—29 cases sugar.

Shippers—Lewis Crampton & Co.

3. (50) Rifles seized by Customs in Bombay.

Forwarding Agents—H. Reynardts & Co., Shipping Agency, Antwerp.

Destination—Kuwait.

Consigned to "Order" at Kuwait.

B.-L. dated Antwerp 1st July 1911.

No. 186-1462 XIV K., dated H. M. S. "Highflyer" at Colombo, the 31st August 1911
(Confidential).

From—His Excellency Rear-Admiral Sir Edmond Slade, K.C.I.E., M.V.O.,
Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Squadron,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Marine Department.

With reference to my letter No. 182—1462 XIV K. of 23rd of August 1911, relative to the smuggling of arms to the Persian Gulf, be pleased to acquaint His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council that arrangements have been made with His Excellency the Governor of Ceylon that any cargo for transhipment to the Persian Gulf which may arrive at Colombo and on examination be found to contain arms will be confiscated.



3

No. 7216-7220-88, dated Simla, the 28th September 1911 (Confidential).

From—A. C. McWATERS, Esq., Under-Secretary to the Government of India
in the Department of Commerce and Industry,


To—
 { The Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Revenue Department.
 { The Secretary to the Government of Madras, Revenue Department.
 { The Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Financial Department.
 { The Secretary to the Government of Burma, Revenue Department.
 { The Secretary to the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam, Financial
 Department.

I am directed to say that it has been reported to the Government of India that two cases have recently occurred in which attempts were made to smuggle arms to the Persian Gulf in consignments of sugar manifested for transshipment to Kuwait.

2. Twenty-five cases marked "K. K. B. 1—25 sugar, from Antwerp to Kuwait," arrived in Bombay on the 30th June last by the Hansa and Hamburg American line steamer S. S. "Ferdinand Laeisz" and were transhipped to the British India Steam Navigation Company's steamer S. S. "Palamcottah" for Kuwait. During discharge one of the cases was accidentally damaged and on examination it was discovered to contain rifles. On a search being made of the whole consignment 50 rifles were found concealed in ten of the cases. The shippers in this case were Bertie Richmond & Co., and the forwarding agents H. Reynardts & Co., Antwerp. The name of the consignees is not known, but they are believed to be a German firm of Kuwait.

3. A further consignment of rifles has since been discovered by the Bombay Customs authorities in certain cases of sugar which arrived in Bombay by the Hansa liner S. S. "Moltkefels", bearing marks A.R.B. These cases also were shipped at Antwerp and were manifested for transshipment to Kuwait. The sugar was packed in layers and the rifles were very cleverly concealed in the middle of the packages, the stocks and barrels being packed separately. The shippers in this case were Lewis Crampton & Co. and the forwarding agents H. Reynardts & Co.

4. As it appears from these cases that this method of smuggling arms to the Persian Gulf is now being employed in a systematic manner, I am to request that, with the permission of ^{His Excellency the Governor in Council} ~~His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor in Council~~, the customs authorities may be instructed to keep a strict watch over all cargo manifested for transshipment to the Persian Gulf.





No 2544 (Confidential), dated Bushire, the 30th September (received the 9th October) 1911.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL P. Z. COX, C.S.I., C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—THE HON'BLE LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SIR HENRY MCMAHON, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.


I have the honour to forward herewith, in continuation of my telegram No 843 of 4th instant, a copy of the report furnished by the Political Agent, Kuwait, on the Marafi family of Kuwait, and their trading operations.

2. The device of bringing contraband arms to Kuwait concealed in cases of loaf sugar seems to have been resorted to just about the time when Messrs. Wöckhaus' Agents were turning active attention to Kuwait (*vide* my telegram No. 395 of 30th April), and it is at all events not improbable that the Marafis were put up to this method of introduction by the German firm.

3. It would seem advisable to await receipt of further information as to the result of the action of the Bombay Customs Authorities in regard to the consignment seized there, before making any special representations to Shaikh Mubarak on the subject of the Marafi family.

NOTE ON THE MARAFI FAMILY (PERSIANS) OF KUWAIT.

The principal members of the Marafi family in Kuwait are given in the following genealogical table:—



The above table gives the more important members, there being a number of others, both present in Kuwait and in Behbahan, from which district the family originally came.

2. They trade in the names of Haji Abdul Karim Behbani and Ismail bin Mahomed Ali Marafi. Between them the family owns two large sea-going vessels, two smaller "booms" trading between the Persian coast and Kuwait and one "water-boom."

3. Their relations with the Shaikh are, and I believe have always been, most friendly—Ismail was the man the Shaikh selected to purchase his arms in Maskat, probably because of his knowledge but also I have no doubt because the Shaikh places considerable confidence in the family.

4. The family's business is in food-stuffs. They purchase and ship dates from the Shatt-el-Arab to India in the autumn by their own two vessels and also by other chartered buggalows. From India these two boats return with timber spices, rope, coffee, etc. The other two boats are employed most of the year between Kuwait, Hindian, Mashur and Basrah carrying barley, wheat and probably also in smuggling tea, arms, and other articles which pay high duties into



Persia by the northern Gulf ports. The firm's imports by steamers are not as large as might be expected, consisting chiefly of rice. It is also the fact I believe that they finance some of the local shroffs in the bazaar. The above may be said to be their ostensible business.

5. Anterior to 1910 the family shared with the other Persian house of Haji Mahomed Taqi the distinction of being the largest wholesale arms-dealers in Kuwait and their boats were largely employed in the arms traffic between Maskat and this port: at that time there seems to be no doubt the sale and purchase of arms and ammunition was their main business and at the end of 1909 they were reported to have a stock of nearly 6,000 rifles and 1,500 cases of ammunition on their premises. How far they have succeeded in keeping up the trade it is difficult to conjecture but there seems little doubt that they constantly attempt smuggling and should their boats escape the Naval patrol there is every likelihood of their being able to land the arms in Kuwait without the Shaikh's knowledge, by the simple expedient of bribing his Customs officials. I was told that they succeeded in importing as much as 500 arms a month but cannot credit figure. Ismail Marafi is in constant communication with Maskat and his agents there are M. Nichan and the Goguyer firm and Mirza Husain. There now seems little doubt that the consignment of so called Loaf Sugar which was over carried by the S. S. "Palancotta", and that captured by the Customs officials in Bombay in the course of transshipment were destined for Ismail Marafi. A search through previous ships' manifests brought the following suspicious consignments to light, of which delivery had been taken as stated below:—

20 cases Loaf Sugar mark M. K. shipped at Maskat, reached Kuwait by S.S. "Bulimba" on the 24th March 1911, and delivery taken by Ismail Marafi.

25 cases Loaf Sugar mark K.K.B. } both transhipped from S.S. "Lichtenfels" to S.S. "Madura" at Bombay, reached Kuwait on 6th April 1911, and delivery taken by Ismail Marafi.

1 case Hardware mark A. J. K. transhipped from S.S. "Lichtenfels" to S.S. "Madura" at Bombay, reached Kuwait on 6th April 1911, and delivered to Haji Mahomed Ali Marafi.

25 cases Loaf Sugar mark K.R.B. discovered in course of landing from S.S. "Palancotta" on 24th July 1911.

If the firm dispose of these arms in Kuwait it must be done secretly for since the Shaikh's prohibition there is no open sale of arms in Kuwait and I imagine that the family finds its best market on the Persian coast.

6. I do not think that either Mahomed Ali or Ismail Marafi have as yet any intimate relations with the German firm of Wöckhaus, though no doubt they sell barley and wheat to this firm as offering them better prices than others—most of the barley purchased this year by Abdulla "Germani" in Kuwait was supplied by the Marafi house.

7. Haji Abdul Karim's son, Abdul Hassan, however is said to have received a large advance from the German firm by way of forward purchase money and that he will buy what he can in Mashur and Hindian, shipping the grain if possible at the Shatt-el-Arab bar into the German Steamers. Beyond this I have heard of no other connection with the German firm.

KUWAIT: } W. H. I. SHAKESPEAR, Captain,
18th September 1911. } Political Agent, Kuwait.



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Minute Paper.

Register No.

1576

Secret Department.

Letter from ^{India,} 3y M

Dated 7 } Sep 6, 1911.
Rec. 25 }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	30 Sept. 11	W	<u>Arms Traffic.</u> Safe-wards in receipt of arms supplied to Koweit. Complicity of Sultan of Muscat in arms traffic. As to a Jask-Bunder Abbas telegram, & an Agency at Sambar.
Secretary of State	2 Oct	St	
Committee	3	E	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State			

Copy to
Adm. } 26 Sep 1911


FOR INFORMATION.


Seen Pol Com ce.
11 OCT 1911

Previous Papers:—

1501
1428
1505

9540. I. 2127. 2000.—11/1910.





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101

No. 173—1462 XIV.-N., dated Diyatalawa, the 7th August 1911.

From—His EXCELLENCY REAR-ADMIRAL EDMOND J. W. SLADE, K.C.I.E., M.V.O.,
Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Squadron,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Marine Department.

With reference to my telegrams * Nos. 68 and 69 of 13th and 16th July 1911, in regard to the capture of two dhows by H. M. S. "Fox" on 11th July with arms and ammunition, be pleased to lay before his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council the accompanying copy of a report, dated 19th July 1911, which has been received from the Senior Naval Officer in the Persian Gulf giving details of the capture.

* Serial Nos. 67 and 43.

2. As stated in my telegram† No. 73 of 3rd August, the dhows have been burnt, the arms and ammunition jettisoned and the crews set at liberty.

† Serial No. 65.

Report of capture of dhows "Hussainyeh" and "Mahomedi" engaged in arms traffic.

H. M. S. "Fox", at Bahrein;

19th July 1911.

No. 40—11.

Sir,

I have the honour to report that, whilst cruising off Muscat, Ras Shaikh Masud, on 11th July, I observed, at 7-30 A.M., two large dhows heading west and almost becalmed to the westward of the great Quoin. On sighting H. M. S. "Fox", one of them altered eight points and attempted to make for Muscat. Considering this suspicious, I stopped and boarded both dhows and, on it being reported that they were both from Sohar with wood, I directed them to be secured one on either side of H. M. S. "Fox", cleared and searched. H. M. S. "Fox", was then in Lat. 26° 30' N. Long. 56° 26' E.

2. The larger of the two, by name "Mahomedi", is a two masted boom, Nakhoda, at the time of capture, Ali Mahomet bin Ali; owned by Hussain bin Zar Mahomet. The latter, I am informed, is his own Nakhoda, but he left his vessel at Sohar and returned to Bushire via Maskat fourteen days before the dhow herself left Sohar. The present Nakhoda is a disreputable looking old man who makes repeated efforts to disclaim his pretensions to the rank, and I think his statement is probably true.

3. The cargo consisted entirely of firewood cut into logs and was transferred to the starboard side of the upper deck of H. M. S. "Fox", and it was not until 10 P.M. that the bottom was reached and carpenters sent down to sound the bottom boards. After a few minutes work, the carpenters having torn out a bottom board, ammunition was found and shortly afterwards rifles.

4. In the meanwhile, similar operations were being carried on with the other dhow on the port side. The name of this boom is "Hussainyeh", Nakhoda Hussain bin Mahomed; owner Hashim of Baraki. She is a moderate sized two masted boom, older than the "Mahomedi", but in good condition.

5. About half-an-hour after the discovery of arms in the "Mahomedi" they were discovered, under similar conditions and in the same relative position concealed in the "Hussainyeh" under her cargo, also of firewood.

6. The crews of both vessels are Tangiseris and number fourteen in each case. Both dhows belong to a party of four which left Tangistan in the middle of April and were known to be intended for carrying arms. The crew themselves appear to be the owners of the wood, whilst the arms are owned by the syndicate of Bushire merchants mentioned in my telegram of 15th July, No. 78, Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf.

7. These are, in the case of "Mahomedi"—Haji Mahomet Shal Mahomet Ali bin Ali and Zahir Haji Khanasir, all of Bushire.



50

In the case of the "Hussainyeh"—Khalfat Ali, Zayir Hassan and Saiyid Muhammad, all of Bushire.

8. The only papers found in the dhows referred to date cargoes of last year, and there was nothing to prove the ownership of either dhows or rifles. They flew no colours, and being rebels to the Government of Persia, appear not to wish to be any way associated with it.

9. The agreement between the owners of the rifles and the crews of the dhows appears to be as follows:—

	Rs.
For each rifle landed in Persia ...	5
For every two pistols landed in Persia ...	5

and, as far as I can make out, each weapon is to carry with it 400 rounds of ammunition.

10. Statement of arms and ammunition seized, &c., is enclosed.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,
JAMES C. TANCRED,
Captain and S. N. O.,
Persian Gulf.

The Commander-in-Chief,
East Indies.

List of arms and ammunition found on board the boom "Mahomedi" captured by H. M. S. "Fox" off Mussendam on 11th July 1911.

Description.	Calibre.	Number.	REMARKS.
Mannlicher Rifles ...	·311	3	Sporting pattern.
Mauser Rifles, 1911 ...	·275	84	Do.
Martini Rifles ...	·303	86	Military pattern.
Lee Speed Rifles ...	·303	3	Do.
Carbines, La Francotte ...	·303	4	
		Total rifles	180
Mauser Pistols ...		18	
AMMUNITION.			
7 Mm.			
Mauser Rifle ...	(·275)	9,450	
Mannlicher Rifle ...	·311	1,200	
Small arm ...	·303	6,560	
Browning Pistol ...		2,400	
		Total Rounds	19,610

H. M. S. "Fox", at Bushire, }
21st July 1911.

JAMES C. TANCRED, Captain.



51

*List of arms and ammunition found on board the boom "Hussainyeh"
captured by H. M. S. "Fox" off Mussendam on 11th July 1911.*

Description.	Calibre.	Number.	REMARKS.
Mauser Rifles, 1911275	61	Sporting pattern.
Mannlicher Rifle311	1	Ditto.
Lee-Speed Rifle303	67	Military pattern.
Martini Rifles303	81	Ditto.
Martini Carbines303	10	Ditto.
Carbine, La Francotte303	9	
Old rifles, Martini45	2	Dhow's arms.
Total rifles		231	
Mauser pistols	9	
Browning pistols	2	

AMMUNITION.

Mauser Rifle275	35,360
Small arms303	51,600
Mauser pistol	8,900
Browning pistol	600
Snider Rifle	20,000
Martini Rifle45	40
Total rounds	...	116,500

H. M. S. "Fox", at BUSHIRE,
The 21st July 1911.

JAMES C. TANCRED, Captain.

*Tonnage, dimensions, &c., of the booms "Mahomedi" and "Hussainyeh"
captured by H. M. S. "Fox" off Mussendam on 11th July 1911.*

"Mahomedi"

Length 78 feet.
Depth 13 feet 3 inches.
Breadth 23 feet.
Tonnage 182.8.

"Hussainyeh"

Length 66 feet.
Depth 15 feet.
Breadth 22 feet.
Tonnage 167.53.

JAMES C. TANCRED,
Captain.

H. M. S. "Fox", at Bushire.
21st July 1911.



52

102

Telegram P., No. S.—513, dated the 1st September 1911.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,

To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

Arms and ammunition for Koweit. Your letter* 2056, 13th August.

* Serial No. 80.

Safe-guards proposed by Shakespear are approved. The Shaikh should be asked to furnish list of arms and ammunition now in his possession and of future distributions. If Shaikh prefers, he may purchase Gras rifles.

Sanction should be held to apply only to present consignment. The question must be reconsidered, in light of experience of adequacy of present arrangement, when Shaikh proposes to make further purchases.

103

Telegram P., No. 73-K., dated the 28th August (received 1st September) 1911.

From—His Britannic Majesty's Consul for Seistan and Kain,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Rumours are prevalent here that a large number of men are preparing at Herat to leave after Ramzan for Mekran to buy rifles.

104

Telegram, No. 833, dated the 1st (received 2nd) September 1911.

From—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

On 27th August, Gumbly reported that an informer stated that Sultan's steamer had landed 1,100 Mausers and a quantity of rounds of ammunition at Sohar for arms, dealers. I instructed Knox to acquaint Sultan of Maskat informally with terms of report and ask him what foundation there was for it, but not to formulate any special remonstrances pending receipt of instructions. Knox reports that Sultan of Maskat replied that report, as received by us, had been spread by Khan Saheb Muhammad Bin Said and was not true, but that between 150 and 200 rifles had gone up in his steamer. If Government of India were to come to direct issue with Sultan of Maskat now over this point, my work with him at end of Ramazan would be considerably prejudiced; therefore, subject to learning your wishes, I would propose to address Sultan of Maskat personally and demi-officially telling him what surprise and concern these reports caused to myself and Government of India, who also received them, and adding that this was one of the matters which I wished to talk to him about at end of Ramazan and hope that pending our meeting he would not afford material for any more of them. Addressed Government of India; repeated Admiral, Bombay.

105

Telegram P., No. S.—514, dated the 4th September 1911.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,

To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

Please refer to your telegram* No. 833, dated the 1st instant. Government of India approve the action proposed by you regarding arms despatched in the steamer belonging to Sultan of Maskat.

* Serial No. 104.



106

No. 1608 E.-A., dated Simla, the 2nd September 1911 (Confidential).

From—The Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department,
To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter* No. 1821, dated the 23rd July 1911, regarding measures for the suppression of the arms traffic.


* Serial No. 58.


2. The Government of India generally agree with you as to the inadequacy of Mr. Gregson's proposals, and I am to forward, for your information, a copy of a letter† No. 150—1462-XIV K., dated the 11th July 1911, from His


† Serial No. 63.

Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief on the subject. At the same time the Government of India believe that the extension of the telegraph line from Jask to near Bandar Abbas, solely in the interests of the stoppage of the arms traffic, would prove a very expensive measure, while the Persian Government would probably strongly resent the formation of what would practically be a Levy Corps in Persian territory, even though they were called line-guards. With reference to your proposal to reopen the question of the establishment of a British Agency at Bampur, I am to say that, in view of the strong opposition shown to the appointment by the Persian Government in the past, the Government of India are not disposed to bring forward the proposal again at present.

3. The whole question will require to be re-considered in the event of the discontinuance of the naval blockade. The Government of India, however, agree with the opinion that you have elsewhere expressed that blockade operations must be continued for the present.









80

No. 2056, dated Bushire, the 13th (received 21st) August 1911 (Confidential).

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL P. Z. COX, C.S.I., C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

With reference to the correspondence ending with Foreign Department telegram* No. S—410, dated 10th July 1911, I have the honour to forward, for

* Serial No. 28.

No. C.—51, dated 31st July 1911.

favour of consideration, a copy of a communication received from the Political Agent, Kuwait, reporting the result of his discussion with Shaikh Mubarak of the measures best calculated to supply an effective check upon the subsequent life-history of the arms and ammunition imported by the latter with our permission.

2. In my letter† No. 1256 of 14th May, I suggested that the rifles be branded with a special device before leaving Maskat, and that the arrangements regulating their issue should be subject to the supervision of the Political Agent.

† Serial No. 150, Part VIII.

As regards the cartridges, apart from the said supervision of their issue by the Political Agent, I could only suggest our requiring a proportion of empty cases to be returned.

Captain Shakespear and Shaikh Mubarak, in modification of the above, contemplate the stamping of the barrels on arrival at Kuwait with the recognised mark of the Shaikh.

3. This arrangement would enable the Shaikh to stamp all rifles coming into Kuwait, with or without our permission, and would not(?) provide a check on the numbers used in Kuwait territory. On the other hand, it would be just as efficacious so far as concerns the contraband trade into Persia, because any weapon found in Persia or *en route* to Persia with the Kuwait mark on it would be *ipso facto* liable to confiscation.

Whether the arms are branded at Maskat or Kuwait seems to make little difference so long as the consignments are supervised by His Majesty's Ships on their way from Maskat to Kuwait, as they will be. Subject, therefore, to the Government of India's approval, I think the Kuwait suggestion under this head may stand.

4. The other details for supervision of the issue and storage of rifles are satisfactory, but I think Shaikh Mubarak should be asked to allow the Political Agent to check the munitions with the list at any time he may wish after, say, 24 or 48 hours' notice.

5. The question of the ammunition while no less important is a much less simple one to deal with. The only further suggestion I can make is that we should require the Shaikh in future to order through a British firm, who would be required to have the cartridge cases stamped with the Kuwait mark before exportation. I do not fancy Shaikh Mubarak would object to this course, but it would not be possible to bring it into force in connection with the present consignment.

6. The crux of the position is that Shaikh Mubarak, if he really needs the munitions, will no doubt get them up by land if we do not comply with what he considers his reasonable needs.

Six months or a year hence we may be in a stronger position than we are now, both in regard to the arms traffic question and the status of Kuwait, and, on the whole, I would advise Government to accept the present proposals (including the right of the Political Agent to check the magazine) and, if necessary, work out a more fully efficacious system before he asks for another consignment.

If it is possible for Government to communicate their decision by telegram, I request the favour of that being done.



No. C.—51, dated Kuwait, the 31st July 1911 (Confidential).

From—CAPTAIN W. H. I. SHAKESPEAR, Political Agent, Kuwait,
To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.


In reply to your letter No. 1756, dated the 11th July 1911, I have the honour to submit the following report after consultation and discussion with Shaikh Mubarak regarding the measures necessary to safeguard the arms, for the importation of which permission may be accorded, from reaching undesirable hands.

2. When I informed the Shaikh of the numbers given in paragraph 2 of your letter, he said he would prefer to substitute Gras rifles and ammunition for the Magazine arms and ammunition there mentioned, having found that these weapons are liable to less deterioration in the hands of his people. I replied that I thought there would be no objection to this course so long as the figures remained the same, and to this the Shaikh assented.


3. After discussing possible safeguards the Shaikh said that all his arms were marked with his own "wasm" (family-mark) stamped into the metal of the barrel, and it would be convenient if this could be continued as all past and future arms would then bear the same mark. The mark is a blunt arrow-head with a dot, thus ↑. The Shaikh agreed with my suggestion that if arms bearing his mark were found at sea in the hands of persons who could not satisfy His Majesty's ships-of-war that they held them under the Shaikh's authority, they should be liable to seizure as stolen property, and conversely those without marks being *ipso facto* not the Shaikh's property were therefore contraband and equally liable to seizure. The marking can be done easily enough in Kuwait as the Shaikh possesses the necessary stamps, and the weapon shown to me was quite adequately marked. The Shaikh further said that he maintained lists of his own arms showing how they were distributed at present and was prepared to furnish me with a copy of this existing list; he also undertakes that when new arms are received that they shall be forthwith stamped, and any issue made from them shall be intimated to this Agency with details of number and to whom issued; also that the return of arms to store (as, for instance, at the termination of the pearling season) and any transfer from one holder to another shall be notified to this Agency. This procedure will enable this Agency to maintain a more or less complete register of the distribution of arms in Kuwait, and a fair check of their movement. I trust the above system will meet with approval, for I am unable to suggest any better method, whilst that described has the merit of being for the most part spontaneously suggested by the Shaikh.

4. With regard to the expenditure of ammunition the matter is more difficult. The return of a proportion of the empty cases to which I endeavoured to obtain the Shaikh's concurrence seems almost impossible. The Shaikh tells me he is prepared to furnish details of issues and return as in the case of arms, for unfired ammunition, but fired cases are generally dropped or thrown away in the excitement of a raid, or display of "powder-play," &c, and the return of the remainder is problematical. He avers that he himself is very stringent in the matter of cartridges, issuing them 30 and 40 only at a time and insisting that a second issue shall not be made to a man without adequate explanation of expenditure. Beyond continued stringency of issue and the maintenance of a register of those issues as described above I regret I have no other safeguard to suggest. The return of even a small proportion of the empty cases would be almost as difficult for the Shaikh to enforce as it would be for us to check, apart from producing an undesirable impression that a harassing inquisition was being inaugurated. A considerable amount of the expenditure in ammunition, specially of '450 Martini-Henry cartridges, is by way of presents to Bedouin who come into Kuwait to pay their respects to the Shaikh.

5. I regret I cannot suggest any method which would give more accurate checks, but I venture to think that the system described will furnish a tolerable idea of the distribution of arms in Kuwait or of their movement thence,



and so long as it is certain that these do not find their way across the Persian Gulf and so to our North-West Frontier in India it is a matter of comparatively small moment to us how many are absorbed by the tribes of the interior of Arabia; it may also be observed that, in the event of our refusing or making the conditions too exacting, the Shaikh would inevitably resort to systematic smuggling.





(59) (61)

Register No.
1570
4440

Minute Paper. **Secret Department.**

1) *Sey's Letter from India, 3y 1y* Dated 7 } Sept. 1911
Letter from D. of India to Govt Rec. 25 }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	21 Oct.	AK	Arms Traffic. <i>Was</i> <i>Smuggling of arms to Koweit in cases of sugar</i>
Secretary of State			
Committee	23	KK	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State			

LA


Copy to *20 (57) } 26 Sep 1911 (1570)*
Adm. }
India (4440) 1 Dec. Sep 148

FOR INFORMATION.

sent Pol Comtee,
25 OCT 1911

Previous Papers:—
 402
 422
 153

9549. I. 2127. 2000.—11/1910.





In any further communication on this subject, please quote

No. 40960/11

and address—


The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.



*The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents
his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India
and, by direction of the Secretary of
State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.*

Foreign Office,

October 20, 1911.





Reference to previous letter:


Description of Inclosure.


Name and Date.	Subject.
To Admiralty, Oct. 17, 1911.	Smuggling of arms to Koweit, in cases of sugar.


(Similar letter sent to)
















74 7

Register No.
1536

Minute Paper. **Secret Department.**

Seja's Letter from India, 36 M Dated 31 August 1911.
Rec. 18 September

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	21 Sept.	WJ	<u>Arms Traffic.</u> Another steamer - the 'Moltkefels' - found ^{at Bombay} to be carrying arms shipped as sugar.
Secretary of State	22	WK	
Committee	24	C.	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State			


Copy to
F.O. 22 Sept

FOR INFORMATION.

Seen Pol Comtee.
27 SEP 1911

Previous Papers:—
4226

9549. I. 2127. 2000.—11/1910.





OPY.

1536

(75)

(M)

INDIA OFFICE,

WHITEHALL, S. W.,

19th October, 1911.


Dear McMahon,

(1536) Please see copy of telegram from Bombay Govt. to you dated 23rd August (enclosed in your weekly letter 26M of 31 August) re discovery of rifles disguised as sugar on board S.S. "Palamcotta". Enquiry has been made here, but we cannot hear of any such firms as Lewis Crompton or Bertie Richmond. If you want us to do anything, we shall no doubt hear from you.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) Arthur Hirtzel.

✓ 7





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
1536
29.0
Telegram.

From - The Secretary to the Government of Bombay,
Judicial, Legislative, Political and
Special Department,

To - The Secretary to the Government of India
in the Foreign Department.

Dated the 23rd (recd. the 24th) August 1911.

Your telegram of 31st July to Foreign regarding
discovery of 50 rifles in 25 cases sugar on board "Palamcottah".
Collector of Customs, Bombay, reports cases in question were
marked K.K.B. and were transhipped ex "Ferdinand Laues",
arrived at Bombay 30th June to the "Palamcottah". Cases were
shipped at Antwerp for Kuwait by Bertie Richmond and Company
forwarding agents, H. Reynhardt and Company. Consignees
name cannot be ascertained but believed to be German firm,
Kuwait. Discovery of rifles was due to accidental damage to
one of cases while being unloaded. The rifles were hidden in
10 out of 25 cases. Report of case made by Commander of
"Palamcottah" on his return from the Gulf led to examination of
another consignment of 25 cases of loaf sugar just arrived by
the Hansa liner S.S. "Moltkefels" bearing marks A.R.B. with
the result that 50 mauser rifles about .275 bore of 1911
pattern






(77) (14)

pattern, sighted to 1000 yards manufactured by the Waffen Fabrik mauser Aktien Gesellschaft Ollondorf A/M were found hidden in 10 cases sugar. The sugar was packed in layers. The middle layer was removed and 5 rifles substituted in each of 10 cases. Shippers name Messrs. Lewis Crampton and Company forwarding agents, H. Reynhardt and Company. Collector of Customs, Bombay, reports ~~in~~ further that the manifest of the S.S. "Lichtenfels" also of the Hansa line, which arrived at Bombay 10th March, showed that another lot of 25 cases were transhipped at Bombay to Kuwait. The cases bore the same marks and the shippers and forwarding agents were the same as those in case of consignment per S.S. "Palancotta" and it is probable that they also contained arms.

Addressed Resident, Bushire, repeated Foreign, Simla.





78 75

Register No.
4226

Minute Paper. **Secret Department.**

Letter from *India 70* Dated 12 } September 1911.
Rec. 13 }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
			<i>1000</i> <i>W</i>
Under Secretary.....	13 Sept.	<i>MS</i>	<u>Arms Traffic.</u>
Secretary of State	14	<i>MS</i>	<i>Failure to trace name</i>
Committee	15	<i>E</i>	<i>of the shippers of rifles</i>
Under Secretary.....			<i>from Antwerp put on board</i>
Secretary of State			<i>as sugar.</i>

Copy to India
15 Sept. 1911, Secy No. 37.


FOR INFORMATION.

*See last para. as to the
practice of receiving on
board ship cargo known
to be contraband.*

Seen Por. on re.
20 SEP 1911

Previous Papers:— *4020*

0540. I. 2127. 2000.—11.1910.





4226

M. 4020 x
79 1/6

In any further communication on this subject, please quote
No. 35301
and address—1911
The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.

RECEIVED IN
13 SEP 1911
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents
copies his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for *India*
and, by direction of the Secretary of
State, transmits herewith *copy* of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
September 12, 1911.


Reference to previous letter:
Foreign Office August 9.


Description of Inclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
<i>t. Consul General Lydcotte,</i>	<i>Shipment of Arms to</i>
<i>to 22 Africa, Sept. 6</i>	<i>Koweit.</i>

(Similar letter sent to *Admiralty.*)

[12]





COPY

No 23.

AFRICA.

35301

7 SEP 1911
September 7, 1911.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Despatch No 2 Africa (34192/11) of the 1st instant, and in reply thereto regret to inform you that, notwithstanding enquiries in various directions, I have not been successful in tracing the address of the firm of Bertie Richmond and Company mentioned in the telegram to you from this Office on July 8 last.

I am assured that the Mate's Receipt for the goods shipped was made out in the name of the above mentioned firm, though no address was given. In view of the fact that it has been found impossible to trace the firm, it appears more than probable that a fictitious name was given with a view to veiling the identity of the exporters of the cargo.


Had I been aware of the matter earlier, it would doubtless have been possible to ascertain whence the two portions forming the consignment in question emanated, or


The Right Honourable

from

Sir Edward Grey, Bart., M.P.

&c., &c., &c.





4226.

(81)

(18)

3.

from what places and by what means they reached Antwerp prior to shipment for Bombay. In view of the time which has elapsed since the shipment, and in face of the obvious reticence of the Antwerp shipping agent, I am afraid that it is impossible to procure more information.

I may mention that, apart from the information supplied in my telegram above referred to, I procured from another and entirely different source, a copy of the manifest of the Steamship "C. Ferdinand Laue" for the voyage from Antwerp. On this document no mention was made of the consignment of 25 Cases of Leaf Sugar, nor was the mark referred to given in that document.

I learn that it is frequently the habit of shipowners and their agents to accept cargo known to be contraband under the title "Contents Unknown", the shippers taking all risks, and probably paying well for the facilities accorded.


I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient

humble servant,

(sd) W. Lydell.





(82) (79)

Register No.
1428

Minute Paper. **Secret Department.**

Secy's Letter from India, No. 337. Dated 10 August 1911.
Rec. 28

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	31 Aug.	WJ	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Arms Traffic</u> . WJ</p> <p>The Admiral's views on Mr. Gregory's proposals. *Z. of Venn, Flaget.</p>
Secretary of State			
Committee	1 Sep	WJ	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State			


Copy to
 To. }
 Adm. } 28 Aug. 1911.


FOR INFORMATION.


Seen Pol Comtee,
4 SEP 1911

Previous Papers :—
 1365
 1368.

9549. I. 2127. 2000.—11/1910.









64

Telegram P., No. 735, dated (and received) the 6th August 1911.

From—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Your telegram,* dated 6th May, No. S.—301. The Sultan of Maskat is pressing to learn result of reference to Government of India. Ramazan com-

* Serial No. 124, Part VIII.

mences in 18 days and during that month he will not be disposed to transact any serious business.

65

Telegram P., No. 73, dated the 3rd August 1911.

From—His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief,


To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Marine Department.

On the 1st August 1911, the Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf, wired :—
Begins. No. 84. The ammunition and arms which were captured on 11th July by H.M.S. "Fox" in the two Tangistan booms have been jettisoned and the prisoners have been set free. The booms have been destroyed by burning.

* Serial No. 48.

Ends. This is with reference to Marine Department telegram,* dated the 19th

July 1911, No. 115—239-M.





(85) (42)

Register No.		Secret Department.	
4020			

Letter from *FD.* Dated *8* } August 1911.
 Rec. *9* }

Formally acknowledged _____

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	<i>10 Aug.</i>	<i>ad</i>	<i>Arms Traffic.</i>
Secretary of State			<i>Report of H. M.'s Consul.</i>
Committee			<i>found at Antwerp</i>
Under Secretary.....			<i>on arms shipped as sugar.</i>
Secretary of State			

Send
LA
10/8
Sent for
10.8.

Copy to
FD. of let. to Vic. 12 Aug
rais - see within

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY


Drapt. let. to Vic, asking that
report be communicated to Gov.

10 August - telegram to Viceroy

Seen For Comtee.
 20 SEP 1911
 (with 4226)

Previous Papers:—
3489

8899. I. 1488. 1000.—8/1910.





DRAFT TELEGRAM.

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

VICEROY, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

(Vaforum)

Ketamilla

(Indian F.O. C.C.)

(Take in from
below, in
telegraphing).

Despatched 10 8 1911.

Jul

*Foreign, secret. Please com-
-municate following telegram
to Cox from Consul-General,
Antwerp, to S. of S. for F. A.,
8th Aug. :- (1) Twenty cases*


----- at Koweit (1)


*From Secretary of State to Viceroy, Foreign Department,
10th August 1911.*


Foreign Secret. Please communicate to Cox following telegram from Consul-General, Antwerp, to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 8th August:—"Twenty (sic) cases marked "K.K.B." described as containing loaf sugar were shipped hence to Koweit by H. Reynardts, Antwerp, Agents for English firm named Bertie, Richmond, & Co. Fifteen cases originated from local chocolate factory; remaining ten were carried to Steamship "Ferdinand Lanff" from quay-shed or warehouse. Antwerp firm state that they cannot give address English Company. Cases were consigned to order at Koweit."


ez


Copy to India.





















Immediate
and
Confidential.





The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

presents his compliments to Under Secretary of State
for India & with reference to his letter of the 2nd instant

C. Heston
August 3. and is directed by the Secretary of State to transmit the
accompanying copy of a telegram, as marked in the margin.

Foreign Office,

August 8, 1911.





91 96

Register No.
3989

Minute Paper. **Secret Department.**

Letter from *To Army* Dated *2* 191/.
Rec. *2, 3 August*

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	<i>4 Aug.</i>	<i>AK</i>	<i>Arms Traffic.</i>
Secretary of State			
Committee	<i>5</i>	<i>AK</i>	<i>Further particulars as to Antwerp arms shipped as sugar.</i>
Under Secretary.....			<i>Enquiry ordered by F.O.</i>
Secretary of State			


Copy to
India (*3989*)
18 Aug. 1911, Secy. 33

FOR INFORMATION.

Seen Pol Com. 20 SEP 1911 (with 4226)

Previous Papers:—
2972

9549. I. 2127. 2000.—11/1910.





In any further communication on this subject, please quote
 No. 30232 1911.
 and address—
 The Under-Secretary of State,
 Foreign Office,
 London.

3989
 92 11372
 89

RECEIVED IN
 3 AUG 1911
 POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

immediate
 The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents
 his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India
 and, by direction of the Secretary of State,
 transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,
 August 2, 1911.


Reference to previous letter:
Foreign Office, August 1.



Description of Inclosure.


Name and Date.	Subject.
M. Consul General at Rushire Telegram No. 714. July 31.	already received = 3972/11 Smuggling of Arms
To M. Consul General at Antwerp. Telegram No. 2. Africa, August 2. (Paraphrases)	from Antwerp to

(Similar letter sent to Admiralty)

[12]









In reply quote

M

Confidential.

Admiralty,



2nd August 1911.

Sir,

I am commanded by My Lords Commissioners
of the Admiralty to transmit for the information of the Secretary
of State for India in Council, decypher

of a telegram dated 1st August No. 133 from the
Commander in Chief East Indies reporting the
seizure by H.M.S. "Fox" of arms concealed in the
cargo of the British steamer "Palmacotta".
A copy has been sent to the Turkish office also.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,


C. I. Thomas

The Under Secretary of State,

India Office.

G & S 2409 [7719] 250 3/07v

[SEE OVER.]





3989

Decypher of Telegram

FROM - The C-in-C East Indies, at Colombo.

TO - The Secretary, Admiralty.

DATED -12 August 1911

No:- 1 3 3

Following telegram received from Senior Naval Officer Persian Gulf 31 July (begins) 82 Acting on information received from Master through Resident Persian Gulf "Fox" boarded British India Steam Navigation Company's vessel "Palmacotta" high seas latitude N.25.37 longitude E 57.34 31 July seized as contraband 10 cases of registered sugar but containing addition of rifles. Total amount captured 48 Mauser rifles and sugar ^{forming} surplus, contraband, together with 15 similar cases of sugar only, shipped in steamer C ~~stop~~ Ferd Laeisz at Ras al Arish, transhipped to "Palmacotta" Bombay, taken to Koweit, unclaimed there and were on return journey to Bombay when seized (stop) Consignee at present unknown there is reason to believe they are first consignment of arms to German Firm Koweit, Persian as Manager (stop) Discovered by bursting of (?) a case (stop) Instructions are requested (stop) telegram ends. *Relq. tel. sent to* S.N.O. Persian Gulf No.137 1st August (begins) Your 82 Report action taken as soon as possible regarding 15 similar cases sugar (stop) The whole of consignment contraband and non-contraband is to be landed at Jask pending instructions (ends)

x C's tel. No. 714, 31 July, is:-

"Steamship "C. Ferd Laeisz".

27

+ Locality doubtful.




Decipher of Telegram

FROM - The G-in-C East Indies, at Colombo.
TO - The Secretary, Admiralty.
DATED - 12 August 1911

No: - 133

Following telegram received from Senior Naval Officer
Persian Gulf 31 July (begins) 82 Acting on information received
from Master through Resident Persian Gulf "Tex" boarded British
India Steam Navigation Company's vessel "Palmasotta" high seas
latitude N.25.37 longitude E 57.34 31 July seized as contraband
10 cases of registered sugar but containing addition of rifles.
Total amount captured 48 Mauser rifles and sugar formed surplus
contraband, together with 15 similar cases of sugar only shipped
in steamer C stop Ford Lascar at Ras al Aish, transhipped to
"Palmasotta" Bombay, taken to Koweit, unclaimed there and were
on return journey to Bombay when seized (stop) Consignees at
present unknown there is reason to believe they are first
consignment of arms to German Firm Koweit Persian as Manager
(stop) Discovered by bursting of (?) a case (stop)
Instructions are requested (stop) telegram ends. *For Decipher*
S.N.O. Persian Gulf No. 137 1st August (begins) Your 82
Report action taken as soon as possible regarding 15 similar
cases sugar (stop) The whole of consignment contraband and non-
contraband is to be landed at Jask pending instructions (ends)

* Case for No. 137, 1st Aug. 1911
"Steamship" C. Ford Lascar
T. Ford Lascar



(96) (96)

Register No.
3972

Minute Paper. **Secret Department.**

Letter from **70** Dated } 29 July 1 Aug. 1911
Rec. }


	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	1 Aug.	act	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Arms Traffic</u></p> <p>Intimation to French Govt. as to injury done to us by arms traffic.</p> <p>Seizure of arms shipped at Antwerp for Koweit as sugar.</p> <p style="color: red;">Copy to India - See within</p>
Secretary of State	1	LF	
Committee			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State			


FOR INFORMATION.

Seen Pol Com ee,
20 SEP 1911
(with 1225)

Previous Papers:—

9540. I. 2127. 2000.—11/1910.





Immediate
and
Confidential.

30252
1911

3972

97

97




The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State
for India,

A. Gen. Cox.
7/14 July 31
(3 Copies)
and is directed by the Secretary of State to transmit the
accompanying copies of a telegram, as marked in the margin.

Foreign Office,
August 1, 1911.

[15]





3972

CONFIDENTIAL




Consul-General Cox to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31, 9 P.M.)


(No. 714.)


Bushire, July 31, 1911, 5.5 P.M.

TWENTY-FIVE cases of loaf sugar, marked KKB, were recently consigned from Antwerp to Koweit, and, having been brought to Bombay by steam-ship "C. Ferd Lauer," were there transhipped to British-India steam-ship for Koweit. Ten of them were found to contain arms, and have to-day been seized on the high sea by His Majesty's ship. Kindly instruct His Majesty's representative at Antwerp to endeavour to ascertain from whom consignment emanated.

[730—195]









✓ (100) 97

Register No.
[1360]
1385

Minute Paper. **Secret Department.**

Seay's Letter from India, 31 M
32 M

Dated 27th July
Rec. 14 August 1911.
21 "

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	25 Aug.	AK	Arms Traffic.
Secretary of State	28	NR	
Committee	29	<u>C.</u>	Col. Goo's criticism of Mr. Ferguson's proposals
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State			

Copy to Jo. } 24 Aug. (1360)
Adm. } 22 Aug. (1385)


FOR INFORMATION.

Col. Goo's suggestion in the last sub. pers. of pers. L seems valuable. Mr. G. of I. will doubtless take it up if they think it worth while.

Seen Pol Comtee,
4 SEP 1911
(with 1028)

Previous Papers:—
Boq

9549. I. 2127. 2000.—11/1910.





58

No. 1821, dated Bushire, the 23rd (received 31st) July 1911 (Confidential).

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL P. Z. COX, C.S.I., C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to submit my views on Mr. Gregson's recent proposals in connection with the suppression of the arms traffic, as directed in Foreign Department letter* No. 1129 E.-A., dated the 15th June 1911.

* Serial No. 211, Part VIII.

2. Mr. Gregson starts with the premise that the smuggling of large consignments by Afghans is giving place to a traffic in small quantities by Baluchis and that this change will be established. It seems to me, however, that the change of methods referred to has simply been resorted to for the reason that our blockade operations have made the smuggling of large consignments too risky; and that if, while the import into Maskat remains unrestricted as at present, our blockade measures are relaxed, we may expect a speedy reversion to the former *modus operandi*. Afghans will surely not pay high prices for arms to Baluch middle-men in the hinterland, if by moving in strong parties down to the coast they can get direct delivery of dhow-loads from Maskat.

In fact, Mr. Gregson's suggestions seem to me to be based on a hypothesis which it would be premature to assume.

3. Moreover, even assuming that the Afghans have relinquished for good the practice of coming down to the coast in large parties, I am of opinion that the tract from Biyaban to Bandar Abbas is still by no means adequately provided for by Mr. Gregson's suggested arrangements. It would be essential I think that the telegraph line should be extended from Jask to Minab or Naband (just short of Bandar Abbas) under the provisions of Article 1 of the Telegraph Convention of 2nd April 1868, and that line-guard levies should be provided, as for the Charbar-Jask section.

4. In connection with the general question of a land cordon, however, I would refer to the correspondence of 1908 (especially paragraphs 12 to 17 of letter No. 2094, from the Hon'ble the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, to the Foreign Department); and, again, to Major Webb-Ware's recent memorandum of April 1911, as bearing thereon.

The latter's suggestion that a strong guard for the protection of the telegraph line should be located at Dehanch Baghi seems quite justifiable *vis à vis* the Persian Government and likely to be efficacious, but the question of the bearing of the measures taken by us near the Afghan frontier, upon the Afghan mind, is a factor which the Government of India will take into account and on which I can offer no opinion.

Confining myself then to the Mekran aspect of the question, I am of opinion that with the telegraph line extended through Biyaban and telegraph levies posted along it on the same scale as those proposed for the Charbar-Jask section, combined with the location of a British officer as Consul at Bampur with a strong escort, we should have a fairly effective and not very expensive permanent scheme for keeping Persian Mekran out of mischief in connection with the arms traffic, and keeping Afghans away from the coast.

5. Referring to the question of the appointment of a British Agent to Bampur and, in that connection, to Government of India despatch No. 33 of 15th March 1906 to His Majesty's Secretary of State, I would observe that I do not recollect, if I ever heard them, the precise reasons which made the Government of India unwilling to receive a Persian Consular Official at Quetta, but it seems possible that they may have hinged directly or indirectly on our relations with Russia at the time—relations which have since been greatly modified; and on the other hand it might be practicable to get a British officer to Bampur at the present juncture without reviving the Quetta question, which probably the present Persian régime have forgotten all about.



We are already entitled to place an officer at Bam, and there seems nothing to prevent an officer so appointed from arranging to winter at Bampur. I think there can be no doubt that the location of a British officer there would not only assist us greatly in keeping the subsidised Baluch Mirs up to the mark, but the fact of his presence would also tend materially towards keeping Afghans away.

While the details of measures which may be taken on the coast line depend primarily on the conditions prevailing at any particular time in connection with the import into Maskat, I am of opinion that the appointment of an Agent to Bampur is to be recommended in any case. The region in question is already in our sphere and must sooner or later be opened up to civilisation and the sooner we set about quietly strengthening our influence there the better.

I trust the question will be re-examined.



59

No. 157—1462 XIV N., dated Diyatalawa, the 14th July 1911.

From—His Excellency REAR-ADMIRAL SIR EDMOND J. W. SLADE, K.C.I.E.,
M.V.O., Commander-in-Chief, H. M. Ships and Vessels, East Indies
Station,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Marine Department.

Be pleased to lay before His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council the enclosed copy of a letter, dated 19th May 1911, received from the Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf, reporting the destruction of 10 Mauser pistols and 2,400 rounds of ammunition found on board the British India Steam Navigation Company's S. S. "Dwarka."


Dated H. M. S. "Fox" at Wakra, the 19th May 1911.


From—CAPTAIN J. C. TANCRED, Senior Naval Officer in the Persian Gulf,


To—His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief, H. M. Ships and Vessels, East
Indies Station.


I have the honour to report that the Master of the British India Steam Navigation Company's Steamer "Dwarka", on arrival at Bushire on the 17th May, informed me that in consequence of a notification from Major Knox, Political Agent at Maskat, he had made search on board his vessel and discovered a tin box containing ten Mauser pistols and 2,400 rounds of ammunition; the owner of the box could not be found.


2. Accordingly I sent an officer to receive the arms, which have now been jettisoned.













(105)
(102)

Register No.
3802
~~(994)~~

Secret Department.

Letter from *F.O.* No. 24538 Dated *5* } *July*, 1911.
Rec. *6*

Formally acknowledged _____

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	<i>6 July</i>	<i>AK</i>	<p><i>Arms Traffic.</i> <i>WV</i></p> <p><i>Leave of Sheikh of Koweit to import arms & ammunition for his own use.</i></p> <p><i>F.O. agree to immediate import, but not give undertaking for the future.</i></p>
Secretary of State	<i>7</i>	<i>UK</i>	
Committee			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State			

24 July *SW*
8-VII-11

Copy to *F.O. + 13 July 1911 India 24 July*
India 14 July 1911
Secy. 28

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY


Off. telegram to S. of I. instructing them accordingly.

8 July - telegram to Viceroy

Seen Pol Com. Co.
18 JUL 1911

Previous Papers:—
1021
997

8890. I. 1488. 1000.—8/1910.






DRAFT TELEGRAM.

SECRETARY OF STATE
TO
VICEROY, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.
(Retamilla)

Despatched 8.7. 1911.
Jw.
8.7.

Foreign secret. Your telegram 15 June.
Arms for Koweit. H.M.G. agree to
permit immediate import of quantity
recommended by you, but wd. give no
undertaking as regards future since such
wd. hamper them in any discussion with
Turkish Govt about Koweit or arms traffic





In any further communication
on this subject, please quote

No. 24538/11.

and address—
The Under-Secretary of State,
Foreign Office,
London.



FOREIGN OFFICE

July 5 1911.

Sir:-

I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 21st ultimo respecting the granting of permission to the Sheikh of Koweit to import arms and ammunition for his own use.

Sir E. Grey concurs in the Earl of Crewe's view that permission might be granted to the Sheikh to import the quantity of arms specified in paragraph 2 of your letter as required for immediate use, but he would prefer that nothing should be said to the Sheikh about future annual supplies. An undertaking as to the future would hamper His Majesty's Government in any discussion with the Porte on the question of contraband in the Gulf or in any discussion about Koweit.

I am,


Sir,

Your most obedient,
humble Servant,

The Under Secretary of State,
India Office.

W. Langley







108

Register No.
1021

Minute Paper. **Secret Department.**

① Secy's Letter from India, No. 234

Dated 13 June, 1911.
Rec. 19 June, 1911.

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	2 June	last	<u>Arms Traffic.</u> Daily correspondence from the Gulf WSW
Secretary of State			
Committee	26	WK	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State			

Copy to
To. } 19.6.11
Army.


FOR INFORMATION.

Nothing of interest

Seen Pol. Com. Sec.,
14 JUL 1911

Previous Papers:—

9549. I. 2127. 2000.—11/1910.





1021

84



169

No. 1275, dated Bushire, the 19th (received 29th) May 1911 (Confidential).

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL P. Z. COX, C.S.I., C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter from Captain Shakespear forwarding an application from Shaikh Mubarak to import 15,000 cartridges, Mannlicher, 1896, under circumstances explained.

2. I think he must be allowed to get them, but as the subject generally is under correspondence it seems advisable to refer to the Government of India first.

If they concur in my view I beg that their acquiescence may be telegraphed to me.

I am forwarding a copy of this letter and enclosures to the Political Agent, Maskat, and Senior Naval Officer, for information.

No. C.—29, dated Kuwait, the 9th May 1911 (Confidential).

From—CAPTAIN W. H. I. SHAKESPEAR, Political Agent, Kuwait,

To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

With reference to the correspondence ending with my letter No. C.—21, dated the 10th April 1911, I have the honour to submit the following request from Shaikh Mubarak in regard to the ammunition which he was permitted to ship from Maskat during the past year.

2. It appears that amongst the arms shipped as Mauser Magazine rifles and carbines were included what should have been described as "Mannlicher Magazine Carbines, 1896 pattern" to the number of thirty. By a mistake the ammunition, at the rate of 400 rounds per weapon, supplied with these carbines turns out to be Mauser ammunition and consequently useless for the Mannlicher weapons. The Shaikh tells me that he only discovered this fact during the last week, after opening out all the ammunition he has when he wished to issue the Mannlicher carbines to his mounted guards. He begs that he may be permitted to import the correct ammunition from Maskat by steamer in order to avoid delay and any chance of native boats attempting smuggling in excess. The dealer in Maskat from whom the weapons were obtained and who has the correct ammunition is Mirza Hussain Ibn Abdul Baqi, Isfahani. The Shaikh also said he would like a few thousand rounds in excess of the regulation number sold with these rifles.

3. In the circumstances and as the number of rounds will amount to only 12,000, apart from any excess which you may be inclined to sanction, I have the honour to recommend that the Shaikh's request may be considered favourably, and that the dealer may be informed that he can ship the ammunition by mail-steamer under a pass from the Political Agent, Maskat.

P.S.—10th May 1911.—I have the honour to enclose copy of a letter in Arabic which the Shaikh sent to me for forwarding to the Political Agent,



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Maskat, which relates to the same subject and in which the Shaikh asks definitely for 15,000 rounds. I regret the late receipt of the letter does not permit me to furnish a translation before closing the mails.

Translation of a letter from Shaikh Mubarak es Subah, Ruler of Kuwait, to Major S. G. Knox C.I.E., Political Agent, Maskat, dated 11th Jemadi I 1329= (12th May 1911).

After enquiring after your health, let it not be hidden from you that we have previously purchased arms from Maskat, with the permission of the British Government for arming our soldiers and that there were amongst the five shots Mausers thirty carbines while the rest were rifles, and as owing to a mistake all the cartridges shipped were for the rifles and the carbines remained useless without cartridges, we have asked our mutual friend Captain Shakespear, to write to our friend His Honour Colonel Cox, to obtain for us a permission for purchasing twelve thousand cartridges which (usually) accompany the carbines and three thousand and four hundred more, the total being fifteen thousand cartridges. And we have advised our Agent, Mirza Hussain bin Abdul Baqi Nazafi, Isfahani, to refer to you. Inshallah, the permission has been obtained and you have ordered the purchase to be made as written by Captain Shakespear. The question of shipment depends on your opinion. If you wish to decide whether the shipment should be made by boat or by mail, the latter is preferable to the former, because the boat-owner may, if he obtained permission, venture to ship others. The mail is therefore more desirable, and your opinion is higher.

This is what was to be stated and please continue to furnish me with news of your health and that of the Madame and accept my assurance of esteem.

170

Telegram P., No. 495, dated the 30th (received 31st) May 1911.

From—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

The Admiral has sent me following telegram, dated 30th May:—*Begins.* On 29th May, Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf, telegraphed:—*Beg ns.* The Shaikh of Rams has been exporting arms contrary to his treaty and in opposition to his Chief, the Shaikh of Ras-ul-Khaima. With the sanction of Colonel Cox I propose to fine him Rs. 2,000, and, in event of his failure to comply, to bombard his town. *Ends.*

If you concur I should like a Political Officer or the Native Agent to proceed in "Fox". *Ends.*

171

Telegram P., No. 494, dated the 30th (received 31st) May 1911.

From—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

I have sent following telegram to Admiral, and repeated it to Senior Naval Officer:—*Begins.* Your Excellency's telegram, dated 30th May. If after meeting of British Agent and Shaikh of Ras-el-Khaima, the Senior Naval Officer is satisfied as to guilt of headman of Rams, I concur in his ordering him to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000. If payment is not made within a specified time, I think Senior Naval Officer might first attach one or two pearling dhows belonging to place if any are present. If there are no boats present, or if seizure does not suffice, I think the Rams tower might be demolished, but, without permission of higher authority, I am unable to authorise this. *Ends.*



173

Telegram P., No. 500, dated the 31st May (received 1st June) 1911.

From—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

My telegram* No. 494 of yesterday. Senior Naval Officer telegraphs, 31st

* Serial No. 171.

May:—*Begins.* There is no doubt as to guilt of headman of Rams. Before your telegram reached me, I had allowed him four days in which to pay fine, failing which his tower would be destroyed. He has collected the fine from villagers and asks for seven days to make payment. It is suspected that it is his intention to bolt to the hills. A remarkable ruffian. There are no dhows belonging to him in the village. *Ends.*

I have sent the following reply:—*Begins.* Your telegram of to-day. I presume that four days law does not expire before night of 2nd or morning of 3rd instant. Refuse to listen to headman's request for extension, and if there are any pearling boats at all belonging to village, it would be well to detain them as security for payment within the time. Pressure will be put on headman by owners. It ought to be possible for Shaikh Ras-el-Khaima to make arrangements by land for preventing headman's escape to hills. *Ends.*

The headman in question was charged with having deliberately allowed Mekranis to embark a cargo of arms in spite of remonstrance of Shaikh Ras-el-Khaima and Agent. The former has specifically asked that the headman should be punished and, as an example is very necessary, I trust that sanction will be telegraphed for demolition of his tower, in event of money not being paid within period first given by Senior Naval Officer.


Addressed to Government of India, Foreign Department, and repeated to Naval Commander-in-Chief.

174

Telegram P., No. S.—342, dated the 31st May 1911. *CCP*

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,
To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire. *CCP*

Your letter No. 1275, dated 19th May. You may permit import by the Shaikh of 15,000 cartridges for which he asks.





(111) (98)

Register No.
997

Secret Department.

Letter from *Viceroy* Dated *15* } *June* 1911.
Rec. *16*

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	<i>16 June</i>	<i>last</i>	<i>Arms Traffic.</i> <i>Proposal to allow the Sheikh of Koweit to import limited quantities of arms & ammunition under certain conditions for his own use.</i>
+ Secretary of State	<i>16</i>	<i>last</i>	
Committee	<i>18</i>	<i>E.</i>	
Under Secretary.....	<i>20</i>	<i>last</i>	
Secretary of State			

Copy to *India*
30 June 1911, Secy. 26

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY


Sp. letter to F.O. supporting, with remarks.

20 June 1911 - Sp. appd. Pol. Council

Letter to F.O., 21st June 1911.

Previous Papers:—
983
943
901

8809. I. 1488. 1000.—8/1910.





INDIA OFFICE,
21st June 1911.

Sir,

I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to invite reference to serial numbers 128, 137, and 156 in the printed correspondence regarding the arms traffic, forwarded to you in this Office letters of the 27th May, 3rd and 12th June 1911, and with

* Dated 15th June 1911.

reference thereto, to enclose copy of a telegram from the Government of India on the subject of the request made by the Sheikh of Koweit for permission to import arms and ammunition for his own use.

The Government of India recommend that the Sheikh be informed that immunity will be granted for the immediate passage of 2,000 Martini rifles, 500 magazine rifles, 525,000 Martini cartridges, and 150,000 magazine cartridges, and hereafter annually of 2,000 weapons (and presumably, a corresponding amount of ammunition), provided that, in consultation with the British Agent, he will devise, and agree to adopt, such safeguards as shall appear to the Government of India practical and adequate.

That the Turkish Government will strongly object to any such arrangement seems highly probable, for it will be remembered that in the conversation between Hakki Pasha and Sir H. Babington-Smith, reported in the latter's letter to Sir A. Nicolson, of 30th December last, the Grand Vizier complained that "under British protection . . . Koweit was the centre of the contraband arms traffic, and a source of continual conflict with her neighbours." In the general settlement of outstanding questions in the Persian Gulf which is about to be proposed to the Turks, the autonomy of Koweit will presumably be included, even though Basra may be selected as the terminus of the Bagdad Railway; and it may well be that if the Turks are led, by the arrangement now proposed, to suppose that among the disadvantages to themselves resulting from the recognition of the Sheikh's position will be the perpetuation of the conditions complained of by the Grand Vizier, the success of the negotiations will be imperilled.

If the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs regards this as a real risk, the Earl of Crewe would not press the present proposals, though for his own part he would be prepared, on a general view of all the interests involved, to ignore Turkish susceptibilities in this matter, and would greatly prefer to see the Government of India's recommendation adopted.


I have the honour to be,


Sir,


Your most obedient humble Servant,


(S^d) R. Ritchie

The Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.
S. 77.











consultation with the British Agent, he will advise, & agree to adopt, such safeguards as shall appear to the G. of I. practical & adequate.

That the Turkish Gov: will strongly object to any such ~~for~~ arrangement seems highly probable, for it will be remembered that in the conversation ^{between} with Hakkî Pashe ^{and} ~~reported in~~ Sir H. Belmont's ^{reported in the letter's} letter to Sir A. Nicholson of 30: Dec. last the Grand Vizier complained that "under British protection... Koweit" was the centre of the contraband arms "traffic & a source of continual conflict with her neighbours." In the ^{some} settlement of outstanding questions in the Persian Gulf which is about to be proposed to the Turks the autonomy of Koweit will presumably be included, even the Basra may be selected as the terminus of the ^{Bagdad} railway; & it may well be that ^{as has, by the arrangement now proposed, to suppress} ~~where~~ the Turks ^{realize} that among the disadvantages to themselves resulting from the recognition of the Sheikh's position will be the perpetuation of the conditions complained of by the

(2293/11)




Grand Vizier, the success of the negotiations will be imperilled.

If the S. of S. for S.A. regards this as a real risk, the Earl of Howe will not press the present proposals, though for his own part he would be prepared, on a general view of all the interests involved, to ignore Turkish susceptibilities in this matter, & would greatly prefer to see the S. of S.'s recommendation adopted.

(Sd) R. Ritchie.

W. Law
S.B.

W.
TR





997
Departments are requested, if they suspect that there is any mistake in this telegram, to communicate immediately with the Private Secretary to the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State.

COPY OF TELEGRAM.

FROM *Kiliny*


DATED *15th June 1911*

RECEIVED AT LONDON OFFICE *26 June*



Foreign, Secret. Please see Cox's letters of
(901) 30th April and 14th⁽¹⁵⁾ May forwarded with
Foreign Secretary's letters of 11th and 25th
May. Arms for Kuwait. If we refuse to
allow Sheikh to obtain arms and ammunition
openly, he will do so surreptitiously. I do
not think that Sheikh would send arms to
Persia, though he might possibly dispose of
some to Mohammerah. Sheikh's intention
probably is to carry on small trade in
arms with some of tribes in Arabia. Neither
of these contingencies would injure our
interests. On the whole I think that it would
be best to accept Cox's proposal but would
reduce amount of ammunition by half.
If you agree, I will instruct Cox accordingly
and direct him to submit definite proposals
as to safeguards after discussion with Sheikh.

To *5/16* *1/3*
India *5/17*





2893

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

EASTERN DEPARTMENT.

[January 6.]

SECRET SERIES.

SECTION 3.

[637]

No. 1.

Sir H. Babington Smith to Sir A. Nicolson.—(Received January 6, 1911.)

*Banque nationale de Turquie, Constantinople,
December 30, 1910.*

(Extract.)

I SAW the Grand Vizier yesterday, and I enclose a memorandum of our conversation.

* * * * *

Hakki Pasha, in the course of our conversation, dwelt a good deal on the Bagdad question and on the situation in Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf. He stated distinctly that he thought the railway on its present footing must be made as far as Bagdad. This is significant in connection with the reports which are current, that negotiations have been begun for the early construction of the line between Helif and Bagdad, and also in connection with the paragraphs in Djavid Bey's budget statement, in which he refers to the Bagdad question, and points out that in five years' time, the earliest date at which the line could be completed, the surplus of the debt revenues will probably have increased sufficiently to provide the guarantee as far as Bagdad, and that the Germans, therefore, will lose nothing by abandoning their lien upon the proceeds of the increased customs duties. The Grand Vizier also stated distinctly that it would be necessary to arrive at some arrangement satisfactory to England about the section between Bagdad and the Gulf, and expressed his readiness to bring pressure to bear on the Germans, if necessary, in this direction. I do not know whether the general political situation as regards Germany makes it any more likely now that they would be prepared to come to terms; but it is evident, in the first place, that we have no means of preventing the German line from reaching Bagdad, and, in the second place, that friction is likely to become more and more acute unless some settlement is reached. Such a settlement would, in itself, improve our relations with the Turks also, and I confess I do not see why we should not at the same time give the Turks some satisfaction regarding Koweit, if we obtain binding engagements regarding its alienation or use as a "port de guerre."

I will not, however, write more on this subject, as I hope I may have the opportunity of seeing you shortly in London.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Memorandum of Interview with Hakki Pasha, Grand Vizier, on December 29, 1910.

I INFORMED Hakki Pasha that I was leaving for London in a few days, and that it would be necessary to arrive at a decision regarding the future of the National Bank. As he was aware, recent events had raised grave doubts as to whether the bank could with advantage continue its operations. The decision of this question would depend, in great measure, upon the prospect of obtaining active and practical support from the Government. The bank would never have been started unless the invitation of the Ottoman Government and the attitude of the British Government had given it expectation of support from both.

Hakki Pasha said that in England there appeared to be a mistaken idea that, because a concession had been given for the Bagdad Railway, the ground was entirely occupied, and there was no room for any other enterprises in Turkey. This, he said, was a complete mistake. The Bagdad Railway was an existing concession. If it were to be given again, it would very likely be arranged in a different fashion; but, anyhow, there it was, and it could not be revoked. But the Turkish Empire was large, and there was room for very many other enterprises which were open not only to German capital, but to British capital; and British capital would be heartily welcomed.

I said that I did not think that this erroneous view was held by anyone who was well informed. It was undoubtedly true that the Bagdad question had assumed

[1852 f-3]



great importance in the relations between England, Turkey, and Germany, both in itself and also in relation to the position in Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf generally. If the Bagdad question could be settled in a satisfactory manner, I was convinced that it would have an admirable effect on the relations of the three countries.

Hakki Pasha said that the question of Koweit was at the root of the Turkish feeling about British action in that part of the world. On this subject he spoke strongly. He said that he regarded it as beyond doubt that British action in relation to Koweit had been unjust. Under British protection, although there was not a protectorate in the technical sense of the word, Koweit was the centre of the contraband arms traffic, and a source of continual conflict with its neighbours. So long as this anomalous state of affairs existed, it was impossible to restore peace and order in that part of the world. Koweit was like a thorn stuck in the side of Turkey; and it was British action there more than anywhere else that had created suspicions of British aims in Mesopotamia.

I said that I was not acquainted with the details of the question, but whatever the rights or wrongs of the matter, his Highness knew perfectly well that British action regarding Koweit was not directed against Turkey, but against the possibility of Koweit falling into other hands. The Grand Vizier said that he quite realised this, but that practically the action taken by way of defence against another Power operated as against Turkey. It was not in any way Turkey's interest or desire to permit any other Power to establish itself there. Even under the old régime, Abdul Hamid had not permitted the Germans to acquire a coaling station in the Red Sea. The new régime would be even more strongly opposed to any such acquisition. If there were any doubt as to this, Turkey would be willing to take formal engagements as to the use of Koweit as a naval station. He said that, in his opinion, the matter was one that ought to be capable of settlement if there was good-will on both sides; but he complained that he had been unable to obtain a frank and full discussion of the question, which was the first condition of an understanding.

I said that the matter was not one in which I was entitled to express an opinion, but that I saw with great regret the extreme sensitiveness of Turkish opinion as regards the most innocent and legitimate activities of British shipping and commerce in the Gulf. I referred to a recent article by Ismail Hakki Babanzadé, in which the presence of British shipping at Bussorah and the extent of British trade there were treated as matters of offence and indications of sinister intentions; whereas it was clearly essential to the prosperity of the country to welcome all the shipping and trade that could come, whatever the nationality.

Hakki Pasha replied that articles in the press must not be taken too seriously. Ismail Hakki Babanzadé had just returned from Bagdad and Bussorah; and what had produced more impression on him than anything else was the question of Koweit.

The Grand Vizier then returned to the question of the Bagdad Railway. He said that the Germans must be allowed to complete the line to Bagdad, but that he quite recognised that beyond Bagdad it was necessary to find some arrangement which would satisfy England. What precise solution was to be preferred he could not say. The Germans had certain "droits acquis," and clearly any arrangement must be a matter for negotiation; and it was for the interests concerned to formulate proposals. The Turkish Government would be very anxious to arrive at a settlement, and would be prepared to bring pressure on the Germans with this object. One solution would be to make the line south of Bagdad an international one; another solution would be that it should be a Turkish Government line, a suitable arrangement being made with the interests concerned for providing the capital.

As regards the position of Turkey generally, he said emphatically that, in his view, it was most undesirable to give any one Power an exclusive or preponderant influence in Turkish affairs. He wished to remain on good terms with all the world; and the interests of Turkey lay in securing the assistance of all the Powers equally for her development.

I then spoke again of the position of the bank. I said that so far the bank had received no practical evidence of the Government's desire to support it. No Government accounts had been given to us, and the only semi-official account we had was that of the Commission de la Flotte. The Constantinople loan had only been arranged after competition with other banks, and after a struggle lasting over several months. I asked whether he could give me any assurances of practical support in the future which I could lay before our friends in London. Hakki Pasha said that, as regards Government accounts, their hands were tied to a very considerable extent by the terms



of the concession of the Ottoman Bank. The Constantinople municipal loan had produced profit sufficient to cover the expenses of the bank for one year at any rate. If the bank had been able to conclude the loan recently under discussion, the profits would have provided for the bank for two or three years at least. Unfortunately, this had been prevented by the action of the British Government, which, he said, speaking quite unofficially, he could only describe as a blunder. If the British Government did not interpose any bar in future the National Bank would be able to take part in Government loans, either in co-operation with the Ottoman Bank or in competition with it. Apart from that, he repeated that the whole of Turkey was open to foreign enterprise, and that foreign capital would be welcomed. If British capital would come to take part in the development of the country, there would be a profitable field for the bank's energies. He regretted that British capital had taken so little interest in Turkey in recent years, and thought that both the press and commercial circles were not well-informed. He referred in this connection to the mining law, in the amendment of which the British Government had taken a great interest. The law had been amended, but in the two years which had elapsed since then there had not, so far as he was aware, been a single British application for a mining concession.


I replied that British capital had had very good reasons for avoiding the country under the old régime; and in order to persuade it to come here now it was necessary to offer adequate inducements, and to create the conditions necessary for success. In the case of mines, for instance, the absence of roads and railways made all mines, except the richest, unremunerative. This accounted for the absence of applicants. As regards works of public utility we found, unfortunately, a certain want of practical sense in the Public Works Department. With the object of securing advantages to the State concessions were hedged round with impossible conditions. It would be to the real interest of the Government to grant the first concessions on terms which would make them thoroughly remunerative; whereas the conditions now laid down were such that there could not be a large profit, and that there might very likely be no profit at all.

Hakki Pasha admitted that there was truth in what I said, but added that, in his own opinion, this difficulty would disappear in time. At the outset of a parliamentary régime, there was a tendency to criticise everything. In the endeavour to avert such criticism, the conditions had perhaps been drawn too tightly. Experience would remedy these defects.

I asked the Grand Vizier whether they proposed to approve the Bagdad municipal loan. He said that he had been somewhat disappointed as regards the administrative capacities of Nazim Pasha, and that they had doubted whether the money would be satisfactorily spent if it were granted. He thought, however, that they would come to the decision to support Nazim Pasha still, and in that case they would approve the loan. I represented that it was very desirable to decide the matter as soon as possible, since my letter to Nazim Pasha, resuming our liberty of action in the matter, had probably reached him, or would reach him in a day or two. I added that it might have some influence as regard the future of the banks if I could point to one business, at any rate, though not a large one, which had been concluded. Hakki Pasha said that he would endeavour to hasten the decision.

H. BABINGTON SMITH.

December 29, 1910.





(119) (42)

Register No.

983

Minute Paper.

Secret Department.

Secy's Letter from India, No. 22 of

Dated 25 May 1917.

Rec. 10 June

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	15 June	WAK	<p><u>Persian Gulf</u></p> <p>Arms Traffic.</p> <p>Weekly correspondence</p>
Secretary of State	15	WAK	
Committee	18	C	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State			

Copy to
C.O.
Army. } 12 June '17.

FOR INFORMATION.

Most of this is old. But 2:156 may be noted. We have not yet got the G. of I.'s decision on the question whether the Sheikh of Koweit sh. be allowed to import arms for his own use. But it is interesting to notice that he is not aware of, or informed by, answers in Parliament. The reference to Sir E. Grey's alleged repudiation of our obligation to protect Koweit, is to his answer to a supplementary question on 21st March:-

"Does the 2nd hon. gentleman admit the implication in this question that Great Britain claims protective rights over the

Secn Pol. Comm.,
27 JUN 1911


Precious Papers:-

9549. I. 2127. 2000.-11, 1910.



the territory of Koweit?"

Sir E. Grey: "I leave to my hon. friend who put the question the responsibility for the use of the words "protective rights."



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
No. 102—1462 XIV K., dated Bombay, the 10th May 1911.

From—His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Squadron,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Marine Department.

Be pleased to lay before His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council the following report on the present condition of the arms traffic in the Persian Gulf.

2. The passage of arms from the Oman to the Mekran and Biyaban Coast of Persia has practically ceased. A few attempts are still made to smuggle small quantities of rifles and ammunition across, but they are not of sufficient importance to constitute a danger.

3. Arms penetrate into the centre of Persia on their way to the Afghan frontier by two main routes, one from the Mekran Coast *via* Bint, and the other from the Biyaban Coast *via* Serzeh, Jaghin and Gurg. The action of the Expeditionary Force has demonstrated that both routes are unsafe, and the result is that, as far as our present information shows, the Afghans have withdrawn from Mekran and Biyaban entirely.





4. From the Mekran Coast the route lies along the bank of the Rapch river, where abundance of fresh water is to be found at all seasons of the year (as is evident from the fact that large fish were seen by several officers in the upper reaches of the river), grazing is plentiful, access to and from the fertile Bint-Geh valley is comparatively easy, and from that district northwards the route although difficult in parts, is short. The majority of the arms landed on this coast find their way to the Bint-Geh valley, and thence to the interior.

5. During the south-west monsoon landing on the Mekran Coast is very difficult, except at a few more or less sheltered spots under favourable conditions. It is then that the Biyaban Coast requires the greater attention, as it is easy with a good breeze to slip across the 30 miles of open water from Mussandam in a night. The road runs right along the Biyaban Coast instead of touching it only at certain points, as in Mekran. With the help of the villagers on the Biyaban Coast the arms-runners are able to get away arms and ammunition to the hills without much difficulty before they can be seized, and it is therefore of the utmost importance to keep such a hold over the villagers on the coast as will ensure the refusal of their help to the gun-runners. Having once reached safety in the mountains the arms are out of our reach, and usually are taken north *via* Jaghin, Gurg and Nasratabad.

6. The action taken at sea has resulted in the almost complete cessation of attempts to run cargoes, but signs have been evident lately that they would begin again if sufficient support could be obtained on the coast. Afghans came down in considerable numbers to Fanooch and Bint recently, and many of them joined Barkat Khan, who apparently persuaded them that he could arrange to get the arms through, as he had done in former years, in spite of our efforts to stop them.

7. This Chief, Barkat Khan, is actively hostile and he has been taking very strong measures to drive out the nominal head of the Biyaban district, and to bring the villagers that are now under the control of the latter completely into his own power. He hoped that after effecting this he would be able to reorganise the whole scheme of arms-running to his own advantage. The result would have been a repetition of the state of affairs on that coast which prevailed from 1906-10, only possibly worse, because pushed by necessity it would probably have been better organised.

8. Barkat has had considerable success, and several villages, particularly those which lie back from the coast and have not felt our presence, have assisted him with men and in kind. He has also drawn largely on the Bashakard tribe, with whom he is connected by marriage with the daughter of Ghulam Hussain, the Chief of Yakdar. The latter Chief was at one time quite friendly, but since Barkat's marriage he has been more and more influenced by his son-in-law, until he has now definitely sided against the British. In fact, Barkat's evil influence is felt principally through his matrimonial connections.

The father of his first wife is Mir Haji, who has been put into Barkat's place, but is quite untrustworthy, and will only side with us as long as we can protect him.

Islam Khan is the father of his second wife, and the attitude that he has adopted is largely due to the persuasion of his son-in-law.

Ghulam Hussain is the father of Barkat's third wife.

Meshedi Abbas is the father of his fourth wife. At the time Barkat married her, Meshedi Abbas was head of the Persian Customs at Jask, and was in consequence most useful to his son-in-law in conniving at the import of arms, until his removal was brought about towards the end of 1909.

9. From the foregoing it is evident that the central figure in the Mekran and Biyaban districts is Barkat Khan. If he can continue to impress his various fathers-in-law, particularly Islam Khan, as well as the villagers along the Biyaban Coast with the idea that the British can be safely defied, then we must not expect assistance from them, but on the contrary a decided recrudescence of activity may be looked for next season, with regular visits from Afghan purchasers. In fact, the market will be reorganised with fresh vigour,



and any reduction of naval expenditure will be out of the question. If, on the other hand, it can be shown that disregard of the wishes of Great Britain and support of Barkat Khan entails severe chastisement, then we may hope that he will be discredited, and that those who are now uncertain which side to take will decide to go with us and forbid the entry of Afghans into the district. The authority of the Persian Government does not exist in any shape or form in these districts, and therefore it is not of any use to expect assistance from them. The only time that they have attempted to assist us and agreed to keep Barkat in custody was disastrous, for he bribed his custodian and escaped very shortly after his arrival at Bushire, much to the discredit of British prestige.

10. I therefore decided to take advantage of a cargo of arms having been looted from a Kuwait dhow that had been recently stranded, to land the military force at Sirik, in order to try to recover them, incidentally striking a heavy blow at Barkat and his following. The operations were entirely successful. Barkat has been driven out of a position that he thought impregnable, with considerable loss. He himself thought discretion the better part of valour, and was at Sarh-i-Gurg during the action, far from all possibility of harm. The Bashakard tribe stood aloof as a whole, and even the Tarzeh section, to which Barkat's father-in-law Ghulam Hussain belongs, deserted him after the fight. The Afghans who had been with him disappeared, and all who have in any way assisted him have felt the hand of the British and seen the troops in their villages. It is hoped that this will effectively discredit Barkat, particularly as some of his own personal property has been destroyed as retaliation for the damage that he has done to the villages of those who were friendly.

11. On the Mekran Coast, Saiyid Khan has been loyal as far as he is able, and has endeavoured to prevent the Afghans from making his country a base of operations. On the other hand, Islam Khan has not been above suspicion, and influenced no doubt by his son-in-law, Barkat Khan, he has been watching the development of events before deciding how to act. Although nominally under Saiyid Khan, he is by far the more powerful personality of the two, and since he controls the coast districts round the mouth of the Rapch river, he is an important person in connection with the arms traffic.

12. The expedition which was landed once at Galag in 1910, but which did not advance in force into the Karwan district (Rapch river), shook Islam Khan's confidence, and since then he has been considering the idea of taking a subsidy from us, and of keeping the Afghans out of his territory. Apparently Barkat has been trying to persuade him otherwise, and it is possible that the latter arranged that a large caravan should arrive at Panooch and Bint just at the moment when the question of the subsidy was under consideration, in order to bring pressure to bear on him. This the Afghans undoubtedly did, whether at Barkat's suggestion or not, and at the time when the expedition arrived on the coast Islam Khan was wavering, and had almost decided to go against us, and to forego his subsidy. It was therefore of great importance to demonstrate to him that he could be struck at without difficulty from the sea, and advantage was taken of a reported depôt of arms at Joshder, a place north-west of Karkindar, and of another at Sarahingi, to advance the whole force through his territory and make a dash for Bint.

13. The column was accompanied by Saiyid Khan during the whole time, but he was frequently under the influence of opium, and was of little use. Islam Khan also joined the force, but was rather sceptical of the ability of the troops to do much. After he had accompanied the column on one or two marches, however, and particularly after the dash on Bint he appears to have completely altered his tone. It is now obvious to him that the Bint-Geh valley is open to attack from the sea within about six days from the time of arrival on the coast, and that Great Britain therefore has the power of enforcing her will if it ever should become necessary to do so.

14. The force did not have any fighting in Mekran and Islam Khan, therefore, has not had a demonstration of its capabilities in that respect. During the operations in the Biyaban district, however, the troops turned Barkat out of reputed impregnable position with considerable loss to the tribesmen. The position was far worse than anything met with on the way to Bint, and



the necessary object-lesson has been supplied to Islam Khan. The accounts of this fight which have circulated through the country have not lost in repetition, and it is hoped that Islam Khan has now come to the conclusion that it will be more to his advantage to accept the British subsidy and loyally act up to its conditions.

15. On the Persian Coast and the coasts of the islands to the westward there has been a persistent rumour that arms are being run to Kishm, Charak, Shiwu, Tahiri, and other places along the coast towards Bushire. The arms for Kishm and Charak are said to come from the Trucial Coast, and for the other places from Katar. It is known that arms go overland from Oman to the Trucial Coast and also by Kuwait dhows to Katar, but we have so far not been able to find any arms in the course of transit from either of these districts to the Persian Coast. Now that the immediate danger on the Mekran and Biyaban Coasts has passed away, I have arranged for a closer watch over the dhows coming from the Arabian Coast inside the Persian Gulf. One Kuwait dhow which has been caught with arms on board will be burnt, and it is hoped that the example will deter others from shipping contraband cargoes.

16. The quantity of arms and ammunition run by these routes into Persia is probably not large, and seeing the enormously increased price of transport, it does not seem likely to be a very paying speculation to attempt to pass them up into Afghanistan. With the exception perhaps of those brought to Kishm most of the rifles landed are said to be absorbed in Persia itself.

17. Large quantities of arms and ammunition are still being imported into Maskat, principally by German steamers, and their destination is a matter of speculation. Probably most of them go by land or land and sea combined to Katar, and thence I am inclined to think that the greater part find their way into the Arabian Peninsula. It seems to me that the Arabs are arming themselves as rapidly as they can, and that they all view the revolt in the Yemen against the Turk with considerable sympathy, and this being so it seems probable that the difficulties which formerly were said to exist over the passage of arms from the coast to the interior have become very much modified. This is pure speculation, but it is the only way in which I can account for the continued import of arms into Maskat. I feel sure that only a small proportion of them reach the Persian Coast, while the remainder disappear entirely from our view. It would appear that the latter must be conveyed into Arabia, where it is probable that a very large demand exists for the most modern type, which is all that is now imported into Maskat.

18. This is not a permanent deflection of the business, and if through any lack of vigilance on our part it again became possible to run the arms across to Mekran, the trade would immediately revive, because the profits by this route are much more considerable than they can be by the long land route to Central Arabia.

19. There is lastly the question of how to deal with Maskat itself. In this connection I have nothing to add to the telegram of Colonel Cox, No. 388,*

* Serial No. 110.
dated the 28th April 1911, addressed to the Foreign Department, with which I thoroughly agree. I am strongly in favour of the second alternative proposed by him, namely, to give the Sultan sufficient financial inducement to make him separate from Ali Musa and his confederates, and afford real co-operation by the introduction of an effective system for the registration of arms imported and sold subject to friendly supervision by us, or by other similar means. I think that this will go a long way towards keeping the arms under control.

Every rifle and every box of ammunition coming into Maskat should be registered both on entry and on being re-exported. Arms and ammunition going out of the country by sea to a legitimate destination should be declared, and, if it were found that false declarations had been made for the purpose of smuggling into prohibited areas, a remedy could be devised which would hit the exporter severely. All arms moving coast-wise from one place to another in Oman territory would have to be accounted for under severe penalties, and by this means we might succeed in making it more difficult to smuggle arms out of the country. These measures will not give us complete security, and a



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watch would still have to be maintained, but it would take the form of a preventive service on the coast of Oman itself, rather than a large blockade of a considerable extent of the coast of Persia.

20. In consequence of the success of the operations of the Expeditionary Force, I propose, as an experiment, to pay off two launches during June and have ordered them to arrive at Bombay towards the end of May. I would ask that their gun and special fittings may not be removed, so that if it be found next season that we cannot do without them, they may be ready to be sent up again at short notice. This will leave four launches in the Gulf, which I propose to keep going during the hot weather.

21. It is possible that towards the end of the year I may be able to recommend steps which will lead to a further considerable reduction of expenses. I cannot make any definite statement on the subject, however, until I have seen how the situation settles down during the hot weather and the early part of next season, but I feel fairly confident that matters will so shape themselves as to enable this step to be taken in November or December.

22. I hope that next season the force that will be sufficient to keep the trade from reviving will be the three subsidised ships, with the "Fox" as Senior Officer, and four launches. It would be necessary that the subsidised ships should be effective vessels, however, with full white crews, not vessels like the "Lapwing" and "Redbreast" which carried partly lascar crews. The "Odin" and "Espiegle" that have taken the place of the two gunboats are quite satisfactory and suitable for this purpose, while the "Sphinx", which does very well for the work in the Gulf in the hot weather, is generally at Bombay for three or four months during the cold weather refitting, when her place is taken by a more effective ship.

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No. 89—1462 XIV N., dated H.M.S. "Highflyer" at Sirik, the 15th April 1911.

From—His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Squadron,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Marine Department.

With reference to my telegram* No. 36 of 12th April 1911, communicating the capture by H.M.S. "Espiegle" of three badans on 5th, 6th and 7th April,

* Serial No. 71.

respectively, with arms and ammunition on board, be pleased to lay before His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council the accompanying copy of a report received from the Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf Division, upon this subject.



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Reporting capture of arms and ammunition by H.M.S. "Espiegle".

Dated H. M. S. "Perseus" at Raph, the 9th April 1911.

From—The Commander and Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf,

To—His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Squadron.

I have the honour to forward herewith the report by H.M.S. "Espiegle" of the capture of three small dhows apparently engaged in arms traffic.

2. I took charge of these dhows from H.M.S. "Espiegle" on the evening of the 7th April 1911 with the intention of towing them to Jask. During the first watch the sea and wind increased considerably and at the solicitations of the crews of the dhows I took them on board "Perseus". Shortly afterwards the two small badans broke adrift in an apparently sinking condition; at about 1 A.M. the third dhow sank whilst in tow.

3. I landed the crews, 17 men in all, at Jask and left them in custody of the Military.

Capture of three dhows engaged in arms traffic.

Dated H. M. S. "Espiegle" at Makhellif, the 7th April 1911.

From—COMMANDER C. M. LEFROY,

To—The Senior Naval Officer, H. M. S. "Perseus", Persian Gulf Division.

I have the honour to report that on the 5th and 6th instant the cutter detailed to watch the French dhow "Fath-el-Khair" off Sahm, with orders also to search passing dhows, captured two small badans. The report of Lieutenant Courtney I. Greer, the Officer in charge of the Cutter, is attached.

2. At 3-30 A.M. on Friday, the 7th, I sent a boat away off Dil to search some passing dhows, and captured one at 6 A.M. carrying arms and ammunition.

3. Return of vessels detained and a statement of rifles, &c., seized are forwarded herewith, together with table of measurements,

Capture of two arms-carrying badans.

Dated H. M. S. "Espiegle" at Makhellif, the 7th April 1911.

From—LIEUTENANT C. I. GREER,

To—The Commanding Officer, H. M. S. "Espiegle".

I have the honour to report that on the night of Wednesday, 5th instant, whilst cruising in the cutter, I seized two badans containing arms and ammunition under the following circumstances.

2. At 8-30 P.M. whilst standing down the coast under oars and when about three miles to southward of Sahm and about three and a half miles from the shore, I sighted a badan with her sail lowered. I boarded her and proceeded to search her. The Nakhoda at first denied having any cargo except fish, but a superficial search showed her to be full of rifles and ammunition. The Nakhoda then produced papers purporting to be passes from the Sultan of Maskat. I considered them unsatisfactory, and detained the badan, placing a guard on board her, and took her in tow.

3. At 4 A.M. on Thursday, 6th idem, whilst standing to the southward and when about five miles to the southward of Sahm and three and a half miles off the coast, I sighted a badan under sail standing to the northward. I waited until she was close and bailed her to lower her sail. She held on, but after two rifle-shots had been fired (the second through her sail) she lowered her sail and I proceeded alongside and searched her. The Nakhoda stated that his cargo was fish, but on removing the upper part of the cargo a quantity of rifles and ammunition was found. The Nakhoda then produced a permit purporting to allow him to trade in arms and bearing the stamp of the Sultan of Maskat. This I considered to be unsatisfactory, and detained the badan, placing a guard on board her. A light south-easterly breeze was blowing throughout the night. I then proceeded inshore with the two badans in tow, and anchored in shallow water until daylight.

4. On Thursday a Shamal set in, making a lee shore. I accordingly towed the badans further out, and remained at anchor until the arrival of H.M.S. "Espiegle".

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H. M. S. "Espiegle," } *Statement of Rifles and Ammunition seized with*
 at Makheilif, } *three dhows on 5th, 6th and 7th April 1911.*
 7th April 1911.

Date seized, and Nakhoda's name.	Rifles.	No.	Ammunition.	No. of Rounds.
5th Muhammad bin Suleiman.	Mauser ...	58	28 cases ...	31,500
	Martini carbine '450	39	12 bags ...	About
	" " '303	52		4,700
	Lee '303 ...	4		
	Mannlicher ...	1		
	Ross '303 ...	2		
		156		36,200
6th Kalfar bin Saiyid.	Mauser ...	28	8 cases ...	12,000
	Lee '303 ...	5	3 bags S. A. ...	} 3,600
	Martini '303 ...	4	1 bag 12 bore ...	
	" '450 ...	1		
	Mannlicher ...	1		
	Mauser pistol ...	2		
	Double-barrelled 12 bore and '303 ...	1		
		42		15,600
7th Marghid bin Sereid.	Mausers ...	2	5 cases ...	7,500
	Martini '450 ...	1	1 case ...	4,000
			9 bags ...	3,500
		3		15,000
	TOTAL ...	201	...	66,800

C. M. LEFROY, Commander.

H.M.S. "Espiegle," } *Statement of Measurements of three captured*
 at Makheilif, } *dhows engaged in Arms Traffic.*
 7th April 1911. } *(Art. 171,3, S. O. Book.)*

Date taken and detained.	Length of outside planking between stem and stern post.	Girth outside keel.	Depth.	Tonnage.
5th April ...	34' 4"	12' 10"	3' 4"	
6th " ...	32' 8"	11' 2"	3' 0"	
7th " ...	38' 8"	18' 8"	6' 0"	

The above details have been this day taken by us, and are certified correct.

C. I. GREER, Lieutenant.

C. W. SHINKFIELD,
Chief Carp. Mate.

Approved.

C. M. LEFROY, Commander.



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H.M.S. "Espiegle,"
at Maskat,
14th April 1911.

*Detailed description of Arms and Ammunition
captured by this Ship on 5th, 6th and
7th April 1911.*

Arms pattern and Marks.	No.	Ammunition pattern.	Rounds.
MAUSER— Waffenfabrik A.G. oberin- dorf A/N 1910, 7mm. Ditto ...	88 2	·303 KYNOCH ENGLAND— Mark VI ...	17,450
MARTINI-HENRI— Carbine ·303 Nitro-proved E Maskat ... Carbine ·450 Nomark ·450 FFF ... Maskat Imperial Gun Co. English Manu. TM BL ... Maskat ·0 ... Rifle ·303 La Francotte ... Persian lion T.M. ·450 European manufacture „ 45 7 ... 1 1 26 10 1 ... 4 1 2	MAUSER— Fabrique nation d'armee de guerre Hostal Liege 7mm. DW and MK ... Hintenberger patro nen zundhutschen metallwarren. Fabrique Model /93 ... MANNLR— 20 Stuck patronen M88 Mantelgoschoss No. 0 auf rahmen. MAUSER. Geladene patronen fur die Mauser Pistole. AUF STRENFREN MOD ·99 ...	40,220 800 1,960 100 280 800 400
MANNLICHER— Mark 88 ... Loewe, Berlin, 1891 1 1	MARTINI-HENRI ·450— Cartouches pour fusil ... Rolled cases ... Loose cartridges ...	3,600 140 80
LEE— ·303 No mark ... BSA ... LSA 1 4 1	CARTOUCHES POUR FUSIL— Gras model 1574 ... Mauser Gelisthade Pistol cal ·763 ...	60 400
ROSS— ·303 Canada Gun Co., 1905 ...	2	SHOT CHILLED CARTRIDGES 18 12 bore ...	200
MAUSER PISTOL— Waffenfabrik oberindorf A/N.	2		
MISCELLANEOUS— Double-barrelled 12 bore and ·303. Imperial Gun Co.	1		
	201		66,490

The Senior Naval Officer,
Persian Gulf.

C. MAXWELL-LEFROY,
Commander.



H. M. S. "Espingole",
at Makhlaf,
7th April 1911. } Return of Vessels detained as engaged in the Arms Traffic (Authority:—Article 164, S. O. Book.)

Date detained.	Where. If at sea, lat. and long.	NAME OF			Under what colours.	How rigged.	NUMBER OF			WHERE			Date of leaving last port.	Nature of cargo.	To whom consigned.
		Vessel.	Master.	Owner, and of what place.			Men.	Guns.	Tons.	From	Bound	Belonging.			
7th April.	24° 10' N. 57° 0' E.	Dhow.	Marghid bin Serid.	Nehmat bin Abdurrahman Sohar.	...	Dhow.	6 and 1 passenger.	Masbat.	Sohar.	Sohar.	7th April Dil.	Rifle and ammunition.	Ali bin Nehmat Sohar.
6th April.	24° 08' S. 77° 01' E.	Badan.	Kalim bin Sayid.	Sir. Hamid bin Jawa Sohar.	...	Badan.	6	Masbat.	Sohar.	Sir.	2nd April Barka.	Lists attached.	Abdurrahman Sohar.
5th April.	24° 10' N. 56° 59' E.	Badan.	Muhammad bin Sulaiman.	Hamid bin Jawa Sohar.	...	Badan.	4	Masbat.	Sohar.	Sohar.	2nd April Masbat.	...	Shakh Abdul Moosin Sohar.

for adjudication.

Sent to

The Commander-in-Chief,
East Indies.

C. M. LEFROY,
Commander.



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(Translations.)

I.

With my permission.

[] Seal of Sultan of Maskat.

Dhow shipping 67 Mauser rifles, 600 rounds of Mauser ammunition, and 11,200 rounds of ammunition, bound from Maskat to Sohar and Ras-al-Jabal.

Captain of dhow—Muhammad bin Suleiman.

Help the people of the dhow.

Dated the 24th March 1911.

SULTAN OF MASKAT.

II.

With my permission.

[] Seal of Sultan of Maskat.

Dhow shipping 60 rifles, 18,000 rounds of ammunition bound from Maskat to Sohar and Ras-al-Jabal.

Captain of dhow—Muhammad bin Suleiman.

Help the people of the dhow.

Dated the 25th March 1911.

SULTAN OF MASKAT.

III.

With my permission.

[] Seal of Sultan of Maskat.

Dhow shipping 25 rifles, 4,900 rounds of ammunition bound from Maskat to Sohar.

Captain of the dhow—Hamid bin Abdulla.

Help the people of the dhow.

Dated the 25th March 1911.

SULTAN OF MASKAT.

IV.

With my permission.

[] Seal of Sultan of Maskat.

Dhow shipping 42 rifles, 4 pistols and 18,000 rounds of ammunition bound from Maskat to Sohar and Ras-al-Jabal.

Captain of dhow—Kalfan bin Saiyid.

Help the people of the dhow.

Dated the 3rd April 1911.

SULTAN OF MASKAT.

V.

With my permission.

[] Seal of Sultan of Maskat.

Dhow shipping 2 Mauser rifles, 13,000 rounds of ammunition bound from Maskat to Sohar and Ras-al-Jabal.

Captain of dhow—Marghid bin Sereid.

Help the people of the dhow.

Dated the 25th March 1911.

SULTAN OF MASKAT.

Letter to son of Sultan of Maskat (Nother Muhammad).

Letter to Mullah Abdura Hein (7).



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Telegram P., No. 320—S., dated the 19th May 1911.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,
To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Please refer to your letter* No. 1202, dated 7th May. After reading Gregson's letter† No. 1 of 23rd April, posted to you on 15th May, and Craufurd's telegram‡ of 13th May, reporting that supplies are still furnished to Afghans

by Islam Khan, do you still consider it worth while to grant allowances to these men? Government of India are inclined to think it would be waste of money.

* Serial No. 146.
† Serial No. 131.
‡ Page 44 of notes.

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No. 1256, dated Bushire, the 14th (received 22nd) May 1911 (Confidential).

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL P. Z. COX, C.S.I., C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to refer to Foreign Department telegram* No. S.—311, dated the 13th instant, regarding the Shaikh of Kuwait's requirements in the

* Serial No. 127.

direction of arms and ammunition.

2. The Shaikh has generally pledged himself not to let the arms and ammunition, which he gets permission to import, find their way into unauthorised hands. He also expressed verbally, during the recent interview of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and myself with him, his readiness to allow the Political Agent supervisory access to them. That alone would not necessarily regulate the destination of the munitions once they left the warehouse, but I suggest that, if before exportation from Maskat the stocks of the rifles were branded with a special device, which would make them at once identifiable if found outside their legitimate sphere, and if they were issued in Kuwait under arrangements subject to the supervision of our Political Agent, a fairly effective check upon their distribution would be achieved.

As regards cartridges, I can only at present suggest that Shaikh Mubarak should be required to produce 75 per cent of the empty cases of those last indented for, each time a fresh indent is presented.

3. I think he could in all probability be got to introduce safeguards on the above lines, but the Government of India will understand that it would be inconvenient for the Political Agent or me to discuss them with him now, if we shall subsequently have to inform him that his indent is considered by the Government of India to be excessive and must be reduced.

I therefore recommend that the Government of India first decide arbitrarily what they will consider to be Shaikh Mubarak's legitimate requirements and that the latter be informed that we will give him immunity for the passage of those amounts if, in consultation with the Political Agent, he will devise and agree to adopt such safeguards on the above lines as shall appear to the Government of India practical and adequate.

4. I presume that the case of the dhow "Fateh-el-Khair" referred to in your telegram under reply is that reported in my letter No. 1297 of 22nd May 1910. The Shaikh's attitude has a good deal improved since then and in the recent case concerning a dhow of the same name, referred to in my telegram† No. 370 of 24th April, it has been quite satisfactory.

† Serial No. 98.

5. While I fully realise that we should allow political considerations to influence us as little as possible when dealing with practical issues arising out of the arms traffic problem, I think we need to bear in mind at the present juncture that the reports in the vernacular papers regarding Sir Edward Grey's



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alleged repudiation of our obligation to protect Kuwait, in the House of Commons—a report which Shaikh Mubarak produced in Durbar at our last meeting and asked me to explain; our inability to entertain his request to be allowed to present himself at Delhi; and the recent overtures made to him by the German firm—amount to a good deal collectively and make it advisable for us to humour Shaikh Mubarak at the present juncture as far as we can do so without prejudice to other interests.

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No. 1257, dated Bushire, the 14th (received 22nd) May 1911 (Confidential).

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL P. Z. Cox, C.S.I., C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

In continuation of my telegram* No. 442, dated 13th May, I have the honour to submit, for the information of Government, copies of Major Knox's letter No. 628, dated 5th May, and enclosures, regarding the case of the boarding of the French dhow "Muzaffar" by an officer belonging to H. M. S. "Philomel".

* Serial No. 140.

No. 628, dated Maskat, the 8th May 1911.

From—MAJOR S. G. KNOX, C.I.E., Political Agent and His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Maskat,

To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

In continuation of my letter† No. 601, dated the 27th April 1911, I have the honour to forward herewith, for your information, a copy of letter, dated the 6th May 1911, and its enclosure, which I have received from the French Consul, Maskat, on the subject of the boarding of the dhow "Muzaffar" by the officer in charge of H. M. S. "Philomel's" cutter at Kohlab.

† Enclo., Pro. No. 139.

118

Consulat de France

à

Mascate.

Mascate, le 6 Mai 1911.

Monsieur et Cher Collègue,

J'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre sous ce pli une lettre de la maison Goguyer répondant aux conclusions des autorités navales Britanniques que vous avez bien voulu me faire connaître par votre lettre du 26 Avril reçue le 30.

Mes ressortissants vous seraient obligés de vouloir bien entendre les déclarations détaillées du "Nakhoda" et de l'équipage du "Mocaffa" des le retour de ce boutre à Mascate.

Bien que le Gouvernement Français n'ait pas ratifié l'extension à ces parages de la zone définie par l'art. 21 de l'acte de Bruxelles et que par suite les prescriptions de l'art. 34 ne soient pas exigibles dans le Golfe d'Oman ou s'est produit l'incident du "Mocaffa", j'ai demandé des explications aux gérants de la maison Goguyer sur le défaut d'inscriptions signalétiques constate par les autorités navales britanniques. Ils m'ont répondu que la peinture employée par eux était de mauvaise qualité et qu'elle n'a pu se fixer sur les bois du boutre trop imbibé d'huile de poisson. Ils m'ont promis de remédier le plus tôt possible à cet inconvénient.

Les couleurs du "Mocaffa" étaient d'ailleurs arborées au moment où l'incident s'est produit et l'autorisation de naviguer sous pavillon français avait été, en temps utile, portée par moi à la connaissance de M. le Major Trevor.



Comme je l'ai dit dans ma précédente lettre à ce sujet, les croiseurs de S. M. Britannique rencontrés par le boutre en question l'ont respecté (ceci du propre aveu du Nakhoda et de l'Equipage) et aucun n'a cru devoir procéder à son égard comme la barque de Kohlab.

J'ajoute que le séjour du boutre à Kohlab n'a été l'objet d'aucune observation de la part des autorités persanes et que par conséquent ni cet argument ni celui tiré de l'acte de Bruxelles ne sont applicables en l'espèce.

Enfin les déclarations du Nakhoda et de l'Equipage (qu'ils affirmeront au besoin sous serment) étant absolument contraires à celles des autorités navales Anglaises, je vous serais obligé de vouloir bien les entendre, comme le demandent mes ressortissants, après le retour du boutre à Mascate et au moment qui vous conviendra le mieux.

Veillez agréer, Monsieur le Consul et cher collègue, l'assurance de mes sentiments de haute considération.

A. JEANNIER.

Monsieur Knox, Consul de S. M.
Britannique, Major de l'Armée,
à Mascate.

A. GOGUYER.
MASCATE (Arabie).

Mascate, le 4 Mai 1911.

Monsieur le Consul de France,
Mascate.

Monsieur le Consul,

Nous vous remercions d'avoir bien voulu nous faire connaître la réponse de Mr. le Consul anglais à notre plainte à lui transmis le 24 mars 1911 au sujet—de l'agression commise par une barque de S. M. Britannique contre notre boutre "Mocaffa," dument—autorisé à battre pavillon français.

Nous constatons par cette réponse que les autorités navales anglaises nient les faits allégués par le nakhoda et l'équipage du "Mocaffa," comme elles ont nie précédemment les faits allégués par le nakhoda et l'équipage de notre boutre "Fath-el-Kheir". Nous constatons également que, dans l'un comme l'autre cas, les déclarations détaillées du nakhoda et de l'équipage n'ont pas etc., entendues par le Consulat d'Angleterre; de sorte que, des deux parties en cause, savoir autorités navales britanniques et maison Goguyer, une seule est crue sur sa parole; quant à l'autre, elle n'est pas admise à s'expliquer.

Nous pensons que cette procédure est irrégulière et nous vous serions obligés, Mr. le Consul, de prier Mr. votre collègue d'Angleterre de vouloir bien écouter (ainsi que nous l'avons des le début demande à son prédécesseur) la plainte circonstanciée du nakhoda et de l'équipage du Mocaffa des que le dit boutre sera de retour à Mascate.

Pour ne pas nier purement et simplement. Les autorités navales britanniques sont, cette fois, entrées dans quelques considérations sur lesquelles nous ne devrions pas insister vu qu'elles ne concernent pas notre cas. Nous nous permettrons toutefois—de les refuter comme suit :

1. Nous savons par feu notre oncle et patron, Mr. Antonin Goguyer qui était très au courant de toutes ces questions, que l'acte de Bruxelles n'est pas applicable aux Français dans la région arabe—persane—turque : Mr. Goguyer nous avait lu un extrait du "Journal Officiel" (à lui prêté par le Consul de France d'alors) qui ne laisse aucun doute sur ce point. Les autorités navales anglaises ne peuvent donc valablement reprocher au "Mocaffa" l'absence des indications spécifiées par l'article 34 de cet acte.—Nos essais de peinture à l'huile pour marquer notre boutre n'ont pas réussi à cause de la mauvaise qualité de la peinture dont nous disposions à ce moment.

2. Notre boutre n'avait pas à rendre compte aux autorités navales anglaises des motifs qui le retenaient à Kohlab plutôt qu'à Tchahbar. Les



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autorités persanes seules auraient pu interroger à ce sujet le nakhoda, qui leur aurait répondu sans difficultés, vu qu'il ne se livrait à aucune opération irrégulière; s'elles ne l'ont pas fait cela ne saurait nous être imputé?

3 et 4. A supposer que certaines allures (lesquelles?) de notre bote "Mocaffa" aient paru suspectes à la barque qui l'a assailli, combien devaient sembler suspectes à notre nakhoda les allures de cette barque, en apparence britannique, dont l'équipage l'attaquait revolver au poing, malgré le pavillon français (brisait et fouillait les malles des passagers, visitait la cale, bref agissait comme en pays conquis vis à vis des corps et des biens.

5 et 6. Le nakhoda et l'équipage sont, comme vous le savez Mr. le Consul, en contradiction absolue avec les autorités navales britanniques qui affirment avoir laissé tranquille le "Mocaffa" après avoir vu ses papiers de bord.

Nous croyons donc nécessaire d'insister sur tous ces faits contraires, s'ils sont exacts, comme il nous paraît, aux traites et conventions en vigueur.

Les papiers ont été montres des l'abordage, mais les marins anglaises n'en ont tenu compte qu'après avoir achevé leur perquisition illégale.

Nous vous prions instamment de demander à Mr. votre collègue anglais de vouloir bien entendre notre plainte dans ses détails des le retour ici du nakhoda et de l'équipage en question.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Consul l'assurance de nos considérations distinguées.

A. ELBAZ.

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
Telegram P., No. 328 S., dated the 23rd May 1911.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,

To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Knox may reply to French Consul about dhow "Muzaffar" on lines proposed in your telegram* No. 450, dated 16th May.

* Serial No. 148.





(128) (174)

Register No.
901
(36024)

Minute Paper. **Secret Department.**

Seq's Letter from India, no. 20 M
Letter from Admiralty, 9. recd. 29 May

Dated 11 } May 1911
Rec. 27 }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	30 May	East	Arms Traffic.
Secretary of State	31	RM	Directly correspondence from the Gulf.
Committee	1-VI	C.	The capture of 3 badans by H.M.S. Espiegle.
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State			

Copy to
F.O. } 27 May 1911
Adm. }
~~Adm. sent~~


FOR INFORMATION.


The question of Koweit, raised in No. 126, is inconvenient. The Turks already profess to believe that we encourage the theft of steel in arms.

Seen Pol. Comm.,
13 JUN 1911

Previous Papers:—

9549. I. 2127. 2000.—11/1910.





121

Telegram P., No. 46, dated Maskat, the 3rd May 1911.

From—His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Squadron,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Marine Department. (Repeated
to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.)

I would offer the following observations with reference to your telegram *
No. 115—182 M., dated 2nd May 1911.

* Serial No. 118.


Mir. Barkat Khan is the principal Agent in the traffic in arms in Persian Baluchistan, and it was at his invitation that the Afghans came down this year. Barkat Khan was, according to reports, boasting that, with a view to assisting him, they were coming in large numbers from Fanooch. It appears that the villages which are loyal to us have been raided by Barkat with the sole object of obliging them to give active assistance to the Afghans and to him, as it is not possible to make sure of getting away a cargo even after it has been landed, without this assistance from the villages on the coast. Mir Haji and Mir Kambar who, at our suggestion, were placed in charge of the coast of Biyaban and who have shown their loyalty by refraining from assisting gun-runners, complained that lately some of their men had been killed and their followers had extensively been looted by Barkat Khan. It was reported by the representatives of those who had been looted, who came into Jask, that violence had been used by Barkat Khan who gave out that those who followed him would not be molested, and that the friends of the Sircar would be looted. The fact that during these raids the Afghans were with Barkat Khan was known, and it is said that he was joined afterwards by many more.

In connection with these operations it was recently admitted by the Governor of the ports on the coast to the Political Resident, Persian Gulf, that the former had no force or means to act against Barkat Khan. That in these regions the Government of Persia are powerless, is notorious, and if we had not taken action, the assistance of any of the people of the coast in the matter of the suppression of the traffic in arms could not any longer be counted upon by us, and an extremely difficult situation would have been created. It would probably have been said by Barkat Khan that he had driven us off, and his prestige with the Afghans would have enormously increased.

During the south-west monsoon the Biyaban is the easiest coast for purposes of the arms traffic. Except rarely, arms running on the coast of Mekran during the monsoon is almost impossible. The coast of Biyaban being only 30 miles from the coast of Oman, is also the most difficult one to guard, and dhows which are certain of being received on the other side in a friendly manner, can easily go across unobserved and land arms. As stated in

† Serial No. 147, Part VII.

my telegram† No. 16, dated the 25th February 1911, it is therefore most important that, unless we are prepared to continue for an indefinite period the blockade on a costly scale (the resumption of hostilities?), with the help of the Mirs and villages on the coast should be maintained. It will be possible in a short time to make a very large reduction in the expense of the blockade if we succeed in breaking the power of Barkat Khan over these Mirs and villages.





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In the circumstances explained above, and seeing that the movements in question would have a greater bearing on the issue of the arms traffic operations than the seizure of cargo of ammunition and arms, I thought it advisable to carry them out when I received the telegram from the Government of India quoted above, the troops had already been ordered to re-embark.

122

Telegram P., No. 47, dated Jask, the 4th May 1911.

From—His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Squadron,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Marine Department. (Repeated to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf).

"But the ostensible reason for the expedition was to recapture a cargo of arms which had, about a fortnight ago, been wrecked on the coast of Biyaban from a Kuwait dhow and some of which had been taken by the natives. The Expeditionary Force have recovered about half of the arms".

It is requested that the above may be inserted at the end of the last paragraph of my telegram* No. 46, dated the 3rd instant.

* Serial No. 121.



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124

Telegram P., No. 301 S., dated the 6th May 1911.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,

To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

Your telegram * 388 of 28th April. Please state precisely lines which you consider should be followed in fresh discussion and negotiations with Sultan.

* Serial No. 110.

With regard to captured dhows, you may make communication which you propose to Sultan; the arms should be retained, and crews sent to Sultan.

126

Telegram P., No. 48, dated the 4th May 1911.

From—His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief, Jask,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Marine Department. (Repeated to the Director, Royal Indian Marine; General Officer Commanding, Bombay Brigade; and the Political Resident, Persian Gulf.)

Ships have embarked troops and sail so as to arrive Bombay on 8th instant. This is with reference to my telegram, dated the 1st instant, No. 45.



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127

No. 115—188 M., dated Simla, the 6th (received 8th) May 1911 (Confidential).

From—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Marine Department,
To—The Quarter-Master-General in India.

With reference to the Chief of the General Staff's memorandum No. 215—2, dated the 29th March 1911, regarding the organisation of a force for combined Naval and Military operations in connection with the suppression of the arms traffic in the Persian Gulf, I am directed to say that the Government of India sanction the demobilisation of the force on its arrival at Bombay, and the despatch of the troops to their respective stations.

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No. 1117, dated Bushire, the 30th April (received 8th May) 1911.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL P. Z. Cox, C.S.I., C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to solicit the views of the Government of India on the subject of the right of the Shaikh of Kuwait to import from Maskat or from Europe such arms and ammunition as he needs for the supply of his own requirements, and as to the limits of what we can properly and safely regard as his "reasonable requirements."

2. Last autumn, our blockade operations having for some time past made it impossible for him to get arms up from Maskat in the ordinary way, Shaikh Mubarak applied for a permit of immunity for the safe conveyance of a consignment from Maskat, in replacement of some 2,000 weapons purloined or surrendered by his Bedouin adherents during their unsuccessful operations against the forces of the Muntafik under Shaikh Saadun, in the previous spring. After consultation with the Political Agent at Kuwait, and being satisfied with the *bona fides* of the Shaikh's needs, I requested the Political

Agent at Maskat* and the Senior Naval Officer to arrange for the safe passage of the arms, while taking the necessary

precautions to ensure that the Nakhodas of the dhows employed did not smuggle up additional weapons under cover of the immunity granted to the Shaikh. These arms duly reached Shaikh Mubarak, the despatch of the last batch being reported by Major Trevor on 17th November.

3. Meanwhile the slump in the sale price of rifles at Maskat continued, and Shaikh Mubarak wrote that, owing to the extreme favourableness of the market, he was anxious to bring up further supplies and begged that the permit be extended to cover them. In replying, I impressed upon him the inexpediency of bringing up more at present and thus affording material to the hostile criticism of his enemies and the accusation that he was trading in arms; but

* Vide enclosures to Residency letter No. 2860, dated 20th October 1910, to the Foreign Department.



this only drew forth a further appeal. His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief arrived in the north of the Gulf about this time and added his advice to mine, namely, that if Shaikh Mubarak must buy more arms he should keep them in Maskat until next year and not bring them up now: it was not long, however, before the Shaikh renewed his importunities for a permit to bring them up at once. Meanwhile copies of the hostile articles of Ismail Hakki Bey in the Turkish newspaper "Tannin" reached me and on the return of the Political Agent and myself from tour, the former was directed to draw Shaikh Mubarak's attention to these articles,—which specifically accused the Shaikh of making an arms emporium of Kuwait.—and to reiterate my advice to postpone further import: again when I visited Kuwait a few days later with His Excellency Sir Edmond Slade, we once more urged on the Shaikh the advisability of postponing further importation for the present. He deferred to our advice, but begged me to represent his point of view to the Government of India in the meanwhile and I expressed my readiness to do so.

4. His position, as he explains it, is as follows:—

- (i) Kuwait is an emporium for the trade of Central Arabia, both for export from the land side and for import by sea. By sea, trade is happily rendered safe for all by the dispositions of Pax Britannica; but for the safety of trade by land he has to make provision; and, for his own good name, to ensure the safety of merchandise and travellers from molestation by Bedouin within his sphere of influence. To this end he has to maintain himself in a position of armed strength sufficient to enable him to control the routes both from northern and southern Nejd to Kuwait.
- (ii) He has been put to abnormal trouble and expenditure in men and arms during the last two years by the hostility of the Muntafik and his unsuccessful encounter with them of last spring.
- (iii) His Bedouin adherents are hopelessly wasteful of their ammunition, emptying their rifles at the slightest temptation at birds, hares, or anything else that may give them a mark, and it is impossible to check this habit, from which an enormous wastage of ammunition results.
- (iv) Every year 1,000 or more boys of the Kuwait community reach manhood and pass in to the fighting strength of the town and have to be provided with rifles.
- (v) Lastly, that whereas previous to our operations he had no difficulty in supplying his wants in emergency from arms retailed by local traders in Kuwait; now, as the result of his loyal co-operation with us in forbidding and preventing the export, the local arms trade in his town is altogether stopped and there is not a new rifle to be purchased in the place.

For these reasons he has to rely on our allowing him to exercise his right to import what he wants for his own needs and giving him immunity for their passage up the Gulf.

5. He specifically wants to import now, or as soon as we will permit him (and begs that permission may not be long delayed)—

- 2,000 Martini rifles,
- 500 Magazine rifles,
- 1,050,000 Martini cartridges,
- 300,000 Magazine cartridges,

and states that after that, his regular requirements in future will be about 2,000 rifles per annum with a proportionate amount of ammunition.

6. On the one hand, we have to reckon at present with a very hostile Turkish press; the passage of arms up from Maskat covered by a pass from ourselves is not a matter which can be prevented from becoming public; and in our own interests we need to make sure that we are not taken advantage of and the arms imported for disingenuous purposes.



On the Shaikh's behalf it can be said that the reasons which he gives are founded on fact; that ultimately he has the right, and cannot be prevented from getting what arms he needs; and that we cannot fairly hinder him from obtaining what he really wants for his own protection; and finally, that so far as our present experience goes, Shaikh Mubarak's attitude in the matter of co-operation with us, and in refraining from supporting his own subjects when in the wrong, has been eminently satisfactory. This opinion I know His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief shares. While, therefore, I felt bound to do my utmost to discourage the Shaikh from further imports at present and in any case did not feel justified in authorising them without reference to Government; yet I am of opinion that we should, if possible, allow him to get the arms at present asked for, and that 2,000 weapons per annum would not be an unreasonable figure to be guided by in future; always provided that Shaikh Mubarak continues, as at present, to act up to his obligations in co-operating with us for the suppression of the contraband traffic.

7. I trust that I have gone into the matter sufficiently to enable Government to favour me with their views and instructions.

No. 1 (Camp), dated Persian Gulf, the 23rd April (received 10th May) 1911.

From—E. G. GREGSON, Esq., Superintendent of Police on Special Duty, Government of India, Foreign Department,

To—The Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to report that, in accordance with instructions from the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Squadron, I arrived in Charbar on the 28th March.

2. All transport arrangements were made for the force moving from Charbar, and Sardar Saiyid Khan of Geh was called into Charbar. Information regarding the movements of Afghans was telegraphed to the Admiral from time to time.

3. On the 8th April I left Charbar with Sardar Saiyid Khan in the armed launch "Tamil" for Rafeh. The force landed at Galag on the 10th April.



4. Sardar Saiyid Khan was prepared to render every assistance to the advance. It was evident from the very first, however, that he wished to avail himself of the occasion to embroil his cousin Sardar Islam Khan with the Government. Further, he was anxious for our troops to march to Bampur, where local politics apparently demanded his presence, and an escort would undoubtedly have added much to his importance.

5. Sardar Islam Khan of Bint was informed by letter of our arrival. Before the receipt of the reply, however, a letter was received asking us not to believe the reports regarding his harbouring Afghans, and for Saiyid Ghafur Shah to be sent to bring him into our camp. Islam Khan arrived on the 15th. He announced his willingness to accompany the force, and protested his innocence as regards the reports of his complicity in the arms traffic.


6. There was no doubt that the Afghans had used Bint and Panooch as their head-quarters. A caravan of some five hundred of them with a thousand camels were reported at Haimani, a few miles beyond Panooch. They had wandered in small numbers throughout Sardar Islam Khan's province without any interference. Under these circumstances, Colonel Delamain, Commanding the troops, decided to march straight on Bint with a small body, in order to create the impression that acting as an advance guard we should go on to Panuch.

7. Islam Khan was prepared, though evidently surprised at this unexpected turn of events, to accompany the force. Sardar Saiyid Khan accompanied us the first march towards Kurandab, and then stayed behind on the plea of ill-health. The troops after a short halt in the Bint valley (8½ hours) returned on the 17th April.

8. Our sources of information were the Sardars, and they informed us that the Afghans on our approach hurriedly left the tract of country near the coast, and on our further advance they moved out of Haimani on their return journey to Afghanistan.

9. On the troops returning to Galag from Burka Bund, the Sardars agreed to accompany them, but at the last moment they sent in excusing themselves as it was not a very profitable undertaking. Saiyid Khan had important business in Bampur, and Islam Khan was afraid of coming to the coast for fear of arousing the jealousy of his cousin if he came alone with us. Of the two Sardars, Islam Khan is undoubtedly the most virile and the most important factor. There is little doubt that his policy has been to gain all he can from the arms traffic by assisting Afghan gun-runners in every possible way, and instructing his subjects to do the same. When called to account he pleads both his innocence and his inability to resist the incursions of large bodies of Afghans.

10. The value of the march to Bint lies in its demonstrating to both Islam Khan and the Afghans our ability to strike right into the centre of Mekran. We have at the same time strengthened the waning influence of Sardar Saiyid Khan throughout Mekran, and hitherto his attitude has been in our favour. If both these Chiefs realise that we intend not only to drive the Afghan gun-runners out of Mekran, but are prepared to enforce their own obligations to us, we shall have gone a very long way towards stopping the traffic in arms through Southern Persia.





Copy.

Capture of 8 Bedans by H.M.S. "ESPIEGLE"
on 5, 6 & 7 April 1911 with arms and
ammunition.


25th April 1911.

.303/1462 XIV N.

Report or submission to Admiralty,
Submitted for information. A copy of a telegram dated 12
April 1911, addressed to the Government of India
communicating this capture is enclosed. With regard to the
report that the Sultans Yacht was being used for conveying
arms to SOHAR and neighbouring places, this vessel on 13
April 1911 took on board at MASQAT a number of rifles,
which she landed subsequently at SOHAR.

(Sd) Edmond J. W. Slade.

Rear-Admiral.





Copy.

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Reporting capture of arms & ammunition by
H. M. S. "Espiegle"

H. M. S. "PERSEUS".

at Rasch,

9th April 1911.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward herewith the report by H. M. Ship "Espiegle" of the capture of three small Dhows apparently engaged in Arms traffic.

2. I took charge of these Dhows from H. M. S. "Espiegle" on the evening of the 7th April 1911 with the intention of towing them to JASHK. During the first watch the sea and wind increased considerably and at the solicitations of the crews of the Dhows I took them on board "PERSEUS". Shortly afterwards the two small Bedans broke adrift in an apparently sinking condition: at about 1 a.m. the third Dhow sank whilst in tow.

3. I landed the crews 17 men in all, at JASHK and left them in custody of the Military.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Signed) C. P. Beaty-Pownall.


Commander & S.N. O.

Persian Gulf.

The Commander-in-Chief,

H. M. Ships & Vessels,

EAST INDIES.





Copy.

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CAPTURE OF THREE DHOWS ENGAGED IN ARMS TRAFFIC.
.....

H. M. S. "ESPIEGLE" at Makheiliff.
7th April 1911.

Sir,

I have the honour to report that on the 5th and 6th instant the Cutter detailed to watch the French Dhow "Path el Khair" off Sahm, with orders also to search passing Dhows, captured two small Bedans. The report of Lieutenant Courtney I. Greer, the Officer in charge of the Cutter, is attached.

2. At 8.30 a.m. on Friday, the 7th, I sent a boat away off Dil to search some passing Dhows, and captured one at 6a.m., carrying Arms and Ammunition.

3. Return of vessels detained and a Statement of Rifles etc. seized are forwarded herewith, together with Table of Measurements.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,


Your obedient Servant,

(signed) C.M. Lefroy.

Commander.

The Senior Naval Officer,
H.M.S. "PERSEUS",

PERSIAN GULF DIVISION.





Copy.

(137)

(278)

CAPTURE OF TWO ARMS-CARRYING BADANS.

H.M.S. "ESPIEGLE" at Makheilif,
7th April 1911.

Sir,


I have the honour to report that on the night of Wednesday, 5th instant, whilst cruising in the Cutter, I seized two Badans containing Arms and Ammunition under the following circumstances.

2. At 8.30 p.m. whilst standing down the coast under oars and when about three miles to Southward of Sahm and about three and a half miles from the shore, I sighted a Badan with her sail lowered. I boarded her and proceeded to search her. The Nakhoda at first denied having any cargo except fish, but a superficial search showed her to be full of rifles and ammunition. The Nakhoda then produced papers purporting to be passes from the Sultan of Masqat. I considered them unsatisfactory, and detained the Badan, placing a guard on board her, and took her in tow.

3. At 4a.m. on Thursday, 6th idem, whilst standing to the Southward and when about five miles to the Southward of Sahm and three and a half miles off the coast I sighted

THE COMMANDING OFFICER,

H.M.S. "ESPIEGLE" .





(138) (134)

sighted a Badan under sail standing to the Northward. I waited untill she was close and hailed her to lower her sail. She held on, but after two rifle-shots had been fired (the second through her sail) she lowered her sail and I proceeded alongside and searched her. The Nakhoda stated that his cargo was fish, but on removing the upper part of the cargo a quantity of Rifles and Ammunition was found. The Nakhoda then produced a permit purporting to allow him to trade in Arms and bearing the stamp of the Sultan of Masqat. This I considered to be unsatisfactory, and detained the Badan, placing a guard on board her. A light South-East^{erly} breeze was blowing throughout the night. I then proceeded inshore with the two Badans in tow, and anchored in shallow water untill daylight.

4. On Thursday a Shamal set in, making a lee shore. I accordingly towed the Badans further out, and remained ^{at anchor} untill the arrival of H.M.S. "ESPIEGLE".


I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(signed) C. E. Greer.

Lieutenant.



7th April, 1911.

Return of Vessels detained as engaged in the
Arms Traffic (Authority:-Art.164, S.O.Book)

Sent to
THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EAST INDIES.

for Adjudication
(sgd.) C.M. Lefroy.
COMMANDER.

View on the Qatar Digital Library: http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100026100508.0x000054



Copy.

(140)

(176)

H.M.S. "ESPIEGLE",
at Makheilif,
7th April 1911.

Statement of Rifles and Ammunition seized with
three Dhows on 5th, 6th and 7th April 1911.

Where Seized & Dhow's name.	Rifles	No.	Ammunition.	No. of Rounds.
5th. omed bin uleiman	Mauser Martini carbine .450 carbine .303 Lee .303 Mannlicher Ross .303	58 39 52 4 1 2 <u>156</u>	21 cases 12 bags	31500 about 47000 <u>36200</u>
6th. far bin Said	Mauser Lee .303 Martini .303 .450 Mannlicher Mauser pistol Double barrell 12 bore and .303	28 5 4 1 1 2 1 <u>42</u>	8 cases 3 bags S.A. 1 bag 12 bore	12000 3600 <u>15600</u>
7th. agnid bin Sereid	Mausers Martini .450	2 1 <u>3</u>	5 cases 1 case 9 bags	7500 4000 3500 <u>15000</u>
	TOTAL	201		66800

(Signed) C. M. Lefroy.

Commander.

View on the Qatar Digital Library: http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100026100508.0x000056



copy.

M.S. "ESPIEGLE",
at Makeilif,
14th April 1911.

Statement of Measurements of Three captured Dhows
engaged in Arms Traffic. (Art.171,3, S.O. Book).

Boat taken and detained	Length of outside planking between stem and stern post.	Girth outside keel.	Depth	Tonnage.
5 April.	34' 4"	12' 10"	3' 4"	
3 "	32' 8"	11' 2"	3' 0"	
7 "	38' 8"	18' 8"	6' 0"	


The above details have been this day taken by us, and are
certified correct.

(Signed) C. E. Greer
Lieutenant.

(Signed) C.W. Shinkfield
Chief Carpenter

Approved.

(Signed) C.M. Lefroy.
Commander.





Copy.

(142)

(142)

Translations.

1.

With my permission.

Seal of Sultan of MUSCAT.

Dhow shipping 67 Mauser rifles, 600 rounds of Mauser Ammunition, and 11,200 rounds of ammunition, bound from MUSCAT to SOHAR and RAS-AL-JABAL.

Captain of dhow Mahomed bin Suleiman.

Help the people of the dhow.

Dated 24th March 1911.

(Sd) Sultan of MUSCAT.

II.

With my permission.

Seal of Sultan of MUSCAT.

Dhow shipping 60 rifles, 18,000 rounds of ammunition bound from MUSCAT to SOHAR and RAS-AL JABAL.

Captain of dhow Mahomed bin Suleiman.

Help the people of the dhow.

Dated 25th March 1911.

(Sd) Sultan of MUSCAT.

III.

With my permission.

Seal of the Sultan of MUSCAT.


Dhow shipping 25 rifles, 4,000 rounds of ammunition, bound from MUSCAT to SOHAR.


Captain of the dhow Hamid bin Abdulla.

Help the people of the dhow.

Dated 25th March 1911.

(Sd) Sultan of MUSCAT.





(143) (X)

Translations.

IV.

With my permission.

Seal of the Sultan of MUSCAT.

Dhow shipping 42 rifles, 4 pistols and 18,000 rounds of ammunition bound from MUSCAT to SOHAR and RAS-AL-JABAL.

Captain of dhow Kalfan bin Said.

Help the people of the dhow.

Dated 8rd April 1911.

(Sd) Sultan of MUSCAT.

V.

With my permission.

Seal of the Sultan of MUSCAT.

Dhow shipping 2 Mauser rifles, 18,000 rounds of ammunition, bound from MUSCAT to SOHAR and RAS-AL-JABAL.

Captain of dhow Marghid bin Sereid.


Help the people of the dhow.

Dated 25th March 1911.

(Sd) Sultan of MUSCAT.

Letter to son of Sultan of muscat. (Norther Mohammed.)

Letter to Mullah Abdura Hein. (?)





py.

M.S. "Espiegle"

Masqat,

4th April 1911.

Detailed Description of Arms and Ammunition captured
by this ship on 5th, 6th and 7th 1911.

Arms Pattern & Marks	No.	Ammunition Pattern	Rounds.
user:- ffenfabrik A.G.oberin rf A/N 1910, 7mm.	88	.303 Kynock England Mark VI	17,450
tto 1908	2	Mauser, Fabrique nation d'armes de guerre Hostal Liege 7mm DW and MK	40,220 300
RTINI-HENRI:- rbine.303 tro-proved E	45	Hintenberger patro nen zundhutzen metallwaaren	1,960
scat	7	Fabrique model /93	100
rbine.450 mark.450	1	Mannlr. 20 Stuck patronen M88 Mantelgeschoss No 0 auf rahmen	280
F.	1	Mauser. Geladene patronen fur die Mauser pistole	800
scat. Imperial Gun Co.	28	Auf strenfren mod.99	400
glisch manu: TM BL	10	Martini-Henri .450 Cartouches pour fusil	3,600
scat A B fle.303	1	Rolled cases	140
Francotte	4	Loose cartridges	80
rsian lion T.M. .450	1	Cartouches pour fusil Gras model 1574	60
ropean manufacture ..	2	Mauser. Gelisthade Pistol cal.768	400
NNLICHER:-		Shot chilled Cartridges 18 12 bore	200
rk 88	1		
ewe, Berlin, 1891	1		
et:- .303	1		
mark	4		
IA	1		
IA	1		
SS:- .303	2		
mada Gun Co., 1905	2		
USER PISTOL:- ffenfabrik oberindorf A/N ..	2		
ISCELLANEOUS:- ublebarrelled 12 bore d .303 Imperial Gun Co. ...	1		
	201		66,490


(Sd) C. Maxwell-Lefroy,

Commander.

he Senior Naval Officer,

PERSIAN GULF.

View on the Qatar Digital Library: http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100026100508.0x00005e



Copy.

TELEGRAM P

From Commander-in-Chief, East Indies
To Government of India, Marine Department
Date 12th April 1911.
No. 38.

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already
received

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A report has been received from H.M.S. "ESPIEGLE" that she captured three bedans not flying any colours on 5th, 6th and 7th April respectively on the high seas just south of Sohar with arms and ammunition on board. Total 200 rifles and 66,800 rounds.



When the dhows were boarded, the Nakhodas in all three cases stated that they had not any arms on board, and it was only after the arms had been found that they produced passes for more or less the correct amount signed by the Sultan of Masqat.

These passes as far as I can learn, are obtained by Ali Khan bin Musa from the Sultan, and are filled up by the former and given to the dhows. Of late this traffic has much increased, and it is possible that it has some connection with the arrival of the Afghans on the coast.

We have not interfered with Masqat dhows on the Batineh coast this season, in order not to push the Sultan too hard, but since nothing is done by His Highness to check the flow of arms to Sohar and to other places on this coast, I think that pressure might be put upon him by capturing any vessels found on the high seas.

It has been reported that the Sultans Yacht is being used for conveying arms to Sohar and neighbouring places, but this has not yet been confirmed.

All the Bedans sank in bad weather as they were being towed to Jashk. The crew and arms have been landed at Jashk.





"Times of India"

13 May 1911

3604

146

142

THE MEKRAN EXPEDITION.

Landing at Galag.

Our correspondent writes from Jask, April 22, said:—

As your readers are aware, the flagship and two R.I.M. vessels left Bombay at 6 p.m. on April 7th for the Mekran coast, the exact destination being contingent on the reports received by wireless telegraphs during the passage up. The Mekran coast whither we were bound is uninviting and barren. In many places, at Galag for instance (our ultimate rendezvous), the shore is a mere strip of very low sand, with extensive salt water swamps behind. No vegetation is to be seen from seaward, except here and there a clump of date palms, indicating the vicinity of a village or settlement. There are no perennial rivers and near the sea the streams, which are frequently dry become mere salt water creeks only navigable for a short distance inland by small boats. There are no regular harbours on the Mekran coast, though there are occasional roadsteads where the launches and boats engaged in the blockade find shelter from the prevailing shamals.

Owing to information received en route, we set course for Galag where we arrived at 11 a.m. on the 10th. Khor Galag proved to be a small creek in an otherwise unbroken coastline where the surf breaks heavily all the year round. Unfortunately the entrance to the creek is barred by a sand spit, on which the sea was breaking heavily when we arrived, so it was decided to land the troops and mules on the open beach to save time. Disembarkation was immediately proceeded with and found to be no light task. The troops and mules were towed ashore in lifeboats, eight of which had been specially fitted to carry mules. Four steam launches were employed in towing three boats at a time and thus there was a constant stream of boats going backwards and forwards from ships to shore—a distance of two miles. The scene on the surf-bound beach was a lively one. As each launch with its tow arrived at the outer fringe of surf it cast off and the boats were poled through the surf to the shore. In they came borne on the crest of a wave, and with a rush and a bump were brought up all standing on the shelving beach. At the same time each succeeding wave would come rolling in and throw the boats about in a most alarming manner. Out jumped the sepoys, and out jumped the mules, only too glad to set foot on shore again. The behaviour of the mules under what was to them a very trying time was excellent, and after their involuntary surf bath they rolled themselves in the hot sand with evident delight. The complete disembarkation of the expedition took longer than was anticipated owing to the weather conditions being unfavourable, but before the end of 24 hours the whole expedition was ashore and already on the march. Some very amusing incidents occurred at the landing place. One boat, full of mules, when 50 yards from the shore, was completely capsize by a big wave, all the mules being thrown into the water. Undismayed, they all struck out boldly on an exciting race for the shore, urged on by the cries of the sepoys on the beach. The race was won by a battery mule, a pot-bellied old creature who received on landing an ovation worthy of a Derby winner. On another occasion a boat-load of cooking utensils capsized, and the sight of a 100 shrill-voiced sepoys, clad in *puris* *naturalibus*, wading in the surf in the endeavour to retrieve their pots and pans, was extremely diverting. Before noon the last of the expedition had disappeared over the sand hills on their long march inland.

BLOCKADE OF THE COAST.

While lying at anchor off Galag, which is nine miles east of Rapsch, we were visited by several of the launches and boats who are engaged in the blockade of the Mekran coast. At the time of writing there are four launches and ten ship's boats engaged on this work. Each of them has a section of the coast to patrol about ten miles in length, with orders to search every dhow they see. They are detached from their parent ships for as long as four or five weeks at a time, and live a hard and exciting life in their diminutive floating homes. The use of a razor is apparently unknown, as without exception every officer, and man too, was bearded like the parol. They all looked very fit and hard as nails, and lamented the fact that, since the blockade has become so close, "no business is doing."

The coastline patrolled by these vessels stretches from Gwatar to Jask and the mesh is now drawn so fine that it would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the gun-runners have abandoned this part of the coast altogether, at least for the present.


The whole tendency of the gun-runners seems to be to shift the scene of operations further to the westward. The only recent capture of arms was on the Oman coast where at a place called Khor Kakan—north-west of Muscat, opposite Jask—the armed launch *Minor* on the 15th March made a haul of 150 rifles, 50 Mauser pistols, and 60,000 rounds of ammunition.

There is no doubt that with the advent of the hot weather and the military expedition matters have come to a standstill. The gun-runners are held up by the naval force and the consignees, the Ghilzais, are held up by the military force. Like Othello their "occupation is gone." There is a vast quantity of arms and ammunition awaiting shipment in Muscat at the present moment, but the gun-runners realise the futility of attempting to land them on the opposite coast. The Ghilzais, on the other hand, are daily becoming more impatient and it was reported

that as late as April 9, the day previous to the landing of the troops, a party of Ghilzais were in Rapsch. At the time of writing small bands of the more adventurous tribesmen are gathered on the coast, and all boat's crews have stringent orders not to land anywhere on the coast outside the Telegraph concession at Jask, and boats are warned to keep outside the creeks at Galag and Rapsch. The *Espegle* is stationed in the Gulf of Oman, in the vicinity of Muscat, the *Alert* at Dibai and the *Persens* and *Philomel* off the Mekran coast.

RETURN OF THE LAND FORCE.

At 4 a.m. on the morning of the 21st, the landing parties of seamen and native crews from the R.I.M. ships were sent ashore to await the expected return of the expedition. Soon afterwards, before it was light, the advance guard were seen crawling slowly over the sand hills and a little later the whole force appeared in sight. They looked tired and dusty and were all anxious to get aboard again for a bath and clean clothes. The re-embarkation commenced at once, this time half a mile up Galag creek, where there is little or no surf. In twelve hours the whole force were on board once more and before the last boat was well clear of the water the fleet had weighed and were heading for Jask. Here the fleet arrived at half-past six on the morning of the 22nd, and are now lying preparatory to moving off again for another landing. Colonel Delamain and staff have gone ashore to seek information, and on their return the Northbrook is proceeding to Sirik and the *Hardinge* to Ras Jagin. Up-to-date everything connected with the expedition has been successful, and it is believed that after this next landing of troops, which will probably be to-morrow morning (Sunday 23rd) the object of the Mekran expedition will be accomplished.





Brush with Outlaws.

A later message says:—At Jask we learnt that the expedition was to proceed to Sirik, a small fishing village in the Bahiyan district, some 30 miles north of Jask. We left Jask on the 23rd April, at 6 a.m., the Persens, the Northbrook, and Hardinge, taking with us Mir Hajir, Sheikh of Sirik, who was accompanying the Expedition ostensibly as guide, counsellor and friend. He was an old man, about 70 years of age, and had two followers with him, and seemed greatly relieved to get back again to his own country. His story was to the effect that a certain Sheikh Barkat Khan, warrior and freebooter, ex-Governor of Bahiyan, had burned his villages, raided his date groves and stolen his cattle. Now Sheikh Barkat Khan is the son-in-law of Mir Hajir, and moreover the friend and intermediary of the Ghilzai gunrunners and he had approached Mir Hajir with proposals to take an active part in supporting the gun-runners. This Mir Hajir had refused to do, as he said out of loyalty to the British Raj. Whereupon Barkat Khan descended on Sirik and smote it ruthlessly, and Mir Hajir, unable or unwilling to retaliate, had sought the protection of the British.

So matters stood when the expedition arrived at Sirik, on the afternoon of the 23rd, and found there the armed launches Karanja and Mashona. Mir Hajir was sent ashore that afternoon; but the disembarkation of troops did not commence until the following morning at 4-30 a.m. Although taking place on a surf-bound beach with no shelter whatever from the prevailing Shamal, the disembarkation proceeded without mishap. The mules have apparently got quite used to the rough handling they receive, and jump in and out of the boats as if to the manner born. At 3 p.m. the whole of the expedition was ashore and moved off inland, taking with them Mir Hajir.

The next morning the Admiral arrived in the Flagship, and left again in the evening; but at 2-30 a.m., on the morning of the 25th the flagship again returned. It appears that shortly after landing Mir Hajir had approached Colonel Delamain and informed him that he might expect to meet with serious opposition from Barkat Khan, who was then stationed with about 200 followers in the hills at a place called Pushak, some 20 miles inland. Colonel Delamain promptly sent a wireless message to the Flagship, asking the Admiral to return and land as many Marines and Bluejackets as possible. The Northbrook and Hardinge were ordered to have all boats ready at half an hour's notice to convey the naval landing party ashore and everybody was on the tip-toe of excitement, expecting a big fight, when a later message was received from the Colonel to say that reinforcements would not now be required, as Barkat Khan was not expected to make any serious opposition.

A BRISK ACTION.



Colonel Delamain commenced marching into the interior at once taking with him Mir Hajir. There are two ranges of hills here—one about five miles from the coast and the other some fifteen miles further inland. On the 28th the Force reached a pass leading through the second range of hills at a spot called Pushak—20 miles east of Sirik—and here it was on the hills above the pass that Mir Barkat Khan with some 180 followers was waiting. At an early hour on the 28th Col. Delamain received a note from Barkat Khan expressing regret that they had not been able to meet earlier but hoping that their meeting would not now be long delayed. The Colonel's reply was to order a general advance into the


pass, and at midday the enemy opened fire from the hillsides around—the range at times being less than 200 yards. The Mountain Battery was quickly brought into action and did most of the damage—one of the shells taking a man's head clean off. Barkat Khan and his followers put up a good fight and it was not until 3 p.m. that the last of his men finally broke from their shelled-out *songars* and fled. The enemy's losses were as far as is known 8 killed and 14 wounded and 1 prisoner who was shot through both legs and captured. Our losses were three slightly wounded. After the action the Force camped for the night where they were and commenced the return march to Sirik the next morning, where they arrived at daylight on the 4th May. With regard to Mir Hajir, the worthy gentleman, after the action, tried to persuade the Colonel not to advance further and to allow him to go and try and convert Barkat Khan to the British cause. This the Colonel wisely refused to do. Mir Hajir came down to the beach at Sirik to see the force embark, and presented Colonel Delamain with a couple of fine looking vegetable marrowes as a peace offering. One other incident happened on the beach whilst re-embarking and that was the appearance of a woman closely veiled who begged to be allowed to take the only prisoner away. She was his sister—she said—and he was the only relative left to her. She was told that he would be taken to Jask and cured of his wounds and then sent back to Sirik; but she replied that she did not want him to be cured, she wanted to take him away. But the only prisoner now fattens in the hospital at Jask.

MOVEMENTS AT SEA.

On Saturday 29th April, the Northbrook left Sirik for Maskat. She went to bring an extra 8 days land and 8 days sea rations, also fresh vegetables and last, but not least, the mails. On May 1st in company with the Espiegle (who left with all lights out), the Northbrook returned to Sirik.

At 10 o'clock that same day when still some 25 miles from Sirik she met the Flagship bound for Maskat. From her orders were received to embark the force at Sirik on the 4th, leave at once for Kuhistak, 200 miles further up the coast, and disembark the force there again. Then after taking her mails and fresh provisions she proceeded on her way to Maskat while the Northbrook resumed the course to Sirik. Here she found the Hardinge and turned over to her half the land and sea rations. But no sooner was this completed than "buzz" went the wireless and soon every body knew that all operations were to stop. Everybody was glad that the Mekran Expedition was over and took no pains to hide his joy. On the 3rd we heard that the main body were encamped some half a dozen miles inland. At 4 a.m. the next morning away went all the B. L. M. boats for the beach, some two miles distant. At 5 a.m. the first boat load of mules were safely on board again and by 7 o'clock in the evening the last three boats were ready to push off from the shore. But the fates had willed otherwise. For at that moment a nasty squall arose increasing the surf tremendously. For two hours and a half did those three devoted boats try to battle their way out through the surf, but all to no purpose. At 9-30 p.m. they gave up the unequal struggle. The force was just yet not to leave Sirik, for Sirik had not yet done with us. Willy nilly we had to camp on the beach for that night, for all the world like shipwrecked mariners. Unfortunately everybody's baggage had been sent off to the ship earlier in the day. So there we were with nothing except the clothes we stood up in and they were soaked—150 sepoy and 6 officers with the lascars crews of the three boats. Fires were hastily lit and the shivering crowd gathered round to warm themselves as best they could. But Providence had not yet deserted us. About half past eleven a launch was seen approaching the shore slowly buffeting along against the heavy sea that was now running. She came quite close in—and we heard a welcome voice cry out through the darkness of the night "Food and blankets." You may be sure we soon had that food and those blankets—and for the rest of the night we were more or less comfortable. At 5 a.m. the next morning the surf had gone down considerably and soon afterwards the "shipwrecked party" (as they were pleased to call themselves) were safe on board.








THE RETURN.

On Thursday, 4th May, at 2 p.m., the Northbrook left Sirik for good, the Hardinge having already proceeded to Banji, a place further to the southward to pick up a detachment there. At 10 o'clock in the morning of the 5th we arrived at Chahbar and after making one or two transfers to the Flagship and Fox which we found at anchor there we left at noon the same day in company with the Flagship for Bombay. The Hardinge was astern of us having called at Jask while we were at Chahbar. But she spurted and caught us up and now (4 p.m. on Sunday afternoon the 7th—just a month later) the three ships—Flagship, Hardinge and Northbrook—are all steaming towards Bombay which we hope to reach at daylight to-morrow.

His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief, who arrived in Bombay on Monday morning, 8th May, from the Persian Gulf, is residing for a few days in the Admiral's House.









In any further communication on this subject, please quote

M.01084.

and address letter to—

The Secretary,
Admiralty, Whitehall,
London, S.W.

3811
Confidential.

H. 3687 ✓
(150) (146)
Admiralty, S.W.

16th August 1910.



Sir,

With reference to Admiralty letter M.0937 of the 15th ultimo, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for India in Council, that the Commander in Chief, East Indies, has been informed that under the Proclamation of the Sheikh of Koweit dated the 24th May 1900, His Majesty's Ships have the right to search British and Persian as well as Koweit vessels found in Koweit waters, and he has been requested to cause the printed statement issued to H.M. Ships at the Station to be amended accordingly.

I am, Sir,


Your Obedient Servant,


The UNDER
SECRETARY OF STATE,
INDIA OFFICE.


C. J. Thomas

Put by

✓ 14
L.P.—No. 8.









152 1910

Register No.
1126

Minute Paper. **Secret Department.**

Seay's Letter from India, No. 28 M, Dated 21 July } 1910.
Rec. 8 Aug. }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	10 Aug.	W.A.	<u>Arms Traffic.</u> Reports from Persian Gulf
Secretary of State			
Committee	11	W.A.	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State			


Copy to F.O.
Admiralty } 9 Aug. 1910.
D.M.O. sent.


FOR INFORMATION.

Seen Pol. Comm. 17 AUG 1910

Previous Papers:—

7908. I. 516. 1000.—4/1910. [1278/09.]







58

137

Telegram P., No. 723, dated the 14th (received 15th) July 1910.

From—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Please refer to your telegram No. 387 S.,[‡] dated 13th instant. I was not consulted in any form regarding the deportation of Saiyid Abdur Rahim.

[‡] Serial No. 129.

Craufurd telegraphed on 8th July that he proposed to expel Dadulla, who preferred India to Bushire, and asked whether I could support detention as being important in connection with Mir Barkat case. I replied demi-officially suggesting that, as Dadulla was ready to go to India, he should be induced to apply in writing for an indulgent passage by the Patrick Stewart. I agree that his translation is important and do not think we need hesitate to deport Afghans or that Resident need be consulted in advance. As regards the general question of obligation to consult Resident, since receipt of Foreign Department telegram, dated 12th January, No. 15 S.,[§]

[§] Serial No. 266 in Part I of Series.

it has been understood here that all measures which could be regarded as part of blockade operations were the immediate responsibility of the Naval and Military authorities, the Admiral and Intelligence Officer consulting me informally when they thought fit. It is conducive to effectiveness of blockade operations that this should continue to be the position as far as possible, and that Naval and Military authorities should have free hand within reasonable limits, and not be hampered more than necessary by political niceties which must be taken into account by Resident if he is consulted in advance. In the event of question arising, Residency would, as far as practically possible, support action of blockade authorities to Legation.



59

The deportation of Saiyid Abdur Rahim is not defensible from international point of view, but now that it has been carried out, I think that his return to Jask might be held in abeyance, and that he might be detained at Karachi until I see whether difficulties are likely to be raised by Persian authorities. Should they protest, I will say that I will make further enquiries, and he might be sent back in the meanwhile.

138

No. 1774, dated Bushire, the 3rd (received 13th) July 1910 (Confidential).

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL P. Z. COX, C.S.I., C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

With reference to paragraph 2 of my letter* No. 1670, dated 22nd June 1910, I have the honour to submit a copy of a communication received from Captain Shakespear from which it will be seen that Sheikh Mubarek denies that the

* Serial No. 106.

(1) Koweit Diary entry, dated the 14th June 1910,
(2) Koweit Agency No. C.—39, dated the 21st June 1910.

Koweit dhow referred to (and another) brought back cargoes of arms as reported to the Political Agent.

2. I am sending details to the Political Agent, Maskat, and Senior Naval Officer, for information and enquiry.

Extract from the diary of the Political Agent, Koweit.

14th June.—A buggalow arrived late yesterday evening from Maskat, and it is said she has on board her about 3,000 rifles and ammunition. They belong to Abdulla-bin-Atiji and others and were shipped by the firm of Messrs. Goguyer of Maskat. It is just possible that the firearms were shipped, while M. Elbaz was in Maskat and that his present visit to Koweit was timed to watch developments regarding this consignment. The buggalow on her arrival anchored opposite the Sheikh's Customs House, but the next morning moved on to Bunder Shweikh. The firearms are said not to have been landed yet, probably due to the Sheikh's absence. She belongs to one Shahin-bin-Ghanim, and in returning from the Malabar coast visited Maskat. Besides the firearms, she has other cargo on board.

No. C.—39, dated Koweit, the 21st June 1910 (Confidential).

From—CAPTAIN W. H. I. SHAKESPEAR, Political Agent, Koweit,

To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

With reference to paragraph 5 of my letter† No. C.—37, dated the 15th June 1910, later reports described the

† Encls. to Serial No. 106.

large buggalow as bringing 1,700 rifles and not 3,000 as was first reported.

2. This is one of the large buggalows trading with the Malabar coast, and it is said that, when calling at Maskat on her homeward voyage, she picked up the 1,700 rifles and sailed for Lingah, and that she was held up by a British man-of-war, but escaped search by showing false papers. Her name is given as "Ambar Towil", and her nakhuda is one Khalifa-bin-Shabin, the son of the owner. I also heard that another of these large buggalows had brought 500 rifles.

3. Both these vessels arrived during the Sheikh's absence, which made it necessary to defer action pending his return. On his return as the Sheikh made no move, I enquired whether he knew of the arrival of these two buggalows and of the reports current about them, and to make it quite clear, I related what I had heard. The Sheikh said he had heard the rumour as regards Shahin-bin-Ghanim's boat and immediately on the Nakhuda's arrival



60

had taken steps to discover the truth. He found the rumour groundless and thought besides Shahin was not such a fool as to risk practically all he had in the world (the buggalow and her cargo) for a precarious profit in carrying contraband arms. Of the other buggalow he had not heard, but he was sure it could not be true, for he would certainly have been informed of any attempt at smuggling.

4. I think myself that it is fairly certain that these buggalows have brought arms in spite of the Sheikh's denial, but as proof in Koweit is almost impossible through fear of the Sheikh, I am compelled to accept his word unless indeed unmistakable evidence can be adduced of purchase or shipment at Maskat.

5. I believe false papers are frequently carried by dhows as well as their true ones, and if the story I have heard here of the "Ambar Towil's" escape from search is at all in accordance with facts, it would appear that a very strict search is required of all dhows.

141

Telegram P., No. S.—401, dated the 16th July 1910.


From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,


To—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL P. Z. Cox, C.S.I., C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

Please refer to your telegram 623* of 11th June. Two large arms

* Serial No. 137.

caravans, as you are aware, have passed through Seistan into Afghanistan within the last three weeks, after doing much damage to telegraph line, &c. Reports from Seistan and Chagai announce presence of yet another caravan moving northwards from Bampur. Do you consider that Robat detachment can be safely withdrawn, when the caravan referred to has passed Seistan? Or do you think that operations will be recommenced by Afghan gun-runners this autumn so early as to make it worth while to retain detachment at Robat for the present? Please consult Tehran Legation.







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146

Telegram P., No. 99 K., dated the 15th (received *via* Robat on 18th) July 1910.
From—His Britannic Majesty's Consul for Seistan and Kain,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.


Following telegram sent to His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran :—
Begins. No. 8. 200 Kainat sowars, &c., are now collected at Neh for which
place I am leaving. At Koh-Malik-Siah there are at present 250 camel-loads
of merchandise including 200 for Meshed. Goods will, as opportunity offers, be
pushed on to Seistan. *Ends.*

148

Telegram P., No. S.—409, dated the 19th July 1910.
From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,
To—The Hon'ble the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, Ziarat.
Consul, Seistan, telegraphs* on 15th July:—"Following telegram
* Serial No. 146. * * * Seistan".

149

Telegram P., No. S.—410, dated the 19th July 1910.
From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,
To—His Britannic Majesty's Consul for Seistan and Kain.
Agent, Governor-General, Baluchistan, has been asked to act on suggestion
regarding detention of goods in your
telegram 91 K.,† 11th July.
† Serial No. 121.





157 158

Register No. **3687**

Minute Paper. **Secret Department.**

Letter from *Admiralty* Dated *15* } *July* 1910.
70. Recd 5 Aug 1910 Rec. *16* }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	<i>19 July</i>	<i>2000</i>	<i>Arms Traffic</i>
Secretary of State	<i>20</i>	<i>KK</i>	
Committee	<i>21.</i>	<i>K.</i>	<i>Revised statement, drawn up by Comm- in Chief, East Indies Station, showing powers of H. M.'s Ships to search vessels suspected of being engaged in the illicit traffic in arms.</i>
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State			


Copy to *India (of formls)* 5 Aug. 1910 Secy. 21


FOR INFORMATION.


*Seen Pol. Commr.,
28 JUL. 1910*


Previous Papers:—
4393/09

7908. I. 516. 1000.—4/1910. [1278/09.]












Enclosure in No. 1.


STATEMENT showing the Powers of His Majesty's Ships to search Vessels suspected of being engaged in the Traffic in Arms.

Locality of suspected Vessel at time of visit.	Country of origin of Vessel.	Port to which Vessel should be taken if detained.	Authority for exercising the right of search and detention.	Reference. (The M. letters were addressed by the Admiralty to the Commander-in-chief, East Indies.)
On the high seas..	Muscat*	Muscat ..	Sultan's Proclamations, 13.1.98 and 17.10.03	M. 0153 of 25.4.01, M. 1736 of 16.2.04, M. 17539 of 29.1.04.
	Persia..	Nearest Persian port at which a proper customs administration exists*	Agreement with Persia, 18.12.97	M. 0153 of 25.3.01.
	British (native craft only)	Nearest British port, or Jashk, if in the Persian Gulf	..	Letter from Political Resident, No. 199, of 3.3.04, addressed to Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf. Memorandum was accepted by the Government of India, and forwarded to Admiralty in East India letter No. 294/1466 of 13.5.04.
In territorial waters—				
British† ..	All vessels ..	Berbera or Zeyla if in British Somaliland waters, Aden if in Aden Protectorate waters	Usage. With regard to French vessels, Agreement with France, 13.12.06	M. 048 of 1.2.07, M. 0364 of 30.3.10.
Italian Somaliland Protectorate	All native vessels under any flag	If under Italian flag, to Bandar Kassim or handed over to an Italian man-of-war; if under any other flag, to Berbera or Zeyla	Agreement with Italy, July 1904	M. 5936 of 11.5.04.
French ..	Vessels cannot be searched by His Majesty's ships in French waters	
Turkish ..	Vessels cannot be searched by His Majesty's ships in Turkish waters	M. 0153 of 25.3.01, M. 0364 of 30.3.10.
Muscat ..	British, Persian, Muscat	Muscat ..	Sultan's Proclamations, 13.1.98 and 17.10.03	M. 0153 of 25.3.01, M. 1736 of 16.2.04, M. 0364 of 30.3.10.
Persia ..	British, Persian, Muscat, Bahrein, Koweit	Nearest Persian port at which a proper customs administration exists*	Agreement with Persia, 18.12.97	M. 0153 of 25.3.01, M. 0364 of 30.3.10.
Bahrein ..	Bahrein, British, Persian	Bahrein ..	Agreement with Bahrein, dated 1898	M. 0364 of 30.3.10.
Koweit ..	Koweit, British, Persian	Koweit ..	Agreement with Koweit, 24.5.00	M. 0364 of 30.3.10.

* For the present all these vessels are to be detained pending instructions.

† The territorial waters of Baluchistan (with the exception of those of Gwadur, which belongs to Oman) are British waters.








Statement showing the Powers of His Majesty's Ships to search vessels suspected of being engaged in the Traffic in Arms.

Locality of suspected Vessel at time of visit.	Country of origin of Vessel.	Port to which Vessel should be taken if detained.	Authority for exercising the right of search and detention.	Reference. (The M. Letters were addressed by the Admiralty to the C-in-C. East Indies.)
THE HIGH SEAS.	Masquat &	Masquat	Sultan's Proclamations 13/1/98 & 17/10/03.	M.0153 of 25.4.01 M.1736 of 16.2.04 M.17539 of 29.1.04
	Persia	Nearest Persian port at which a proper Customs administration exists &	Agreement with Persia 13/12/97	M.0153 of 25.3.01
	British (native craft only)	Nearest British port or Jashk if in the Persian Gulf.	—	Letter from Political Resident No. 199 of 3.3.04, addressed to SMC P.O. Memorandum was accepted by the G. of I. & forwarded to Admiralty in E.I. Letter No. 294/1486 of 13.5.04.
TERRITORIAL WATERS.	British *	All vessels.	Berbera or Zeila, if in British Somaliland waters Aden, if in Aden Protectorate waters.	Usage. With regard to French vessels, Agreement with France, 13.12.06.
	Italian Somaliland Protectorate	All native vessels under any flag	If under Italian flag, to Bandar Kassim or handed over to an Italian man-of-war; if under any other flag, to Berbera or Zeila.	Agreement with Italy July 1904.
	French	Vessels cannot be searched by H.M. Ships in French waters.	—	—
	Turkish	Vessels cannot be searched by H.M. Ships in Turkish waters.	—	—
	Masquat	British, Persian, Masquat.	Masquat	Sultan's Proclamations 13.1.98 & 17.10.03
	Persia	British, Persian, Masquat, Bahrain, Kuwait.	Nearest Persian port at which a proper Customs administration exists &	Agreement with Persia 16.12.97.
	Bahrain	Bahrain, British Persian.	Bahrain.	Agreement with Bahrain dated 1898.
Kuwait.	Kuwait, British and Persian (see Admiralty letter M. 21026, 16 Aug 1904)	Kuwait &	Agreement with Kuwait dated 24.5.00.	M.0364 of 30.3.10

* The territorial waters of Baluchistan (with the exception of those of Gwadar, which belongs to 'Oman) are British waters.

& For the present all these vessels are to be detained pending instructions.

(Enclosure to East Indies Confidential General Memorandum No. 48).





(176)
(162)
WR

Register No.
957

Minute Paper. **Secret Department.**

Seay's Letter from India, No. 23 M, Dated 16 June 1910.
Rec. 4 July 1910.

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	6 July	Law	<u>Arms Traffic</u> Affairs in Persia Sheikh of Koweit & French Conspire- ment.
Secretary of State	7	W	
Committee	8	Mc.	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State			


Copy to Secy. Admiralty } 5 July 1910.


FOR INFORMATION.


Sent Pol. Comm. 12 JUL 1910

Previous Papers:—
918

7908. I. 516. 1000.—4/1910. [1278/09.]









13

27

Telegram P., No. 438 C., dated (and received) the 7th June 1910.

From—The Hon'ble the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

My telegram* No. 419 of the 4th June. A report from Robat states that the Khalifa's caravan travelling *via* Baluch Ab and Girdi has passed through to Afghan territory.

* Serial No. 17.

28

(Secret.)

Telegram, dated the 3rd June 1910.

From—The Secretary to the Government of India, Marine Department, Simla,
To—His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Squadron.

The Government of India consider that, in view of French and German interest aroused by our activity in the Persian Gulf, information regarding captures of arms and the operations generally, should be kept as secret as possible.

29


No. 408 P., dated Karachi, the 4th (received 7th) June 1910.


From—H. WHITBY SMITH, Esq., Director, Persian Gulf Telegraphs, in Political Charge, Mekran Coast,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

Has the honour to send copy of telegram received from Mr. Gumbley of this Department at Jask—"4th June. Five days ago a party of 300 Afghans left Maihan by the Ramishk Road for Seistan".

2. Maihan is the same as Meba in Lieutenant Birdwood's map.





39

No. 130, dated the 6th (received 9th) June 1910.

From—The Director, Indo-European Telegraph Department (Persian Gulf Section),
Karachi,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

Has the honour to send copies of three telegrams received from Jask :—

“5th. Islam Khan and Saiyid Khan are fighting at Fanooch. Casualties:
Islam Khan one and Saiyid Khan four men killed.”



16

"5th. My telegram of 4th. This is only party now remaining."
 "5th. 80 Afghans left Tutan by the Fanooch road about four days ago for Seistan. They have only 20 rifles."

40

No. 133, dated the 6th (received 9th) June 1910.

From—The Director, Indo-European Telegraph Department (Persian Gulf Section), Karachi,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

Has the honour to send copy of telegram received from Jask :—

"My telegram of 22nd May last. The Khalifa and his following left Bampur about sixteen days ago for Seistan".

41

Telegram, No. 60 N., dated the 8th (received 9th) June 1910.

From—The Hon'ble the Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in the North-West Frontier Province, Nathingali,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Continuation my No. 179 N. of 2nd. Gregson wires :—*Begins.* 116. Khalifa Khair Muhammad's caravan reached Helmund. Another party of Afghans still at Putai in Mekran.

43

Telegram No. 58 K., dated (and received) the 11th June 1910.

From—MAJOR F. MCCONAGHEY, His Britannic Majesty's Consul for Seistan and Kain, Birjand,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Dehaneh Baghi reports 800 Afghans due Baluchab, 10th June; 300 reported to be going *via* Rig and 500 *via* Koh-i-Malik Siah to loot. Khair Khalifa passed Girdi on 4th. Some damage was caused to our rest-house, shop, &c.

44

Telegram P., No. 623, dated (and received) the 11th June 1910.

From—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Arms traffic. Please see your telegram* No. 320 S., dated 8th June. I have consulted His Britannic Majesty's Legation at Tehran and we agree that

* Serial No. 31.

it will not be advisable to withdraw troops by the 15th June, owing to the presence in neighbourhood of the central line of various parties of Afghans. But, with the exception of about 25, all the Afghans have left the coast, so that it would not be necessary to postpone for many days the withdrawal of the troops.



17

45

Telegram, No. 470, dated the 10th (received 11th) June 1910.

From—The HON'BLE LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SIR H. McMAHON, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.,
Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, Quetta,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Your telegram* No. 1192 E.-A. of 8th June. Recent reports show that
* Serial No. 32. there are 500 Afghans, mostly Afridis
and Kabulis, still in Persia. Of these

300 are reported to have started on 31st May for Seistan *via* Ramisk, remain-
ing 200 have not yet started. Both these parties are very exasperated. Until
they are reported to have crossed Afghan border I would recommend detention
of detachment.

(+9/9/10)

as/

46

Telegram P., No. S.—327, dated the 11th June 1910.

From—The Foreign Department, Simla,


To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

Robat detachment. Please refer to my telegram,† dated the 8th June.

† Serial No. 31. On 10th June the Agent to the Governor-
General, Baluchistan, telegraphed as fol-
lows:—

‘Recent reports show * (Serial No. 45) * detention of detachment.’

Please consult His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran before con-
veying your views.





19

49

No. 425 P., dated the 9th (received 11th) June 1910.

From—H. WHITEY SMITH, Esq., Director, Persian Gulf Telegraphs, in Political charge Mekran Coast,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

With reference* to my No. 130 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to explain that the telegram quoted below

* Serial No. 39. "5th. My telegram of 4th. This is the only party now remaining". Referred to the following telegram from Jask, dated the 4th instant :—

"There are now 200 Afghans in Putai; they are awaiting three of their party and a consignment from Maskat".

2. I now sent copy of a further telegram, dated the 8th instant, from Jask, referring to this party of 200 Afghans :

"This party left Putai five days ago travelling *via* Maihan to Tutan. At Mihaan they left 25 men with instructions to remain there till they got news from Maskat. The balance at Tutan are expected to leave shortly for Afghanistan by the Kutaich road".

51


Telegram P., No. S.—328, dated the 12th June 1910.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,

To—The Hon'ble the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, Ziarat.

Please see your telegram† No. 470, dated 10th instant. The following has been received from His Britannic Majesty's Consul for Seistan :—"Dehaneh

‡ Serial No. 45. Baghi reports 800 Afghans due Baluchab 10th June, 300 reported to be going *via* Rig and 500 *via* Koh-i-Malik Siah to loot. Khair Khalifa passed Girdi on 4th. Some damage was caused to our rest-house, shop, &c." Repeated to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.





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58

No. 85—1462 XIV K., dated Diyatalawa, the 23rd May 1910.

From—His EXCELLENCY REAR-ADMIRAL E. J. W. SLADE, Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Squadron,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Marine Department.

I have the honour to forward, for the information of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council, the attached report received from the Senior Naval Officer Persian Gulf, dated 15th May 1910, relative to the operations for the suppression of the traffic in arms.

No. 996 M., dated Simla, the 10th (received 11th) June 1910.

Endorsed by Marine Department.

Copy of the above, with copy of enclosure, forwarded to—

The Foreign Department.

The Chief of the General Staff.

No. 9, dated the 15th May 1910.

From—The Commander, H.M.S. "Philomel",

To—His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Squadron.

I have the honour to report that, on the 22nd March, I took over the duties of Senior Naval Officer from Commander Bird.

2. H.M.S. "Perseus" left the same day for Aden.

3. After the "Hardinge" had embarked her troops at Sirik, I sent her to Jask to await further orders. Your telegram concerning her reached me on the 28th March, and I issued her sealed Sailing Orders in accordance with your instructions. She left Jask for the rendezvous at 4 A.M. on the 1st April.

4. On the 26th March, I boarded a dhow about 15 miles from the Oman coast bound from Kishm to Sohar; she had no cargo, but one Afghan passenger; 2,000 rupees and 217 dollars were found in a box in her stern-sheets. I took the dhow in tow and proceeded with her to Mubarak where I anchored for the night, after having taken the Afghan, crew and money out of her. The Nakoda declared the money belonged to him but, as I considered this doubtful, I decided to take the money to Jask and hand it over to Captain Craufurd for investigation, letting the dhow go. I, at the same time, informed the Nakoda that, if, on enquiry it turned out that he was the owner of the money, it would be returned to him in a fortnight or three weeks time, on his calling for it at Jask. Eventually it was found that on this occasion he was trading honestly and that the money really did belong to him, so it was returned accordingly.

5. The Afghan prisoner was sent by slow mail to Karachi under police escort.

6. Met and communicated with "Redbreast" on the 29th March, sent her north to be under the immediate orders of "Sphinx."

7. The case of Mir Barkat Khan has given a lot of trouble. Whilst at Jask, His Excellency the Darya Begi agreed with Senior Naval Officer and Major Austin as to his proved complicity in the Arms Traffic and promised to deport him. Later His Excellency explained that, being doubtful of the retention of his office after 31st March, and as to whether summary deportation would meet with approval of the Persian Government, he considered it advisable to keep Barkat with him at Bunder Abbas until he should receive information from Tehran. This change in ideas on the part of His Excellency is evidently due to the assistance rendered by Barkat's tulangchis to him on the occasion of the late raid at Bunder Abbas. Barkat eventually left for Bushire on the 28th March.

8. On 7th April, I received information through Jask that it was reported by the Rodi patrol that a consignment of arms had been landed at Passa Bunder west of Gwatar on Tuesday, the 5th instant, but the quantity

*Already rec'd
F-3598/10*



was unknown, as the natives would not allow the patrol to approach; also that the arms were still there on the 7th and were guarded by three Afghans. I immediately signalled to "Proserpine" to proceed at once to Charbar, embark 50 men and go on to Passa Bundar and seize the cargo. At the same time I signalled to the Officer Commanding Troops, Jask, to obtain his sanction to these arrangements and for him to give the necessary orders to Charbar. I also ordered "Proserpine" to supplement landing party as considered necessary.

9. At arrival at Passa Bundar the landing was effected and a thorough search of all huts and the surrounding district made, but with no result, the natives one and all denying that there had ever been any arms there. There was nothing to be done under these circumstances but to embark the party and return with them to Charbar, which was accordingly done. The following day the "Proserpine" returned to Gwatar and thoroughly searched the place and the surrounding country with a party of her own men, but could find no trace of arms, nor yet of camel tracks on any of the roads leading inland.

10. A line Inspector was then sent from Jask and Major Raven and Mr McMeekin from Charbar also went to see what information they could get; Captain Craufurd also having his own intelligence people at work. The result of all these investigations, although in some cases contradictory, generally go to prove that 64 rifles were landed and loaded on to 8 donkeys at once and taken inland to Bint. It appears that the patrol gave correct information in the first place, but was afterwards intimidated by Jilal Khan and went back on his word, though he eventually told the truth again when carefully questioned.

11. There are various stories current as to the intention of the Afghans both on the Mekran and the Biyaban coasts, one being that they had made up their minds only to wait until a certain date, and to leave with or without their consignment of arms. Cargoes still seem to be leaving Maskat for Sohar, but apparently are not getting much further, although every now and again information arrives that arms will be landed at certain places on the coast. However there has been no actual attempt so far that has been heard of except the one already quoted at Charbar and another which is reported on lower down.

12. On the 4th April 200 Bashkardis attacked 650 Afghans somewhere near Sarzeh, but the Afghans had information by letter from Barkat Khan's father-in-law as to the time and place of the contemplated attack, and were ready when the Bashkardis arrived. The latter were repulsed at once and pursued some 4 or 5 miles losing 36 men in all, 2 of whom were taken prisoners, shot and then burnt, which action from all reports seems to have lost them many friends in this part of the country. Since the fight I understand that 2 or 3 Afghans have been murdered, and it is quite possible that eventually they may have to fight their way out of the country.

13. On the 24th April the "Philomel", when cruising off Ras-al-kuh, captured 2 dhows, the contents of which were 1997 rifles, 158 mauser pistols and 907,000 rounds of ammunition. A separate report has been sent in on this subject. The arms and ammunition were consigned to Jan Muhammad Nurakai and Nadir Shore Afridi. Those cargoes have since been jettisoned in accordance with orders received by telegraph from you.

14. In obedience to orders contained in your telegram No. 78, I proceeded to Maskat on the 5th May to confer with Major Trevor as to the suitability of the merchant Nassib Bin Muhammad to hold the contract for fresh provisions in the southern portion of the Gulf. Major Trevor is of the same opinion as myself and thinks that Captain Craufurd takes a very highly coloured view both of this man's desire to do harm and interfere with our arrangements for the suppression of the Arms Traffic and also of his opportunities of so doing.

15. At the present time Nassib has large financial interests at stake, and should suspicion fall on him at any time, he would stand to lose a very good income and one far greater than he could expect to make by participation in



the arms trade in its present state. We are of opinion that he is far too good a business man to take any chance of this sort. As to Captain Crauford's complaint that Nassib will now have agents on the Mekran coast who will carry all sorts of undesirable information from one coast to another, I would beg to point out that he has had agents across the water ever since he has held the Maskat provision agreement. These men have been employed by him in buying sheep and cattle, the former animals being impossible to obtain in Oman.

16. The "Perseus" arrived at Maskat from Aden on the 4th May. On the 5th May I arrived at Maskat to coal and received your telegram informing me that sailing orders would arrive by mail on the 9th instant and that, if convenient, I should meet the mail steamer. Under these circumstances, as nothing of importance was taking place and the time available after coaling was barely sufficient for me to get over to the Biyaban coast and return, I decided to wait at Maskat until the 9th instant.

17. On the 7th May the sad news of the death of His Majesty King Edward VII was received through Jask. The "Philomel" and Consulate immediately half masted colours and His Highness the Sultan followed suit at his palace and on board his yacht.

18. The Mail arrived at 8 A.M. on Monday the 9th May, bringing my sailing orders. I waited in harbour until I had fired the Royal Salute in honour of the proclamation of His Majesty King George V and I then proceeded to pick up my boats and visit Jask for the purpose of conferring with Captain Crauford on the subject of the provision agreement and the suitability of Nassib Bin Muhammad to hold it. Captain Crauford now agrees that no harm is likely to come through any action taken by Nassib, but at the same time desires me to point out to you that if at any time he is proved to have circulated information to our detriment his agreement should be terminated at once.

19. The Collier "Tangistan" arrived at Jask at noon on the 10th instant. I sent her to unload 2,000 tons at Maskat with orders to then return to Jask by which time ships will be again empty and ready to coal from her. The "Sheikh", "Panther" and "Tamil" also arrived at Jask on the 10th, the latter with her feed pump broken down.

20. All fishermen met with off Bunji Mabarak and the neighbourhood have informed my boats that 100 Afghans under Jan Muhammad had sacked and burnt half the village. Some stories say some of the natives were killed and others that they were most severely beaten. The whole stretch of coast in that district is now quite deserted, all the natives having left for places where their property is more secure.

21. Captain Crauford informs me that he has information that a party of Afghans are coming from Sarzhai down to Hillari Gut, a precipitous mountain with a good water-supply, about 12 miles north of Gangan and that their intention is to hold the place and raid the surrounding country, they have with them Dadulla and Abdulla Dervish two of Barkat's most active advisers.

22. I turned over the Senior Naval Officer's Box on the 11th May to Commander H. J. T. Marshall, H.M.S. "Proserpine" giving him all necessary information in writing. A copy of this document I have also kept to turn over to Captain Hunt at Bombay. In accordance with orders received from Commanding Officer "Fox" in November last, I have also turned over to Commander Marshall copy No. 64 of Indian Army Cipher "G".



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No. 1517, dated Bushire, the 5th (received 13th) June 1910 (Confidential).

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL P. Z. COX, C.S.I., C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

- (1) Resident to Political Agent, Koweit, No. 1215, dated the 18th May 1910.
 (2) Resident to Sheikh Mubarak, No. 172, dated the 17th May 1910.
 (3) Political Agent, Koweit, to Resident, No. C. 28, dated the 24th May 1910.
 (4) Sheikh Mubarak to Resident, dated the 24th May 1910.

* Serial No. 7.

In continuation of my letter* No. 1297, dated 2nd May 1910, I have the honour to forward, for the information of Government, copies of further correspondence regarding the seizure by Shaikh Mubarak of the cargo of arms brought by the French dhow "Fateh-el-Khair."

No. 1215, dated the 18th May 1910.

From—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,

To—The Political Agent, Koweit.

With reference to the correspondence ending with your telegram,† dated 12th May, I have the honour to enclose a letter (with translation for your information and record) from myself to Shaikh Mubarak.

† Encl., Serial No. 7.

2. I have written it with the idea that it may serve to corroborate or punctuate the several steps taken by Shaikh Mubarak; but if for any reason you think it unnecessary or inadvisable, please use your discretion to hold it over pending reference to me.

3. I take the opportunity to thank you for your persevering and successful efforts to get the Shaikh to confiscate the consignment.

4. It is difficult to conjecture confidently the motive which prompted him to take the arms into his own custody, but I suppose it was in order to make sure that he got the arms himself if all went well, or was in a position to hand them back to the French subjects concerned, if the latter made themselves inconveniently unpleasant, and he did not get adequate support from us.

No. 172, dated the 17th May 1910.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL P. Z. COX, C.S.I., C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—SHAikh MUBARAK IS SUBAH, Ruler of Koweit.

After compliments.—Captain Shakespear duly informed me how you had reported to him (i) the arrival of the dhow "Fateh-el-Khair" under French colours on or about 27th April with a cargo of contraband arms, in contravention of your proclamation of May 1900, and (ii) the subsequent landing of the



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arms in spite of your orders. He informed me also of your decision to confiscate the illicit consignment and to hand it to him for safe custody. I have finally learnt from him that you have preferred to take them into your own custody and have now placed them under a guard in your Customs House and will not allow them to be moved without the knowledge and consent of the British authorities. That is all good. The object is, as you know, to prevent them falling again into the hands of undesirable people. This contraband traffic in arms is an evil thing which you as Ruler of Koweit are fully justified in stamping out and it is not likely that the French Government will support their dependents in smuggling the arms into your very town in spite of your well-known prohibition. If they do make any complaint to you on the subject, you may rest assured that the British Government will take your part in replying to it and will support you in upholding your just rights and keeping contraband arms out of your territory.

No. C. 28, dated the 24th May 1910.

From—The Political Agent, Koweit,
To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your two letters Nos. 1214 and 1215, dated the 18th May 1910, and of the enclosures forwarded therein.

2. I delivered your letter to Shaikh Mubarak as I think it will be advantageous for him to know how the matter was regarded by you and because it furnishes a useful record of his and our attitude in the matter. I have the honour to enclose herewith the Shaikh's reply to you, of which I have retained a copy for my office records.


Dated the 15th Jemadi I 1328 (24th May 1910).

From—SHAIKH MUBARAK ES SUBAH, Ruler of Koweit,
To—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL P. Z. COX, C.S.I., C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

I have duly received your honour's esteemed letter, dated 7th Jemadi I 1328 = 17th May 1910, containing your order about the contraband arms on behalf of the High British Government.

I, your sincere friend, will abide by your orders in any case. I received information five months ago about the pressure used by the High Government at Maskat (enforcing) the said prohibition. Without receiving any orders from you, I sent a telegram to Saiyid Yusuf Ziwawi at Maskat to warn all the boats of my subjects not to ship arms—neither for our side, nor for anywhere else—and that all my subjects should not deal in such articles, notwithstanding that my subjects were not dealing in them since long and it was the Persians and the inhabitants of Nejd who dealt in them. In former times when the Government was silent about this matter, a quantity of these arms used to pass our side and turn into the possession of certain tribes and none besides them. I also used to obtain profits from them, but abandoned those profits in obedience to your order, because obedience to your orders and your satisfaction are the greatest profits for us.

As to those which reached our side by the Samboq, they are, as you have been advised by Captain Shakespear, placed at the Customs. With regard to your remark that the High Government will answer for us. I know this for a certainty, and we have none besides God and it and remain under its attention and protection. May God enable us always to obtain your satisfaction: This (is what was to be stated) and I expect to receive your kind attention. May you continue to be preserved and guarded.





(171) (187)

Register No.

918

Minute Paper.

Secret Department.

Letter from *India, No 22 M*

Dated *9 June 1910*

Rec. *27*

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	<i>29 June</i>	<i>East</i>	<u>Arms Traffic.</u> Correspondence received from India <i>Wew</i>
Secretary of State	<i>30</i>	<i>Wew</i>	
Committee	<i>4.7.</i>	<i>M.</i>	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State			

Copy to *FO.*

Admiralty } *28 June 1910*


FOR INFORMATION.

The pressure applied to the Sheikh of Kuwait, & the assurance of support given to him, are in accordance with S. of S.'s telegram of 21st March /10

Sent Pol. Comm.,
12 JUL. 1910
(with 3114)

Previous Papers:—

7908. I. 516. 1000.—4/1910. [1278/09.]







*From Secretary of State to Viceroy, Foreign Department,
21st March 1910.*

Foreign Secret. Your Foreign Secret telegram of 14th instant. Arms traffic. I accept your views as to passes and communication to Sultan. Please telegraph estimated cost of proposed wireless installations before taking any action.

As to France, French Consul's action in facilitating purchase of dhow for arms traffic will now be made ground of strong representation to French Government, who will be urged to assist His Majesty's Government by permitting Sultan to prohibit import for one year, and our ships to search French dhows during that period, just as we are assisting French in preventing arms traffic with Morocco. This should not cause any abatement of rigour of blockade, but it must be borne in mind that we have no right even to touch French dhows except in British waters, and, with reference to Admiral's telegram to Government of India, No. 35, dated 20th February, enclosed in your Foreign Secretary's letter of 24th February, he should be reminded that orders of 1867 only permit stopping of dhow flying French flag where there is presumption that she is wrongfully flying it. If you think it practicable you may take action proposed in paragraph 2 of India Office letter to Foreign Office, dated 24th February, enclosed in my Political Secretary's letter dated 25th February.





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No. 80—1462 XIV N., dated Diyatalawa, the 13th May 1910.

From—His Excellency Rear-Admiral, E. J. W. SLADE, Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Squadron,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Marine Department.

With reference to my telegram No. 56 of 25th April 1910, I have the honour to forward, for the information of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council, the attached report received from the Commanding Officer of H. M. S. "Philomel" of the capture of two arms running dhows in the Persian Gulf on 24th April 1910.

2. As communicated by my telegram No. 62 of 11th May 1910, the arms and ammunition found in these dhows have been sunk, in accordance with Marine Department telegram No. 780 M. of 3rd idem.

Reporting capture of two dhows.

H. M. S. "Philomel",
at Maskat,
2nd May 1910.

No. 5.
Sir,

I have the honour to report that on Sunday, 24th April 1910, at 4-30 P.M. whilst cruising off Ras Al Kuh, a dhow was sighted to the south-west standing



towards the land. I at once chased, and on seeing me alter course, the dhow went about and stood out to sea.

2. About 10 minutes later, I sighted a second dhow, which behaved in the same manner, as the first, on my heaving in sight. I went on full speed, with the boilers then alight, and fired half a dozen rounds of 3-pr., before they lowered their sails.

3. On boarding the first dhow, it was at once plain, that she was full of arms. I got her alongside the lee side, and then proceeded towards the second, which was about a mile off, boarded her, and found her cargo was also arms and ammunition. In neither case was there any attempt at concealment of the contents of the hold.

4. I attribute the fact of these dhows being so close to the land, with three hours of daylight still to run owing to the land being obscured by a heavy cloud of sand, and that consequently, they were not aware of their close proximity to it.

5. Both dhows were cleared by 9 P.M., taken in tow, and towed towards Jask; a strong Shamal had risen in the meantime, and I thought, during the night, that I should have to take the Seedie crews out, and abandon the dhows; more especially as one had lost her rudder, but the wind abated towards the morning, and I eventually got them anchored safely in Jask West Bay, at 8 A.M. Another, and very much stronger Shamal, sprang up in the afternoon of the 25th, and continued to blow until 4 A.M. the following morning. At some time, during the night, the larger of the two dhows broke adrift, and went on shore, and when daylight came, she was found to be a total wreck. It was reported to me, by Lieutenant Ward, R.I.M., who was on board both these craft, when they were being taken in tow, that the larger of the two, was in a very rotten condition, and he had great difficulty in finding any place good enough, to secure the towing hawser to. I think that the probable reason, of the accident, was that the beam, to which the cable was secured, carrying away, owing to the extra heavy strain put upon it, due to wind and sea.

6. There was one Afghan passenger in the first dhow, and none in the second. The crews of both, and the dhows, were handed over to Colonel Whyte, at Jask. Receipts for them are attached. The Afghan prisoner was discharged to "Proserpine" for passage to Maskat and Karachi.

7. Attached is a detailed list of contents. It is submitted, that I may be allowed to jettison the cargo, before my arrival at Bombay, as it is impossible, in a ship of this size to place such a large amount of stuff under lock and key.

8. Measurements of dhows are attached.

I have, &c.,

V. G. GURNER,

Commander and Senior Naval Officer,
Persian Gulf.

Measurements of two dhows captured.

Dimensions for tonnage:—

Length	...	70 feet	} = 136½ tons.
Beam	...	19 " 6 inches	
Depth of hull	...	10 "	

Length	...	50 feet	} = 75 tons approximate.
Beam	...	14 " 6 inches	
Depth of hull	...	9 " 6 "	



5

Particulars of Rifles.

Rifle.	Number.	Marks.
.303 Rifle ...	450	Lee Speed Patents B. S. A. Co. and on Barrels E on top of Chamber.
.303 Rifle ...	449	B. S. A. on barrel. Field Rifle Co. to right of Butt. E on top of Chamber.
.303 Martini Carbine ...	170	E on top of Chamber.
.303 Martini Rifle ...	390	Superior quality. English manufacture.
.303 Martini Carbine ...	120	No marks. Maskat.
.45 Martini Henri Rifle ...	73	{ Crown F. R. } On butt 1885 } F. R. Martini BHAM } 58 B.
.45 Mauser ...	111	{ Manufacture D'Armes } St. Etienne. } M. L. E. 1874.
.45 Mauser Carbine ...	30	Ditto.
Snider ...	204	WERNDL.
Total ...	1,997	
Lee-Metford Sword Bayonets.	346	{ Williamson } London W+D } H.L.I.
Mauser Pistol ...	153	{ WA++ CHFABRIK } SER CBERNDORF } NECKAR.

Particulars of Ammunition.

Name.	Rounds, &c.	Marks on paper.	Marks on Cartridges.
.303		10 .303	
Hard Nosed ...	296,300	Cartridges	KN/08 vi
.303			
Soft Nosed ...	110,000	Cartridges S. A. Ball .303 inch Cordite Mark VI	B C VI
.303			
Hard Nosed ...	56,400	Cartridges S. A. Ball .303 inch Cordite Mark VI	B/08 VI
.303			
Hard Nosed ...	68,550	10 Ball Cartridges for .303 Magazine Rifles Cordite Solid Bulled Kynock Ltd. Walton Birmingham.	K C VI
.45			C
M. H. Solid drawn cases.	140,000	...	577 450 RB
.45			
Mauser ...	185,400	10 Cartouches pour Fusils Modèle 1874 Gras Société Française Munitions	SFM †



6

Name.	Rounds, &c.	Marks on paper.	Marks on Cartridges.
7-63 Mauser Pistol	... 50,600	20 Petronen No. 403 Furdie Mauser Selb Flalle Pistole Cal. 7-63 Dutche Waffen, etc.	D. W M KK 403
·303 Caps	... 100 Boxes	Pyrotechina Aramatei 1,000 Capse Model 1879 Annul 1886 Luna 9	
Percussion Caps	... 144 Boxes	Romania Capules Paillouces Etain Pour poul a Percussion.	
Martini-Henri ·303 Caps.	31 Boxes	Government quality. Warranted not to fly or miss fire.	Henry-Mar- tini Caps.
Snider Caps	... 71 Boxes	Kynoch and Co. Superior anti corrosive. Metal-lined Percussion Caps. Warranted.	

Copy of receipt for body of one Afghan Prisoner.

H. M. S. "Proserpine".

JASK;

25th April 1910.

Received from Commander Victor G. Gurner, Senior Naval Officer,
Persian Gulf, the body of one Afghan prisoner, for passage to Maskat.

H. J. MARSHALL,

Commander.

Copy of receipt for prisoners and dhows.

Taken charges of—
17 prisoners.
2 dhows.
1 pair handcuffs.

R. A. ARMITAGE,
Lieutenant and Adjutant,
117th Maraka.



7


H. M. S. "Philomel,"
Maskat,
2nd May 1910. } Return of vessels detained as being engaged in the arms traffic.

Date detained.	Where, if at sea, state Latitude and Longitude.	NAME OF			How rigged.	NUMBER OF			WHERE			Date of leaving last port.	Nature of cargo.	To whom consigned.	To what port sent for adjudication.
		Vessel.	Master.	Owner and of what place.		Men.	Guns.	Tons.	From.	Bound.	Belonging.				
24th April 1910.	Latitude 25° 43' N. Longitude 57° 07' E.		Rahim Dad.	Rahim Dad, Bunji.	2 masted dhow.	10	Nil.	136½	Sohar.	Bunji.	Jask.	20th April 1910.	Arms and ammunition.	rifles consigned to Nadir Shih, Afridi.	Jask.
24th April 1910.	Latitude 25° 43' N. Longitude 57° 07' E.		Solmin Bin Ali.	Solmin Bin Ali, Bunji.	1 masted dhow.	7	Nil.	75	Sohar.	Bunji.	Jask.	20th April 1910.	Arms and ammunition.	750 of these	Jask.

There seemed to be no system as to the stowage of these cargoes, there being much more ammunition in one dhow than in the other.

V. G. GURNEE,
Commander.

The Commander-in-Chief.



**CONFIDENTIAL.**

No. 1297, dated Bushire, the 22nd (received 30th) May 1910.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL P. Z. COX, C.S.I., C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The HON'BLE MR. S. H. BUTLER, C.S.I., C.I.E., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.


With reference to my telegram Nos. 488 and 515 dated 11th and 18th May respectively, I have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, copies of the telegraphic communications between the Political Agent, Kuwait, and myself, resulting in the confiscation or attachment of the cargo of arms and ammunition landed in Kuwait from the Samboog "Fateh-al-Khair," flying the French Flag and purporting to be owned by Messrs. Goguyer & Co.

I also enclose copies of Captain Shakespear's letters written during the progress of his negotiations with the Shaikh in which he records at length the details of his conversations with the Shaikh and of the procedure followed. It may be convenient for the Government of India to have these for reference in case the incident should give rise to controversy.

2. It will be remembered that in Foreign Department telegram No. S. 199, dated 27th March, I was given discretion to make certain communications to the Shaikhs of Kuwait, Bahrein, Muhammerah and the Trucial Coast Ports. In this connection I would explain that in the case of Muhammerah, where the Customs are administered by the Belgian régime and where the Director would in the ordinary course be only too glad to confiscate for the Persian Government any contraband consignment of which he got information, a communication in the sense indicated seemed hardly needed. In the cases of the other Shaikhs mentioned, specially the Trucial Chiefs, the questions of temporary custody and eventual delivery or payment of compensation were somewhat difficult matters to handle and needed different and cautious treatment in each case; I was therefore anxious to deal with them on the spot in personal communication with the Shaikhs and British representatives concerned on my pre-hotweather visit to the Arab Coast Ports. The outbreak of Plague in Bushire, however, with its consequent quarantine difficulties and the difficult situation in the Shatt-el-Arab had delayed me from week to week and no communication had been made to Shaikh Mubarak when the arrival of this consignment at Kuwait was reported.

3. It will be seen that Captain Shakespear had a very difficult task to get the Shaikh to act up to his obligations, and that the latter has since done his best to make it appear that we are entirely responsible for the seizure. I find it difficult to believe that Shaikh Mubarak's demeanour in this respect was really attributable to any doubt as to whether he would have our support, and think the truth more probably is that he is compromised, by correspondence or otherwise, with Messrs. Goguyer & Co., and realises that the only basis on which he can justify the seizure to them is the excuse that the British authorities insisted on it and that he had no choice but to comply. His desire, on further consideration, to get the arms back into his own custody is not I think far to seek. On the one hand if he finds himself at issue with the French and we, having regard to his soiled hands, find it difficult to support the seizure, he will so be enabled to restore the arms when his position becomes too awkward. On the other hand, if his action proves indefeasible, he will be sure of getting the arms or their value for himself, possession being nine points of the law.

4. As to the legal aspect of the seizure, we must perhaps be prepared for the contingency of Messrs. Goguyer & Company being able to show that in sending



the consignment to Kuwait they had been given by Shaikh Mubarak reason to believe that he had no objection to the importation and that consequently the seizure must have been due solely to pressure from us and not to the Shaikh's own motion, as we would have them believe.

But our position in the matter vis-à-vis the French Government seems so strong, specially in view of the recent French refusal to give us the right of search over dhows under their Flag, that there does not appear to me to be any strong reason why we should not frankly accept the onus of having insisted on the seizure by the Shaikh. At all events I submit that the advantage from an Arms Traffic point of view of seizing this trial consignment, a fact which Captain Shakespear writes "has caused the greatest consternation in Kuwait," greatly outweighs the seriousness of the possible complication which may arise from the Shaikh being proved to have been in collusion with Goguyer & Co.

In the latter case, while we shall have effected what was necessary in the execution of our measures for the suppression of the Arms Traffic, we shall at the same time have cleared the atmosphere between ourselves and the Shaikh and have so unmasked him that he will no longer be able to persevere with the obvious insincerities and mental reservations which distinguish his communications to us in connection with the Arms Traffic.

Trusting that the views of the Government of India will not be greatly divergent from the above.

(Confidential) No. C-19, dated Kuwait, the 28th April 1910.


From—CAPTAIN W. H. I. SHAKESPEAR, Political Agent, Kuwait,

To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Beshire.

In continuation of my letter No. C-9, dated the 2nd March 1910, I have the honour to report what, as far as I am at present aware, is an entirely new development in the Arms Traffic.

2. To take matters in their proper sequence I would recall the seizure of a Kuwait "boom" with arms on board by H. M. S. "Hyacinth" about the 27th January 1910 near Muttra. It will be remembered that this "boom" was allowed to proceed after inspection but was taken back to Maskat with her cargo by her Kuwaiti Nakhuda, Muhammad Saleh. Of the course of the case in Maskat I have no knowledge, but it appears that the Nakhuda, without the knowledge of the "boom's" owners, entered into some illegal contract for her sale to the French firm of Goguyer et Cie. Shaikh Mubarak becoming aware of this so-called sale, and claiming jurisdiction over the "boom" as carrying Kuwait colours and papers, and over both her owners and Nakhuda as being Kuwait subjects, addressed His Highness the Sultan of Maskat requesting extradition of Muhammad Saleh for trial in Kuwait. His Highness replied to the Shaikh that the Nakhuda had already left Maskat. It is worthy of note that Muhammad Saleh also disregarded the Shaikh's orders—*vis-à-vis*, those in which he informed his agents in Maskat sometime in January that no "booms" were to leave Maskat with arms except with the written permission of the British Political Agent. This precaution was taken by the Shaikh, I imagine, to safeguard his subjects' property from confiscation by British men-of-war. Such are the preceding facts and the Shaikh rested, awaiting an opportunity to bring the offending Muhammad Saleh to trial.

3. Yesterday I was informed by the Shaikh that a Maskat "sambuk" had arrived with a cargo of arms with the offending Nakhuda Muhammad Saleh on board, and that he would be glad of my views before dealing with the case as the vessel was a different one belonging to Maskat. I went to see the Shaikh at once, and advised him, that so far as Muhammad Saleh was concerned, I saw no legal difficulty in his having him apprehended at once for the same offence and on the same grounds, on which he had already asked the Sultan of Maskat for his extradition. As for the "sambuk" and her cargo, in virtue of his own notification of May 1900, and his recent orders to his agents in Maskat, confiscation



of the arms by him would appear to be legal, but seeing that the "sambuk" belonged to Maskat, and the arms also probably to Maskat or French subjects, it would be politic to hold them in suspense pending a reference to you.

4. At this time I was not made aware of the full details of the case, nor do I think that the Shaikh himself knew any more, but later in the evening it appears the Shaikh summoned the boat's Nakhuda, and then sent his Secretary to me with her papers, from which it appears that the "sambuk" is French subjects' property—that of Goguyer et Cie—carries French ship's papers, all so far as I can judge in order, and sails under the French Flag. This dénouement of course entirely altered the case. Time did not admit of my making copies of the papers, but they consisted of the following:—

- (a) A "Titre de Navigation" in which the sambuk is described as the "Fateh-al-khair," built in Debai, of 119 tons, belonging "à la Maison Goguyer citoyen français résidant à Mascate et à la Société française des munitions représentée par Mr. Neauber," commanded by Jandok bin Sendan, and entitling her to sail under the French Flag. The document assigns the vessel "Lettre Signalétique M", and "No d'inscription 1," and is dated the 12th February 1910 over the signature and seal of the French Consul at Maskat. There are several manuscript emendations in the printed text, which seem to show, that the form is one usually used in French colonies, as well as a note specially absolving the Captain of the boat from being a French subject.
- (b) A Crew Agreement form with the names of 11 men, of whom 10 are described as Maskat subjects and one, the last, the offending Muhammad Saleh as "Mahbub bin Saleh, sujet turc de Kuwait, 70 ans, 1 m, 10, capitaine en 1er, embarqué le 24 mars 1910." The agreement is signed by 3 persons, A. Elbaz being the only decipherable signature. In this document the vessel is also "autorisé à naviguer sous pavillon français pour faire la navigation dans la mer des Indes et le Golfe Persique"; it is dated the 12th February 1910 at Maskat over the French Consul's signature. She has made several voyages to Sohar in Oman, and the last endorsement reads "Expédié de Mascate le 25 mars 1910 allant à Kuwait et Basrah chargé d'armes et munitions ayant 11 homes d'équipage et—passagers."
- (c) A Bill of Health, certifying Maskat as a clean port of departure, issued by the French Consulate.

5. In view of these papers, the Shaikh again desired my advice, and I informed his Secretary, that I saw no reason to change my mind as regards the Nakhuda Muhammad Saleh, who, as a Kuwait subject charged with an offence in respect of a Kuwait "boom", could not escape the Shaikh's jurisdiction in Kuwait itself simply by the fact of being one of the crew of a boat flying French colours. I suggested therefore that he should be apprehended, and his case proceeded with, as the Shaikh had originally intended. As regards the boat and her cargo, it was doubtful if the Shaikh's notification of May 1900 could be held to apply in its entirety, and in my opinion the best course for the Shaikh would be to abide by the spirit of his notification and late order to his Maskat agents, by informing the Captain of the boat, that he had specifically prohibited the import of arms into Kuwait, and the boat and her cargo had better therefore return to Maskat, or continue her voyage to Basrah, for he would not allow her cargo to be landed in Kuwait.

6. The Shaikh's Secretary then said a difficulty would arise, for the Nakhuda Muhammad Saleh was the only one of the crew who had any knowledge of the northern part of the Persian Gulf. My reply was that, in that case, the Captain (for Muhammad Saleh is not the real Captain of the boat) was at liberty to engage any of the many other pilots available in Kuwait; or if he elected to stay, he would do so on his own initiative and at his own risk after fair warning from the Shaikh. I saw no reason in this small difficulty for releasing Muhammad Saleh. After this the Shaikh's Secretary took his leave and it remains to be seen how the Shaikh acts in the matter.



7. My object throughout, and I explained it carefully to the Shaikh's Secretary, is to avoid any possibility of the Shaikh becoming entangled through points of maritime law with the French Consulate in Maskat, and I trust the advice I gave, will meet with your approval. Having no recent knowledge of how the arms traffic question is being handled at present, nor any papers to which to refer, regarding either our own or the French Consul's position in the matter of these native craft in these waters, I am considerably handicapped when the Shaikh asks me for information or, in rare instances, like the present, for advice.

8. The Shaikh seems to have been much impressed by the "sambuk" flying a French flag and appears genuinely anxious for our advice in order no doubt not to compromise himself with either the French, British or Turkish Governments.

9. This report is written as the mails are being closed and I am sending to Fao a telegram which I trust will give sufficiently early information to admit of my receiving some general instructions for the Shaikh by the mail of the 4th May in the event of the "sambuk" not having left Kuwait or the Shaikh ignoring my suggestions.

(Confidential) No. C-22, dated Kuwait, the 4th May 1910.

From—CAPTAIN W. H. I. SHAKESPEAR, Political Agent, Kuwait,

To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

In continuation of my letter No. 19-C., of the 28th April 1910 and subsequent telegrams, I have the honour to report further developments in the case of the "sambuk" which brought arms to Kuwait on the 27th April under the French Flag.

2. I attach a copy of a note I made on the 1st May immediately after my interview with the Shaikh which gives in detail what passed between us. I waited for the Shaikh's promised official letter until 3 P.M. the following day and from independent sources having ascertained other facts which further convinced me that Shaikh Mubarak did not intend any effective measures, if indeed he was not actually thwarting us, I sent my boat to Fao with my second telegram.

3. The further facts which I have been able to glean are:—

(a) that it is extremely probable the arms were landed in broad daylight and not at night as described by the Shaikh;

(b) that only the ordinary duty of \$ 6 a rifle was levied on them, and therefore the Shaikh in no way penalised these arms;


(c) that the Shaikh took part of the consignment for his own use as is his usual custom from all arms landed in Kuwait. My information is that the consignment was 400 rifles and several cases of ammunition, of which the Shaikh took 120 rifles and probably some ammunition too. The Shaikh told me the consignment consisted of 321 rifles, an odd and improbable figure.

(d) that the consignee in Kuwait is Messrs. Goguyer et Cie's local agent, one Mullah Abdullah Atiji, a Kuwaiti Arab, who was formerly Shaikh Mubarak's Secretary.

The Shaikh's absolute power in Kuwait makes it impossible for the consignment to have been landed secretly and against his orders as he alleges, and accordingly to my mind there is not the slightest doubt of the Shaikh's active connivance in the case.

4. I waited until the forenoon of to-day (4th May) in order to give the Shaikh ample time to send me his promised official letter, and nothing having been received up to that time, I sent a message to say I should like to call on him at 4.30 P.M.

5. So much of this letter was drafted when I received your telegram No. 441, dated the 3rd May, just before proceeding to see the Shaikh again.



6. After the usual greetings, I enquired from the Shaikh first how he had dealt with Muhammad Saleh, the Kuwaiti Nakhuda. The Shaikh informed me that though the man had admitted his authority, he produced a document in Arabic signed by the French Consul in Maskat, setting out that the man was bound by an engagement to pilot the "sambuk" to Kuwait or Basrah and back to Maskat. The Shaikh accordingly allowed him to leave in the "sambuk" yesterday, but he assured me he intended to punish the man when he next came within his reach.

7. Having ascertained that the arms were still unsold with Goguyer et Cie's local agent, I informed the Shaikh of the receipt of your telegram No. 441, urged upon him that Government expected him in this instance to fulfil his obligations, gave him reasons for the course, assured him of Government's support, and pointed out that if he confiscated the arms landed in contravention of his old prohibition and recent express orders (as he had himself intimated to me) and lodged them in the Agency under my charge, he had nothing to fear from the French Consul in Maskat. I pointed out that the reason for asking him to lodge the confiscated arms in the Agency was to prevent them passing again into the hands of dealers and thereby convincing such dealers that importation in the face of the Shaikh's prohibition would be a profitless enterprise. The Shaikh listened to my arguments quietly, now and again reiterating his desire to do nothing contrary to the wishes of the British Government. Finally he said he would confiscate the arms from the local dealer, adding that he would serve him with a written notice that he was doing so as he had deliberately infringed his orders, but that he would be glad of the presence of one of the Agency staff when the notice was to be served and during the removal of the arms to the Agency. As the Shaikh did not press me for anything in writing, I agreed to assist him by sending one of my clerks. It was arranged therefore that one of my clerks should be present to-morrow morning, when in his presence the Shaikh's notice would be served on Mullah Abdullah Atiji, and that subsequently the clerk should accompany the Shaikh's representative and coolies, and be also present at the removal to the Agency of all the arms and ammunition received from the French "sambuk" by Goguyer et Cie's local Agent. The Shaikh also said he would inform Mullah Abdullah that he would not recognize his agency for the French firm, nor admit any more arms to be landed for him. Having expressed my thanks at the Shaikh's evident desire to assist His Majesty's Government in the suppression of the arms traffic, and again assured him of their full support, I took my leave, the Shaikh reiterating his intention of furthering our wishes to the best of his ability.


8. The Shaikh's change of front is curious and difficult to explain, unless it was actuated by the not improbable idea of enhancing the value of his co-operation. I urged on the Shaikh the advisability of making his written notice to Mullah Abdullah Atiji (on which he seemed resolved) as brief as possible, and of confining it merely to saying that the confiscation was being enforced as punishment for disregard of a long-standing prohibition of which the culprit was well aware.

9. The mail will probably have left before I can report the result of the Shaikh's proposed action, and though I endeavoured to leave no loop-hole by which he might find a way of escape from his present undertaking, I am rather sceptical of its complete execution. I will report by telegraph, however, what actually results.

10. It is improbable that the Shaikh will expose his own connivance by surrendering any of the arms he may have already taken for himself, and it will therefore be necessary to assume as correct, his figures of the boat's cargo, but on this point I shall not be able to furnish accurate details until the consignment has been lodged in the Agency.

Note of a Conversation with Shaikh Mubarak on 1st May 1910.

Received Resident's wire 11 A.M. May 1st, and sent over to Shaikh to say should like to see him at 4.30 P. M. (10.30 Arabic time).



After usual greetings, asked Shaikh about the French "sambuk". Shaikh replied that he had done his best by ordering it out of the port and refusing permission to landing, but that the Maskat Nakhuda head threatened him with going to Fao and wiring to French Consul. Finally, against his orders, the arms in number of 321 rifles, mostly 5. shot magazine Mausers and a lot of ammunition had been landed during the night of Friday-Saturday (29th-30th April), and were now in possession of the French firm's agent, Mullah Muhammad Atiji. The "sambuk" still in harbour and Muhammad Saleh not arrested, but Shaikh intends arresting him. Informed Shaikh of receipt of telegram from Resident and translated first part to him. He demurred saying afraid of the French, so again pointed out promise of British support and urged as a reason that deposit of the arms in the Agency would ensure Shaikh was not subjected to difficulties with French for the matter would then pass to British Government. Shaikh still demurred and asked to be allowed to write officially to me reporting the landing of the arms against his orders and asking for my opinion, and that I should reply in an official letter requesting him to confiscate them and send them to the Agency. I made no comments, but said that letter seemed hardly necessary in view of very plain terms in Resident's telegram of Government's assistance. Said he would prefer the letter so as to have something to show any Frenchman who made things unpleasant for him. Talk then drifted to Muhammad Saleh, and Shaikh said he proposed summoning some of his old men to pronounce on his nationality and if they said Kuwaiti he would imprison him. After various other subjects I left. Most unsatisfactory, as convinced Shaikh did not tell me correct number of rifles, and landing was impossible unless covertly connived at by Shaikh. Do not believe he proposes anything for Muhammad Saleh.

Just at leaving, Shaikh brought up old plea that "sambuk" could not leave without pilot, and as his proclamation does not include confiscation or detention of the empty boat, especially when he has not confiscated the arms, I reiterated my previous suggestion that boat could engage any of the dozens of other Kuwait pilots.

1st May 1910.

W. H. I. SHAKESPEAR.

(Confidential) No. C.-23, dated Kuwait, the 10th May 1910.

From—CAPTAIN W. H. I. SHAKESPEAR, Political Agent, Kuwait,

To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

I have the honour to submit the following report in continuation of my letter No. C.-22, dated the 4th May 1910, and in explanation of the two telegrams subsequently sent to you, regarding Shaikh Mubarak's action in the matter of the arms and ammunition landed from the French sambuk "Fateh-el-Khair."

2. My scepticism as to the Shaikh's good intentions was not unjustified, for when my clerk presented himself at the Shaikh's palace as arranged on the morning following the conversation already reported, the Shaikh informed him that he would not confiscate the arms without "an order from the Sahib." I had taken the precaution of furnishing my clerk with written instructions, and on his explanation of these, the Shaikh apparently began to equivocate and distort the arrangements upon which he had agreed with me the day before; finally he sent Abdullah bin Muhammad Atiji to receive his orders direct from me. I returned a message that I had no "orders" for anyone except my own clerk, and that the latter had been sent to the Shaikh in accordance with his request of the previous day. The Shaikh then definitely refused to carry out the confiscation and sent my clerk back to inform me of his decision. On this I went immediately to see the Shaikh. The Shaikh at once began to explain that I must have misunderstood his intentions the day before, that it was impossible for him to issue orders for confiscation, etc., etc. I heard the Shaikh out, and then took him over the whole of the ground again carefully, finally translating to him parts of my letter C.-22 in which I had already reported our conversation to you. In reply to frequent queries whether my report did not truly represent what had actually passed, the Shaikh invariably replied in the affirmative; I then pointed out that, that being the case, I was at a loss to explain his change




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of attitude to Government, for after all, Government only required his assistance under his old prohibition, while, as I had more than once assured him, they were prepared to give him all support possible in the event of his action being questioned by the French. I pointed out that, as I had already informed Government of his readiness to assist, they could not but be surprised at his change of front, and would probably draw unfavourable inferences in spite of his frequent professions of friendship. It was impossible for me to confiscate the arms for he was Ruler of Kuwait; the prohibition stood in his name, and confiscation in his own territory must therefore proceed from him. After various other attempts at subterfuge, the Shaikh finally agreed to, substantially, the same procedure as on the previous day, omitting the written notice to Abdullah Atiji. He said he would like to inform him, however, before me, and therefore had him summoned, when after some unimportant preliminary remarks, the Shaikh said to him "You are my subject and my order is upon you, the Sahib's man and my man will go together to your house and take the arms landed against my orders from the French 'Sambuk', and together convey them to the Sahib's house, and it is my order". I record these words verbatim as subsequently the Shaikh endeavoured to assert that the "order" was from the British Government. I tried to have the confiscation carried out there and then, but at the Shaikh's request agreed to the following day, and, to give a receipt for the arms and ammunition as soon as received in the Agency.

3. On the following day, the 6th May, my clerk attended at the Shaikh's palace with the same orders as before. He informs me that the Shaikh reiterated all his previous equivocation, and finally sent his man to me with Abdullah Atiji to ask whether I was agreeable to granting time in order that the arms might be sent back to Maskat. As I had already repeatedly explained to the Shaikh our object in the confiscation, I contented myself with remarking that, seeing the arms had already been in Kuwait some 10 or 11 days, I was not agreeable to any further delay. The confiscation was then carried out as arranged and the arms brought to the Agency. They consisted of 301 Gras carbines, modèle 1874, and 30,100 rounds of ammunition for them. I made out a receipt as received from the Shaikh's man who actually brought them. The Shaikh refused to accept my receipt and sent his man to explain that my receipt must be personally from me to Abdullah Atiji, all mention of the Shaikh's name to be omitted.

4. On hearing the above I went to see the Shaikh again and listened for an hour to another most ingenious and bare-faced attempt by the Shaikh to reconstruct our previous conversations and agreements. I was obliged to check further perversion of the truth by pointing out again, that my records could not possibly bear the interpretations the Shaikh now desired to put on his and my words, and seeing that he had himself admitted in my previous interview that my record was accurate, I was at a loss to understand his object at this late date in evading the obvious meaning of our words. Finally the Shaikh said he was afraid of the French Government, that he was not a Great Power, and would like in writing from me that the British Government would support him. I said I was perfectly willing to accede to this request, but that a receipt direct from me to Abdullah Atiji was impossible, and that if he was satisfied, the arms would be forthcoming from my charge but objected to a receipt to his own name for them; we could dispense with receipts. The Shaikh said this would suit him better if he had the letter assuring him of British support. Accordingly I destroyed the previous receipt and drafted a letter at once.

5. For the next two days the Shaikh did everything he could to produce the impression that the Political Agent had seized the arms and refused to grant a receipt, and finally sent me a message that, if I did not grant a receipt to Abdullah Atiji as he desired, he would be compelled to furnish him with an "istihad" (paper of witness) as to what he had heard and what had actually passed. I replied that such a receipt was impossible and that I was willing to explain the reasons once more. Accordingly I again visited the Shaikh on the 8th May and listened to another long declamation of what were supposed really to have been



our arrangements, and how the Shaikh was disappointed in my refusal to omit his name from any part in the affair. The Shaikh went so far in what was obviously a prepared attempt to repudiate our conversations, that I felt it was necessary to speak in rather plainer terms of his action than I had hitherto used, and took him categorically through the whole of our conversations until he admitted that he had agreed originally to confiscate the arms himself, lodge them in the Agency; that the suggestion for the presence of one of the Agency Staff had come from him and that, though I had considered it unnecessary, I had acceded to his request. He was so insistent that I should grant a receipt to Abdullah Atiji direct, that I said, as the Shaikh did not appear to accept my reasons for not doing so, I was willing to refer the point to you, but I should be compelled to lay before you also how, from his original prompt readiness to assist Government, the Shaikh had gravitated to endeavouring, by various tortuous and questionable methods to evade his part in the matter, make difficulties where none existed, and all this in spite of an explicit assurance of support and assistance. The Shaikh then shifted his ground and asked if Government's wishes would be met by his holding the arms in his own custody. I said, as I had intimated at one of our first conversations, that they would under certain conditions *vis:—* that the arms must not remain with a dealer, they must be kept in some special safe place, kept intact and not allowed to be moved without the consent of the British Government, and that I should be permitted access to them in case of inspection being necessary. The Shaikh agreed to the conditions and said he would store them in his customs-house. The Shaikh's reversion to this arrangement is curious for as long ago as the 1st May I suggested this course, and he then refused it, saying he preferred the arms should be in the Agency. To prevent any further possible doubts, I repeated the conditions to the Shaikh and informed him that I would send the arms over on receipt of his written undertaking.

6. The following morning the undertaking was handed to me and the arms and ammunition were removed to the Shaikh's customs-house. The Shaikh demurred at giving me a receipt for them, and as I had already recorded the marks, numbers, etc., of the consignment, I did not press the point. Later I was informed that the arms had been lodged in a separate room in the customs and the room sealed with the Shaikh's seal.

7. Copies and translations of the documents which passed between the Shaikh and myself are attached hereto. The course of the case has not been quite as satisfactory as I desired, but the Shaikh's peculiar methods make straight-forward dealing difficult; I trust however, that the result will be consonant with the wishes of Government; I have succeeded in maintaining that the confiscation was carried out by the Shaikh in virtue of his prohibition, the arms are now under his custody in one of his public buildings, and we hold his written undertaking that they shall not be removed without the consent of the British Government.


8. My report has run to an inordinate length, but in the circumstances of the case it appeared advisable to have the facts on record in some detail, for my personal opinion is that some stronger form of persuasion will be required, if Government desire the Shaikh to confiscate any further consignments.

Instructions for Head-clerk.

Head-clerk—

With reference to what I told you verbally, here are your instructions:—

1. The Shaikh is going to confiscate the arms, ammunition, etc., landed from the French "Sambuk" last Friday against his orders and prohibition. The consignment is with Abdullah Atiji.
2. The Shaikh desires an Agency representative present when he has Abdullah Atiji served with a written notice to above effect.
3. The Shaikh desires an Agency representative to accompany his men when the arms are formally confiscated and brought from Abdullah Atiji's premises for safe lodgment in the Agency.
4. You will be the Agency representative, simply to watch proceedings and take charge of the arms, ammunition, etc., when being taken to the Agency.



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5. If desired you should note numbers, marks, etc., of cases or weapons, but in conjunction with the Shaikh's men. Any receipt required will be given by me when the arms arrive at the Agency.

6. Attend at the Shaikh's palace at 2 hours after sunrise (little earlier will be better).

W. H. I. SHAKESPEAR,

4th May 1910.

Translation of letter No. 211, dated the 6th May 1910, from Captain W. H. I. Shakespear, Political Agent, Kuwait, to Shaikh Mubarak-as-Subah, Ruler of Kuwait.

After compliments.—With regard to the "Sambuk" in which there is a French flag, of which Your Excellency informed me that it had come from Maskat, and its cargo is arms and ammunition, and that this is contrary to Your Excellency's proclamation and contrary to your recent orders to your Agent in Maskat. The British Government is obliged to Your Excellency for your wish to help the British Government in the prohibition of the traffic in arms in the Persian Gulf, and because of the disobedience of the Nakhuda to your special order of prohibition from landing the arms from his vessel in Kuwait, I am willing that the arms be deposited in my house for safe custody and I say that the British Government will help Your Excellency in your laudable efforts in the prohibition of the traffic in arms in the Persian Gulf. And this is what was necessary, and may you be preserved.

Translation of letter from Shaikh Mubarak-as-Subah, Ruler of Kuwait, to Captain Shakespear, Political Agent of the British Government, dated the 28th Rabi-uth-Thani, 1328 (8th May 1910).

After compliments.—And after that regarding the arms which arrived in the "Sambuk", we will put them in the customs-house building under guard and will not hand (them) over except with the agreement of the British Government, and this is what was necessary and may you be preserved.

Telegram, dated the 28th April 1910.

From—Captain Shakespear, Fao,

To—The Resident in Bushire.

"Sambuk" with arms from Maskat with regular French papers and flag arrived Wednesday and errant Nakhuda Muhammad Saleh aboard. Shaikh asked my advice, so suggested he should apprehend Muhammad Saleh on grounds which he already asked his extradition from Maskat *vide* previous demi-official to Trevor. Suggested boat be informed Shaikh already prohibited import arms by notification May 1900 and recent letters to Maskat and therefore better return Maskat with cargo or proceed Basrah as intimated in her papers. Shaikh anxious for advice not to compromise himself so trust you can send general instructions by mail 4th May. Full written report reaches you fast mail Monday.

Telegram, dated 29th April 1910.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL P. Z. COX, C.S.I., C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—CAPTAIN SHAKESPEAR, Fao, Political Agent, Kuwait.

Your telegram of 28th April from Fao. If the arms were wrongfully landed in Kuwait territory in contravention of the Shaikh's prohibition, you are



10

authorised to urge Shaikh Mubarak to seize them and deliver them for the time being to your custody. Under such circumstances, His Majesty's Government undertake to support the Shaikh in the event of any unpleasantness with the French and will be prepared to consider the expediency of paying the Shaikh compensation for their value, or of handing the arms over to him, after a time when there is no risk of their passing back into the hands of dealers. Should Shaikh object to hand them to you as Government suggest, you might make some effective arrangement with him, under which he will deposit them in some special place to which he will allow you friendly access, and will give you written undertaking not to let them go out of such custody, except in agreement with you, the object being to prevent their getting back to dealers. Supposing the arms were not landed, I advise action as follows:—Presumably the arms were not manifested. Should the Nakhuda allege that the consignment was for Turkish territory, Shaikh would explain that he believed import of arms into Turkey was ordinarily prohibited, and that the circumstances of this case were sufficiently suspicious to oblige him to detain the dhow and arms, pending production by the Nakhuda of a permit from the Wali of Basrah to import them. Should arms not have been fraudulently landed and should Nakhuda admit or should there be evidence to prove that the consignment was for some Persian or Arab port, covered by existing prohibitions, arms and dhow should be detained pending further telegraphic reference to me as to disposal. Shaikh should take any action he sees fit in regard to the treatment of Nakhuda Muhammad Saleh. In any case report action finally taken by wire.

Telegram, dated 23rd May 1910.

From—CAPTAIN SHAKESPEAR, Political Agent, Kuwait,

To—The Resident, Bushire.

Your telegram 29th April. Interviewed Shaikh Sunday, and found arms been landed during Friday—Saturday night, and delivery taken by Goguyer's local Agent, a Kuwaiti. Shaikh avers this done contravention of his express orders, but from independent source hear that accepted 120 rifles for himself and only usual duty levied. Landing against Shaikh's orders if real, would be impossible. Urged Shaikh therefore in sense first part only of your telegram, but he pretends much anxiety from Maskat Nakhuda's threats of reporting to French Consul. Said he would write officially to me and like official reply requesting him to confiscate arms and lodge them in the Agency. No letter yet received 3 P.M. Monday and do not think Shaikh intends running straight. Presume your telegram does not authorise official letter of description suggested, but if Shaikh addresses me, I could frame answer saying in view of Shaikh's manifest intention to assist Government, and his old proclamation, am willing to receive arms in Agency for safe custody, and assure Shaikh of British Government's support in laudable endeavour to suppress traffic. If you approve please wire as man will await answer at Fao. Consignment was 400 rifles and unknown amount ammunition evidently trial trip. Shaikh said he would apprehend Muhammad Saleh but consider even this doubtful.

Telegram No. 441, dated the 3rd May 1910.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL P. Z. COX, C.S.I., C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—CAPTAIN W. H. I. SHAKESPEAR, Political Agent, Kuwait.

Your 223-3. This consignment having according to the Shaikh's personal intimation to you, been illicitly imported in contravention of his prohibition, and in defiance of his orders, it is clearly most important to himself and to us in the interests of the suppression of the traffic, that he should vigorously enforce his prohibition by such action as will deter others. Sound Shaikh first as to whether on the strength of a letter to you on the terms you suggest, he is ready to confiscate the arms and let you have temporary custody of them. If so, well and good. If not, then in order to ensure confiscation and custody, there is no



11

objection to your informing him in writing, that you are authorised to assure him, that His Majesty's Government will support him in the event of any unpleasantness arising with the French, as the result of his enforcing his prohibition in this and other such cases. Make sure that he understands the reason for our wanting temporary custody of the arms and inform him also, in writing, if necessary, that we will hand them back to him later on, or give him reasonable compensation for them if destroyed. As Shaikh has already informed you that arms were illicitly imported, it seems late in the day for him to write you an official letter to that effect, but if he still wants to do so, please see that it is suitably worded.

Telegram, dated the 9th May 1910.

From—CAPTAIN W. H. I. SHAKESPEAR, Political Agent, Kuwait,

To—Resident, Bushire.

Confidential. Continuation of my letter C.-22. Have received 301 Gras carbines and 30,100 cartridges in Agency on 6th May. Shaikh issued no written notice to Abdullah Atiji and wanted me give the man receipt direct omitting all mention of Shaikh. I disagreed as confiscation by Shaikh and not by me. After much talk, Shaikh having refused receipt to him, desired and accepted a letter from me in term suggested in my telegram 223-3 so trust matter practically settled now for present, though Shaikh uses every opportunity of producing impression that confiscation is by British Government and not by him. Shaikh also endeavouring to get himself outside affair in every possible way.


Telegram, dated the 12th May 1910.

From—CAPTAIN W. H. I. SHAKESPEAR, Political Agent, Kuwait,

To—Resident, Bushire.

My last telegram little previous as Shaikh, having spent three days trying every method of evading his part in affair even to reconstructing our conversation, finally said he would like custody of the arms. He refused this course at the beginning but as he now seemed willing and was ready to give me the necessary written undertaking for their non-removal without British consent, I complied and have returned him whole consignment on 9th May. It is now lodged in customs house under guard and I hold Shaikh's written undertaking.

G. C. B. P., Simla.—No. C:379 F. D.—26-10.—39.—H.C.G.L.





(182)
18

13

Telegram P., No. 412 C., dated (and received) the 2nd June 1910.

From—The Hon'ble the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Your telegram No. 29^c-S. of the 28th May. A report from the Political Agent, Chagai, states that the Khalifa, with 100 men and 400 camels laden with arms and ammunition, reached Galugan on 27th May and is due at Baluch Ab *en route* for Afghan Seistan on the 1st June.

14

Telegram, No. 68, dated the 1st June 1910.

From—His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Squadron,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Marine Department.


Please refer to Marine Department telegram of the 31st May, No. 937 M.
The following is the text of my telegram No. 64:—

On May the 25th, at 9 p.m., the "Perseus" captured a dhow, in 25°-22' north latitude, 28°-50' east longitude, 13 miles from Maidani. The dhow



10

carried 2,260 rifles, 50 pistols, and 270,000 rounds of ammunition. I propose to keep the modern rifles, and destroy the old pattern ones. The dhow has been sent to Jask. Her crew escaped ashore before capture.



17

Telegram P., No. 599, dated (and received) the 4th June 1910.

From—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Reference my telegram of 22nd April, No. 388. Following report received from Jask :—*Begins.* A party of 300 Afghans left Maihan for Seistan by the Ramishk road 5 days ago. *Ends.*

18

Telegram P., No. 419 (Confidential), dated (and received) the 4th June 1910.

From—The Hon'ble the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Please refer to my telegram No. 412 C., dated 2nd June. The Khalifa is reported as at Baluch Ab on 2nd instant.



11


19

Telegram P., No. 176 C., dated 3rd (via Robat 6th) and received 6th June 1910.

From—His Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul for Seistan and Kain,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

A telegraphic report from Inspector of seventh section, Indo-European Telegraph Department, states that a caravan of 100 Afghans with 400 camels carrying arms were at Galuchah and are due on 1st instant at Baluch Ab. They are said to be Khalifa Khair Muhammad's men. I have informed the local Government.

Sent to India and repeated as No. 24 to His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran.





(C o p y)

Telegram - P.



From - The Secretary to the Government of India
in the Foreign Department, Simla,


To - The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
B u s h i r e .

No. S-312.

Dated the 4th June 1910.

Arms traffic. Please see telegram S-54, February 5th.
Captures of arms are reported in the Press almost as soon
as made. In view of interest displayed by other Powers in
our activity in the Gulf, Government of India consider
that the less publicity regarding arms traffic operations,
the better. Please issue instructions to all concerned.

Addressed Political Resident, Persian Gulf, repeated
to North West Frontier; Agent to the Governor General in
Baluchistan and to the Commissioner in Sind for favour of
communication to the Director, Persian Gulf Telegraphs.





Copy.

Telegram P.




From---- The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
Bushire,

To----- The Secretary to the Government of India
in the Foreign Department.

No. 603, dated and received 5th June 1910.

Please refer to your telegram No. 312-S., dated the
4th June. Everything possible will be done locally,
but it is difficult to prevent news of captures of arms
eventually reaching the public. Would it not be
possible to square Reuter and press in Bombay and London ?





Telegram P.



From---- The Secretary to the Government of India
in the Foreign Department, Simla,

To---- The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.


No. S-320.

Dated the 8th June 1910.

Reference your telegram No. 599 of 4th instant.

Is there any objection to withdrawal of troops from Rohat
on 15th June ?

Please telegraph your views.





Copy.

Telegram.




From----- The Secretary to the Government of India
in the Foreign Department, Simla,

To----- The Hon'ble the Agent to the Governor General in
Baluchistan.

No. 1192-E.A.

Dated the 8th June 1910.

Your telegram 261, April 15th. Do you now think
troops can be safely withdrawn from Robat on or about
15th June.





[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

ARMS TRAFFIC.

[February 24.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 2.

[6598]

No. 1.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 24.)

Sir,

India Office, February 24, 1910.

WITH reference to this office letter of the 10th instant and your reply of the 16th instant, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copies of further telegrams from the Viceroy, dated the 17th and 22nd February,* from which it appears that the Muscat agent of the firm of Goguyer is purchasing dhows, and, with the consent of the French consul, dispatching arms and ammunition under the French flag.

So far as Viscount Morley is aware, His Majesty's ships cannot touch French dhows carrying the French flag, but the import of arms having been prohibited by all countries bordering on the gulf except Katr, the rulers of those countries can presumably confiscate any such arms as may be landed in that territory. With a view, therefore, to minimising the evil, Lord Morley would propose, if the Government of India think it practicable, that the sheikhs of Koweit, Bahrein, and Mohammerah and the trucial chiefs should be urged to seize any such consignments and hand them over to the British authorities, His Majesty's Government undertaking to support the sheikhs and chiefs in case of any unpleasantness with the French, and, if necessary, to give compensation for the arms, or to restore them ultimately to the local rulers, when assured that there is no risk of their merely passing into the hands of the dealers.

With regard to the last paragraph of the Viceroy's telegram of the 22nd instant, I am to enclose copy of Lord Morley's telegram of the 20th instant referred to therein,† and to remark that the Viceroy's expression "our issuing passes" is not quite correct. The official who would be responsible for the issue of passes would be an official of the Sultan of Muscat, though doubtless a British subject, and the French would therefore have no *locus standi* for objecting.

In conclusion, I am to invite attention to the letter from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty of the 21st instant, of which it is understood that a copy has been furnished to your department. As regards the agreement with the Persian Government of 1897, Lord Morley is of opinion that the Sadr-i-Azam's letter of the 18th December, 1897, read in the light of Mr. C. Hardinge's letter of 11th December, 1897, does not authorise the search by British ships in Persian waters of any dhows irrespective of their character and nationality. But he would be glad to be favoured with Sir E. Grey's views on this point,‡ and on the others raised by the admiral.§

I am, &c.

R. RITCHIE.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

February 22, 1910.

(Telegraphic.) P.

ARMS traffic.

Holland informs us by telegraph that the representative of Goguyer has bought a dhow and sent her under the French flag to Katr laden with arms and ammunition, and that the report of the purchase has been confirmed by the French consul in reply to a request for the exchange of a list of dhows. Holland had previously been informed by the Sultan that the transaction was not carried out with his assistance or approval. Afterwards his Highness paid a long visit to the French consul, who told Holland that he had been informed by the Sultan that he had no recollection of the proclamation of 1898 empowering us to search ships.

Goguyer is negotiating purchase of another dhow, and Holland has been told by

* See [5725].

† See [6382].

‡ See [5725].

§ See [5725 and 6325].


[2628 aa—2]




the French consul that Goguyer intends to establish agents wherever possible on the Arabian coast with a view to extending his business.

It will be remembered that the export of arms and ammunition to the coast of the Persian Gulf outside the territorial waters of Muscat is illegal except as regards Katr, where we have not recognised the claims of Turkey. The action, therefore, of the firm of Goguyer is openly disreputable. It is evident that their position is becoming desperate.

Having regard to the development of the situation since my last telegram was dispatched, I am asking Trevor and Holland for their opinions on the proposal contained in your message of the 20th instant before taking action upon it. On receipt of their views I will communicate with you without delay. It is probable that the French would object to the issue by us of passes to French dhows. In requesting the admiral to telegraph his views I have asked him not to interfere with French dhows.







190 195

Register No.
818

Minute Paper. **Secret Department.**

Scry's. Letter from India, No. 19 M, Dated 19 May } 1910.
Rec. 4 June } *W*

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	8 June	<i>W</i>	Arms Traffic. S.S. 'Dunham's' movement. Sinking of H.M.S. 'Philomel's' captures. Customs of arms by Sheikh of Koweit.
Secretary of State	9	<i>W</i>	
Committee	11.	<i>W</i>	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State			

W


Copy to
A.O. + Adm.
13 June 1910


FOR INFORMATION.


Seen Pol. Comm.
21 JUN 1910

Previous Papers:—
791

7908. I. 516. 1000.—4/1910. [1278/09.]









116

Telegram, No. 62, dated the 11th May 1910.

From—His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Marine Department.

Please refer to your telegram* No. 780 M. The following telegram
has been received from the Senior Naval
Officer in the Persian Gulf:—


* Serial No. 96.

I have sunk the arms and ammunition captured on the 24th April 1910. X

No. 846 M., dated Simla, the 16th (received 17th) May 1910 (Confidential).
Endorsed by Marine Department.

Copy of the above forwarded, in continuation of Marine Department
No. 780 M., dated the 3rd May 1910, to—
The Foreign Department.
The Chief of the General Staff.
The Director-General of Ordnance in India.

x By H.M.S. 'Philomel' - 1998 rifles,
150 pistols, + 907,000 rounds of ammunition.






117

Telegram P., No. 515, dated (and received) the 18th May 1910.
From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL P. Z. Cox, C.S.I., C.I.E., Political Resident in the
Persian Gulf,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

My telegram* of the 11th May, No. 486, Sheikh Mubarak at first demurred
to having custody of arms himself, but
subsequently changed his mind and said
he would like to have them in his own charge. They were accordingly handed
over on 9th May. He will lodge his custom house under seals, giving under-
taking in writing that without our concurrence they would not be moved.

* Serial No. 105.





194

Register No.

791

Minute Paper.

Secret Department.

Seq's Letter from India, 18 m

Dated 12 May 1910.


Rec. 28


	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
		SB	Arms Traffic. W.W.
Under Secretary.....	31 May	Law	
Secretary of State			
Committee	1 June	W.W.	Disposal of cargo captured by "Philomel".
Under Secretary.....			Cargo belonging to Bogyer confiscated by
Secretary of State			Sheikh of Koweit.


Copy to 70. } 20 May 1910.

FOR INFORMATION.

7908. I. 516. 1000.—4/1910. [1278/00.]









Telegram - P.

From - The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
To - The Secretary to the Government of India
in the Foreign Department.


No. 488.

Dated 10th recd. 11th May 1910.



The Dhow, Fatch-el-Khair, carrying French flag and papers and purporting to belong to Goguyer, arrived at Koweit on April 27th with a cargo of about 400 rifles and 40,000 rounds of ammunition. According to the Sheikh, the cargo was brought in contravention of his prohibition and landed in defiance of his orders. The Sheikh's attitude was insincere; he is believed to have retained about 100 rifles for himself and allowed the dhow to leave; but on 6th May, after much pressure, he decided to confiscate the cargo from Goguyer's agent and has delivered it to our Political Agent for custody. The quantity so made over is 301 gras rifles and 30100 rounds.

Addressed Foreign, Simla, repeated to Senior Naval Officer, and Political Agent, Muskat.





197 198

Register No.
3114

Secret Department.

Letter from *F.O.* Dated *18* March 1910.
Rec. *19*

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	<i>14 March</i>	<i>EAR</i>	<p style="text-align: center;">Arms Traffic.</p> <p><i>As to approaching Turkish port regarding the searching of dhows in the Persian Gulf flying the Turkish flag. Sir J. Lorother advises against this step: proposal to let the matter rest until the arms traffic in dhows under the Turkish flag becomes serious.</i></p>
Secretary of State.....	<i>21</i>	<i>Ku</i>	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India 8 April '10
Secy. Mr.

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

St. telegram to G. of I. accordingly

Telegram to G. of I., 21 March.

(F.O. dispatch to Sir J. Lorother, 22 Feb.; added to the papers)


Sent +
21-3-10
M.

21/3

Sent Pol. Comtee, 8 April 1910

Previous Papers:—
2984

6540. I. 1636. 500.—9/1909. [I. 725.]





3114

(198) (193)

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

Add to 3114
all to 3114.
8th. 10.

ARMS TRAFFIC.

CONFIDENTIAL



[February 22.]

SECTION 1.

14 3114

[4905]

No. 1.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 6. Africa. Confidential.)

** Foreign Office, February 22, 1910.*

Sir,

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith copies of correspondence respecting the measures which are being taken to suppress the arms traffic in the Persian Gulf,* where, as your Excellency is doubtless aware, a considerable British naval force is engaged in patrolling with a view to capturing any dhows that may endeavour to ship arms from Muscat to the Persian coast.

So far the measures have been directed only against Muscat and Koweit dhows, but, as your Excellency will gather from the letter from the India Office of the 10th instant (enclosure 1 in this despatch), the Government of India have now raised the question of approaching the Turkish Government with a view to obtaining authority to search and seize dhows flying the Turkish flag.

I should be glad to be furnished with your views as to whether the present is an opportune moment for approaching the Turkish Government in the sense suggested, and whether such a request would be likely to be well received by them.

As your Excellency is aware, the importation of arms, other than revolvers and sporting guns, and of ammunition into Turkey is prohibited. In the absence of Turkish men-of-war in the Persian Gulf it would seem reasonable to hope that the Porte might be willing to entrust to His Majesty's ships the task of seeing that this prohibition is respected so far as the Gulf ports are concerned.


I am, &c.

E. GREY.

** India Office, February 10, 1910; to India Office, February 16, 1910.*

[2628 y-1]

*Copy to India
25 March 1910
Secy 12*





DRAFT TELEGRAM.

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

VICEROY, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.


(Vaforum)


Despatched 21-3-1910.


G. Foreign secret. Your telegram 15 Feb.
Arms traffic. H.M. Ambassador Constantinople anticipates no useful result from asking Turkish Govt to give light of secret. H.M.G. therefore propose not to raise question until traffic in Turkish shows becomes serious. Meanwhile see last sentence my telegram 17 Feb.

Copy to India. (+12) 1 Apr.

70 (2) 23 Arch.
31 Arch.









Copy.



CONSTANTINOPLE,

February 28th 1910.


No. 1
Africa.
(7799)

Sir:-

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your confidential despatch No. 6 Africa of the 22nd instant inclosing correspondence respecting the measures which are being taken to suppress the arms traffic in the Persian Gulf and requesting my views as to the question, which the government of India has raised, of approaching the Porte with a view to obtaining authority for His Majesty's Ships to search dhows flying the Turkish Flag.

I fear that it is out of the question to hope for any useful result from such a step. A request of the kind would certainly be met with a polite refusal, probably coupled with a promise that the Porte itself would send vessels to assist His Majesty's naval forces in the suppression of the trade. Supposing that some effort were made to carry out this promise, which is more than problematical, it is most unlikely

Sir Edward Grey, Bart., M.P.,
&c., &c., &c.






202 1907
unlikely that anything effectual would be done, while there
would be the serious risk that the officers commanding the
Turkish vessels would be apt to extend their activities
to vessels belonging to subjects of native chiefs under our
protection, and so raising a number of thorny questions.

I have &c.,

(Signed) Gerard Lowther.





Register No.
[3003]
330

Secret Department.

Letter from Admiralty,
Telegram "India",
Dated 21, 22 Feb. 1910.
Rec. 22

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	22 Feb.	2008	<p>Arms Traffic.</p> <p>Views of Naval C. in C. on East India Station on possible future developments.</p> <p>Representative of Foguier has purchased dhows and despatched her for Kato, laden with arms and ammunition, under French flag.</p>
Secretary of State.....	23	1/11	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India 25 Feb 10
Scay 8

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.


Q. E. 70.


Letter to F.O., 24 Feb.

Secn Pol. Comm.,
SMAR.1010

Previous Papers :-
24984 175
304 2410
2472

6540, I. 1638, 500.-9/1900, [I. 725.]





India Office,

24 Feb 1910.

Sir:-

With reference to this Office letter of the 10th inst., and your reply (No. 4905) of the 16th inst., I am directed by the S. of S. for India to forward, for the information of the S. of S. for Foreign Affairs, copies of further telegrams from the Viceroy from which it appears that the Muscat Agent of the firm of Goguyer is purchasing dhows and, with the consent of the French Consul, despatching arms and ammunition under the French flag.

2. So far as Viscount Morley is aware H.M. ships cannot touch French dhows carrying the French flag; but the import of arms having been prohibited by all countries bordering on the Gulf except Kutr, the rulers of those countries can presumably confiscate any such arms as may be landed in their territory. With a view therefore to minimising the evil, Lord Morley would propose, if the Govt. of India think it practicable, that the Sheikhs of Koweit, Bahrain and Mohammera and the Trucial Chiefs, should be urged to seize any such consignments and hand them over to the British authorities, H.M. Govt. undertaking to support the Sheikhs and Chiefs in case of



of any unpleasantness with the French, and if necessary to give compensation for the arms, or to restore them ultimately to the local rulers, when assured that there is no risk of their merely passing into the hands of the dealers.

With regard to the last para. of the Viceroy's telegram of the 22nd inst., I am to enclose copy of Lord Morley's telegram of the 20th inst. referred to therein, and to remark that the Viceroy's expression "our issuing passes" is not quite correct. The official who would be responsible for the issue of passes would be an official of the Sultan of Muscat, though doubtless a British subject, and ~~thus~~ the French would therefore have no locus standi for objecting.

In conclusion I am to invite attention to the letter from the L.C. of the Admiralty M.021 of the 21st inst., of which it is understood that a copy has been furnished to your dept. And Morley is of opinion that the Sadr-i-Azam's letter of 18th Dec. 1897, read in the light of Mr. C. Hardinge's letter of 11th Dec. 1897 does not authorize the record by British ships of ~~land~~ ^{waters} ~~there~~ in Persian ^{any} ~~of~~ shows misapprehension of their character & nationality. But he would be glad to be favoured with Sir E. Grey's views on this point & on the others raised by the Admiral.

(3003/10)

As regards the agreement with the Persians (p. 9 1897)

(89) R. RITCHIE.



From Secretary of State to Viceroy, 20th February 1910. (205) (206)

Foreign Secret. Your telegram dated 13th instant. Arms Traffic. Maskat. I am consulting Foreign Office about France. Meanwhile something might be done to restrict exports. Could Sultan be induced to declare export of arms by sea illegal without passes issued under his authority by British or other trustworthy official, to be appointed by him on our recommendation as his own employé. Such passes to be issued at Maskat only, export of arms from all other Oman ports being prohibited by Sultan. Sultan to give us final voice in dealing with suspicious dhows captured under such conditions as recent case at Lima. Cox recommends this and Foreign Officer consider no previous reference to French Government necessary. Please instruct Holland to propose this to Sultan. It may, of course, be necessary to offer pecuniary inducement.



of any unpleasantness with the French, and
if necessary to give compensation for the
arms, or to restore them.

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"our issuing passes" is not quite correct.
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the issue of passes would be an official
of the Sultan of Muscat, though doubtless
a British subject, and ~~the~~ the French
would therefore have no locus standi for
objecting.

In conclusion I am to invite
attention to the letter from the L.C. of the
Admiralty M.021 of the 21st inst. of which
it is understood that a copy has been
furnished to your Dep^y. And Mr. [unclear] is
of opinion that the Sadr-i-Azam's letter of
18th Dec. 1897, read in the light of Mr. C.
Hardinge's letter of 11th Dec. 1897 does not
authorize the use of British ships of
war in Persian waters ⁱⁿ ~~shows~~ misrep-
resentation of their character & nationality. But
he would be glad to be favoured with Mr
C. Guy's views on this point & on the others
raised by the Admiralty.

(82) R. NITCHIE.

(3003/10)

As regards the Agreement
with the Persian Govt. of 1897.



Departments are requested, if they suspect that there is any mistake in this telegram, to communicate immediately with the Private Secretary to the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State.



COPY OF TELEGRAM.

FROM

Kisrov

DATED

Balutia 22nd Feb. 1910

RECEIVED AT LONDON OFFICE

21st Feb.

9.40 p.m. 22 Feb.


206 1/11-2901
304/10
copy of the
61 20 Feb
@ 7 p.m.
ans @ 11 p.m.

Foreign Secret. Arms traffic. Holland telegraphs that representative of Goguyer has purchased dhows and despatched her for Kato laden with arms and ammunition under the flag of the French Govt, and that the French Consul confirmed the report of the purchase in reply to request to exchange list of dhows. Sultan had previously told Holland that the arrangement was not made with his approval or assistance. Later the Sultan paid a long visit to the French Consul, and later has told Holland that Sultan informed him that he had no recollection of proclamation of 1898 empowering search of ships by us. Goguyer is negotiating purchase of another dhow and French Consul has told Holland that with view to extend business Goguyer intends to establish agents wherever possible on the Arabian coast.

The export of arms to coast of Persian Gulf outside British territorial waters is illegal except as regards Kato where we have not recognized British claims. The action of Goguyer's firm is therefore openly disreputable. The position of his firm is evidently becoming desperate.

The situation having developed since I last telegraphed, I am asking opinions of Heron and Holland on the proposal contained in your telegram of 20th February before taking action upon it, and will communicate them to you at once. The French would probably object to our issuing passes to the French dhows. I have asked Admiral not to interfere with French dhows and to telegraph to them.

(Addressed to J.F. & repeated to Heron & Lord C.-in-C.)





In any further communication on this subject, please quote
M - 021

and address letter to—
The Secretary,
Admiralty, Whitehall,
London, S.W.



Sir,

Admiralty,
21st February 1910.

*Copy to India
25 Feb '10
Secy 8*

I am commanded by My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for India in Council, that they have had under consideration the report from the Commander-in-Chief on the East Indies Station dated the 24th December (No:- 1049/1462/xiv) in which he gives an account of the steps taken to suppress the Arms Traffic in the Persian Gulf, and states his views on possible future developments.

Copy of the letter is contained in the Government of India Print No. 198.

2.- Amongst other points the Commander-in-Chief notices the possibility of arms being carried in dhows under foreign flags, and requests definite information whether the terms of the Agreement with the Persian Government dated 18th December 1897 authorise him to seize vessels in Persian or British waters which are attempting to land arms whatever their character or nationality.

The Agreement states that "in addition to such measures as may be taken by Persian officials, His Majesty's Ships should examine and search all merchant vessels trading in the Persian Gulf". It appears, therefore, that His Majesty's Ships could search any vessel suspected of carrying arms, within the territorial waters of Persia, irrespective of its character or nationality.

On the other hand the Secretary of State for India, in his despatch of the 9th November 1900 to the Government of India stated that it would be necessary to come to an


Under
Secretary of State,

arrangement

INDIA OFFICE,

S.W.

A.P.—No. 8.






208 209
arrangement with the Turkish Government before British vessels could search ships carrying the Turkish Flag.


3.- A similar question arises in respect of seizures of vessels under a foreign Flag in Muscat waters. The terms of the Proclamation of the Sultan of Muscat of the 18th January 1898 are not so general as those of the Agreement with Persia, and it was held that the right of search does not extend to other than British, Persian or Muscat vessels.

4.- My Lords note that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in his letter of the 22nd October last stated that the possibility of the blockade being rendered less effective by arms being carried in dhows under foreign Flags, must be dealt with if and when it arises. In the present situation, however, it is necessary that the Commander in Chief should be definitely informed what are his powers in respect of such vessels, i.e., whether vessels under foreign Flags suspected of carrying arms in British, Persian or Muscat waters may be visited and searched, and if necessary detained for enquiry, their cargoes being confiscated. I am to request that the Secretary of State will state what instructions should be given to the Commander in Chief on this point.

(29.10/10)
5.- I am to refer in this connection to telegram No.18 from the Commander in Chief, copy of which was sent to the India Office and Foreign Office on the 28th January, in which the Commander in Chief reports the seizure and subsequent release of a dhow flying Turkish Colours in Muscat territorial waters. He also urges that steps may be taken to notify and enforce the prohibition of imports of arms into Koweit.

My Lords hope that the measures recommended by the Commander in Chief in this telegram will be favourably considered by the Secretary of State with a view to increasing the





the effectiveness of the blockade.


6.- Copy of this letter has been sent to the Foreign Office and the Secretary of State has been requested in accordance with the suggestions in paragraph 15 of the Commander in Chief's letter of 24th December, to give instructions to His Majesty's Consuls General at Marseilles and Port Said to inform the Commander in Chief, East Indies, by telegraph of any ships leaving these ports with arms and ammunition for the Persian Gulf, in order that a watch may be kept on their movements.

I am,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Abraham Peave






[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

ARMS TRAFFIC.

CONFIDENTIAL.



[6325]

No. 1.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received February 22.)

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Admiralty, February 21, 1910.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to forward herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a letter of this date, which has been sent to the India Office, relative to the suppression of the arms traffic in the Persian Gulf.

I am to request that should the Secretary of State see no objection, His Majesty's consuls-general at Port Said and Marseilles may be instructed to inform the commander-in-chief on the East Indies station, by telegraph, of any ships leaving those ports with arms and ammunition for the Persian Gulf, in order that a watch may be kept on their movements.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Admiralty to India Office.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Admiralty, February 21, 1910.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for India in Council, that they have had under consideration the report from the commander-in-chief on the East Indies station, dated the 24th December, in which he gives an account of the steps taken to suppress the arms traffic in the Persian Gulf, and states his views on possible future developments.

Copy of the letter is contained in the Government of India print, No. 198.

2. Amongst other points the commander-in-chief notices the possibility of arms being carried in dhows under foreign flags, and requests definite information whether the terms of the agreement with the Persian Government, dated 18th December, 1897, authorise him to seize vessels in Persian or British waters which are attempting to land arms, whatever their character or nationality.

The agreement states that—"in addition to such measures as may be taken by Persian officials, His Majesty's ships should examine and search all merchant vessels trading in the Persian Gulf." It appears therefore that His Majesty's ships could search any vessel suspected of carrying arms within the territorial waters of Persia, irrespective of its character or nationality.

On the other hand, the Secretary of State for India, in his despatch of the 9th November, 1900, to the Government of India, stated that it would be necessary to come to an arrangement with the Turkish Government before British vessels could search ships carrying the Turkish flag.

3. A similar question arises in respect of seizures of vessels under a foreign flag in Muscat waters. The terms of the Proclamation of the Sultan of Muscat of the 13th January, 1898, are not so general as those of the agreement with Persia, and it was held that the right of search does not extend to other than British, Persian, or Muscat vessels.

4. My Lords note that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in his letter of the 22nd October last, stated that the possibility of the blockade being rendered less effective by arms being carried in dhows under foreign flags must be dealt with if and when it arises. In the present situation, however, it is necessary that the commander-in-chief should be definitely informed what are his powers in respect of such vessels, i.e., whether vessels under foreign flags suspected of carrying arms in British, Persian, or Muscat waters may be visited and searched, and, if necessary, detained for enquiry, their cargoes being confiscated. I am to request that the

[2628 y-4]



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My Lords hope that the measures recommended by the commander-in-chief in this telegram will be favourably considered by the Secretary of State with a view to increasing the effectiveness of the blockade.

6. Copy of this letter has been sent to the Foreign Office, and the Secretary of State has been requested in accordance with the suggestion in paragraph 15 of the commander-in-chief's letter of the 24th December, to give instructions to His Majesty's consuls-general at Marseilles and Port Said to inform the commander-in-chief, East Indies, by telegraph, of any ships leaving these ports with arms and ammunition for the Persian Gulf, in order that a watch may be kept on their movements.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE



211 216

Register No.
**2982+
(+304)**

Secret Department.

Letter from *70.*
Telegram from Viceroy
17 Feb. Formally acknowledged

Dated *16* Feb. 1910.
Rec. *17*

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	<i>17 Feb.</i>	<i>Zab</i>	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Arms Traffic.</u></p> <p><i>Koweit and Turkey. Concurrence of Sir E. Grey in proposed instructions to Govt. of India regarding Koweit. The 'Muzaffarnagar' case. Sir E. Grey being consulted on question of approaching the Turkish Govt. Sir E. Grey, not disposed to agree to seizure of Turkish flag without previous understanding with a notification to Turkish Govt.</i></p> <p><i>Claim of French trader at Muscat</i></p> <p>Copy to <i>India 25 Feb 10</i> <i>India Secy. 8.</i></p>
Secretary of State.....	<i>17</i>	<i>RK</i>	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

send
M.
17. 2. 10.

Int +
17/2/10

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

8ft. telegram to India accordingly.


Telegram to India, 17 Feb.

Seen Pol. Com'ee,
8 MAR 1910
(with 320)

Previous Papers :—

224
293

6540. L. 1636. 500.—9/1909. [L. 725.]





From Secretary of State to Viceroy, Foreign Department,
17th February 1910. (212) (217)


Foreign Secret. Your Foreign Secret telegrams of 4th February and 13th February. Arms traffic. As regards Koweit and Bahrein, I approve. Sheikh of Koweit should be warned of intended action and told that we rely on continuance of his loyal co-operation. He might telegraph *via* Bushire to his agent at Maskat to warn Koweit dhows not to carry arms without letter of authority from Political Agent. A week's grace might be allowed.

Proposed instructions to Holland re Goguyer's agent approved.

Naval officers should be warned to avoid seizures in Maskat waters lest French get hold of a really good case against us.

As to Turkey, His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople is being consulted. Meanwhile Turkish dhows will of course not be interfered with.

212/10





DRAFT TELEGRAM.

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

VICEROY, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

(Vafrorum)

Despatched ⁷ 17/2 19/0.

18.

(213)

Foreign secret. from foreign secret
 telegrams 4: Feb. & 12: Feb. Arms traffic.
 As regards Koweit & Bahrain I approve.
 Sheikh of Koweit should be warned of
 intended action & told that we rely on
~~cooperation of~~ his loyal co-operation. He might telegraph
 via Bushire to his agent at Muscat to
~~inform~~ Koweit ^{not} to carry arms
 without letter of authority from British
 Political Agent. A week's grace might
 be allowed.


Proposed instructions to Holland re
 Foguier's agent approved.

Naval Officers should be warned to
 avoid seizures in Muscat waters as far
 as possible to avoid last French get-
 hold of a really good case against us.

As to Turkey H.M. Ambassador at
 Constantinople is being consulted. Meanwhile
 Sheikh shows will of course not be interfered
 with.

Copy to India. (+cp) 25 Feb

- 20 (2) 19.2.10
 - 24.2.10
 - Army 21.2.10





Departments are requested, if they suspect that there is any mistake in this telegram, to communicate immediately with the Private Secretary to the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State.

COPY OF TELEGRAM.

FROM Viceroy

DATED 17th February

RECEIVED AT LONDON OFFICE 2-49 p.m.




Foreign Secret. My telegram of 13th February.
Arms traffic — Holland has sent copies
of further correspondence with French
Consul who supports claim of Goguyer's
agent for 123,125 francs which includes
an item 5000 francs for value of show.


Holland further reports that Goguyer's
agent contemplates buying a Maskat show
and that it, and the Koweit show "Muzaffar",
if its purchase is ultimately completed
will possibly be sailed under French
flag if French Consul can be induced to
register them.


Copy to 20th

{ 17/2/10
@ 24.2.10

India @ 25.2.10









(4905/10)

(216) 211

Monsieur Goguyer's agent or the French Consul at Muscat, to make any protest that may seem called for - and he concurs in the instructions which the Government of India propose to send to Mr. Holland.

(216-10)
With regard to the question of approaching the Turkish Government, raised in your letter of February 10th, I am to state that Sir E. Grey is consulting His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople on the subject.


Sir E. Grey would, however, not be disposed in any case to agree to His Majesty's Ships seizing dhows flying the Turkish flag, without some previous understanding with, or notification to, the Turkish Government, especially as the Turks are themselves opposed to the arms traffic and the amount of that traffic at present carried on in Turkish dhows appears to be inconsiderable.

I am,

Sir,

Your most obedient,
humble Servant,

W. Langley





212
217

Register No. 292-3

Secret Department.

2 Telegrams from Viceroys, 4/13 Feb
 Supp Letter from India, No. 4 M, 4/27 Jan '10
 Letter from Colonial Office, 4/11 Feb.

Dated 11, 12 + 14 Feb. 1910.
 Rec. 11, 12 + 14 Feb.

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	15 Feb	Each	Arms Traffic
Secretary of State.....	15	NK	Retention & liberation in Muscat waters of a Koweit ship with arms etc. on board
Committee.....			Attitude of Sultan of Muscat.
Under Secretary.....			Proposal of Colonial Office to appeal to the Hague regarding export of arms from Muscat
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India (see within)

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.

Off to I.O. Supporting C.O. proposal with
modifications & suggestions.


Letter to I.O., 21 Feb
 Telegram to Viceroy, 21 Feb.

Seen Pol. Comm.,
9 MAR 1910

I do not see what
territorial concessions
could safely be
given in India
to France

Previous Papers:—

6540. I. 1636. 500.—9/1909. [I. 725.]





(218) (73)

MINUTE.

Telegram A illustrates the importance of the measures proposed by the G. & I. in their telegram of the 4th inst., as to which we addressed F.O. on 10th inst. Import of arms into Koweit is already illegal, but until the Sultan of Muscat declares export to Koweit illegal, arms cannot be seized in Muscat waters, & it is rather unfortunate that the "Hyacinth" did not wait until the dhow was on the high sea before seizing her. Luckily, however, the case for complaint is very weak. The Sheikh of Koweit has behaved quite properly, & as appears from Capt. Sheehy's letter of 29th Dec. (received this mail), he is fully alive to the risks of overtly permitting importation. A copy of the telegram has gone to the F.O., who will deal with it in replying to our letter of the 10th inst. It is not necessary to write to them again. The G. & I. will be answered when we get the F.O. letter.


Telegram B is a belated comment on Mr. Holland's ~~letter~~ telegram of 19th Jan^r (already circulated) in reply to our warning of Feb. 4th against driving the Sultan into the arms of the French. The G. & I. again raise the question of coming to terms with France; & in this connexion C.O. letter to F.O. of 10th Feb. should be read. The C.O. minute on appeal

5610. I. 724. 1000.—4/1909.



to the Hague as to the legality of the export of arms
 "from Jibuti to the eastern coast of the Red Sea & to
 Muscat." The suggestion seems to be made ^{mainly} ~~for~~ ~~mainly~~
 with the hope of bluffing the French into coming to
 terms with us, in order to avoid going to the Hague.
 If the bluff were successful, & restrictions imposed in
 which the Muscat question would again be discussed with
 France - well. But if arbitration were accepted, India
 would gain nothing, as there are practically no
 exports of arms from Jibuti to Muscat (indeed,
 Major Cox tells me that Muscat now exports to Jibuti),
 & even if the general Jibuti export trade were stopped
 arms would still go straight to Muscat. At the
 same time, this seems a good opportunity to ask the
 F.O. again to take up the Muscat question on its own
 merits with France. The C.O. arguments about the effect
 of the blockade are good; & if by any mischance
 the blockade comes to an end at the end of April
 through lack of funds, we shall be deprived of our
 most effective weapon. But if there are restrictions
 & they are to be successful, India must be prepared
 with a quid pro quo, & it seems advisable to
 telegraph ~~them~~ ^{them} at once to the F. & S. in order that
 they may have proposals ready when the time comes.

The re-opening of negotiations for the prevention of
 imports will not deal with the proposal which has just been
 made for the regulation of exports by the issue of licences at Muscat. For the F.O. think
 this can be done without reference to France.



India Office,
Whitehall, S.W.

Securities of the

This paper telegraph has not
mentioned when you discuss the
paper letter to the 70 with the
Hilfze & myself this morning -

I have submitted the it

Amuse me

21-2-10

Wm



to the Hague as to the legality
"from Jibuti to the eastern coast
Muscot." The suggestion seems
with the hope of bluffing the
terms with us, in order to win
If the bluff were successful, &
which the Muscot question would
France - well. But if arbiters
would gain nothing, as there
exports of arms from Jibuti
Major Cox tells me that Muscot
is one of the general Jibuti &
arms would still go straight

some time, this seems a good opportunity to ask the
I.O. again to take up the Muscot question on its own
merits with France. The C.O. arguments about the effect
of the blockade are good; & if by any mischance
the blockade comes to an end at the end of April
through lack of funds, we shall be deprived of our
most effective weapon. But if there are negotiations
& they are to be successful, India must be prepared
with a quid pro quo, & it seems advisable to
telegraph them at once to the I. & S. in order that
they may have proposals ready when the time comes.

The re-opening of negotiations for the prevention of
imports will not clash with the proposal which has just been
made for the regulation of exports by the issue of passes at Muscot. For the I.O. think that
this can be done without reference to France.



292 (220) (215)

DRAFT TELEGRAM.

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

VICEROY, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

(Vafrosum)

Despatched 21-2-1910.

Handwritten initials

*Send
in.
21/2/10*


so as to

(+rus/10)

Foreign secret. Your foreign secret telegram 15th inst. Arms traffic. I am addressing J.O. as to negotiations with France. If negotiations take place some territorial concessions in India will probably be necessary as quid pro quo. Please consider this ~~but we have definite proposals ready~~ ~~spends occasion time~~ ~~What would be your attitude towards~~ compensating dealers as proposed in Holland's telegram of 15th Jan?

Copy to India. (47) 11 mch '10.

J.O. 23 Feb '10.
7 mch '10





U. S. of S.
I.O.

21 Feb. /10

Book
49
(2965710)

I am directed by the U. S. of S.
for I. to say that he has received
a copy of a letter (n: 1458) addressed
by the C.O. to your dept: on the 10:
inst. in which the Earl of Grey
suggests that H.M.G. should now take
steps to bring the question of the export
of arms & ammunition from India
to the E. & Western coast of the Red Sea
& to present before the Hague Tribunal

It is observed that the suggestion
is apparently made rather in the hope
that the French Gov: may ^{prefer} to come
to terms rather than to risk taking a
weak case to arbitration, ^{as from the}
Indian point of view they seem to favour
~~this point of view that I am now~~
~~travelling the preferable alternative. For it appears to~~
~~directed to address from. As regards~~
~~arbitration itself, Viscount Bryce is~~
~~of opinion that a successful appeal to~~
~~on the view raised in the C.O. letter~~
the Hague Tribunal would contribute little
to the solution of the difficulty in the
Persian Gulf. He understands that
practically

Copy to India
4 March 1910
Secy. 9



practically no arms are exported from
Tibuti to Muscat; & the closing of the
former port would not interfere with the
direct trade between Europe & Muscat.

On the other hand, as pointed out
by Lord Curzon, the present moment ^{is} in many respects very suitable for the
renewal of negotiations with the ^{Sultan} ~~Govt.~~
The success of the naval blockade
in the Persian Gulf has, temporarily at
all events, paralyzed the arms trade in
those regions, & French merchants are
suffering heavy losses in consequence - losses which will be increased, if effect
is given to the proposal to restrict the
export of arms by the issue of peace
by the Sultan.
~~seems in many respects a suitable one~~
~~for the renewal of negotiations with the~~
~~Sultan Govt.~~ Whether it is preferable
to invite ^{negotiations} ~~it~~, or to attempt to force
it by the threat of arbitration, is
for Sir C. Grey's consideration. In either
case Lord Curzon would suggest that,
for the reason given above, the question
of Muscat should be treated separately
from that of Tibuti.

In this connexion I am to
enclose copy of a telegram from the
Govt of India, who, it will be seen, are
anxious to learn it on early date
whether there is any prospect of coming
to terms with France. As regards the
question whether the Sultan could be

From S. of I. 13: Feb. (292/10) B



(222)

(X)

supported in the event of his prohibiting the import of arms in the face of his Treaty with France, Lord Morley fears that this suggestion ^{in its present form} could not be entertained. But if an appeal is to be made to the Hague on the question of Jibuti, it is for consideration whether the Muscat question should not also be referred ^{as a separate issue.} It might be argued that the Sultan is free to prohibit the import of arms on the grounds (1) that the arms traffic did not exist at the time when the treaty of 1844 was negotiated and cannot therefore reasonably be held to be covered by it; (2) that the treaty contains no provisions for denunciation, and that the perpetual maintenance of a commercial treaty in altered conditions, and in defiance of the wishes of one of the contracting parties, is a derogation from the independence of that party, which independence the other party has formally undertaken to respect; (3) that the unlimited importation of arms by a State of low civilisation like Muscat can only be to the common danger of the State itself



itself and of its neighbours and
(4) that in view of the above
considerations and of the attitude
of the whole civilised world
(except France), as shown at the
recent Conference, to the import-
ation of arms in such circumstances,
the treaty of 1944, so far as it
may be held to have legalized the
arms traffic in the past, is now
void, in accordance with the
principle laid down by Hall,
International Law, page 365 :

"A treaty becomes void

" (6) by incompatibility with the

"general obligations of states,

"when a change has taken place in

"undisputed law or in views

"universally held with respect to

"morals".

(SR) R. RITCHIE.



293

A

From Viceroy, 13th February 1910.


Foreign Secret. My telegram of 4th February. On the 27th January H.M.S. "Hyacinth" boarded a dhow named "Muzaffarnagar" in Maskat waters. Dhow had no ship papers but belonged to Koweit, and cargo of arms and ammunition was consigned from Goguyer to a Koweit merchant. Nakoda possessed pass signed by Sultan of Maskat authorising transport of arms and ammunition within his territorial limits. Careful enquiry was held by Holland on board flagship, and, as there were no grounds for supposing cargo intended for Persian territory, Admiral permitted dhow to continue voyage and furnished Nakoda with pass preventing search by other men-of-war. Sultan was duly informed. Goguyer's representative has from the first taken up position of ill-used person and is making himself very objectionable. He told Holland that he is prepared to fight us in every possible way; that the Sultan's proclamation was waste paper in view of French treaty, and that he would press this point on French Government, and would meanwhile export arms to any place he wishes and hold us responsible for any losses he may sustain. He further informed Holland that he had contracted with Nakoda that, in event of dhow being captured by man-of-war, it should become Goguyer's property, and he is pressing claim strongly (? for) compensation, including cost of dhow and Koweit valuation of arms, of which he now declines to take delivery. He brings a charge of wounding one of dhow's crew by a sailor, and the theft of 25 baskets of sweetmeats by "Hyacinth" men.

Holland has a telegram from Koweit owners of the dhow to the Maskat representative, stating that Sheikh Mubarak ordered that the dhow should be stopped. In spite of this telegram having arrived before dhow left, the Nakoda refused to obey order. Sheikh Mubarak's Bushire agent (? confirmed) this, and told Trevor that Sheikh had issued orders prohibiting dhows sailing from Maskat during Afghan gun-running season, and threatening severe punishment to those who infringed order. The Sheikh himself, in conversation with Captain Shakespear, admitted our right to search dhows, and expected us to do so.

French Consul, in submitting Goguyer's claim, requests recognition on grounds that it is based on French treaty still in force, and that restrictive measures introduced by Sultan have not been concurred in by the French Government. As dhow belonged to Koweit it is for Sheikh to make protest on subject of her detention and the alleged wounding of one of the crew, and Goguyer's agent has no *locus standi*. Latter's claim that, on strength of his conditional contract, dhow became his property on seizure by man-of-war cannot be allowed, and in any case it is not specifically supported by French Consul. Sheikh's agent at Bushire informed Trevor that, on receipt of a telegram from Nakoda asking permission to sell dhow, he replied peremptorily refusing to allow sale.


I propose to instruct Holland to reply to Consul that Government are unable to recognise that Goguyer has any claim to compensation from us for the temporary detention of his goods, or for the trifling damage caused to two packages which were opened for examination, in default of a bill of lading. Do you agree? Papers have been sent by weekly letter.

Copy to 20 (+) 14 Feb
@ 24 -
" " Copy (+) 14 -
" " Invi @ 25 -





292
Departments are requested, if they suspect that there is any mistake in this telegram, to communicate immediately with the Private Secretary to the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State.



COPY OF TELEGRAM.

FROM

Vicery

DATED

Balaatta 13th Feb. 1910

RECEIVED AT LONDON OFFICE

6.54 P.M.


224
B


Arms traffic. Your letter telegram of 4th Feb. [?] has been sent to Political Agent at Balaatta. Please refer to latter's telegram to go of 19th January last forwarded with Foreign Secretary's weekly letter 3 M of 20th January. In letter of 23rd January (copy sent to his Office and of 30th instant) Holland expresses his telegram [?] and [?] expresses himself in favour of coming to an arrangement on the basis suggested by the Sultan if this be feasible. Major Hervey points out that the Sultan has only now made overtures to us when he sees we are in earnest and our action has temporarily paralyzed arms trade; and that if H.A. [?] are prepared to support Sultan in prohibiting import of arms we shall be able to impose on him any further condition we choose. Holland telegraphs 10th February that Sultan will be liable to entangle himself with the French if reply to his overtures is delayed. We doubt this as we can apply pressure by stopping our subsidy. Also Sultan requires our support and like others in Gulf sees that we have at last determined to take action.

We propose to defer expressing our views as to policy to be adopted towards Sultan of Muscat until after Major Hervey's return. Meantime we shall be glad to hear as early as possible what prospect there may be of coming to terms with France, and whether Sultan could be supported in case of his prohibiting import of arms into Muscat in face of Treaty with France. It seems evident that Sultan could not himself stop imports and that we should have to do [?] this for him.

Copy to H.O. of 14 Feb.

Wise © 25-







as so few made a business of carrying cargoes of arms from Maskat. Koweit occasionally imported arms, but only just enough to meet the local demand. He also said that though dhow-owners took papers and even labelled the cases as for Koweit, they did not come to Koweit, but generally ran their cargoes on the Katif coast, whence the arms were distributed to the interior, Riadh, Hail, &c., and most to the north among the Muntifich and other tribes from Zobeir along the Shatt-el-Arab to nearly as far as Baghdad. The rates for carriage, he informed me, were about \$18 from the Katif coast to Nejd and about \$23 from the same place to Zobeir and the north-west, in both cases the rate being based on a camel-load of 20 rifles without ammunition. He added that the traffic was largely in the hands of the Ajman Bedouin. He admitted that some of this overland traffic found its way to Koweit, but only a very small proportion, quite two-thirds of the imports going to the north. He said he had been accused by the Wali at Basrah of allowing Koweit to be used as a depôt for forwarding arms to the Arab tribes on the river, but had pointed out to him that the real fault lay with the Turkish officials in Katif and Hassa.

Both Chiefs remarked on our apparently fatuous policy of attempting to stop the traffic in the Persian Gulf without prohibiting manufacture in England and export thence, and instead employing the much more expensive machinery of ships-of-war to stop fast-sailing native craft over an area of hundreds of square miles of open sea. As a large proportion of the arms, at least of those in Koweit, are of English manufacture, no doubt the present policy does seem incomprehensible, and is answered, I am afraid, by the specious argument that the English Government does not desire to cause loss to its own manufacturers in England, but prefers to shift the burden of any such loss on to the shoulders of the native purchasers in Maskat.

4. In submitting the above my main object is to show that Sheikh Mubarak so far has not abandoned his old policy of attempting to hoodwink us as to the real state of the arms trade in Koweit, and not because I attach any value to the information volunteered, which I regret, I am convinced, is supplied solely for official consumption.

Extracts from the diaries of the Political Agent, Koweit, Nos. 51 and 52, for two weeks ending 22nd and 29th December.

The news of the recent capture of dhows and rifles at Maskat by His Majesty's gun-boats has caused an alarm among the firearms dealers in Koweit. Haji Muhammad Taki's boom which had gone for the purpose of bringing arms has come back empty for fear of being captured by the gun-boats.

An Arab dealer in firearms was making enquiries that he had heard of the capture of dhows carrying rifles and asked whether it was safe for him to send specie to purchase arms at Maskat. He was told that he could do just as he liked and take the chance. He also enquired whether the import of firearms into and export from Maskat would be stopped altogether. He said he had heard something to that effect.

Firearms are now openly sold in Koweit and it is no more a secret. Several new shops have recently been opened where arms are kept for sale.

One Basri bought a dozen Mauser pistols from a shop where the Agency head clerk happened to be present and made no attempt to hide them. They murmured that the pistols were made by the Englishmen!

It is reported that Sheikh Jabir bin Mubarak has been discussing the attitude of the English Government in trying to stop the import into and export from Maskat of firearms and thereby causing heavy loss to merchants. He is supposed to have said that the English should first stop their manufacturers at home. The Sheikh of Koweit will be a considerable loser by the stoppage of the arms traffic from Maskat, as he used to get \$6 on every rifle imported.



19

41

Telegram P., No. 66, dated (and received) the 20th January 1910.

From—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Please refer to my telegram No. 16, dated the 7th January. A report from Mr. New states that Khalifa left Karwan yesterday to meet Sardar Saiyid Khan at Fancooch and that there now does not seem much chance of an attack on Charbar, certainly not at Moharram. He adds that there are about thirty Afghans in Dashtyari and sixty in Karwan.

42

Telegram P., No. 67, (dated and received) the 20th January 1910.

From—MAJOR A. P. TREVOR, In charge of the duties of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Arms traffic. I presume that no action will be taken on Holland's telegram No. 90 till return of Major Cox, who has been delayed in London for a fortnight and will probably arrive on 7th February at Maskat.

Addressed to Government of India, Foreign Department; repeated to Political Agent, Maskat.

45

Telegram P., No. 24 (Confidential), dated (and received) the 21st January 1910.

From—The Hon'ble Lieutenant-Colonel Sir A. H. McMahon, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.,
Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan,
Sibi,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Please refer to Holland's No. 3, dated 4th January, to Sultan of Maskat. Benn, who recently visited Mekran coast, has sent in following reports corroborating views expressed therein :—First report *begins*. "There is no doubt that



20

Wali of Pishukan encourages Afghans and I was informed that both he and the Wali of Gwadar have received distinct orders from Maskat to render every assistance to Afghans. Afghans are said to be waiting for further consignments in neighbourhood of Pishukan. Second report begins. "From information I obtained I believe all local officials at Gwadar are abetting arms traffic, including Native Assistant paid by Telegraph Department. This information is confirmed by information received from another source". I have placed small Mekran Levy detachment at Pishukan, but as force at my disposal is very limited will defer putting detachment in Gwadar itself until further necessity arises. I would recommend placing detachment of about 50 infantry at Gwadar on pretext of protecting telegraph offices from gun-runners whenever moment arrives for putting pressure on Sultan through Gwadar.

48

Telegram P., No. 27, dated (and received) the 22nd January 1910 (Confidential).

From—The Hon'ble Lieutenant-Colonel Sir A. H. McMahon, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.,
Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General, in Baluchistan,
Sibi,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Please refer your telegram No. S.—21 of the 15th January. It is hardly possible for the Consul, Seistan, to communicate with Saiyid Khan of Geh. Moreover I think it very undesirable to encourage communications between Baluch Sardars in North with those of Southern Baluchistan. In my opinion the most effective means of communicating with, and of bringing pressure on, Saiyid Khan of Geh are—

- (i) through the Director of Persian Gulf Telegraphs through whom he enjoys telegraph subsidy; (ii) through Sardar Mehrab Khan of Gitehki, one of our own Mekran Sardars who has considerable influence over him. Please see my telegram of to-day's date, No. 28 (Confidential), as regards land question.



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
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
Telegram P., No. 25 C., dated Seistan, (received *via* Robat on 24th) the 20th January 1910.

From—His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Seistan,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

The following telegram repeated to Sir G. Barclay, No. 7 :—*Begins.* Arms Traffic. Mr. Howson telegraphs that further enquiries show that some 3,000 camels and 900 Afghans have passed through Ahwaz bound for the south. His Majesty the Amir, his informant reports, advanced money to many of these men to buy rifles. They were accompanied by Ghulam Khan, Lowani. *Ends.*





26

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62

Telegram P., No. S.—40, dated the 25th January 1910.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta,

To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

A report received from His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Seistan, states that 3,000 camels and 900 Afghans bound for the south have passed through Ahwaz. The Amir is said to have advanced money to many of these men for the purpose of buying rifles. Ghulam Khan Lowani accompanied them. Repeated to the Vice-Consul, Bundar Abbas, and addressed to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

64

Telegram P., No. 28 (Confidential), dated (and received) 24th January 1910.

From—The Hon'ble Lieutenant-Colonel Sir A. H. McMahon, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.,
Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, Sibi,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Copy of the telegram you showed me at Calcutta regarding negotiations for purchase by Afghans of land near Geh has not yet been received by me, but from what I remember of the telegram I have now come to definite conclusion that land in question is a small tract of good land between Rapch and Bint which was given about seven years ago by Saiyid Khan of Geh to Mulla Khair Muhammad commonly known as Khalifa, who had made a good Kharez* to irrigate it. The Khalifa, who is an Afghan, formerly of Shorawak, has many disciples including Sardars Islam Khan of Bint and Saiyid Khan of Geh. The Afghan gun-runners whom he assists largely visit him, and we would have endeavoured to seize him or get him removed were it not for his religious influence. He wrote last year to us and offered this land for sale or exchange for similar tract in Mastung. For what then appeared to be an obviously good reason I ignored the offer. I have forgotten the actual details of the correspondence, but I have sent to Quetta for the papers. It is quite probable that in hopes of being allowed to return to Afghanistan the Khalifa is selling the land to the Afghans. He may, however, be willing

* (? "Canal" or "attempt.")

Khalifa



to sell it to others for a higher figure. It is clearly important to prevent the sale of the land to the Afghans, as it is most favourably situated for a depôt or colony as regards coast and main route inland. The only courses which appear to me to be open are either to prevent or cancel sale by threatening Saiyid Khan with the wrath of the Persian Government, or to purchase it ourselves at a higher price through Sardar Mehrab Khan of Gitehki and then dispose of it to Saiyid Khan by gift or otherwise. Except it were backed by threat of action by ourselves in name of the Persian Government the first alternative would have no effect and would turn this important and useful Sardar against us in any case. The advantage offered by the second alternative would be to strengthen our relations with the Sardar by means of McConaghey who is well acquainted with Saiyid Khan and other Sardars. He has visited them and the land in question. Should my suggestions appear to the Government of India to merit consideration they would perhaps, in order to enable McConaghey to supply any further information that may be required, desire him to be sent to Calcutta.

Telegram P., No. 82, dated the 25th (received 26th) January 1910.

From—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Please see my telegram* No. 14 over 36 dated the 12th January. I have now received a long rambling reply from

* Serial No. 1.

Sardar Saiyid Khan to my warning in which, among other things, he says that he is servant not only of the Persian Government but also of the British Government, that Afghan trading caravans have always been friendly with the Baluchis and that Afghans are numerous and said to total 1,000 or 2,000 men this year and that he is unable to expel them.

The Sardar concludes "you are aware further that the large number of Afghans are not under the control of the Baluchis and that there had been no ill-feeling among them and that unless the Government prevent them such affairs cannot be regulated by me. I will not refuse to perform orders and services of Kaiser-i-Hind and will abide by what you may say, and act upon your instructions. In such duties and affairs it is my duty to afford co-operation and guidance in your work, but the prevention and the expulsion of the Afghan are beyond the power of myself and my tribe. Please let me know and I will perform any work or services you may have for me."

I am replying to Sardar reminding him that he was not asked to expel Afghans but only to refrain from aiding, and granting any concessions to the gun-runners. In my opinion now that Sardar Saiyid Khan sees that we mean business in regard to the suppression of the Mekran arms traffic, he is unlikely voluntarily to grant any concession of land to the Afghans.

Addressed to the Government of India in the Foreign Department and repeated to His Britannic Majesty's Minister, Tehran.



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No. 59, dated Maskat, the 16th (received 25th) January 1910 (Confidential).

From—R. E. HOLLAND, Esq., Political Agent and His Britannic Majesty's Consul,
Maskat,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

In accordance with the instructions which I have received from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, I have the honour to submit herewith, for your information, a copy of letter No. 58, dated the 16th January 1910, which I have addressed to the Resident on the subject of the illicit arms traffic.

No. 59, dated Maskat, the 16th January 1910.

From—R. E. HOLLAND, Esq., Political Agent and His Britannic Majesty's Consul,
Maskat,

To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

I have the honour to refer to your telegram No. 35, dated the 12th January 1910, on the subject of the illicit arms traffic.

2. I enclose herewith copies of the lists of captured arms and ammunition which have been furnished to me by the officers commanding His Majesty's ships. I have added against each item the approximate market rate at the date of enquiry. The first statement showing arms and ammunition captured in the dhow "Badil" in Lima Bay was supplied to me by Captain Hunt after the date of my letter No. 1255, dated 23rd November 1909, and it should be substituted for the list which formed an enclosure to that letter.

With a view to facilitate identification and valuation of rifles captured, I am asking the Senior Naval Officer kindly to send me in future, for examination and return, one sample of every kind of rifle found in each consignment captured.

3. On receipt of Foreign Department telegram* No. S.—5, dated 4th January 1910, I enquired from the Senior

* Serial No. 209 Part I.

Naval Officer whether any expanding or explosive bullets had been found in this season's captures. In reply, Captain Hunt, R.N., informed me that about 3,500 rounds furnished with expanding bullets had so far been found. In the cargo captured by H. M. S. "Lapwing" on 4th December about 3,000 rounds of Mannlicher ammunition contained soft-nosed bullets and out of the ammunition found by H. M. S. "Perseus" on 1st January near Pishukan 500 rounds of .303 contained expanding bullets.

4. It is impossible to say with accuracy from what specific source in Europe the captured rifles came because the Maskat merchants buy from one another, and the supplies from Europe are often ordered through agents such as Messrs. Carling, Times, Dharwar, &c., who purchase from manufacturers. I have been able to see the catalogues of Messrs. Albrecht Kind of Dieringhausen, Gustav Genschow of Hamburg, and Clabrough and Johnstone of Birmingham, and I notice that Albrecht Kind sells all kinds of Mausers and Mannlicher rifles and carbines; Gustav Genschow sells Gras, Chassepot, Werndl, Snider, Martini-Henry, Mauser Mannlicher, Berdan, and other kinds of rifles; while Clabrough and Johnstone sell Martini-Henry, Martini-Metford and Enfield rifles. Doubtless there are many other European firms who stock the same makes. I append a note on the subject of expanding bullets.

5. Government desire to know whether the import of arms at Maskat is expanding or contracting. The total

number of cases of arms and ammunition imported between 1st April and 31st December 1908 was 7,110, out of which 1,782 cases contained rifles, 15 cases contained revolvers and 5,313 contained ammunition. Between 1st January and 31st December 1909 only 6,709 cases were imported, out of which 1,476 contained rifles, 27 contained revolvers and 5,206 contained ammunition.



I am informed that merchants were apprehensive as to the results of the Brussels Arms Conference, and that orders were in consequence held over. As soon as it was ascertained that no injury to the trade would result from the Conference large supplies were ordered and they are due to arrive in ships expected here shortly. On the other hand, some merchants have been endeavouring to countermand their orders on account of the recent successes of His Majesty's ships.

7. A copy of this letter has been forwarded to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Calcutta, in accordance with your general instructions.

Statement showing the estimated value, at current rates, of the arms and ammunition captured in Lima Bay by H. M. S. "Fox" in show "Badil" on 4th November 1909.

ARMS.		Rs.
90 Lee-Speed Magazine rifles '303 at Rs. 114 each	...	10,260
290 Carbines '303 at Rs. 40 each	...	11,600
300 Rifles, Service Martinis, '450 at Rs. 40 each	...	12,000
370 Rifles, Foreign makes of '450 at Rs. 35 each	...	12,950
250 Rifles, Sniders '577 at Rs. 15 each	...	3,750
1,500 Total.	Total	50,560
AMMUNITION.		
42,000 Cartridges '303 by Kynoch at Rs. 66 per 1,000	...	2,772
65,000 Cartridges '450 by French and Swiss at Rs. 65 per 1,000	...	4,225
12,000 Cartridges '450 by Eley at Rs. 45 per 1,000	...	540
119,000 Total.	Total	7,537
	Grand Total	58,097

Statement showing the estimated value, at current rates, of the arms and ammunition captured by H. M. S. "Fox" from a Persian show on 3rd December 1909.

ARMS AND AMMUNITION CONSIGNED TO KATR.

ARMS.		Rs.
130 Rifles, Mauser magazine model, 1908 (10-shot), at Rs. 96 each	...	12,480
95 Rifles, Martini '450, at Rs. 34 each	...	3,230
20 Rifles, Fusil Gras, at Rs. 15 each	...	300
60 Mauser pistols at Rs. 37 each	...	2,220
10 Browning pistols at Rs. 30 each	...	300
14 Revolvers, French, at Rs. 20 each	...	280
329 Total.	Total	18,810
AMMUNITION.		
82,000 Rounds Mauser ammunition at Rs. 65 per 1,000	...	5,330
54,000 Rounds Martini ammunition at Rs. 64 per 1,000	...	3,456
14,000 Rounds Pistol ammunition at Rs. 30 per 1,000	...	420
150,000 Total.	Total	9,206

ARMS AND AMMUNITION CONSIGNED TO BUSHIRE.

ARMS.		
30 Rifles, Mauser magazine, at Rs. 96 each (5-shot)	...	2,880
17 Rifles, Sporting Mannlicher, at Rs. 35 each	...	595
47 Rifles, Martini Metford, '303 long at Rs. 40 each	...	1,880
80 Rifles, Martinis of sorts, '450 at Rs. 34 each	...	2,720
174 Total.	Total	8,075



31

AMMUNITION.

	Rs.
40,000 Rounds Mauser and Metford ammunition at Rs. 100 per 1,000 (Cartridges in clips—5 each) ...	4,000
30,000 Rounds Martini ammunition at Rs. 64 per 1,000 ...	1,920
<u>70,000 Total.</u>	<u>5,920</u>
Grand Total ...	<u>42,011</u>

Statement showing the estimated value, at current rates, of the arms and ammunition captured from a dhow by H. M. S. "Lapwing" on 4th December 1909.

ARMS.

	Rs.
199 Snider Rifles at Rs. 10 each ...	1,990
38 Do. (Werndl) at Rs. 4 each ...	152
322 Rifles, Martini action '303, at Rs. 35 each ...	11,270
10 Lee-Enfield Magazine rifles (10-shot) at Rs. 90 each ...	900
139 Martini Rifles '450 at Rs. 34 each ...	4,726
270 Carbines '303 at Rs. 35 each ...	9,450
16 Carbines '450 Martini at Rs. 35 each ...	560
710 Rifles, Fusil Gras '433, at Rs. 15 each ...	10,650
3 Mauser Rifles '311 (Magazine 10-shot) at Rs. 96 each ...	288
1 Winchester Rifle '300 at Rs. 50 ...	50
<u>1,708 Total.</u>	<u>40,036</u>

AMMUNITION.

13,500 Snider ammunition at Rs. 50 per 1,000 ...	675
6,000 Martini ammunition at Rs. 65 per 1,000 ...	390
113,940 Rounds '303 ammunition at Rs. 65 per 1,000 ...	7,349
45,060 Fusil Gras ammunition at Rs. 65 per 1,000 ...	2,929
32,500 Mannlicher and Mauser ammunition at Rs. 65 per 1,000 ...	2,083
<u>211,000 Total.</u>	<u>13,426</u>
Grand Total ...	<u>53,462</u>

Statement showing the estimated value, at current rates, of the arms and ammunition seized from a dhow by H. M. S. "Philomel" on 6th December 1909.

ARMS.

	Rs.
652 Gras Rifles '433 at Rs. 13 each ...	8,476
165 Snider Rifles '577 (Werndl) at Rs. 6 each ...	990
7 Gras Carbines '433 at Rs. 13 each ...	91
<u>824 Total.</u>	<u>9,557</u>
52 Sword Bayonets at Re. 1 each ...	52

AMMUNITION.

54,200 Rounds Gras ammunition at Rs. 65 per 1,000 ...	3,523
2,000 Rounds Snider ammunition at Rs. 60 per 1,000 ...	120
<u>56,200 Total.</u>	<u>3,643</u>
Grand Total ...	<u>13,252</u>



32

Statement showing the estimated value, at current rates, of the arms and ammunition captured by H. M. S. "Perseus" on the 1st January 1910 from the shore near Pishukan.

ARMS,		Rs.
350 Snider Rifles '577 (Werndl and B. S. A.) at Rs. 4 each	...	1,400
170 Martini Rifles '450 at Rs. 35 each	...	5,950
100 Martini Metford Rifles '303 at Rs. 35 each	...	3,500
30 Lee-Enfield '303 Lee-Speed Magazine Rifles (10-shot) at Rs. 90 each	...	2,700
200 Fusil Gras Rifles '433 at Rs. 15 each	...	3,000
850 Total.	Total	16,550
250 Bayonets (French) at two annas each	...	31
AMMUNITION		Rs.
10,000 Snider ammunition at Rs. 50 per 1,000	...	5 0
30,000 Rounds Martini ammunition at Rs. 65 per 1,000	...	1,950
20,000 Rounds Fusil Gras ammunition at Rs. 65 per 1,000	...	1,300
40,000 Rounds '303 ammunition at Rs. 65 per 1,000	...	2,600
100,000 Total.	Total	6,350
	Grand Total	22,931

Note regarding the sale of expanding bullets in Maskat.

I enclose two pages* which I abstracted from the catalogues of an arms dealer, from which it will be seen that European arms merchants quote specific prices for soft-nosed and expanding bullets.

* Not reprinted.

2. I saw, but was not able to obtain possession of, a brown paper wrapper which had formed the outer covering of a package of '303 cartridges, and which bore the following inscription :-

Cartridges. S. A. Ball.
'303 Inch. Cordite.
Dum-Dum Bullets.
Mark II.

THE BIRMINGHAM METAL AND MUNITIONS CO., LTD.

A pencil note was added on the wrapper as follows: "Manufactured by the King's Norton Metal Company, Limited, Ammunition Works, Abbey Wood, England. I am informed that the cartridges are imported through the agency of Messrs. Carling and Co.

The late M. Goguyer imported expanding bullets from the Société Française d'armes et munitions, according to my information, and another firm imports from the Société Russo-Belge Herstal.

3. I cannot get any reliable information as to the number of expanding bullet cartridges sold recently, but there does not seem to be a very great demand for them at present.

R. E. HOLLAND,—15-1-10.



73

Telegram P., No. 87, dated and received the 26th January 1910.

From—MAJOR A. P. TREVOR, In charge of the duties of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,


To—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

Please refer to my telegram No. 51 of the 18th January.

His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran telegraphs that the Administrator of Customs has telegraphed to all Gulf offices to strictly examine cases and luggage arriving from Maskat. He has appointed Monsieur Constant (who was here for some time as Director, and is returning in "Tabaristan" which is due in a few days) to be Special Inspector, Jask-Charbar, instead of taking over Directorate of Bunder Abbas as intended. Meanwhile, pending Constant's arrival, the Officer Commanding Charbar and Austin are authorised to attend Customs House inspections.

These arrangements seem to be adequate and officers concerned have been informed. The Assistant Resident will kindly urge Monsieur Constant, on his arrival at Bunder Abbas, to take up the appointment as soon as possible.

Addressed to the Political Agent, Maskat; repeated to Bunder Abbas and the Government of India, Foreign Department.





232 237

Register No.

224
(256)

Secret Department.

Telegram Letter from *Viceroy*, Dated *48* Feb. 1910.
Rec. *58*

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	8 Feb.	<i>iaa</i>	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Arms Traffic.</u></p> <p>Koweit trade. Proposals of the Govt. of India in connection with suppression of trade with Koweit. Bahrain and Mical Chief proclamation and notification. Proposed agreement with Turkey. Service of copy to...</p>
Secretary of State.....	9	<i>W</i>	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to
I.O. + 5/2/10.
India (as within)

FOR USE BY DEPARTMENTS ONLY.


Sp to I.O. proposing to approve I. of I's suggestions

Letter to I.O., 10 Feb.

Secy Pol Com. 8 MAR 1910
(22330)

Previous Papers:—
29/10/10
196

6540. I. 1636. 500.—9/1909. [I. 725.]






233 278

MINUTE.

The position as regards Koweit, Bahrein, the
Persian Gulf, & Turkey, is explained on pages
3 to 5 of the I.O. print flagged below.
As regards the first three, the proposal is simply
to enforce existing proclamations.





234 219

Pressing

10 Feb. 1910.

U. S. & S.
I.O.

book
36

from Murray 4 Feb/10

I am directed by the I. & S. for I. to forward for the information of the I. & S. for I.A. copy of a telegram from the I. & S. regarding the movements of the arms traffic in the Persian Gulf.

Vicount Morley agrees with the I. & S. that it is desirable to prevent Koweit from becoming the main depot of the trade - a possibility on which some further light is thrown by Mr Holland's telegram of 19 Jan., of which a copy is enclosed. He accordingly proposes - unless Sir E. Grey sees reason to the contrary - to approve the proposed action suggested by the I. & S.; requesting them to explain the circumstances to the Sheikh of Koweit, to tell him that they rely on his loyal co-operation in enforcing his proclamation, & to suggest that he should telegraph to his agent at Muscat & warn any of his agents that may be there against sending up

Copy to India
11 Feb 10
Secy 6





arms without a letter from the Political Agent.

The question whether the moment is opportune for approaching the Turkish Govt with a view to obtaining authority to seize & search dhows flying the Turkish flag is for Sir C. Grey's decision. But such dhows are at present few in number, & it is for consideration whether H.M.'s ships should not at once be instructed to take the necessary action in such rare cases as may arise, the ^{captured} arms being kept & handed over to the Turkish Govt with apologies if a protest is made.

Lord Knolly proposes to instruct the G. & S. to treat ^{as fraudulent} any transactions of the kind described in the last para. of their telegram of the 1st inst.

(Sgd) R. Kitchie







256

Departments are requested, if they suspect that there is any mistake in this telegram, to communicate immediately with the Private Secretary to the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State. (236) (236)

COPY OF TELEGRAM.

FROM *Viceroy* *Circulated with 224*

DATED *8th February*

RECEIVED AT LONDON OFFICE *12.58 p.m.* *x (224/12)*


RECEIVED IN
-8 FEB 1910
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

Foreign Secret. My telegram of 4th February. Arms Traffic.

Trevor telegraphs:-

"Sheikh of Bahrein has applied for permission to import forty rifles and two thousand rounds of ammunition from Maskat, so he evidently expects imports to Bahrein or in Bahrein shows to be seized"

Copy to 20 9.2.10
21.2.10
India 25.2.10





237 272

Register No.
2910
[186]

Minute Paper. **Secret Department.**

Two Letters from Admiralty,
Telegram from Viceroy;

Dated 28, } Jan. 1910.
Rec. 28, 29, 29

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	29 Jan.	WZ	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Arms Traffic.</u></p> <p>Seizure of arms &c. in Muscat territorial waters addressed to fugitive's agent at Koweit: release of above orders. As to prohibition of import of arms into Koweit. Seizure of arms &c. on Jasin river near Jask: 3 Affghans killed. Our troops will not land except to protect Jask, etc., or for ransom on arms.</p>
Secretary of State....	31	WZ	
Committee	2	WZ	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State....			

Copy to

FOR INFORMATION.

The raid on the Persian coast east of Jask has resulted in a considerable haul. 3 Affghans were killed.

On the Naval C. in C.'s telegram of the 27th Jan., as to the capture & release of the 'Muzafa' and the steps necessary to deal with the possible transference of the stocks of arms merchants from Muscat to Koweit, no action here seems called for at the present stage. The telegram has been repeated to the Govt. of India.

Attention is called to

Previous Papers:—

6172. I. 1278. 1000.—7/1909.

Seen Pol Commr.
8 MAR 1910
(with 330)



the remarks as to the Koweit Trade
 on p. 4 of the annexed F.O. Memo. (Asiatic Turkey
 Print, 18 Nov. '00, Sec. 1). It will be seen
 that, although the Sheikh forbade in
 1900 "the importation of arms into Koweit
 - or exportation therefrom" and gave
 British & Persian vessels of war the
 right to search in Koweit territorial
 waters vessels carrying the British,
 Persian or Koweit flag, as well as
 Koweit vessels in Indian or Persian
 waters, little serious attempt has
 been made to check the import of
 arms into Koweit. The Sheikh has
 been inclined to resent our interference
 in the matter of the traffic, and in
 Aug. '00 the Sec. of State gave the Govt.
 of India authority "to suspend as long
 as they should think fit the activity of
 the naval authorities in the searching
 of mail steamers going to Koweit. Major
 Cox had reported - "Temporary inactivity
 "will do no practical harm, since traffic
 "to Koweit does not immediately affect
 "British interests as Mesopotamia traffic does."
 Presumably many of the arms would find
 their way into the interior of Arabia,
 to Meshkeemrah, etc.

2 Feb from V
 8 Aug '01
 Do. to V
 26 Aug '01



238


238

MINUTE.

It will be seen that the 'Muzafa' searched in Muscat territorial waters, flew Turkish colours. There is no express authority to search Turkish vessels, but there is no reason to anticipate difficulty in the present case. (See pp. 2, 5 of the F.O. point referred to above).

From encs. No. 5 in the Admiralty letter to us of the 28th Dec. last, it will be seen that naval officers were instructed by the Naval C. in C. that in Muscat territorial waters they might search "all native vessels except those under the French flag".

(The telegrams have been seen by Major Case).





(239)

(234)

From Viceroy, 8th August 1908.


Foreign Secret. Following from Cox, Shiraz, 4th August :—

"Senior Naval Officer informs me that on 6th July H.M.S. 'Sphinx,' in Maskat harbour, searched two mail steamers for arms destined for" (group omitted, probably 'Koweit'), "and asks my views as to further steps. Political Agent's report has not yet reached me, but search was successful, and will doubtless have a salutary effect on British Indian Company. If, however, this course of action is persevered in at present, it will in all probability have a prejudicial effect on amenableness of Sultan of Maskat and Sheikh of Koweit, preservation of which may be of great importance to Government should they shortly require one or both rulers to fall in with any change of policy in regard to Maskat or Koweit consequent on conclusion of Brussels Conference. I am, therefore, asking Senior Naval Officer to suspend activity pending intimation of wishes of Government. Temporary inactivity will do no practical harm, since traffic to Koweit does not immediately affect British interests as Mekran traffic does."

We have approved action of Cox in directing suspension of activity for the present.

*From Secretary of State to Viceroy, Foreign Department,
26th August 1908.*

Foreign Secret. Your telegram of the 8th instant. Arms for Koweit. Suspension so long as you think fit of activity of naval authorities in such cases is approved by His Majesty's Government.






In reply quote

M

Confidential.

2910



Admiralty,

28 Jan. 1910.

Sir

I am commanded by My Lords Commissioners
of the Admiralty to transmit for the information of the Secretary
of State for India in Council, decipher
of a telegram dated 28 Jan. No. 19 from the
Commander in Chief East Indies.

Copy has also been sent to the
Foreign office. I am, Sir,


Your obedient Servant,

C. I. Thomas

The Under Secretary of State,
India Office.

G & S 2409 [3122] 500 5/08v

[SEE OVER]






(241)
(236)

DECIPHER OF TELEGRAM No. 19
from Commander-in-Chief, East Indies,
Jask, 28th January 1910.


Landed a force from "Hardinge" and "Hyacinth"
during the night of 26th January - 27th January under
command of Colonel Delamaine 123 rifles to find and destroy
an arms depot said to be established on the right bank of
Jagin River, Makran.


After 7½ hours march depot was found guarded by
party of Afghans who were driven out of a Sangar in a strong
position. 760 rifles and carbines besides revolvers
bayonets and gunpowder and in short under 50,000 rounds of
Ammunition were destroyed. Losses Afghans 8 killed,
British nil. British Minister Teheran and Government of
India have been informed.



DECIPHER OF TELEGRAM NO. 19
from Commander-in-Chief, East India,
Jask, 28th January 1910.

Landed a force from "Harrington" and "Hysanin"
during the night of 26th January - 27th January under
command of Colonel Delamain 128 rifles to find and destroy
an arms depot said to be established on the right bank of
Jaskin River, Makran.
After 7½ hours search depot was found guarded by
party of Afghans who were driven out of a bunker in a strong
position. 760 rifles and carbines besides revolvers
bayonets and gunpowder and in short under 50,000 rounds of
ammunition were destroyed. Losses Afghans 3 killed.
British nil. British Minister Tehran and Government of
India have been informed.







243
238


DECIPHER OF TELEGRAM


FROM ... Commander in Chief, East Indies,
DATED... Jask, 27th January 1910, 6.15 p.m.


No.18. "Hyacinth's" cutter brought into Muscat Harbour dhow named "Muzafa" this morning, 27th January which contained 200 Mauser rifles and 400,000 rounds of ammunition addressed to Goguyer's Agent at Koweit. Dhow was flying Turkish colours, but she had no papers and she carried a letter addressed to Goguyer's Agent in Koweit which was not opened. From examination of Nakoda and crew it appeared that she belonged to Koweit. She had a pass from the Sultan (of) Muscat good for his territorial waters. As she was taken in Muscat territorial waters and there were not grounds for suspicion that the arms were going to Persian territory, I ordered her release and gave directions she was to be towed back to the position in which she was captured. Goguyer's Agent in Muscat informed Political Agent, Muscat, that the dhow was his property, as he had made a contract with the Nakoda that in the event of capture she should become his. This does not appear to be a bona fide sale, such as would give to dhow right to claim protection from the French. Dhow produced no evidence to show that her ownership had passed or was intended to pass to French hands. If this claim were recognised it would obviously open the door to easy evasion of the (?) blockade.

There is a wish on part of arms merchants ^{at Muscat} to move as much as possible of their stock to Koweit. It is believed that their intention is favourably considered at Koweit, and this apparently (a) test case to try to get the arms through.

I.









186

No 2903.

Departments are requested, if they suspect that there is any mistake in this telegram, to communicate immediately with the Private Secretary to the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State.

COPY OF TELEGRAM. X

FROM Vicary

DATED Calcutta 28.1.10.

RECEIVED AT LONDON OFFICE 6-40 A.M.

RECEIVED IN
29 JAN 1910
POLITICAL DEPARTMENT


Circulated with 29/10


Foreign secret. S. 43. Arms traffic. Your telegram of 28th January, M. 4. Your presumption as regards troops is correct.

Addressed H. M. Minister, Tehran; repeated S. 43. for India & Political Resident, Persian Gulf.

x City below.

Copy to 20. @ 31 Jan
@ 2 Feb
.. India @ 4 Feb.





CONFIDENTIAL

Already
circulated

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 26, 11.50 A.M.)

(No. 34.)

Tehran, January 26, 1910, 1.45 P.M.



FOLLOWING sent to India, No. 4:—

"Your telegram of 27th December.

"Despatch of troopship with troops to the Persian Gulf alarms Persian Government. I am endeavouring to [group omitted: ? ally] them.

"I presume troops will remain on board, except in case of danger to our detachments at Charbar, Bunder Abbas, and Jask, or in case of a raid against arms depôts.

"(Repeated to Foreign Office, No. 34, and Bushire, No. 15.)"





[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

ARMS TRAFFIC.

[December 31.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[47273]

No. 1.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received December 31.)

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Admiralty, December 28, 1909.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to forward herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of correspondence with reference to the suppression of the arms traffic.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Admiralty to India Office.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Admiralty, December 28, 1909.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for India in Council, copy of a letter, dated the 4th November, from the commander-in-chief on the East Indies station, with inclosures, relative to the suppression of the arms traffic.

2. With regard to paragraph 3 of the commander-in-chief's letter, I am to state that the agreement with Persia, dated the 18th December, 1897, cannot be traced in this department, and I am to request that a copy of this agreement may be furnished for the information of the commander-in-chief.

3. The proposal of the commander-in-chief that captured dhows and arms should not be handed back to the Sultan of Muscat and the Persian authorities, and that if necessary the existing agreements on the subject should be modified, appears to their Lordships to be very desirable, and they would be glad to learn the views of the Secretary of State on this subject, which, it is understood, has already been under consideration in connection with recent captures.

4. I am to inclose copy of a letter which has been sent to the Colonial Office respecting the Somaliland Fire-arms Regulations, referred to in paragraph 4 of the commander-in-chief's letter.

5. Copy of this letter, with inclosures, has been sent to the Foreign Office.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Admiralty to Colonial Office.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Admiralty, December 28, 1909.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to forward herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, extract from a letter, dated the 4th November, which has been received from the commander-in-chief on the East Indies station relative to the Somaliland Fire-arms Regulations.

2. Admiral Slade points out that the regulations of 1905, which repeal those of 1899, and also those of 1903, entitled the "Somaliland Fire-arms Amendment No. 2," contain no mention of the reciprocal powers of visit, search, and seizure, granted to officers of British and Italian men-of-war in respect of vessels suspected of being engaged in the arms traffic.

It cannot be traced in this department whether the regulations of 1903, which conferred these powers, have been re-enacted in some other form, or, if not, why they have been abolished.

[2532 hh—1]



2

My Lords would be glad if the Secretary of State would cause them to be supplied with further information on this point.

3. A copy of this letter has been sent to the Foreign Office and India Office.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 1.

Rear-Admiral Slade to Admiralty.

Sir,

"*Hyacinth*," at Bombay, November 4, 1909.

WITH reference to East Indies letter of the 11th ultimo, relative to the traffic in arms, be pleased to lay before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty the annexed copy of a memorandum addressed to the officers commanding the ships on this station, enclosing a statement showing the powers possessed by His Majesty's ships for exercising the right of search and detention of vessels engaged in the arms traffic.

2. I am aware that under the proclamations of the Sultan of Muscat of the 13th January, 1898, and the 17th October, 1903, to which reference is made in Admiralty letters of the 25th March, 1901, of the 16th February, 1904, and of the 29th January, 1904, dhows engaged in illegally exporting arms or ammunition in Oman waters, and Muscat dhows so employed upon the high seas, are confiscated with the arms and ammunition on board for the Sultan of Muscat. Similarly, under the agreement with Persia, dated the 18th December, 1897, to which reference is made in Admiralty letter of the 25th March, 1901, arms and ammunition seized in Persian waters or from Persian vessels on the high seas are confiscated for the Persian Government. It will be seen, however, that I have given orders that for the present all these vessels, except native craft taken in Muscat waters, are to be detained pending instructions. The whole of the conditions governing this trade are now so different to what they were at the time of issue of the original orders, and the suppression of the arms traffic appears to be of such importance to the Empire, that it is most necessary to take all the steps in our power to prevent the arms, ammunition, and the dhows carrying them, from finding their way back to Muscat or Persia, after having been once captured. I would urge that if the consent of the Sultan and of the Shah is necessary before the dhows in question can be brought to Karachi for adjudication, such consent should be obtained forthwith.

3. In connection with the question of the proclamation of the Sultan of Muscat, dated the 13th January, 1898, and the agreement with Persia, dated the 18th December, 1897, I would observe that copies of these documents are not among the records of this station, and I would ask for the supply of four copies of each, to enable the senior officers' boxes also to be provided with copies.

4. With reference to Admiralty letter of the 20th December, 1907, forwarding correspondence in which are printed the "Somaliland Fire-arms Regulations, 1905," which repeal the "Somaliland Fire-arms Regulations, 1899," and also, *inter alia*, the "Somaliland Fire-arms Amendment (No. 2) Regulations, 1903," it is noticed that the 1905 regulations omit any mention of powers being granted to Italian men-of-war. The 1903 regulations contained a clause granting to the captain and officers of any Italian man-of-war the same powers as are granted to the captain and officers of any British man-of-war in regard to the visit, search, and seizure of vessels suspected of being engaged in the traffic in arms in the territorial waters of British Somaliland, and it would seem to be a question for consideration whether a similar clause should be introduced into the present regulations.

I have, &c.

EDMOND W. SLADE.



3

Inclosure 4 in No. 1.

*Confidential General Memoranda communicated to Officers on the East Indies Station
by Rear-Admiral Slade.*

"Hyacinth," at Mukalla, October 28, 1909.

No. 48.

RIGHTS OF VISIT, SEARCH, AND DETENTION.

THE following instructions on the rights of visit, search, and detention of vessels by His Majesty's ships are communicated for information and guidance:—


2. Under the General Act of the Brussels Conference, 1890, His Majesty's ships are invested with the powers of visit, search, and detention over vessels suspected of being engaged in or equipped for the slave trade, under certain conditions which are laid down in the "Instructions to Naval Officers employed in the Suppression of the Slave Trade" (pp. 2-13.)

3. Articles 8-13 of the General Act prohibit the importation of fire-arms and ammunition into the territories therein specified, but the Brussels Act does not in itself confer any powers of search or detention for the enforcement of the articles quoted.

4. Such rights as His Majesty's ships possess to search and detain vessels suspected of being engaged in the arms traffic are derived from local regulations, when the vessels are in British territorial waters, and from agreements made with certain foreign States when the vessels are in their respective territorial waters. His Majesty's ships have not authority to search upon the high seas vessels suspected of being engaged in the arms traffic, in the absence of treaties with other Powers, and in the case of British vessels, of an Act of the Imperial Parliament.

5. The rights of His Majesty's ships in this connection are summarised in the annexed statement.

EDMOND J. W. SLADE.



Inclosure 5 in No. 1.
STATEMENT showing the powers of His Majesty's Ships to search Vessels suspected of being engaged in the Traffic in Arms.

Locality of Suspected Vessel at time of Visit.	Country of origin of Vessel.	Port to which Vessel should be taken if detained.	Authority for exercising the right of search and detention.	Reference (the M. letters were addressed by the Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.)
On the high seas	Muscat Persia Bahrein Koweit Territory under the Trucial Chiefs and other vessels flying the Arab flag	Muscat* Nearest Persian port at which a proper customs administration exists* No decision has been given. Vessels should be detained pending instructions	Sultan's proclamations, January 13, 1898, and October 17, 1903 Agreement with Persia, December 18, 1897 Not directly authorised, but procedure would probably be free from objection	M. 0153 of March 25, 1901; M. 1736 of February 16, 1904; and M. 17539 of January 29, 1904. M. 0153 of March 25, 1901. Letter from political resident, No. 199 of March 8, 1904, addressed to senior naval officer, Persian Gulf. Memorandum was accepted by the Government of India and forwarded to Admiralty in East Indies letter No. 294/1466 of May 13, 1904.
In territorial waters— British	All vessels	Barbera or Zella, if in British Somaliland waters; Aden, if in Aden Protectorate waters If under Italian flag, to Bunder Kassim or handed over to an Italian man-of-war, if under any other flag, to Barbera or Zella	Usage. With regard to French vessels, agreement with France, December 13, 1906 Agreement with Italy, July 1904	M. 048 of February 1, 1907.
Italian Somaliland Protectorate	Any native vessels, under any flag			M. 5936 of May 11, 1904.
French	Vessels cannot be searched by His Majesty's ships in French waters			
Turkish	Vessels cannot be searched by His Majesty's ships in Turkish waters			
Muscat	All native vessels, except those under the French flag			
Persia	Ditto			
Bahrein, Koweit, and the Trucial Chiefs	Vessels under the Persian or Arab flags	Muscat Nearest Persian port at which a proper customs administration exists* No decision has been given. Vessels should be detained pending instructions	Sultan's proclamations, January 13, 1898, and October 17, 1903 Agreement with Persia, December 18, 1897 Not directly authorised, but procedure would probably be free from objection	M. 0153 of March 25, 1901. M. 0153 of March 25, 1901, and M. 1736 of February 16, 1904. M. 0153 of March 25, 1901. Letter from political resident, No. 199 of March 8, 1904, addressed to senior naval officer, Persian Gulf. Memorandum was accepted by the Government of India and forwarded to Admiralty in East Indies letter No. 294/1466 of May 13, 1904.

* For the present, all these vessels are to be detained pending instructions.



111A (249) (249)

Register No.
4076

Minute Paper. **Secret Department.**

Letter from **FO,** Dated 11 } Nov. 1908.
Rec. 12 }

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary	13. 11	ku	Arms Traffic. War The alleged smuggling of arms &c, into Koweit. Note to the Italian Ambassador stating the facts of the case as now ascertained by the Govt. of India.
Secretary of State	14	ap	
Committee	16.	ku	
Under Secretary			
Secretary of State.....			



Copy to COPY TO INDIA
13 November 1908
SECRETARY'S NO. 116

For information.

Seen & Contd.
24 NOV. 1908

Previous Papers :—
✓ TH 1887

3489. I. 1135. 2000.—6/1908. [1779/07.]





4076 (250) 2/5
 [This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

ARMS TRAFFIC.

CONFIDENTIAL.

[36799]



No. 1.

[October 29.]

SECTION 2.

Sir Edward Grey to the Marquis di San Giuliano.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, October 29, 1908.



WITH reference to Count di Bosdari's note of the 9th May last relative to the reported arms smuggling by a British steamer at Muscat, I have the honour to acquaint your Excellency with the facts of the case as now ascertained by the Government of India.

It appears that on the 5th September, 1907, the British India Steam Navigation Company's steam-ship "Dwarka" arrived at Mohammerah from Eushire. On arrival at that port a certain number of unclaimed suspicious cases were discovered on board. It was decided that these should, on the return voyage, be handed over to His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Muscat, the original port of lading. Accordingly, on the 18th September, 1907, the Commander of the "Dwarka" delivered over to the Consul at Muscat fourteen large boxes, five small cases, and seventeen bundles of arms and ammunition.

At the request of His Highness the Sultan of Muscat, these articles were handed over to one of his representatives, and His Highness appears subsequently to have restored the arms to their original owners—certain local gun merchants. These merchants then arranged with the nakhodas of some sambuks lying in the harbour to transport these and other arms to Koweit, one of which sambuks was the "Fathel Rahaman."

I have, &c.
 (Signed) E. GREY.

[1973 f-2]





(251) (46)

Register No.
1887

Minute Paper. **Secret Department.**

Letter from India, No. 72, Dated 24 Sept. } 1908.
Rec. 10 Oct. }

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary	15 Dec	KU	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Arms Traffic.</u></p> <p>The case reported by the Italian Charge d'Affaires of smuggling of arms, &c., into Koweit. The sambuk "Athel Rahman" was hired by a gun merchant of Muscat, and not by the Captain of an English steamer. Report by Col. Gent. Muscat.</p>
Secretary of State	15	AG	
Committee	16	M.	
Under Secretary	20	KU	
Secretary of State			

Copy to India 23 Oct 08
by 43.



8ft to F.O.


This seems entirely to dispose of the story of the Italian Consul at Hodida.


Previous Papers:—


TH 3219
3056

3489. I. 1135. 2000.—6/1908. [1779/07.]









1887
No. 172 of 1908.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET.

External.

To

THE RIGHT HON'BLE VISCOUNT MORLEY OF BLACKBURN, O.M.,
His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

SIMLA, the 24th September 1908.

MY LORD,

In reply to Your Lordship's Secret despatch, No. 8, dated the 5th June 1908, on the subject of a representation made by the Italian Government regarding the alleged smuggling of arms by a British steamer into Koweit, we have the honour to forward, for the information of His Majesty's Government, a copy of a letter from our Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, from which it would appear that the sambouk "Fathel Rahman" was hired by a gun merchant of Maskat, and not by the Captain of an English steamer.

We have the honour to be,

MY LORD,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servants,

Minto

H. E. Richards.


C. W. C.

Radamson

J. S. Miller

H. W. C.

J. S. Meston





[Confidential.]

No. 2475, dated Bushire, the 15th (received 24th) August 1908.

From—CAPTAIN A. P. TREVOR, I.A., First Assistant Resident, in charge current duties,

To—S. H. BUTLER, ESQ., C.I.E., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.

With reference to your endorsement No. 2240-E. B., dated 25th June 1908, on the subject of alleged arms smuggling by a British steamer, I have the honour to forward a copy of a report from the Political Agent, Maskat, which appears to completely dispose of the case.

A reference was also made to the Political Agent, Koweit, but beyond identifying the British steamer with the "Dwarka," Major Knox is unable to throw any light on the matter.

No. 524, dated the 8th August 1908.

From—CAPTAIN F. MCCONAGHEY, I.A., Political Agent and His Majesty's Consul, Maskat,

To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

With reference to your letter No. 2173, dated 14th July 1908, I have the honour to submit the following report, from which it will be seen that the Sambook "Fathel Rhaman" appears to have been hired by a gun merchant of Maskat and not by a Captain of an English steamer.


2. On 5th September 1907, the British India Steam Navigation Company's S. S. "Dwarka" arrived at Mohammerah from Bushire; on arrival at that port a certain number of unclaimed suspicious cases were discovered. It was decided that these should, on the return voyage, be handed over to the Consul at Maskat, the original port of landing.

3. On the 18th September 1907, the Commander of S. S. "Dwarka" delivered over to His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Maskat 14 large boxes, 5 small cases and 17 bundles arms and ammunition.

At the request of His Highness the Sultan of Maskat these articles were handed over to one of his representatives. His Highness the Sultan afterwards appears to have restored these arms to the original owners of the same, *vis.*, certain local gun merchants. These merchants afterwards made terms with the Nakhodas of some Sambooks lying in the harbour to transport these and other arms to Koweit.

One of the Sambooks engaged appears to have been the "Fathel Rhaman."

G. C. B. P., Simla.—No. C-352 F. D-29-08.—44.—R. W. A.





1908.

SIMLA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET.


External.

No. 172, DATED THE 24TH SEPTEMBER 1908.

Letter to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Alleged smuggling of arms by a British steamer into Koweit.

Foreign Office Press—No. 1104—15-9-08—40.





256 (251)

Register No. 1495

Minute Paper. Secret Department.

Letter from *Viceroy*, Dated 8 August 1908.
Rec. 10 August 1908.

Formally acknowledged

Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary	10 Aug	<i>MS</i>
Secretary of State		
Committee	11	<i>af</i>
Under Secretary	14	<i>MS</i>
Secretary of State		

Muscat.

Two mail steamers searched for arms by H.M.S. "Sphinx" in Muscat harbour. Successful result. Probable salutary effect on British India Co. Proposed suspension of naval activity for the present.

Copy to *India 24 Aug - and see within.*
20 (+) 18/8/08.
24/8/08
Annually 7 Sept 08.
DH. to F.O.

Signal 14 Aug 08

27/11 '07

3651 + 3800
107

Previous Papers:—
3800/07 etc.

1637. L. 1779. 2000.—10/1907.


In their letter of the 27th Feb. last the B. I. S. N. Co. stated that they had issued orders to prevent the smuggling of arms to Koweit, and in later letters - for which they were thanked - of the 17th Sept. & 21st Oct. last, they reported the action taken locally involving the Co. in some loss of profits.

At any rate on the information at present available, it does not



seen necessary to address a
protest to the Company on this
new discovery in their vessels
of arms for Koweit.

As to the likelihood of the
Sheikh of Koweit taking offence
at the activity of the naval
authorities in regard to such
arms, see page 4 of F.O. Point
(Asiatic Turkey), 18th March, Section 1.





enclosed, to the effect
that the suspension for the
purpose of the activity
of the naval authorities
in such cases -
approved by H.M.
Govt. (SP) A. GODLEY.

to. 265

5.B

17




From Viceroy, 8th August 1908.

Foreign Secret. Following from Cox, Shiraz, 4th August :—

“Senior Naval Officer informs me that on 6th July H.M.S. ‘Sphinx,’ in Maskat harbour, searched two mail steamers for arms destined for” (group omitted, probably ‘Koweit’), “and asks my views as to further steps. Political Agent’s report has not yet reached me, but search was successful, and will doubtless have a salutary effect on British Indian Company. If, however, this course of action is persevered in at present, it will in all probability have a prejudicial effect on amenableness of Sultan of Maskat and Sheikh of Koweit, preservation of which may be of great importance to Government should they shortly require one or both rulers to fall in with any change of policy in regard to Maskat or Koweit consequent on conclusion of Brussels Conference. I am, therefore, asking Senior Naval Officer to suspend activity pending intimation of wishes of Government. Temporary inactivity will do no practical harm, since traffic to Koweit does not immediately affect British interests as Mekran traffic does.”

We have approved action of Cox in directing suspension of activity for the present.






1495
Departments are requested, if they suspect that there is any mistake in this telegram, to communicate immediately with the Private Secretary to the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State. (259) (234)

COPY OF TELEGRAM.

FROM Viceroy

DATED Sinda 8/8/08

RECEIVED AT LONDON OFFICE 4-15 pm.




Foreign secret. Following from Cox, Shiraz, 4th August. [Begin]
 Senior Naval Officer informs me that on 6th July H.M.S. "Sphinx" in
 Maskat harbour searched two mail steamers for arms destined for "
~~any outlet, probably "Koweit"~~ and asks my views as to further steps.
 Political Agents report has not yet reached me, but search was
 successful & will doubtless have a salutary effect on British Indian
 Co. If, however, this course of action is persevered in at present, it
 will in all probability have a prejudicial effect on amicable relations
 of Sultan of Maskat & Sheikh of Koweit, preservation of which may
 be of great importance to Govt. should they shortly require one or
 both rulers to fall in with any change of policy in regard to
 Maskat or Koweit consequent on conclusion of Brussels Conference.
 I am therefore asking Senior Naval Officer to suspend activity
 pending intimation of wishes of Govt. Temporary inactivity
 will do no practical harm, since traffic to Koweit does
 not immediately affect British interests as Red Sea traffic
 does. [Ends.]

We have approved action of Cox in directing
 suspension of activity for the present.

*The reading 'Koweit'
 seems certain.

KZ





(260) (245)

Register No. **3219**

Minute Paper. **Secret Department.**

Letter from *70.* Dated *18 May* 1908.
Rec. *19 May*

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary	25 5	<i>ku</i>	<p><u>Arms Traffic.</u></p> <p>The case reported by the Italian Charge d'Affaires of smuggling of arms and ammunition into Koweit. As to pursuing the matter further.</p>
Secretary of State	26	<i>dg</i>	
Committee	27.	<i>ku.</i>	
Under Secretary	1. 6	<i>ku</i>	
Secretary of State			

W

4. TH

Sign of 2 June 08

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
COPY TO INDIA
1908
SECRETARY'S N^o

5/10 to 7.0. + India.

Previous Papers:—

TH 3056.

1637. I. 1779. 2000.—10/1907.





India Office, London,
5th June 1908.

Secret,
No. 8.

To His Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor
General of India in Council.

MY LORD,

I enclose, for the consideration of Your Excellency's Government,
Alleged smuggling of arms by a British steamer into Koweit. copy of correspondence* with the Foreign Office as to a representation made by the Italian Government regarding the alleged smuggling of arms by a British steamer into Koweit.


* From Foreign Office, dated 8th April 1908, and enclosure.
To ditto, dated 13th April 1908.
From ditto, dated 18th May 1908, and enclosure.
To ditto, dated 3rd June 1908.

2. I request that it may be ascertained from the Political Agents at Koweit and Muscat whether, on the report furnished by the Italian Government, it is practicable to obtain reliable information concerning the transaction.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient humble Servant,
(Signed) MORLEY OF BLACKBURN.





ENCLOSURES.

Enclosure No. 1.

Foreign Office to India Office.

No. 10,956.

Foreign Office,
8th April 1908.

Sir,

I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, a copy of a note from the Italian Chargé d'Affaires respecting a report received by the Italian Government from the Italian Consul at Hodeida, in regard to the smuggling by a British steamer of arms and ammunition for Koweit.

Sir Edward Grey would be glad to be favoured with any observations which Mr. Secretary Morley may have to offer in regard to the matter.

I am, &c.,

LOUIS MALLET.

The Under Secretary of State
for India.

Annex.

Count de Bosdari to Foreign Office.

Translation.

Italian Embassy,
27th March 1908.

Your Excellency,

The Italian Consul at Hodeida reported as follows to my Government on 29th January last.

Cavalière Mezzadri, an Italian merchant established many years at Hodeida, and whose business, among other things, consists in importing dates from Basrah, chartered and dispatched last summer an Arab Red Sea sambouk to the waters of the Shat-el-Arab. On arrival at Muskat the nakuda of the sambouk was asked by the captain of an English steamer, which was anchored there with a cargo of guns and ammunition for Koweit, to transport, as he would have wished to do, arms and ammunition to the country of the Emir Moharah-el-Sabbah, together with other sambouks which were sailing at the same time. The English captain who (according to the declarations made to the Arab nakudas) was unwilling to take his ship to the Shat-el-Arab for fear of being discovered, offered one rupee per gun as freight. The nakuda of the sambouk chartered by Mezzadri allowed himself to be tempted by the great gain, which was totally unexpected, and accepted at once. He therefore conveyed and unloaded from his boat at Koweit, 2,000 guns and the corresponding amount of ammunition. Other sambouks did the same, but Mezzadri's nakuda did not know, precisely, the amount of guns they carried, only stating that the English steamer was said to have 8,000 guns on board. The nakuda stated further that this same steamship had first of all gone to unload the arms in question at Mohammerah, on the Persian shore of the Persian Gulf, in transit for Koweit; that the local authorities there did not allow the steamship to unload such a cargo and had wished to confiscate the guns; that at last, after various steps had been taken, the authorities had consented to give back the arms on the captain's undertaking to take them back to the place where they had been shipped, for which reason the steamship had to return to Muskat with her cargo.

S. G.

A 2



In bringing the above to Your Excellency's knowledge, I have the honour to call the attention of the British Government not only to the facts themselves, but to the necessity of taking steps in order that the Bay of Muskat may not become a centre for the traffic in arms with Somali Land.

In anticipation of the reply with which Your Excellency may be pleased to favour me in the matter,

The Right Hon. Sir E. Grey, Bart.,
&c., &c., &c.

I have, &c.,
A. DE BOSDARI.

Enclosure No. 2.

India Office to Foreign Office.

Sir,

India Office,
13th April 1908.

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Morley to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 10,956, dated the 8th April 1908, with which was forwarded a Note from the Italian Chargé d'Affaires calling attention to a case in which a British steamer at Muskat engaged an Arab sambouk from the Red Sea, in the employment of an Italian merchant, to smuggle arms into Koweit. It is stated that the steamer had previously attempted to unload the arms at Mohammerah, but had been prevented from doing so by the local authorities.

The case seems to Mr. Morley one that requires investigation at Mohammerah, Muskat, and Koweit. But it would facilitate such inquiries if precise information could be furnished as to the dates on which the transaction occurred, and as to the names or other particulars by which the steamer and the sambouk could be identified.

Mr. Morley would therefore suggest, for Sir E. Grey's consideration, that, before instructions are sent to the Government of India to institute inquiries at Muskat and Koweit, the Italian Government should be requested to furnish a more detailed statement of the circumstances reported by them.

As Sir E. Grey is aware, the importation of arms at Koweit has been forbidden by the Sheikh, though it has not been found practicable to enforce the carrying out of the prohibition. Nor does the export of arms from Muskat to Koweit come within the scope of the Sultan's Notification of 1898 which declared such export to Persia and British India illegal. As regards Mohammerah, the import of arms into Persian territory has been prohibited by the Persian Government, and it would apparently have been within the rights of the local authorities to have confiscated the consignment in question.

Mr. Morley assumes that, if it is thought desirable to institute inquiries, a report will be called for from the Consul at Mohammerah, as well as from the Political Agents at Muskat and Koweit.

The Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.

I have, &c.,
A. GODLEY.

Enclosure No. 3.

Foreign Office to India Office.

No. 16,365.

Sir,

Foreign Office,
18th May 1908.

With reference to your letter of 13th April last, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before Viscount Morley, a copy of a letter from the Italian Chargé d'Affaires relative to the alleged smuggling of arms by a British steamer into Koweit.



258 263

In view of the uncertain information now supplied by the Italian Consul at Hodeida, I am to enquire whether, in Lord Morley's opinion, there would appear to be any advantage in pursuing the matter further.

The Under Secretary of State
for India.

I am, &c.,
W. LANGLEY.

Annex.

Count de Bosdari to Foreign Office.

Translation.
Your Excellency,

Italian Embassy,
9th May 1908.

In your Note No. 12,963 of the 21st ultimo, your Excellency was good enough to express the desire to be furnished with some further information respecting the English steamer and the native sambouk which, according to information given to the Italian Consul at Hodeida, had been engaged in contraband arms traffic in the Gulf of Muskat.

I did not fail to communicate with the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and I have now the honour to inform your Excellency that the Italian Consul at Hodeida can only add to what I previously told your Excellency that the sambouk was called "Fathel Khaman," and that on the 18th September the sambouk was in the company of the English steamer, whose name is not known.

The Right Hon. Sir E. Grey, Bart.,
&c., &c. &c.

I have, &c.,
A. DE BOSDARI.

Enclosure No. 4.

India Office to Foreign Office.

Sir,

India Office,
3rd June 1908.


In reply to your letter No. 16,365, dated the 18th May 1908, enclosing copy of a further note from the Italian Chargé d'Affaires as to the alleged smuggling of arms by a British steamer into Koweit, I am directed to say that Viscount Morley is disposed to doubt whether further inquiry in this matter is likely to yield any good result.


He is, however, of opinion, having regard to the line taken up by the Italian Government on the question of the arms traffic, that the correspondence should be brought to the notice of the Government of India, with a view to their ascertaining from the Political Agents at Muscat and Koweit whether, on the report furnished by the Italian Government, it is practicable to obtain reliable information concerning the transaction.


A copy of a Despatch which will be sent to the Government of India by next mail is enclosed.

The Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.

I have, &c.,
A. GODLEY.









Wad

Incl. 4.

(265) (266)

3 June 08.

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S-i,

2- reply to v. 6.

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No. 16,365, dated the
18th May '08, enclosing
copy of a further
note from the Italian
Chargé d'Affaires as
to the alleged smuggling
of arms by a British
steamer into Koweit,
I am dir. to say
that Viscount Morley
is disposed to doubt
whether further enquiry
in this matter is
likely to yield any
good result. ~~but that~~
~~having regard to~~
~~the interest in~~

Approved Pol. Com'ce.,
1 JUN. 1908

He is, however, of
opinion, having regard
to the line taken up
by the Italian Govt. on
the question of the Arms
Traffic, that the com-
8




-fvidence should be
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
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 furnished by the Italian
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 the transaction.


A copy of a despatch
 which will be sent to
 the Govt. of India by
 next mail is enclosed.

(SD) A. GODLEY.

W. det
 H. J.
 S. B.
 Y







Translation.
(16365)

ITALIAN EMBASSY.

May 9th, 1908.

Your Excellency:-


In your Note No.12963 of the 21st ultimo
Your Excellency was good enough to express the desire
to be furnished with some further information respect-
ing the English steamer and the native sambouk which,
according to information given to the Italian Consul
at Hodeida, had been engaged in contraband arms traf-
fic in the Gulf of Muscat.

I did not fail to communicate with the Itali-
an Minister of Foreign Affairs and I have now the hon-
our to inform Your Excellency that the Italian Consul
at Hodeida can only add to what I previously told Your
Excellency that the sambouk was called "Fathel Khaman"
and that on the 18th September the sambouk was in the
company of the English steamer, whose name is not
known.

I have &c.,

(Signed)

A. de Bosdari.





Minute Paper. Register No. 2115 268 268

Letter from India, Nov 7 M. Dated 21 Nov. 1907. Rec. 7 Dec. 1907.

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary	9 Dec.	JS	<p>Arms Traffic.</p> <p>Reported arrangements by the Bombay Persian S.N. Co. for the conveyance of arms from Muscat to Koweit. Govt. of Bombay requested the Govt. of India to approach the Co. with a view to the abandonment of the enterprise.</p>
Secretary of State	10	AS	
Committee	10.	JK.	
Under Secretary			
Secretary of State			

Copy to 20. 10.12.07.

For information.


With regard to the suggestion mentioned in the last para. of Maj. Cox's letter of the 21st Oct. last (the last paper on the file), it might also be argued that the fact of an Arms Conference being about to be held by the Powers would be an inducement to shippers of arms & ammunition to press their trade as much as possible before April next.

Secy Pol. Comm., 16 DEC. 1907

Previous Papers:—

TH

1637. I. 1779. 2000.—10/1907.





Copy.

CONFIDENTIAL.

2115

No. 45-5-5- W.F.

269

264

From

The Assistant Secretary to the Government of India
in the Foreign Department,

To

H. O. Quin, Esquire,
Acting Secretary to the Government of Bombay,
Political Department,

Dated Simla, the 21st November 1907.


Sir,

I am directed to forward a copy of a letter from
the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 2302, dated
the 21st October 1907, regarding arrangements which are
reported to have been made by the Bombay Persian Steam
Navigation Company for the conveyance of arms from Maskat to
Koweit.

2. It has been ascertained that the telegram,
referred to in paragraph 2 of Major Cox's letter regarding
the warning to be conveyed to the Company's head office in
Bombay, was never despatched by him.

3. I am accordingly to ask that, with the permission
of the Governor in Council, the Company may be approached
privately on the subject. It is desirable to ascertain
whether it is a fact that the Company are actually intending
to convey arms from Maskat to Koweit and elsewhere, and if

50





270 265
so, whether in view of the fact that this traffic is injurious to the interests of the British Government, they would be willing to abandon the enterprise.

4. Attention is invited, in this connection, to the correspondence on the subject of the arms traffic in the Persian Gulf of which a copy was forwarded to you with this office endorsement No. 1556-B.P., dated May 4th, 1907.

You will note that it is contemplated by the Powers concerned that a conference should be held at Brussels early in 1908, and it is hoped that, as a result of this measures will be devised for the suppression of the arms traffic in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere.

I have the honour to be,


Sir,


Your most obedient servant,

Sy. R. E. Holland,

Assistant Secretary to the Government of India.

kan.





Copy.

Telegram. P.

271

246

From--- Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E.,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
Bushire,

To---The Secretary to the Government of India
in the Foreign Department, Simla.


No. 643.


Dated Bushire, the 17th November 1907.


Received the 17th November 1907.

Maskat arms traffic. I much regret to find that owing
to an oversight the telegram referred to in your telegram
No. 523 has never issued.

Repeated to Viceroy's Camp.









[Confidential.]

No. 2302, dated ^{Shiraz, the 21st} ~~Basra, the 27th~~ October (received 4th November) 1907.

From—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—SIR LOUIS W. DANE, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.

I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, Political Agent to Resident, No. K.-1, dated ^{September 6th, 1907.} a copy of the marginally noted communication received from the Political Agent, Maskat, informing me that the British India Steam Navigation Company assert that the Bombay-Persian Steam Navigation Company and another Turkish shipowner of Bussorah have come to an agreement with certain firms to call regularly at Maskat with a view to conveying arms from thence to Koweit and elsewhere.

I am addressing His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Bussorah, in the one case and in order to save time asking by telegram this day that a warning may be conveyed to the Bombay-Persian Steam Navigation Company's Head Office in Bombay.

I take this opportunity of alluding to the reported intentions of the Powers interested to hold Conference in 1908 on the subject of the traffic in arms.

It is suggested to me that if prominence could be given in Europe and India to the fact that such a Conference has been arranged for the knowledge would create a useful feeling of insecurity among the shippers of arms calculated to have restrictive influence on the traffic in the meanwhile.

(Copy.)

No. K.-1, dated Karachi, the 6th September 1907.

From—MAJOR W. G. GREY, I.A., Political Agent at Maskat,


To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

In connection with the arms trade I have the honour to bring to your notice the following information for which I am indebted to the British India Company's Agent at Karachi.

2. Two steamers, the "John O. Scott," and another belonging, so I am told, to the Bombay-Persian Company and a party of Basra (native) merchants respectively, which are at present trading at the north end of the Persian Gulf, have been solicited by various arms merchants to extend their trips to Maskat with a view to carrying arms and ammunition from that port to Koweit and other Gulf Ports. This they have agreed to do from the beginning of November next.

3. The British India Company would be much put out if this were allowed, and their Agent here has begged me either to take measures for the frustration of the plan, or, to obtain permission for his Company to carry arms themselves in order to mitigate the chances of successful competition against them in regard to passenger and other traffic.

G. C. B. P., Simla,—No. C-554 F. D,—10-11-07,—45—B. B. S.





Minute Paper.

Register No. 1994

Secret Department.

Letter from India, No. 44 M., Dated 31 Oct. 1907.
Rec. 18 Nov.

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary	21 Nov	WK	<p><u>Koweit.</u></p> <p>Presence in Koweit of Ibrahim Elbaz, nephew of M. Jougues. Settlement of Elbaz's accounts with Mubarak. Expected departure of Elbaz from Koweit about the 8th or 9th Oct.</p>
Secretary of State	22	AS	
Committee	22.	M.	
Under Secretary			
Secretary of State			

Copy to 20 4.12.07.


For information.


Seen Pol. Comm. 26 NOV. 1907

Previous Papers:—

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1937. I. 1779. 2000.—10/1907.






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The Under Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs
present his compliments to
the Under Secretary of State
for India, & begs to return
as requested original papers
in India Office letter of
Nov. 21/07

Foreign Office.
Dec. 24.





C530FD
[Confidential.]

No. 2255, dated Bushire, the 18th (received 28th) October 1907.

From—J. H. H. BILL, Esq., I.C.S., First Assistant Resident, in charge current duties,

To—SIR LOUIS DANR, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.

In continuation of my letter No. 2199, dated 12th October 1907, I have the honour to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the marginally-noted letter which has been received from the Political Agent, Koweit, on the subject of the visit paid by Monsieur Elbaz to Koweit.

No. 537, dated Koweit, the 7th October 1907 (Confidential).

From—MAJOR S. G. KNOX, I.A., Political Agent, Koweit,

To—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.


In continuation of my letter No. 528, dated the 29th September 1907, on the subject of Monsieur Elbaz's visit to Koweit and his prolonged stay here, I have the honour to report that, on the morning of the 5th October, the Sheikh's Secretary, Abdul Aziz bin Salim bin Badar was announced. He came to my office, accompanied by Monsieur Elbaz.

2. I asked the reason of the visit and the Sheikh's Secretary produced a paper and asked me to witness Monsieur Elbaz's signature to the document in question. A copy with translation is forwarded herewith. The Secretary proceeded to explain that this was an acknowledgment by Monsieur Elbaz that his accounts with Sheikh Mubarak had been closed and settled, and that he had no further claims against Sheikh Mubarak, and that the Sheikh attached some importance to my signing as a witness and would be thankful if I would consent to do so.

3. Monsieur Elbaz's signature has already been affixed to the document, but speaking in Arabic, he acknowledged his signature and that his claims had been adjusted. I asked when Monsieur Elbaz proposed to leave Koweit and he said to-morrow or the next day. He seemed ill at ease and dissatisfied with the course events were taking.

4. I informed the Sheikh's Secretary that it would be necessary for me to see the Sheikh about the documents before affixing my signature even as a witness and through him, made an appointment to visit the Sheikh that afternoon.

5. I visited the Sheikh accordingly and he informed me that, as I well knew, Monsieur Goguyer had tried to establish himself in Koweit and could not obtain the requisite permission. He then sent Ali bin Thahaba here as an agent for the sale of small arms and ammunition, that the principal and agent had quarrelled and Sheikh Mubarak was delighted to hear of it. Monsieur Goguyer had appealed to Sheikh Mubarak for assistance in settling his claims and Sheikh Mubarak replied that he regretted he could do nothing, as Ali bin Thahaba was a Maskati and not a Koweit subject. Then this Ibrahim or Monsieur Elbaz was sent to settle up the claims and that the Sheikh who had also had some dealings with him, had his books examined and the balance was found correct and duly paid and that what the Sheikh now wanted was my signature to prevent worrying claims from Monsieur Goguyer in the future. On this, I asked the Sheikh whether I could now report to Government that Monsieur Goguyer's transactions with Koweit had been settled all round and that Monsieur Goguyer and his agents would not visit Koweit or have any further business dealings with the town. The Sheikh replied that I could do so, that he objected to the Goguyer connection and had decided to put an end to it.





C530FD

2

6. I then expressed my willingness to witness the document and the Sheikh ordered Abdul Aziz to fetch the paper. While he was gone I said to the Sheikh that I presumed he was aware that, in the course of the month, Monsieur Elbaz had remitted more than half a lakh of rupees to Bombay by the mail. The Sheikh assured me that I must be mistaken, he could not have remitted more than Rs. 10,000. I replied that I did not know where the money had all come from, but that there was no manner of doubt about the remittances. Further discussion was prevented by the arrival of Abdul Aziz with the document.

7. Monsieur Elbaz's departure is nothing new. He had already informed the British-India Agent here of his intention to leave either by the last mail of the 3rd which failed or by the mail of the 10th.

8. It is a mere guess on my part, but I think that the motive for this action on the part of Sheikh Mubarak was that I was indiscreet enough to remark to my Moolla Abdulla how strange it was that the Sheikhs who had been warned by me of the presence of Monsieur Elbaz more than a month ago and had promised to send him away should imperil the chance of the negotiations he was conducting with the British Government by encouraging the man. I also made some ostentatious enquiries about the gentleman and of course these reached the Sheikh who has chosen this method of parading his innocence or at least his determination to be good in future. It is just possible that Monsieur Elbaz may have been told that he is not to come to Koweit again and that the Koweit people will get their arms elsewhere, but it is just as likely that his gloomy acknowledgment of his signature may be due to the fact that he has got much less out of Sheikh Mubarak than he anticipated.

Certified that Monsieur Elbaz appeared before me and acknowledged the above to be his signature and that he had no further claims against Sheikh Mubarak and that his claims had all been settled.


KOWEIT; }
5th October 1907.

S. G. KNOX, Major,
Political Agent, Koweit.

True copy original with Sheikh Mobarak.

KOWEIT; }
5th October 1907.

S. G. KNOX, Major,
Political Agent Koweit.





3

Translation.

The cause of the writing of this paper is that I, Brahim Elbaz, according to the Agency from Monsieur Goguyer for all his business which is in the town of Koweit Ali uth Thahaba being discharged from it, etc., and also looking to the account which Ali uth Thahaba had delayed after the Agency had been taken away from him according to the detail agreed upon and Ali uth Thahaba, the aforesaid, had delayed the demand of the money on account of his discharge from the Agency and I have seen the account between His Highness Sheikh Mubarak us Subah, ruler of Koweit, and between Ali uth Thahaba, the former Agent of Monsieur Goguyer, and I have compared the account. And what was with me and what my principal, Monsieur Goguyer informed me about it (*vis.*, the account) was the same as what was shewn in the true books of His Highness the Sheikh Mubarak us Subah. And the balance due to us from all the accounts was six thousand and two hundred and forty-three French reals and I have received this in full and there does not remain to us the least account with His Highness Sheikh Mubarak us Subah, ruler of Koweit, and I have given this sealed paper with full authority and have witnessed against myself and God is the best of witnesses.

26th Shaban 1325 H. = 5th October 1907.

Witnessed by—

Dahash bin Othmān ud Dahash.

Syud Abdul Mehsin bin Syud Abdulla ut Tuhtabai.

(Signed) Pr. A. GOGUYER.

(Signed) A. ELBAZT.

Certified that Monsieur Elbaz appeared before me and acknowledged the above to be his signature and that he had no further claims against Sheikh Mubarak and that his claims had all been settled.

KOWEIT;

The 5th October 1907.

S. G. KNOX, Major,

Political Agent, Koweit.

True translation.

KOWEIT;

The 6th October 1907.


S. G. KNOX, Major.

Political Agent Koweit.

Note.—The opening portion of this translation is very obscure, chiefly owing to the very bad and ungrammatical Arabic employed. The draft receipt was apparently prepared by a Baghdadi Christian.

The 7th October 1907.

S. G. K.





Minute Paper.

Register No. 1962 SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Letter from India, ho. 42 M., Dated 24 Oct. } 1907.
Rec. 9 hour.

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	14 Nov	Wk	<p>Koweit.</p> <p>Presence in Koweit of Ibrahim Elbay, nephew of M. Jozuy. Connection with the Arms Traffic. Mubarak has not carried out his promise to Major Knox that he would see that Elbay was not allowed to remain at Koweit.</p>
Secretary of State	15	as	
Committee	15.	M.	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State			


Previous Papers:— Cpts 20, 21 Nov '07.


For information


It may be noted that it was the French Consul at Muscat who (after - reads that in -) called Major Jozuy's attention to the Department of Jozuy's nephew for Koweit on an errand connected with the sale of arms.


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
Y 9935. 2000—6/1904. I. 1136.














(282) (2/1)

Copy of letter dated the 18th August 1907, from
Monsieur R. Laronce, French Consul at Muscat, to Major W. G.
Grey, His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Muscat.

tant?

M. Abraham Elbaz, Algérien, neveu de M. Goguyer,
récemment converti à l'islamisme, a quitté Mascate la semaine
passée pour se rendre à Koweit. Ce déplacement ayant trait
au trafic des armes et des munitions de guerre, et le point
précité ayant situé en quelque sorte dans la zone d'influence
Anglaise, j'ai l'honneur de porter ce fait à votre connaissance
afin que le Gouvernement Britannique puisse prendre les
mesures preventives qu'il jugera nécessaires.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur et cher collègue, les
assurances de ma haute considération.





(Confidential)

No. 480 of 1907.

283

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Office of the Political Agent, Koweit.

Koweit 3rd September 1907.

From

Major S. G. Knox, I.A.,
Political Agent, Koweit,

To

Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E.,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.


Sir,


I have the honour to report that, at an interview with Sheikh Mobarak, I mentioned to him that I had heard that Elbaz, Goguyer's nephew, had arrived at Koweit.


2. It was apparently sometime before Sheikh Mobarak understood who was alluded to, for it appears that the man in question goes here under the name of Ibrahim.

3. When he did, he said that Ibrahim certainly had been here but professed that he was unable to say for certain whether the man was still in Koweit or not. He said that he had come armed with a letter of introduction from the Sultan of Muscat who alleges that Ibrahim is a Mussulman convert to settle his accounts with Ali bin Ahmed uth Thahaba and Sheikh Moosa bin Abdur Razzak. Apparently the settlement of accounts with the first named had not been a simple

matter









(Confidential)

No. 2199 of 1907.

British Residency and Consulate-General,

Bushire, 12th October 1907.

From

J. H. H. Bill, Esquire,
First Assistant Resident,
In charge current duties,

To

Sir Louis Dane, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.,
Secretary to the Government of India
in the Foreign Department, Simla.


Sir,

In continuation of this office letter No. 2164
dated 6th October 1907, I have the honour to forward, for
the information and orders of the Government of India, a copy
No. 528 dated 29th September 1907. of the communication marginally noted,
received from the Political Agent, Koweit, on the subject of
the continued presence of Monsieur Abraham Elbaz at Koweit.

I have, etc.,

(Sd) J. H. Bill,

First Assistant Resident,
In charge current duties.





(Confidential)

No. 528 of 1907.

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From

Major S. G. Knox, I.A.,
Political Agent, Koweit,

To

Major P. Z. Cox, C.I.E.,
Resident and His Britannic Majesty's Consul General
in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

Sir,


Dated Koweit 29th September 1907

In continuation of my letter No. 480 dated 3rd of September 1907, I have the honour to inform you, on reliable authority, that M. Elbas, alias Ibrahim, is still in Koweit. He presented himself at the dispensary on the morning of the 28th instant to ask if there were any letters for him. He is known to have remitted Rs. 23,000 by the slow mail of the 28th September and it is reported that he sent a like remittance about a fortnight previously.

2. He is described to me as well-dressed in Arab clothing, wears sandals, has light hair, long and heavy moustache, clipped beard. He stands about 5 foot 3 inches in height, has a hoarse voice and is addicted to the use of scent.

3. I should be glad to know if these particulars of his personal appearance can be confirmed.

4. He lives with one Dahaish bin Othman and his friends






(287) (287)
friends are Syud Yasin, Sheikh Moosa bin Abdur Razzak and Abdul Aziz ut Tawaijari, all three noted arms dealers. The two former are personally known to me and the last named is almost certainly connected with the people of Majma's in Nejd.

5. M. Elbaz is, I hear, canvassing for orders for fire-arms and was talking to one of the family of Haji Muhammed Taqi this morning.

6. I have the honour to request the favour of instructions as to whether any further remonstrances should be addressed to Sheikh Mobarak on the continued presence of this man in Koweit or not. It seems clear that he has not the slightest intention of performing the promise he made to me reported in paragraph 4 of my letter quoted above.

I have, etc.,

(Sd) S. G. Knox, Major,
Political Agent, Koweit.





Minute Paper.

Register No. **1673**

SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Letter from *India No. 37 M*

Dated *13 Sept.* 1906.
Rec. *1 Oct.*

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	<i>5 Oct</i>	<i>MC</i>	<i>Arms Traffic W&W</i> <i>Warning conveyed to Sheikh</i> <i>Mubarak by the Political Agent</i> <i>regarding the trade in arms at</i> <i>Koweit.</i>
Secretary of State	<i>5</i>	<i>MC</i>	
Committee	<i>6.</i>	<i>JM.</i>	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State			


Previous Papers:— *2741*

Copy to F.O. 17.10.06.

The remonstrance, authorized in the S. of S. telegram of the 13th March last, was duly delivered and seems to have produced a temporary coolness between the Sheikh & Captain Knox, who does not anticipate that it will produce any permanent effect.

Seen Pol. Commr.,
16 OCT. 1906

Y 9935. 2000—6/1904. I. 1136.





[Confidential.]

No. 1942, dated Bushire, the 19th (received 27th) August 1906.
 From—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
 To—SIR LOUIS DANE, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India
 in the Foreign Department, Simla.

With reference to Foreign Department telegram dated 22nd March 1906,

- (1) Resident to the Political Agent, Koweit, No. 661, dated 23rd March 1906.
 (2) Political Agent, Koweit, to Resident, No. 142, dated 24th April 1906, with enclosures.
 (3) Political Agent, Koweit, to Resident, No. 227, dated 3rd July 1906.
 (4) Major Cox to Sheikh Mubarak, dated 30th July 1906.
 (5) Sheikh Mubarak to Major Cox, dated 3rd August 1906.
 *Enclosures in Pro. No. 173 in Secret E., July 1906, Nos. 165-177.

authorising me to instruct the Political Agent to remind the Sheikh of Koweit formally of his Arms Prohibition* of 1900 and to request stricter enforcement of it on his part, I have the honour to forward copies of the correspondence detailed in the margin, which has since passed on the subject.

2. It has always been realised that the question of the Arms Traffic to Koweit is a delicate one requiring very cautious handling, and it will also be remembered that the reminder above alluded to was prompted rather by the necessity of preserving the correctness of our attitude *vis à vis* the Sublime Porte rather than by the expectation that it would have any marked or lasting effect on the traffic. The sequel to Captain Knox's remonstrance now tends to demonstrate that the question of the enforcement or non-enforcement of the Prohibition is likely to prove a rock upon which the friendly relations between our Political Agent and the Sheikh may at any time be placed in danger of splitting.

In the present case, for instance, from the occasion of his interview with the Sheikh of 25th May alluded to in the enclosures, Captain Knox dates the commencement of a noticeable falling off in the cordial and frequent intercourse which had previously been customary between them, a change which it was impossible for the Political Agent to ignore. My absence from head-quarters during the ensuing two months had prevented my giving Captain Knox any practical assistance in the matter and just before my return, the tension had become so inconvenient that Captain Knox had been obliged to refer to me for instructions; I am glad to say, however, that later reports received simultaneously with my return showed that the matter was likely to adjust itself and Captain Knox agreed with me in thinking that incidental allusion to the subject in an informal news-letter from myself to the Sheikh would meet the case. I attach for information copies of the communication so exchanged between Sheikh Mubarak and myself, and think the cloud may be considered to have passed over, but its passage has been sufficient to demonstrate the direction of the wind, where the Arms Traffic is concerned.

3. Reverting to the general question, I fear that the language held by the Sheikh in regard thereto cannot be taken very seriously. He indeed alludes plausibly to the possible stoppage of the import into Maskat, but in the event of the elimination of that port as the chief emporium it is probable that a great deal of the trade would be transferred to Koweit; and since I have had an opportunity of inspecting in the Bombay Dockyard the launches under construction for the Persian Government, I am the more inclined to think, especially in the event of our negotiations with the French failing, that the means of suppression indicated in paragraph 4 (b) of my letter No. 585 of 31st December 1905 may on the whole prove the most profitable.

No. 661, dated 23rd March 1906.

From—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
 To—CAPTAIN S. G. KNOX I.A., Political Agent, Koweit.

With reference to your letter No. 246, dated 27th December last, I have the honour to forward for information copies of a telegram dated 22nd March 1906, from the Government of India, and of my telegram to which it is a reply.

C247FD



2

2. I request that in accordance with the instructions of Government you will address Sheikh Mubarak and inform him that the attention of the Resident and of Government has been drawn to the open introduction of arms into Koweit and that you have been directed to request that he will use his utmost endeavours to make his prohibition more effective.

Copies of the correspondence which may pass between you should be forwarded to this office.

No. 142, dated 24th April 1906.

From—CAPTAIN S. G. KNOX, I.A., Political Agent, Koweit,

To—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your confidential letter No. 561, dated 23rd March 1906, and to forward copies of such correspondence as has passed between Sheikh Mubarak and myself on the subject hitherto.

2. It will be seen that the series opens with a letter from Sheikh Mubarak in reply to one of mine. That letter merely mentioned that I had a message for him from Government and wished to know whether he would be likely to return soon or should I communicate with Sheikh Jabir.

3. I mentioned in the same letter that I had received news that M. Goguyer had despatched a boom laden with arms from Maskat which would be due in Koweit shortly.

4. In accordance with Sheikh Mubarak's wishes, I have informed Sheikh Jabir of the instructions I have received through you from the Government of India. He seemed impressed but I can offer no hopes that the impression will last.

Dated Jahra, the 24th Safar 1324 H. (18th April 1906).

From—MUBARAK-US-SUBAH, Ruler of Koweit,


To—CAPTAIN S. G. KNOX, I.A., Political Agent, Koweit.

We have received your letter dated the 22nd Safar 1324 H. (17th April 1906).

Oh my friend, you inform us that an order has come from the exalted Government and it is good and profitable to me.* No doubt according to our friendship and our constancy we have a firm hope in the benevolence of the precious and mighty Government.

And you ask about my coming. I am now delayed on account of the change of climate, since what with my indisposition I have become weak. Now, please God, the climate is suiting me and for this reason I am well here; and the good news you have to give to me, inform my son Jabir. He is in my place and he will inform me, please God. You have mentioned Goguyer the Frenchman. Now the aforesaid Frenchman 3 years ago came to our parts and wanted (? to stay here) and we did not agree and he wanted also to appoint his son and we did not agree and he went to Maskat and writes to us letters and we send him no replies and we have informed those from whose hands the letters come that he should not write to me and that we will not reply and that he has no business in our direction and we will not tolerate his interference and all that to suit your convenience. Besides he is now in Maskat and goes and comes to Bahrein and they reap from him profit. We do not accept this profit, we accept good works. Then how, oh my friend, after this should he send to Koweit, then how, in accordance with your discrimination and judgment can you accept a report of this nature and may you remain guarded.

* This phrase quoted from my own letter I allowed to stand as a comfortable Arabic *façon de parler*. It necessary I must justify it by the Arabic.



Translation of a letter, dated 24th Safar 1324-H. (19th April 1906), from Captain S. G. Knox, I.A., Political Agent, Koweit, to Sheikh Mubarak-us-Subah, Ruler of Koweit.

Your letter dated the 24th Safar has reached me in a good hour and we were rejoiced to hear of your safety and the restoration of your health, and as you wrote, we have informed our friend, the son Jabir, of what has reached us from the Great Government and he, please God, will inform you about that but also I think it better to write to you further and it is that the Resident in Bushire wrote to me this order that news has reached him and also the great Government that arms are coming to Koweit openly and in great quantities, and that I should demand from Your Excellency that you should endeavour to the utmost that the proclamation of Your Excellency published in 1900 A.D. prohibiting the import of arms to Koweit be more effective than it has appeared until now. This was what was necessary and may you remain safe and guarded.

Translation of a letter dated 30th Safar 1324-H. (24th April 1906), from Mubarak-us-Subah, Chief of Koweit, to Captain S. G. Knox, I.A., Political Agent, Koweit.

Your letter dated Safar 1324 H. has reached us here? Please God, my friend, after some days we shall be present in our town and shall meet you, if God please and may you remain safe and guarded.

No. 227, dated 3rd July 1906.

From—CAPTAIN S. G. KNOX, I.A., Political Agent, Koweit,

To—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

In continuation of my letter No. 142, dated 24th April 1906, I have the honour to report that Sheikh Mubarak paid me a visit on the 25th May 1906, and that we had a long conversation on the subject of the Arms Trade.

2. The Sheikh denied that arms were brought into Koweit except in very small quantities for private purposes, not for trade. He also talked long about M. Goguyer, said that he publicly visited Bahrein and resided openly in Maskat and the Sheikh contrasted his own conduct with that of the other two chiefs.

3. During this part of the conversation, he said that M. Goguyer had advised him to keep the representatives of two or three powers in the place, so that they should pull different ways and the Sheikh make profit out of them all. The Sheikh says that he replied that he feared none of them but that he saw one whose ways were good and true and preferred that one, while he had no fancy for any of the others.

4. I said that there were ample proofs to our mind that arms were being imported in large quantities. I reminded him of the cartridges that I had seen and he said that he had sent 16 boxes to Bin Saood. Here I remarked that I had counted 50 boxes and that I had only seen the last consignment of the buggalow load. I told him how a shopkeeper in the bazaar had told me that the duty on each rifle was six dollars and would no doubt have given me much more interesting information, had I not gone away for fear of getting the man into trouble. I said that letters from and to noted arms merchants were constantly coming and going through our Post Office and that we estimated his annual revenue from the trade in round figures at a lakh of dollars.

5. I then explained to him, as coming from myself, that the reason why we originally asked him to notify a prohibition was because so many arms were being smuggled to rebellious tribes on our Indian frontier, and that this wholesale importation in spite of the prohibition enables his enemies and ours to misrepresent matters and attribute far-fetched motives of every kind to us and to him. I advised him, in his own interests, seriously to put a check on the traffic as he can well do if he chooses.



6. Sheikh Mubarak replied that he was as determined as ever to enforce his prohibition but strongly advised that we should stop the trade in Maskat. As regards the lakh of dollars which he took up rather strongly, he said that he did not want it and that if nothing else would convince us of his innocence, he would make the Nakhodas of Koweit vessels procure a clearance certificate from His Majesty's Consul at Maskat that their cargo was innocent.

7. There is no doubt that the Sheikh has received a clear warning and I regret to say that I believe he will disregard it. The proclamation is not worth the paper it is written on and is only a cause of friction.

8. So much, however, must be said that, since this warning it appears that there has been a lull in the importation of arms into Koweit, *i.e.*, during the month of June. It will probably not last long.

Dated the 30th July 1906.

From—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,
To—SHEIKH MUBARAK-US-SUBAH, Koweit.

After greeting and inquiry after his health.

When I last visited Koweit with His Excellency the Admiral, I was very sorry to miss seeing you owing to your absence from Koweit, but I thought it was on account of the severe illness of your deceased son Fahd, and at a time of anxiety did not trouble you with letters. Since then, as you may have heard from Captain Knox, I have been continuously absent from head-quarters and only returned two days ago after two months in India.

It grieves me much to read on my return that in the short time of my absence your two sons Fahd and Sabha have been taken from you. This is a heavy calamity and I beg you to accept my deepest sympathy in your bereavement. It is difficult for us to understand these things, but we must bow to the will of God. Please convey my condolences also to your son Sheikh Jabir.

Another matter too has been a source of much regret to me to read and this is that while I have been away some misunderstanding has interfered with the pleasant and frequent intercourse which had always been customary between you and Captain Knox. I am delighted to learn however by the mail which has just come after my own return, that any little estrangement that there may have been has now been removed. I have always found your relations with Captain Knox so pleasant when I have visited Koweit that it would be a great disappointment to me if anything were to come between you and him.

As, I am sure, is not hidden from you, it is the unchanging wish of my Government and its officers to honour you and maintain your dignity in every way possible, and I cannot doubt but that it is your own wish also to reciprocate in this respect and that our trusted representative at Koweit (and he the only Englishman in your territory) should have an honourable and honoured position in your eyes and those of your subjects. I hope that this will always be the case.

Now regarding my absence in India. I went first to Simla and was honoured with a visit to the new Viceroy, His Excellency Lord Minto, who spoke to me about the affairs of the Gulf. His good-will to you and interest in your affairs and prosperity is no less than that of his honoured predecessor, Lord Curzon. With regard to the latter you will I know be very sorry to hear that within the last few days he has suffered a grievous calamity in the death of his wife Lady Curzon, after a short illness. Perhaps you would like to send him a letter or telegram of condolence. He would I am sure appreciate it. If you care to send any message to me I will see it forwarded to its destination.

On my return from Simla I went to Bombay to look at a steam launch and then saw and talked with Sheikh Ali bin Ahmed of Bahrein. He is importuning much to be allowed to return to Bahrein and if Sheikh Esa can give guarantees for his good behaviour I may be able to recommend Government to let him go back before very long. I think he should have learnt wisdom by now and will not give trouble again.



This is all the news I have. What is your news? What is the condition of affairs in Nejd and the state of your relations with Bin Saood and with the family of bin Rashid?

Finally I trust you had a pleasant visit to our friend Sheikh Khazal and found him in the best of health and prosperity.

I hope I shall receive your esteemed letter before long and hear good news from your side.

May you be preserved and salaam.

Translation of a letter, dated 3rd August 1906, from Sheikh Mubarak-us-Subah to Major Cox.

In the most fortunate time I was honoured by (receiving) your honoured letter dated 30th July 1906 and was glad to learn your well-being and I understood all what you had stated.

As regards what you had remarked about His Excellency the Admiral, my friend, I was exceedingly grateful to be present at the service of you all, and I came as promised and stayed for three days after the (lapse of the) time fixed; although I was indisposed when I came from Jarah, but I did so in order to pay (my) respects to you all and converse with you. During my stay in town my indisposition is increased, and all my family were at Jarah. Captain Knox had noticed this.

As regards your sympathy with me, this is due to your cordiality towards me and as to what had befallen them (i.e., his deceased sons) such are the ways of the world.

With regard to what you had said about my friend, Captain Knox, who is to me like a brother, if God please I will always hold him in esteem and pay him high reverence, for two reasons; firstly, because of my duty and loyalty to the Government, and secondly for his personality and for our social intercourse. I consider myself to be an official like him on behalf of the Government. If I experience from him anything disagreeable owing to his not knowing the fact, I will discuss the matter with him and warn him. And notwithstanding this, if any misunderstanding had occurred for him and if he had written to you anything against me, it will in my opinion prove to him afterwards that I was in the right.

You had written that I am always under the good graces of the Government. This is proved to me owing to my integrity and sincerity towards them and my cordiality with you.

You had asked about the news of Nejd. Before being murdered, Abdul Aziz Ibn Rashid had found himself in fault with regard to me, for virtues (or excellent qualities) had become apparent to him, and he also perceived that he had incurred great losses. So, he interceded for peace, although it was about two years that I had left him alone because the (difficult) circumstances in which he was involved were sufficient for him. And I granted him true peace. After he was murdered, letters were addressed to me by his son Mirab Hammood-el-Obeid-el-Rashid and Sultan, son of Hammood-el-Rashid, praying for the maintenance of (my) friendship and asking me to have an eye on them. I granted this to them. Subsequently I intervened between them and Ibn Saood for peace. If God please their reconciliation will be completed shortly. Both Ibn Saood and Ibn Rashid try to attract my good-will because I wish the good of all.

You made mention of His Excellency Lord Curzon and the death of his honoured wife Lady Curzon. God knows that I have also been greatly shocked by this news, because anything which vexes this illustrious personage will also vex me. And as coming by my dependence to you, I venture to enclose a telegram in this letter. I trust you will order it to be wired, as if sent through you it will reach its destination safely, and I will pay the telegraph charges with thanks.



I received your honoured letter by the hand of Captain Knox to-day, Friday, corresponding with the 12th instant. I had gone to him in his place.

You had written about Ali bin Ahmed Khalifah that he had interviewed you in Bombay and solicited to come back and that if my brother Sheikh Esa guarantees that Ali will behave properly, you can then make a reference to the Government for his coming back before the time. If my brother Sheikh Esa do not recover from his negligence after what people have said against him and after what had befallen to his nephew Ali, then he must certainly be considered to have no discretion left him. If after making such overtures he, Ali, is allowed to return, your long arm can reach him as well as others (where necessary) and your pardon is great.

If God please I am about to proceed to my property at Fao to farm out the produce and hope also Inshallah to interview my brother Sheikh Khazal Khan. If I did not want to trouble him (by inviting him to come to me) I shall go to him in his place for a day.

(Usual complimentary ending.)

(Copy.)

To

His Excellency Lord Curzon.

I was much shocked by death of your august spouse.

This is a great bereavement for me also and I beg to offer condolence and pray God that you may be granted resignation and solace, and that you may be preserved from further affliction.

Chief of Koweit,

MUBARAK-US-SUBAH.



536 292 291

Minute Paper.

Register No. 2741

SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Letter from J.O.,

Dated 78 March 1906.

Rec. 88

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	8 March	NK	<p>Arms Traffic.</p> <p>Introduction into Arabia of arms for the use of Arabs who are disaffected towards the Sultan's rule. Great Britain accused by Turkish local officials of openly favouring the traffic. Opinion of Sir No'lor that the proposed remonstrance should be addressed to the Sultan.</p> <p>Copy to India 30 March 1906 Sent 13.</p> <p>Offt telegram to Viceroy</p>
Secretary of State	9	AG	
Committee	9	NK	
Under Secretary.....	13	NK	
Secretary of State			


Sent AG 13 March 06

Sent 13: 3: 06 + J.D.V.

Previous Papers:—

2613/06. 285/06

Y 10780. 2000.—3/1905. I. 506.





DRAFT TELEGRAM.

Despatched 13th March 1906.

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

VICEROY, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

(Vafrorum)


Foreign Secret. Arms traffic at Koweit.
Ambassador at Constantinople considers that
remonstrances might advantageously be addressed
to Sheikh in accordance with proposal in
Cox's telegraph 10th January last, as Ottoman
authorities constantly report to Porte that British
officers are openly favouring import of arms into
Arabia, and official complaint may be formu-
-lated by Turkish Govt.


(305106)
Approved Pol. Comtee,
13 MAR 1906


Copy to India. (+) 23 March

.. 20. (+) 15 March
p 26 -

W. O. S.
J. M.
J. E.
A. R. B.







*Duplicate.*

295

740

7705

MAR 5 1906

Constantinople,

February 25 1906

No 116

Confidential.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Despatch No 71 (5208) of the 15th instant transmitting copies of correspondence relating to the Arms Traffic in the Persian Gulf.


In reply, I have the honour to state that for some considerable time past it has been brought to my knowledge that the Ottoman Authorities in the Persian Gulf are constantly sending to the Sublime Porte reports in which we are accused of openly favouring the introduction of arms for the use of the Arabs who are disaffected towards the Sultan's rule. These complaints are certain to continue, and may even be officially formulated to me, if measures are not taken to check the import of arms via Koweit. I am therefore of opinion that the remonstrance suggested by Major ^(sic) Knox might advantageously be addressed to Sheikh Moubarak.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,

Sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

The Right Hon.
Sir E. Grey, Baronet,
Etc etc etc.

(Signed) W. R. O'Leary





Minute Paper.

Register No. 305

SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Letter from India, no. 2 M., Dated 11 Jan. 1906.
Rec. 27 Jan.

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	17 Feb	WV	<p>Arms Traffic.</p> <p>Perian Gulf. The traffic at Koweit.</p> <p>As to stoppage of trade at Muscat: question of a "quid pro quo" to the French.</p>
Secretary of State	2	as	
Committee	2/2/	WV	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State			

Copy to 70 } 10.20p
Dimp. }

For information

The question of the Arms traffic in the Persian Gulf will be ready for consideration when the Govt. of India have sent us the report which Mr. Tucker, the officiating Agent to the S.S. in Baluchistan, has submitted in accordance with special instructions from the Govt. of India. The text of Mr. Tucker's report has not been received, but it is stated incidentally in a letter from him of the 23rd inst. on another subject that he had sent in this report on the 15th August.

Seen Pol. Comtee.,
8 FEB. 1906

(493/06)


[x no 194/05.]

Previous Papers:—

1794 / 05
942
539

TH

Y 19789. 2000.—3/1905. L 535.





797 792
TELEGRAM. P.

From- Major P. E. Cox, C.I.E.,

Offg. Political Resident, Persian Gulf, Bushire,


To- The Secretary to the Government of India

in the Foreign Department, Calcutta.

Dated the 10th January 1906.

Received the 10th January 1906.

Reference my letter No. 585 and enclosure, dated the December 31st 1905. Reports have been received of considerable quantities of arms being openly landed at Koweit from native craft since its despatch. I have instructed Knox to inform Sheikh that he has to report these matters to me and doubts whether state of things will be viewed by me with equanimity. The Sheikh may suppose we actively enough connive at traffic, as suggested by French Arabian newspapers, if ^{special} no notice is taken. I shall be glad to know if Government have any special instructions as to tenour before addressing formal remonstrance to Sheikh.





No. 555, dated Bushire, the 31st December 1905 (received 9th January 1906).

From—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

With reference to the correspondence marginally noted, I have the honour to lay before the Government of India certain aspects of the existing traffic in arms, to and from Koweit, which seem to need early consideration.

Resident to Foreign Department, letter No. 62, dated the 4th March 1904.
Foreign Department to Resident, endorsement No. 1677-E. A., dated the 20th May 1904.
Foreign Department to Resident, endorsement No. 2246-E. A., dated the 3rd July 1904.
Resident to Foreign Department, No. 184, dated the 23rd April 1905.

2. I need not, I think, go into details of the previous history of our negotiations with Sheikh Mubarak in this regard.

The mere fact that the prohibition existed has no doubt tended to reduce the traffic somewhat by making it contraband; on the other hand, the Sheikh of Koweit, although invariably denying the impeachment when made, has never displayed any serious desire to make his undertaking to suppress the traffic effective.

Political reasons, however, connected with the struggle between Bin Saood and Bin Rashid for the Nejd supremacy and the delicacy of our Political Agent's position on first arrival at Koweit, have of late made it difficult for us to come to direct issue with Sheikh Mubarak on the subject, and our action has been limited to drawing the Sheikh's pointed attention from time to time, to large shipments arriving at Koweit and to the endeavour to trace the ramifications of the trade.

3. During the last few weeks, the traffic has been brought into prominence in the following manner :—

I. The Agents of the British India Steam Navigation Company having had their friendly attention drawn to the fact that large quantities of arms are being shipped to Koweit by their steamers, colourably manifested as limes or halwa, remind me of the fact that in spite of the prohibition which was notified to British subjects, foreign lines can carry arms to Koweit with impunity and that the Russian line's steamer *Troucor* recently landed 25 cases of arms there.

II. The Political Agent, Maskat, reported by telegram to myself and Government on 20th November, the alleged acquisition by Goguyer of a permit or invitation from Sheikh Mubarak to trade in arms to Koweit. The information since furnished by Captain Knox on this subject is contained in the memorandum which accompanies this letter from which it will be seen that in spite of the Sheikh's disclaimers, the intimation of the French Consul apparently has some tangible foundation.

III. In the same telegram as that just mentioned, Major Grey also reported that Monsieur Laronce had repeated to him suggestions which he made two or three years ago to me, that we should come to terms with the French Government with a view to the suppression of the arms trade to Maskat.

4. The permit quoted by Monsieur Laronce was apparently obtained by Goguyer three years ago, and the action of the French in producing it at this juncture, i.e., during the progress of the negotiations for the interpretation of the Hague Award and accompanying it by a protest against the obstruction offered by us to the arms trade with Koweit, inevitably prompts the conjecture that in their readiness to enter into negotiations with us now, they may be actuated by the belief that while obtaining from us substantial political or pecuniary *quid pro quos* for themselves and the Sultan, for their co-operation in the suppressing of the arms trade to Maskat, they will still leave their subjects at liberty to carry on their operations unchecked at Koweit.



The correspondence quoted in the opening paragraph of this letter does not make it quite clear to me how far we are in a position to prevent Koweit thus becoming the entrepôt of the arms trade without first settling accounts with other powers interested, but in view of the facts above alluded to, it may be found necessary for Government to weigh the comparative cost and advantages of :—

- (i) Giving a *quid pro quo* to the French Government for acquiescing in the stoppage of the trade to Maskat.
- (ii) Enhancing the subsidy of the Sultan of Maskat to an extent which will leave him without a grievance on this score.
- (iii) Possibly taking the same course in the case of the Sheikh of Koweit.

As against :—

- (a) The removal of all restrictions on the traffic in arms on the western shore of the Gulfs of Oman and Persia.
- (b) The inauguration of organised measures, in co-operation with the Persian Government, in order to kill the trade on this side, in which we are mainly interested, by thoroughly policing the eastern shores of the Gulfs above mentioned.

This, I know, is a formidable undertaking. It is true that the Belgian Customs are doing their best in their own interest to combat the smuggling that now goes on through the small ports of the littoral, and the sea-going launches which the Government of India are building for them, will no doubt help to make their endeavours more effective, but I need hardly state that if we take up this measure in co-operation with them, our present naval resources in these waters will not suffice for the purpose.

It is with some hesitation, after what has previously passed, that I allude to the possible necessity for a seemingly retrograde policy in connection with the arms trade of the Gulf, but in case the question should be found to resolve itself into a mere business consideration as to which method is likely to effect the desired end at the least cost, whether financial or political, I have ventured to direct attention to the problems which the present developments of the question seem to indicate.

MEMORANDUM

Giving purport of several detached items of information furnished by the Political Agent, Koweit, between 23rd November and 11th December 1905.

On the 20th November, telegraphic information was received from the Political Agent, Maskat, that the Frenchman Goguyer, armed with a letter from Sheikh Mubarak of Koweit inviting him to deal in arms in his territory, had protested to the French Government against the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, in placing obstacles in the way of his arms traffic.

The Political Agent, Koweit, was asked demi-officially to endeavour to obtain a copy, or at all events ascertain the date, of the Sheikh's letter to Goguyer.

In reply to the Political Agent's enquiries, Sheikh Mubarak denied most emphatically that he or any of his family, or of the Koweit merchants of standing, had ever addressed such a letter to Goguyer; on the contrary, he said that he had copies of letters in which he had written to Goguyer that he had refused to have anything to do with him, and he promised to send copies of these letters. At the same time he admitted to Captain Knox that a few arms did come in for Koweitis, here and there.

A little later on when Haji Ali Thababa, Goguyer's recently dismissed Koweit Agent, was taking leave of Mubarak previous to proceeding to Maskat



in order to settle up his accounts with Goguyer, Mobarek is reported to have said:—

"Go, but ask Goguyer how he came to say that he had a letter written by me to him, when he knew perfectly well how many letters he has sent to me and to Seyyed Khalifa, to which he has received no reply."

So much for Sheikh Mubarak's ostensible attitude. On the other hand, Captain Knox has received from a source which he seems to consider entitled to some credence details of the following correspondence, said to have taken place between Mubarak and one P. Massonet, acting on behalf of the "Manufacture d'armes a feu," at Liège.

In reply to this Company's letter offering their services, the Sheikh is reported to have written on the 23rd September:—

"I have to acknowledge receipt of your letter written in French and German, dated 19th August, and note contents. As regards arms which are generally imported into this country from Maskat, if you are anxious to have transactions with the people here in this class of goods, I hope your so doing will prove most satisfactory, and the merchants will be glad to open their business with you. I shall try my utmost to protect your interests in this line of business, and shall be pleased to furnish you with the address of the well-known merchants to whom you may consign your goods whenever you want to ship them."

This letter elicited the following reply from Liège:—

"I have received your letter and do not clearly understand it. I could either appoint an agent, if you wished, or would you kindly give me the name and address of a merchant who would, with your approval, act as my agent?"


The Sheikh is alleged to have told the man who translated this letter to him, that he would like to enter into negotiations, but could not understand why the English put difficulties in the way of his importing arms and ammunition.

Under the circumstances, Captain Knox fears that there is little doubt that Goguyer has a genuine letter from Sheikh Mubarak permitting him to trade, but he has been unable to obtain a copy or the date of it.

The Political Agent, Maskat, also endeavoured, informally, to get the French Consul at Maskat to show him the letter quoted by Goguyer or give him a copy. Monsieur Laronce while expressing his inability to comply fully, informed Major Grey that the letter was received by Goguyer at the end of 1902 or beginning of 1903.

P. Z. COX.

31st December 1905.





300 245

Register No. **1794** **SECRET DEPARTMENT.**

Minute Paper.

Letter from *India, Nov 7 M.* Dated *23 Nov. 1905.*
 Rec. *9 Decr.*

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	<i>14 Dec</i>	<i>KK</i>	<p>Arms Traffic.</p> <p>Import of arms into Persian Baluchistan from Muscat. M. Jaffer arrived with a letter from Sheikh of Koweit inviting him to deal in arms in his territory. He has protested to French Govt against action of Resident in Persian Gulf in placing obstacles in his way.</p> <p>Copy to <i>20. Dmo.</i> } <i>4.1.06.</i></p> <p>For information.</p> <p>The question of the arms traffic in the Persian Gulf is at present in an unsatisfactory condition.</p> <p>The facts are briefly as follows:-</p> <p>Muscat has for many years been an emporium for the arms trade; as in 1897 the Govt of India determined to make an effort to stop the traffic, which was assuming dangerous dimensions. The Persian Govt has for many years nominally prohibited the import of arms into Persia without license; and in 1897 they</p>
Secretary of State	<i>14</i>	<i>AG</i>	
Committee	<i>15/12/05</i>	<i>M.</i>	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State	<i>15/12</i>	<i>M.</i>	

Seen Pol. Com'ee, 19 DEC. 1905

Previous Papers:—

539
1769

Y 10722. 2000.—3, 1905. I. 306.



and in 1897

they were induced to reiterate the prohibition, as to ask for the assistance of H. H. Gov. in stopping smuggling.


The Sultan of Muscat simultaneously issues a proclamation forbidding the export of arms from Muscat to Persian and Indian ports, and authorising the confiscation of arms intended for such ports. It was not, however, possible to deal with arms which belonged to others than British, Persian or Muscat subjects; nor could the Sultan of Muscat forbid the import of arms into his dominions without the consent of the Powers, which had treaties with Muscat either specifically providing for freedom of trade, or for m. f. n. treatment i.e. France, America & Holland.

In the absence of such a general prohibition, all the Gov. of India could do, as regards British subjects, was to issue (1898) regulations compelling them to register all arms in their possession. These regulations so far as they have been of any effect, have simply tended to drive the trade into the hands of other than British subjects: and the arms trade with Muscat remains very considerable.

The Trucial Chiefs of the Pirate Coast, the Sheikh of Bahrain & the Sheikh of Koweit have ~~also~~ prohibited the arms traffic in their dominions - but, in the last case at least, this step has been of no practical value.

In these circumstances, the Gov. of India recommended in July 1903 that attempts should be made to induce (1) France to agree to total prohibition in Muscat (2) Turkey to agree to no further trade with their coast against smugglers, or at least to declare it illegal of the traffic and (3) that the Muscat Councils regulation of 1898 (above referred to) should be cancelled in the meanwhile, in order to encourage the trade in British hands & therefore, more under control.


The Foreign Office has been repeatedly addressed, but matters remain in statu quo. It seems doubtful whether the statement by the French Council or Minister reported by Major Grey is a sufficient occasion for opening the subject with the F.O.



1794
(Copy)

MA. 1769
579
246
301

Extract from the Baluchistan Agency Diary for
the week ending 16th October 1905.



x x KALAT. x x


The drought is causing a great many people to
leave for Sind. It is said that $\frac{2}{3}$ ths of the whole
population has already left Kharan. The Moharrir at
Ladgasht reports that Mir Sultan Muhammed, brother of ^{Mir} Kia
Khan, Reki, has sent 5 Martini Henry and Magazine rifles
with some Rekis, who are on their way to Bushki with dates
for sale in the Bushki district. The Nausherwani Chief
has been asked to intercept the rifles and also to take
steps to prevent the importation of such arms into his
territory by the Rekis and others.

x x x x

PERSIA.

The Moharrir at Ladgasht reports that the people
of Jalk, Mao, Sinokan and Kasulkan have recently purchased
about 600 rifles of Martini Henry, Magazine and German
patterns from Mascat, and that every inhabitant of these
places is now armed with such a weapon. He further reports
that 90 rifles of the same patterns are at present in the
possession of Mir Bahram Khan, son of Rustam Khan, Nausher-
wani.

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(Copy)

W 539/05
302

Telegram P.

From - Major W. Grey, Political Agent at Maskat,



To - The Secretary to the Government of India in the
Foreign Department, Calcutta.


Dated Maskat, the 20th November 1905.

Received the 20th November 1905.

I have sent the following telegram to Major Cox
today. Begins. Arms trade. Monsieur Goguyer who is armed
with a letter from Sheikh Mubarak of Koweit inviting him to
deal in arms in his territory has protested to the French
Government against the action of the Resident in the Persian
Gulf in placing obstacles in the way and the French Govern-
ment have asked for explanation from the French Consul. He
says that the French Government have not been informed of the
* prohibition to import arms into Koweit and that they suggest
that the British Government should make proposals to them
for the cessation of arms trade at Maskat which he believes
would be accepted provided that a settlement with the Sultan
of Maskat is effected by us as the parties chiefly interested
in the matter. Ends.

(13/11)





Minute Paper.

Register No. **539**

SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Letter from *India, Ho. 8 M.* Dated *23 Feb 1905*
 Rec. *11 Mch.*

Formally acknowledged



	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	<i>17 Mch</i>	<i>VH</i>	<i>Koweit.</i> <i>Refusal of Consul Gen. at Muscat to authorise the B.S.N. Co., at the request of M. Goguyer, to embark arms and ammunition for Koweit.</i>
Secretary of State	<i>17</i>	<i>SB</i>	
Committee	<i>18</i>	<i>SJA</i>	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State			

Previous Papers:—
935/04

Copy to FO. 22.3.05
No information.

Seen Pol. Com. es.,
 21 MAR. 1905

Y 9935. 2000—6/1904. I. 1136.





Confidential

539
(Copy.)

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N^o 67 of 1905.

From

Major W. G. Grey,
Offg. Political Agent and H.B.M.'s Consul,
Maskat.

To

The Secretary to the Government of India
in the Foreign Department, Calcutta.

Political Agency and Consulate Maskat, 6th February 1905.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward for your information, copies of a letter which I received from Monsieur Goguyer and of my reply to him.

2. The correspondence is interesting in connection with the enclosure to my letter N^o 567, dated 22nd November 1904 to your address.



3. A copy of this letter will be forwarded to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

I have, etc,

sd. W. G. Grey, Major.
Offg. Political Agent and
H.B.M.'s Consul, Maskat.

(393/09)

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Copy.

Mascate, le 5 Fevrier 1905.


Monsieur le Consul,

J'ai l'honneur de vous prier de vouloir
bien autoriser l'agence de la British India S.S. Co. a
embarquer pour moi, sur le vapeur le plus prochain à des-
tination de Koweit, une caisse contenant Un Fusil Double
avec 500 cartouches, à destination du Seyyid Khelef fils du
défunt Naquib de Bassorah, actuellement à la residence de
Koweit.

Esperant que vous accueillerez ma demande avec
votre bienveillance habituelle et vous en remerciant, je vous
prie d'agreer, Monsieur le Consul, les assurances de ma con-
sideration distinguées.

Signed. A. Goguyer.

Monsieur le Consul de la Grande Bretagne a Mascate.





306 301
Mascate, le 5 Fevrier 1905.

Monsieur,



J'ai l'honneur de vous accuser reception de
votre lettre, mais puisque l'importation des fusils et des
cartouches a Koweit est defendue, je regrette infiniment de
ne pouvoir pas autoriser l'agence de la B.I.S.N.Co. d'en
embarquer pour Koweit sans permission de mon Gouvernement .

Agrez, Monsieur, l'assurance de ma haute considéra-
tion.

Signed W.G.Grey.

Consul de la Grande Bretagne

a Mascate.





Minute Paper.

Register No. **393**

SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Letter from *India, No. 4 M.* Dated *26 Jan.* 1905.
 Rec. *13 Feb.*

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	<i>17 Feb</i>	<i>NK</i>	<i>Persian Gulf.</i> <i>Koweit: Rejd disturbances: Arms</i> <i>Traffic - Muscat and Koweit: As to grant</i> <i>of gunst. to Mubarak by Great Britain. Extract</i> <i>from the "Al Akhram" of Cairo. As to M. Foguier's</i> <i>responsibility for the article.</i>
Secretary of State	<i>20</i>	<i>ag</i>	
Committee	<i>21</i>	<i>S.M.</i>	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State			


Previous Papers:—
750/04
(225/03)

Copy to FO 28.2.05.

For information.

Seen Pol. Com'ee.,
 27 FEB. 1905

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393

Mr. 122/104
750/54 (308)

I find the following article in *Al-Ahram*, dated the 16th September 1904:—

ARABIA.

From our special correspondent at Maskat.

It is now established that Ibn-i-Rashid has been defeated and Ibn-i-Saood has gained victory.

But the report about the death of Ibn-i-Rashid is false; also is the report of Ibn-i-Saood capturing six guns of the Turkish troops untrue. Ibn-i-Saood captured only one gun, while the remaining guns had been rendered useless by the Turkish troops. The most important thing is that the Sheikh of Koweit has given up his neutrality and has openly taken protection of the English. You have heard that Mubarak Ibn-i-Sabah sent a telegram to the Sublime Porte, intimating that if the Turkish troops did not abstain from helping Ibn-i-Rashid then he would assist Ibn-i-Saood, and seek protection of a foreign power, who would protect him from all harm. He further added in the telegram that foreign powers desire to extend their protection to the Arab Amirs, but the latter prefer to remain subjects of His Majesty the Sultan.

But the Sublime Porte did not send him a reply. Consequently Mubarak sought protection of the English, who have been trying to gain this object for four years past.

On the 8th April 1903, Mr. Balfour stated in the House of Commons that the Sheikh of Koweit had entered into special agreements with the English. But the Sheikh repudiated this statement and said that he was subject to the Sublime Porte. And now he has since two weeks openly renounced his allegiance to the Sultan, and has permitted a British Consul to reside at Koweit. The English have also established a post office there; and the Consul is now endeavouring to open a small dispensary for the treatment of the poor Arab sick freely.

In this way the English have got their footing and flag fixed in Koweit, which is Turkish territory, by the consent of Sheikh Mubarak. Koweit is the key of Arabia in the Persian Gulf. It is key of Irak, and the territory between the two rivers, as the roads lead easily and without obstacles to the interior of Irak from Koweit. In addition to this, Mubarak is on friendly terms with the Sheikhs who reside along these roads. Mubarak has been helping all the Sheikhs for a distance of 500 miles, who break out into rebellion, and he supplies them with arms and ammunition and other supplies they want. All what he requires comes from India, and if it was not for the help of Mubarak the said Arabs would not be able to rebel for want of supplies. Mail steamers call once a week at Koweit *via* Maskat; and the Koweit merchants ship every week hundreds of rifles and ammunition, etc., to Koweit. They have adopted a well-known practice, *i.e.*, they write on the cases containing firearms "cases containing sweetmeats;" and those holding cartridges, "dried limes." The customs officials at Maskat do not inquire about the contents of the cases, while the English officers, who last year made such a noise, when they found a Frenchman carrying six revolvers, shut their eyes when these cases are concerned.

The customs officials at Bushire once opened one of these cases and found fifty rifles in them, and a large number of cartridges. But the English Consul came there and shut their mouths and pressed their hands, and prevented them from making further inspection of the cases, and the arms were restored to the owners, who took them over to Sheikh Mubarak.

Thus Ibn-i-Saood obtains his arms from Koweit and the latter from the English; and so the English are the agents, who supply the Arabs with arms.

I know as a fact that, had not the English made a present of four guns to Mubarak, the latter would not have been able to capture Boreida, which is a strong position and considered in Arabia to be invincible.



It is often that Mubarak has not to pay for these arms and ammunition, because if he had to do so, he would soon be reduced to poverty. A short time after this the English sent him a lakh of rupees.

The Arab rebels cannot find a better help. You may remember that Sheikh Sa'dun bin Mansur, the Sheikh of the Muttasik tribe, attacked a detachment of Turkish troops in December last, and then raided the suburbs of Basrah. When he feared retribution he took refuge at Koweit, and remained under the protection of English guns. After a few months he returned to his place, but did not remain at peace. He plundered a Turkish Kafilah, and nothing was done to him. He is now residing in quiet and without any anxiety. The English have only one line of policy in this country, *i.e.*, to incite the rulers to oppress the people, and then to offer aid to the oppressed people and gain their hearts. It were the English who pressed the Turkish Government to deal severely with Mubarak bin Sabah, to secure peace to the country, the commerce, and the Turkish and the English subjects. When the Sublime Porte acted in accordance with the advice given by the English and began to bring pressure on Sheikh Mubarak, then they offered to protect Mubarak from the danger, and the latter with his tribesmen placed himself under the British protection.

I warn the high officials of the Sublime Government in a loud voice, to be careful about the intrigues of the English in Irak, because they are now casting greedy eyes upon that fertile land watered by two streams. Irak excels Egypt in fertility; and he who possesses this land gets hold of all commerce of the east from Anatolin, Arabia, India, the shores of China, Afghanistan, Tibet, Khiva, Burma, and Siam.

The scheme of the English is greater than what you suppose and dream. If you allow things to go on as before, you will see tomorrow that this young man, Ibn-i-Saood, will become more important than necessary, and more serious than you think. Then make use of artifice and not force, and seek aid of the French and Russians, in order to defend yourselves against this aggression; nothing else will prevent their intrigues. The first step has been taken by them, but you should prevent them from taking the second, before it could be said, "the rent has increased beyond the ability of the mender."

5th October 1904;

A. RAHIM.

No. 3642 E. B., dated the 27th October 1904.

Endorsed by the Foreign Department.

A copy of the foregoing paper is forwarded to the Political Resident, Persian Gulf, for information, and communication to the Political Agent, Maskat, with a view to his ascertaining, as far as possible, the source from which the article emanated.

Translation of an article in Al-Ahram, dated the 16th September 1904.

No. 567, dated the 22nd (received 28th) November 1904. (Confidential.)

From—Major W. G. Grey, Political Agent and His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Maskat.

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to forward herewith, for your information, a copy of letter No. 566, dated 22nd November 1904, which I have addressed to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

No. 568, dated Maskat, the 22nd November 1904.

From—Major W. G. Grey Political Agent and His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Maskat.

To—Major P. Z. Cox, C. I. E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have the honour to reply to your demi-official letter forwarding an extract from the journal *Al-Ahram* of Cairo which had been sent to you by the



3

Government of India in the Foreign Department with their endorsement No. 3642-E. B., dated 27th ultimo, for an expression of opinion as to its authorship.

2. I have no doubt that Monsieur Goguyer is responsible for the contents of the extract. My reasons for forming this opinion are:—

- (1) He possesses a knowledge of Koweit and Koweit affairs probably unequalled by any other non-official resident of Maskat.
- (2) The excessive anti-English bias which is noticeable in many of his former writings also appears in this article, and I know of no other person in Maskat who entertains such hatred of us.
- (3) The article clearly implies that arms are imported into Koweit by the English. Monsieur Goguyer knows well that the (apparent) inconsistency of publicly forbidding and privately encouraging the importation of arms by us would be thoroughly understood by the natives in the present circumstances, and the manner in which the ideas are expressed in this extract bears the stamp of his ingenious manipulation.
- (4) It is possible that the writer's remarks concerning the conveyance of arms to Koweit by merchants in mail steamers are made in the hope of inducing action to be taken which will leave the Koweit field in possession of those who send their consignments in dhows, as Goguyer does, *vide* my letter No. 263, dated 24th May last.

3. A copy of this letter will be forwarded to the secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Calcutta.

No. 588, dated Maskat, the 6th (received 14th) December 1904 (Confidential).

From—MAJOR W. G. GRAY, Political Agent and His Britannic Majesty's Consul, Maskat.


To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to place before you briefly the position of affairs in Maskat as regards the arms trade.

I beg to invite a reference to paragraph 3 of secret despatch No. 46, dated 6th March 1902, from the Government of India to the Secretary of State, and to ask whether it would not be possible to make another effort for the abolition of arms trade in Oman. My French colleague informed me recently that his Government had no intention of expelling Goguyer from Maskat, and the Sultan meanwhile makes the best of a bad job by being friendly with his old enemy. On the other hand, Goguyer, while he has apparently desisted from writing against His Highness (possibly in accordance with instructions received, *vide* the enclosure to my letter No. 302 * dated 28th June last), has by no means ceased his unfair and hostile criticism of our policy in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere. His expulsion from Maskat would therefore appear to be more than ever desirable from our point of view.

4. However, the point to which I desire to invite attention at present is that no half-way position on our part is advisable as regards the arms trade in the present circumstances. Either we must move for its abolition, or we must, by supporting our merchants, render the presence of foreigners in Maskat as innocuous as possible to our commercial prospects generally. Were the latter course adopted, it might be possible not only to retain control over the traffic, but, eventually, to effect the removal of certain foreigners without the employment of compulsion.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 3917 F. D.—J. E. F.





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308

Register No. **942** **SECRET DEPARTMENT.**

Minute Paper.

Letter from India, no 19th, Dated 11 May 1905.
Rec. 27 May

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	1 June	pk	Koweit. Arms Traffic. Report from Capt. Knox. Action taken by Major Cox for its prevention.
Secretary of State	2	ag	
Committee	2	STO	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State			


Copy to 20. 8 June

For information.
The British India S.N.C. appears
to carry much of the arms to Koweit.
W.H.

Seen Pol. Commr.
17 JUN. 1905

Previous Papers:—
nt 750/04
1002/04

Y 10780. #000.—3/1905. I. 506.





[Confidential.]

No. 184, dated Bushire the 23rd April (received 1st May) 1905.
 From—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
 To—S. M. FRASER, ESQ., C.I.E., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.

I have the honour to refer you to Foreign Department letter No. 2918-E.A., dated 7th September 1904, on the subject of the duties of the new Political Agent at Koweit.

2. In paragraph 5 thereof the Government of India expressed their desire to be furnished with information regarding the Trade in Arms with Koweit, and I now have the honour to forward for information a copy of a recent report which I have received from Captain Knox on the subject.

3. When I have at any time received special intimation from Maskat or elsewhere of the consignment of arms to Koweit, I have asked the Political Agent to apprise Sheikh Mubarak of it; and I have also reminded the British India Steam Navigation Company of the prohibition which exists against the importation of arms into that port.

In view however of the somewhat delicate position in which our Representative at Koweit has been placed at first starting, and to the fact that had he shewn any disposition to worry Sheikh Mubarak about this or any other matter, the latter would probably have regarded his presence as a doubtful advantage, and would probably have made things unpleasant for him, it seemed advisable to limit our action to the extent above mentioned, and pending any special instructions which the Government of India see fit to communicate to me on the subject I shall not take any more decided a line so far as Koweit is concerned.

I understand, moreover, that an investigation of the Arms Traffic in the Gulf has formed an item of Mr. J. G. Lorimer's work for the Gazetteer, and on receipt of his report the Government of India will be in a position to take the whole question in review as it exists at the present moment.

No. 230, dated 21st February 1905.

From—CAPTAIN S. G. KNOX, I.A., Political Agent Koweit,
 To—MAJOR P. Z. COX, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 215, dated 15th February 1905, on the subject of the trade in arms and ammunition at Koweit in which I am referred to the correspondence quoted in the margin.

Paragraph 5 of Foreign Department letter No. 2918-E.A., dated 7th September 1904. 2. The instructions contained therein have not by any means been overlooked but I have found the procuring of reliable and detailed information on the subject very difficult.

3. The ordinary attitude of the Koweitis, headed by Sheikh Mubarak and his family, is to deny flatly, in spite of evident proofs to the contrary, that a trade-in-arms in which Koweit is concerned, exists at all, and this has been the usual answer I have received to cautious enquiries in that direction.

4. The few people who are inclined to give any information have enabled me to put the following facts together:—

- (a) The trade in arms at Koweit dates from the time when Sheikh Mubarak made himself Sheikh. Sheikh Muhammed, it is said, was afraid of the Turks and refused to allow anything of the kind.
- (b) About half the imports to Koweit are carried in the British India Steamers, more especially since the Belgians showed some activity in capturing dhows laden with arms. Probably the average load with each fortnightly steamer is 200 rifles or say 5,000 rifles per annum.



(c). The remainder are smuggled along in dhows. All these arms come from Maskat and the total annual trade from both sources is estimated at some 12,000 rifles.

(d). My informants tell me that these arms, after leaving Koweit are distributed equally between Persia and Turkey.

The arms for Persia go by sea to any convenient spot between Mohammerah and Bushire, but not to Bushire itself.

The arms for Turkey, except a small proportion that go to the Bedouins and Nejd, go by creeks and by land to Zubair, whence they are again distributed in Basrah and between Basrah and Baghdad.

(e). A casual question, direct to a Bedouin headman of the Umtair the other day, elicited the information that, according to his estimate, one man in five of the tribe is armed with a Martini-Henry rifle. He added that there is an artificer in the tribe who repairs weapons that get out of order and that the price of a good rifle is reals 100.

If this is correct, there must be a handsome profit in selling to the Bedouin, for Koweit prices are 36 reals for the Martini Henry and 42 reals for the Mauser.

(f). Sheikh Mubarak takes duty on these arms both by sea and land, apparently both on import and re-export. His profit on the trade cannot be less than 50,000 dollars annually.

(g). Trade has been slack lately but it is hoped that with the plentiful rainfall we have had lately in the neighbourhood, and in Persia, purchasers will be in a position to buy and trade is likely to be brisk in May and June.

(h). The following is a list of the principal dealers in arms and ammunition :—

1. Haji Muhammad Ali, Marafi, of Persian extraction.
2. Muhammd Taqui, also Persian.
3. Muhammad Jaueyfi.
4. Mobarak Sayer.
5. Haji Abdulla Thahaba.

The last named is the Agent of M. Goguyer of Maskat but he charges so high a price for his rifles that, it is said, for the last two years he has not been able to sell any. He is not a fool and it is more likely that his trade is a blind while the information that he sends to Goguyer at Maskat is no doubt useful in regulating Maskat prices.

Besides these, there are many small pedlars who dabble in the trade from time to time. To keep track of these would be almost impossible. Many of them are not even natives of Koweit but use Koweit as a convenient distributing centre.



Minute Paper.

Register No. **935**

SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Leg's Letter from *India, ho. 17m.* Dated *28 April* 1904.
 Rec. *14 May*

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	<i>20 May</i>	<i>VM</i>	<i>Arms Traffic.</i> <i>M. Jougues's attempts to open up a trade with Koweit. Report by Mr. Jackson.</i>
Secretary of State	<i>21</i>	<i>VM</i>	
Committee	<i>21</i>	<i>53A</i>	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State			

Previous Papers:—
750



Copied to P.D. 28 June


Sheikh Montarek is evidently inclined to deal with M. Jougues, notwithstanding his promises to us.


Sheikh Khazal is the Sheikh of Mohammar.

Seen Pol. Comtee.
 28 MAY. 1904

Y 8964. 2000.—7/1903. I. 1509.











(314) (369)

Copy of a Confidential letter No. 75, dated the 26th March 1904, from J. C. Gaskin Esquire, Assistant Political Agent, Bahrein, to Lieut-Colonel C.A. Kemball, C.I.E.,
Offg: Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

In continuation of this office letter No. 52, dated the 4th March 1904, I have the honour to submit the following interesting information I gathered from Khamis Effendi and a friend of his named Mohamed bin Merzook, who visited me on the 20th instant, regarding the Frenchmen's transactions at Koweit and Feilieh.

Khamis Effendi, regarding whom references were made to you in connection with Banias trading with Katif, mentioned in the course of his conversation that a Koweit friend of his who stayed with him at Ojair when on his way to Al Hassa told him that the Frenchman who is now at Koweit asked Sheikh Mubarek to give him the monopoly of the arms trade at Koweit on the condition of his paying that Chief a royalty of 10 % on his intended importation of 12,000 rifles monthly, and if that proposition was not acceptable he was prepared to sell that number of rifles to the Sheikh monthly at the rate of 30 Austrian dollars each, the price at which such arms are being
sold







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sold at Muscat; that the Frenchman wanted to buy a house in Koweit for the purposes of his business but the Chief refused to permit his purchasing a house in Koweit and gave him quarters free of rent; that Sheikh Mubarek called the merchants interested in the trade before him and informed them of the offers of the Frenchman and consulted them as to whether his terms should be accepted, and the merchants told the Chief that the tax of 3 Austrian dollars per rifle paid to him by them was equivalent to the 10 % royalty on the original price and advised him not to give the trade to the Frenchman; and that it was not definitely known, when his friend left Koweit, what Sheikh Mubarek intended to do finally regarding the question. Khamis Effendi further mentioned that a fair number of rifles are imported into Al Bidda and Ojair in sailing craft; that the price of a rifle with one hundred cartridges was 35 Austrian dollars at Al Hassa and 40 Austrian dollars at Koweit; and that his Koweit friend was one of the merchants engaged in the arms business at Koweit.

Mohamed bin Merzook, I understand, is a Busreh trader and arrived here on the 19th instant with some of his goods in a baggalow from Busreh. He told me that Monsieur

Goguyer






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Goguyer and Haji Ali Al Thahaba stayed with him in Busreh and the former got to know Molla Hamza the confidential agent of Sheikh Khazal and through him arranged a three days' visit to Sheikh Khazal at Feilieh, and while there he contracted to deliver from ten to twelve thousand rifles to Sheikh Khazal at a ~~price~~ fixed price; and that large number of rifles are smuggled into Busreh by native craft and through Koweit and the price at Busreh is seven Turkish Liras per rifle with a hundred cartridges. He also said that about a month ago he received a letter from Monsieur Goguyer to the effect that he proposed going to Busreh after Haji Ali Al Thahaba's return from Muscat.

The foregoing information has been confirmed by Mohamed bin Attick who arrived here last Thursday from Al Hassa en route for Busreh to join his master Seyed Talib Pasha. He called at the Agency yesterday and mentioned that the Frenchman proposes getting the arms taken direct to Koweit by a steamer, but this I can hardly believe as it would be too open an infringement of Sheikh Mubarek's prohibition of the importation of arms into Koweit territory.

fm





(317)
(34)

Minute Paper. Register No.
2809 **SECRET DEPARTMENT.**

Letter from *F.O.*, Dated *21* } *June* 190*4*
Rec. *22* }

☒ Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
353 Under Secretary.....	22 Jun	<i>RK</i>	<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Arabia.</i></p> <p><i>Kejd disturbances Proposed representations to Turkey: despatch to Mr. W.D. Connor. Concurrence of F.O. in proposal to despatch a Pol. Agent to Koweit immediately. As to prevention of importation of arms into Koweit.</i></p> <p>Previous Papers:— <i>1082</i> <i>276</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Cop to India.</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Spl. telegram India.</i></p>
+ Secretary of State	22	<i>ag</i>	
356 Committee			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State			


Send. 1/13.
20/6.

Seen Pol. Comm.
28 JUN 1904
(with 2823)

tel sent + 26-6-04 20/7/04

Com to India 1 July 1904, day 27.
30 June 1904 *for 12 54/04*

TH Y 8964. 2000 --7/1903. I. 1599.





DRAFT TELEGRAM.

Despatched June 24 1904

277.

SECRETARY OF STATE

TO

VICEROY, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

(Vafroorum)

your tel 29th ult.
 Secret. June 29th May. heyd.

O'Connor has been instructed to ^{address} ~~maintain~~ representation to the Porte making such use as he may think judicious of arguments stated by you - You are authorised to send an officer immediately to Koweit as Political Agent. Fresh measures for the prevention of the importation of arms ^{referred to in paragraph 5 of your Secret Letter No. 76 of 31st March last} at Koweit for the present be deferred.

Copy to 720 (P)
 30 June 1904.

Copy to India. 1 July.


From Secretary of State to Viceroy, Foreign Department,
 24th June 1904.


P.—Your telegram of 29th May. Instructions have been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople to address representations to the Porte as to maintenance of status quo in Nejd, and, in so doing, to make such use of arguments stated by you as he may think judicious. With reference to paragraph 5 of your Secret Letter No. 76, of 31st March last, fresh measures for the prevention of the importation of arms at Koweit will, for the present, be deferred. You are authorised to send an officer as Political Agent to Koweit immediately.


Copy to 720 30 June


Copy to India 1 July

13778. L. 2486. 10000—277777









FOREIGN OFFICE.

June 21st. 1904.

No. 216.

Sir:-

I transmit to Your Excellency herewith copies of correspondence with the India Office as marked in the margin on the subject of the hostilities now in progress in the Nejd.

You should make such use as you think judicious of the arguments suggested by the Government of India in their telegram of May 29th. in support of your representations to the Turkish Government.

I have concurred in the proposals made in the 2nd. and 3rd. paragraphs of the India Office letter of June 2nd.

I am, with great truth and respect,

Sir,

Your Excellency's most obedient,


humble Servant,


His Excellency


The Right Honourable


Sir M. O'Connor, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.,

&c., &c., &c.










INDIA OFFICE,
WHITEHALL, S.W.

Mr Hirst

Herewith a Memorandum for
which the Sec. of State asked.

I would suggest that the draft
to the FO in the Vicary's telegram of
29 May might be marked for signa-
-ture, to save the time required for
Committee. I have shown it to
Sir Ernest Bayley who has no





Minute Paper.

Register No. [2724] 1002

SECRET DEPARTMENT.

Letter from 30 Telegram from Viceroy, Dated 27, 29 Aug 1904. Rec. 28, 30 Aug 1904.

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	30 Aug	RR	<p>Arabi.</p> <p>Rejo disturbances Turkish military support of Ibn Raschid. Proposed representations to Turkey. Opinion of Govt of India on the political aspect of the situation.</p>
Secretary of State	30	ag	
Committee	1 June	1911	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State			

Previous Papers:—

Copy to 20, (1002) 28/5/04.
" India (2724)

Dept to Foreign Office

Seen Pol. Comm.,
7 JUN 1904

COPY TO INDIA (2724)
3 June 1904
SECRETARY'S NO. 23

Y 8964. 2000—7/1903. I. 1309.



From Viceroy, 29th May 1904.

P.—Nejd. Your telegram dated the 25th May. Position of Government of India in regard to Nejd affairs is stated in letter of the 24th March last, Secret, No. 69. Representation might be made to the Porte to effect that, so long as the Turks abstained from interference in affairs of Nejd, we also refrained from intervention; that we are in no way desirous of giving direct or indirect assistance to Bin Saoud; but that our interests in Eastern Arabia are such that intervention on behalf of one of the parties who are contending for supremacy in Nejd cannot be viewed by us with indifference, as tribes with which we have relations cannot but be affected by such intervention; that the relative rights of the two contending parties are so equal that, with a view to the avoidance of internal troubles, and in the interests of peace, the better course would be to leave both sides alone. Sir N. O'Connor might further point out that the Turks were unable, in 1902, to prevent a filibustering expedition setting out against Koweit from Turkish territory, and that the support now being given to Ibn Rashid may strengthen him beyond Turkish powers of control, and that this might create a situation which could not be viewed with indifference by His Majesty's Government, having regard to our relations with the Sheikh of Koweit.

Our opinion as regards Sir N. O'Connor's views on the general political situation is as follows: Our influence with the Sheikh of Koweit has increased concurrently with the success of his friend, Bin Saoud; and if, as a result of active intervention on our part for the purpose of preventing Mubarak from helping Bin Saoud, and of preventing the importation of arms, Turkish influence were allowed to determine the supremacy of the Turkish nominee against Bin Saoud, our prestige at Koweit must suffer materially; and it would probably, on the analogy of El Hasa in 1870, mean the absorption of Nejd by the Turks. The destruction of Sheikh Mubarak's influence would be a natural result of the supremacy of the Turks in Nejd, and possibly also an attack would follow upon the territory of Koweit, the limits of which towards the interior are not defined, from a direction not hitherto contemplated. In this way we might be compelled once more to render Mubarak active assistance against the Turks. This would, in our opinion, be open to greater objection than the re-establishment of the Wahabi dynasty, which is now not so much fanatical as territorial. We are unable, therefore, to accept the view that the success of Bin Saoud would imperil our authority at Koweit, or that we can preserve intact the territory of Koweit better than by preventing the Turks from intervening on behalf of Ibn Rashid.

As regards posting a Political Agent at Koweit, we entirely concur—vide my telegram of the 20th May. We are of opinion that wholesome effect upon Turkish attitude of mind might not improbably be produced by such action; and, if you approve, an officer will be selected immediately to fill the post.

As regards arms, no arrangements have been made with the Porte up to the present for the combined suppression of the traffic, and the importation of arms is proceeding briskly. It is thus not a case of authorising the Sheikh of Koweit to import arms, or even of relaxing measures at present in force for the prevention of the traffic, but merely of letting matters remain as they are. Should the Turkish Government protest (and such a protest would involve an admission by them of our supremacy in Koweit that would be useful), we can offer to do our best to prevent the trade, if they on their part will refrain from interfering in affairs of Nejd, and will co-operate with us as suggested in our Despatch of the 31st March 1904.

Cy to 72 2 June

Cy to 72 2 June



324 324
 2 June 1907
 With reference to the telegram
 from the Viceroy of the 24th May as
 to the affairs of Mejer, I am
 directed by Mr Secretary Brouck
 to suggest for the consideration
 of the Marquis of Lansdowne that
 the reasons, which the Govt of
 India propose should be urged
 on the Turkish Govt in order to
 restrain them from supplying
 Von Rehsio, should be
~~insisted~~ to H^{is} Ambassador at
 Constantinople with a view to
 further representations to the
 sh^h L^{ord} Lansdowne
 approval of this work
 Pater H^{is} Majesty's
 command,

Under Sec of State
 From Mejer
 + Appellate
 to 30 May.
 Book
 168


Copy to India
 10 June 1907
 Secy 24


Explained



however to the views expressed
 in his Mr O'Connor's telegram of the
 25th May as to the attitude of
 the Sultan, Mr Brodrick proposes,
 subject to Lord Lansdowne's concur-
 -rence, at once to authorize the
 Gov. of India to despatch an
 Officer as Political Agent at
 Koweit, in accordance with
^{suggestion}
~~his recommendation~~.

As regards the importation
 of arms for ~~Bia~~ ^{Bia} land, Mr Brodrick,
 while not prepared to depart
 from our declared policy of
 suppressing the arms traffic,
 does suggest that action should
 be







1002 p 2724 oc

Departments are requested, if they suspect that there is any mistake in this telegram, to communicate 326 immediately with the Private Secretary to the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State. 326

COPY OF TELEGRAM

FROM (Lord Ampthill)
+ Viceroys, Simla.

DATED 29 May 1904


RECEIVED AT LONDON OFFICE 6.58. p.m.

(1698/ru)

Foreign Secret. Your telegram of 25th May. Please see our secret letter No. 69 of 24 March which

* [State?] is our position in regard to Nejd affairs. O'Connor might represent that so long as the Turkes refrained from interference in Nejd affairs we also abstained from intervention: that we have no desire to assist Bin Saud directly or indirectly: but that our interests in Eastern Arabia are such that we cannot view with indifference intervention on behalf of one of the parties contending for supremacy in Nejd which must affect tribes with which we have relations: that of two contending parties the relative rights are so equal that in the interests of peace and with a view to avoidance of internal troubles the better course would be to leave both sides alone. It might

* One group undecypherable. further





Departments are requested, if they suspect that there is any mistake in this telegram, to communicate immediately with the Private Secretary to the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State.

(327)

(327)

COPY OF TELEGRAM


FROM

+ Turkey (Continued)

DATED 29 May 1904

RECEIVED AT LONDON OFFICE

further be pointed out that in 1902 the Turks were unable to prevent a filibustering expedition against Koweit starting from Turkish territory, and the present supporters of Bin Rashid may strengthen him beyond Turkish powers of control and produce a situation which having regard to our relations with Subarak we could not view with indifference. As to O'Connor's view of general political aspect of the situation, our opinion is as follows:- the growth of our influence with Sheikh Subarak has been concurrent with the success of his friend Bin Saad and our prestige at Koweit must suffer materially if through our active intervention to prevent Subarak assisting Bin Saad and to prevent importation of arms, we permit Turkish influence to determine supremacy of





Departments are requested, if they suspect that there is any mistake in this telegram, to communicate immediately with the Private Secretary to the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State.

COPY OF TELEGRAM

FROM


3

+ Viceroy (Contd)

DATED 29 May 1904

RECEIVED AT LONDON OFFICE

of Turkish nominee against Bin Saud;
which, on analogy of El Hasa of 1870
would probably mean absorption of Nejd
by Turks. A natural result of Turkish
supremacy in Nejd would be destruction of
Mubarak's influence and a possible attack
from a direction which has not hitherto been
contemplated on Koweit territory, the limits
of which towards the interior are not defined.
We might thus be forced again to assist
Mubarak actively [against] Turks. The
re-establishment of the Wahabi dynasty
which is now rather territorial than
fanatical, would, in our opinion, be open
to less objection than this. We cannot
agree therefore that our authority at
Koweit would be imperilled by the
success





Departments are requested, if they suspect that there is any mistake in this telegram, to communicate immediately with the Private Secretary to the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State.

329

324

4p COPY OF TELEGRAM

FROM

+ Viceroy (Contd)


DATED

29 May

RECEIVED AT LONDON OFFICE

success of Bin Saud or that we can preserve Koweit territory better intact better than by preventing Turkish intervention on behalf of Bin Rashid. We quite agree as to posting Political agent to Koweit (See my telegram of 20th May) and will if you approve immediately select one. We think it not improbable such action might have wholesome effect upon Turkish attitude of mind.

Importation of arms is briskly proceeding and up to present no arrangements have been made with Porte for combined suppression of traffic. It is not therefore a case of authorising Muwarak to import arms or even of relaxing existing measures for preventing traffic but merely of allowing matters to remain where they are. If Turks protest, we can offer to do our best to prevent trade if they will co-operate in manner suggested in my





Departments are requested, if they suspect that there is any mistake in this telegram, to communicate immediately with the Private Secretary to the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State.

330

330

5 COPY OF TELEGRAM

FROM


+ Vicroy (Contd)



DATED


29 May

RECEIVED AT LONDON OFFICE

my despatch of March 31st 1904 and
will refrain from interfering in Kefol
affairs. Such a protest would involve
an admission of our supremacy in
Koweit that would be useful.









[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

332

337

PERSIA AND ARABIA.

[May 9.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

No. 1.

Sir N. O'Connor to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 321.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 4, 1904.

(2552)
WITH reference to my telegram No. 70 of the 26th ultimo, respecting fighting in Arabia, I have the honour to report that I have received a telegram from His Majesty's Consul-General at Bagdad, replying to my inquiry as to whether the capture of Riyadh by Ibn Saoud was correctly reported, and whether it was not meant that Ibn Saoud had taken Hail. Major Newmarch states that he cannot learn whether Hail had been captured, but that Ibn Saoud was in its vicinity; he had certainly taken Aneyza.

(2597)
With reference to my telegram No. 77 of the 29th ultimo, I have received a telegram from Mr. Consul Crow, dated Bussorah, the 2nd May, stating that he is informed that the Turkish authorities will send on the Nejd expedition one battery of artillery and six battalions of infantry from the Bussorah and Bagdad Vilayets. Large numbers of camels have been seized by the Amir for transport, and contracts had been made for six months' supplies.


Mr. Crow also hears that the Sheikh of Koweit is in constant communication with Ibn Saoud, and that the latter had taken Boreyda and Aneyza. He adds that the Sheikh may be obliged, by identity of interests, to lend assistance, or the support of his tribes may be withdrawn from him.

A telegram from Bagdad from Major Newmarch, dated the 2nd May, states that 400 infantry, 160 artillery men with 2 field pieces, 4 mountain guns, and 6,000 rounds of ammunition had left, or were just leaving, for Samawa, and that these would be followed by a further contingent of 800 infantry.

I have, &c.

(Signed) N. R. O'CONOR.

[1974 i-1]





935 ✓ (333) (336)

Register No. **750**

Minute Paper. **SECRET DEPARTMENT.**

Letter from India, No. 76

Dated 31 March 1904
Rec. 16 April 1904

Formally acknowledged

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	9/4/04	NR	Arms Traffic The traffic between Muscat and Koweit: Suppression
Secretary of State	9	ag	
Committee	10	SCB	
Under Secretary.....	16	NR	
Secretary of State	16	ag	
	17	SCB	

Previous Papers:—
24024. (see 2809 - action deferred.)

I think we must add the clause referred to by me - traffic

[See also 1002/04]
L 670 of 2/6/04.

[4 let. to Viceroy 24/6/04. 1004/04.]

Yours to Secy of State 24/6/04. 1004/04. I think we must add the clause referred to by me - traffic

Copy to India 3 June 1904

TH. Secy. 23

The Govt of India make the following proposals to carry further their campaign against the Arms Traffic in the Gulf:—

1. Extension of the terms of the Muscat proclamation of 1898 so as to include Turkish ports, and the territories of the Sheikhs of Bahrain and Koweit and of the Trucial Chiefs, in addition to "Indian or Persian ports" which already fall within the scope of the proclamation.

To this there seems no objection, having

Y 6731. 2000—9/1901. 1. 1909.




having regard to the Agreements with the Chiefs named and to Sir M. O'Connor's opinion as to the legal effect of the existing Turkish notifications.

(2) Omission from the Muscat Proclamation of the phrase limiting its operation to "British, Persian or Muscat Subjects." This goes too far, as the consent of France, the U.S.A and Holland—who all have treaties with Muscat—would have to be obtained to the Proclamation being applied to these subjects. Objections would probably be raised even by Powers who have not treaty rights, e.g. Germany & Russia.


(3) With a view to avoiding questions as to the status of Koweit, to obtain from the Turkish Govt permission either to our right of search over all vessels in Koweit waters "without prejudice to the question of the authority under which the right is exercised"; or to our exercising the right "in Turkish territorial waters in the Gulf outside the Shat el Arab without referring specially to Koweit."

The latter seems the preferable course, but it involves the question whether a similar privilege in respect of searching vessels under the British flag will not have to be conceded to the Turks. In the limited area in which this right would be exercised there seems little practical objection to this, but the principle involved is an important one.



Should the Foreign Office consider it inadvisable to make any communication to the Porte in the sense of either of the Govt of India's recommendations, it would still be open to us, if necessary and in a case of reasonable suspicion, to direct the seizure of arms in Koweit waters under the authority of the F.O. letter of the 10th March last.

I submit a summary of the information contained in the enclosures of the Govt of India letter, and a Draft to F.O.





(335) (340)

The following is a brief summary of the information contained in the enclosures of the Govt of India letters:-

Dimensions of Traffic at Muscat

(See also French Consular Report on Muscat for 1903 which gives the following figures of arms imported (for re-exportation mainly) during the year:-)

from Belgium	8,000
England	3,000
Germany	500
France	500

A cheap Russian gun was placed on the market & commanded a ready sale. The total imports of arms & ammunition during 1903 reached £40,000.

The Political Agent's letter of 1 March 04 gives figures showing a substantial increase in the amount of arms and ammunition sold by British merchants at Muscat:-

week ending	rifles	ammunition
22 Feb. 04	1,326 (Martini)	162,000 rounds
29 " "	352	40,000 "

These returns do not take account of the sales by foreign merchants, which in one case are said to have "lately become greatly extended". It is believed that nearly all the arms at present sold in Muscat are exported to Koweit and its neighbourhood.

Attitude of Sheikh of Koweit

The general attitude of the Sheikh of Koweit towards the arms traffic is discussed in Col. Kimball's letter of 4th March, which contains an account of the visit he recently paid to Koweit in accordance with the instructions reported in the Viceroy's telegram of 22 Feb. last. At this interview Mubarak has warned against intriguing with Gogayya and reminded of the terms of the Agreement of 1900, but his attitude is described as not at all satisfactory. Col. Kimball appears to be of opinion that the Sheikh will not act up to the agreement ~~if this is the case~~ ^{Col. Kimball points out} that we have little or no power of holding him to it. ~~But~~ ^{But} the Govt of India do not share his view that arms seized at Koweit ~~would~~ ^{have} to be handed over to the confiscating authority, i.e. to the Sheikh himself. Mubarak is reported just now to be in financial straits and on that account the more ready to increase his revenues.



revenues by conniving at the traffic. Moreover his intimacy with Goguyer is suspicious. Col. Kemball thinks it probable that, after the Sheikh's own requirements and those of his friends in Nejd have been provided for, Koweit may become the entrepot for the arms traffic to the Persian side of the Gulf (Mohammedan), for which its position is well adapted.


The B.I.S.N. Steamer "Chindwara" which it was reported would take a consignment of arms from Muscat to Koweit, was visited by the Political Agent at Muscat who found Goguyer's agent on board with some large boxes of which the keys were not forthcoming. Although Captain Grey did not take further action beyond reporting to the Resident in the Persian Gulf, 14 cases were removed from the ship as soon as he had left. It is thought that these cases formed the bulk of the intended consignment, as the Commander of H.M.S. "Hepburn", who had enquired on the arrival of the "Chindwara" at Koweit, was assured that no arms had been landed. It was subsequently found, however, that Goguyer's man had landed two cases of arms.

Case of
S.S. Chindwara

Shortly after this the Political Agent reported the departure from Muscat of two dhows having on board 518 rifles and 81,000 rounds of ammunition, under an export pass to Sohar (in Muscat territory); their real destination, however, was said to be Koweit. These boats did proceed to Koweit and Col. Kemball believes, in spite of the Sheikh's denial, that they landed arms there.

Shows traffic

In this connection Col. Kemball observes that a single man of war cannot act effectively against native craft.





Embody the laws of Turkey in
force against all nationalities
other than those with whose treaties
and capitulations they conflict,
and to the agreements on this
subject which have been made
with the Sheikhs of Bahrain and
Koweit and with the Trucial
Chiefs, the Govt of India
propose that the Muscat
proclamation of 1898 should be
revised in such a manner as to
prohibit the export of arms from
Muscat not only to Indian and
Persian ports but also to those of
the Ottoman Empire and of the
Sheikhs of Bahrain and Koweit
and of the Trucial Chiefs. To
this step Mr. Brodrick sees no
objection, and he would suggest,
for Lord Lansdowne's consideration,
that



(337) (342)

that, as a preliminary to the action to be taken by the Govt of India, the Turkish Govt might be informed of the proposal that the Sultan of Muscat should issue a Proclamation extending to Turkish ports the prohibition to export arms.

3. The Govt of India also ^{suggest} ~~propose~~ ~~the~~ ~~understand~~ omission from the Muscat proclamation of the words "and if they are the property of British, Persian or Muscat Subjects." This ^{proposal} ~~alteration~~ appears to Mr. Brodrick to be ^{open to} ~~open to~~ ~~open to~~ ~~doubtful~~, having regard to the rights secured by treaty to France and other Powers. The necessity for obtaining the consent of these Powers to the prohibition of the import



import and export of arms ^{at Muscat}
 by their nationals was recognised
 by the Govt of India in their
 Dispatch of the 30th July last, in
 which they renewed their request
 that, if possible, the consent of
 the French Govt to such prohibition
 might be obtained. Moreover
 it seems improbable that those
 Powers who have no treaty rights
 in the matter would acquiesce in
 the application to the property of
 their subjects of the power of
 confiscation by British and Persian
 ships of war granted by the
 Muscat proclamation, even though
 those arms were seized in vessels
 flying the British or Persian flag.
 The action of the German Govt
 with respect to ^{the} arms belonging to
 German subjects which were seized
 in the "Baluchistan" appears to
 support

forwarded with Sir H. Walpole's letter
 28th August 1903.



Pol. Comm. wd. add:-

At the same time should the view be upheld that the proclamation of 1898 may be extended to the export of arms to the Ottoman Empire, Thailand & Bahrain, Koweit and the ports of the Trucial chiefs the words 'and if they are the property of British, Persian and Muscat subjects' might be amplified by the inclusion of subjects of those other countries.

SR

* See also, see 51. to Viceroy

24 June 1900 (2590/100)

By T. ...

Support this view.

The Govt of India further draw attention to the necessity of taking steps to prevent the port of Koweit, where ~~M. Yagayer~~ ^{under the auspices of M. Yagayer} apparently intends to establish a branch of his business, from becoming an entrepôt for the arms trade. By his proclamation of the 24th May 1900 the Sheikh has prohibited the importation of arms and has rendered vessels suspected of carrying arms liable to search in Koweit waters by British ships of war, and to the confiscation of any arms destined for Indian, Persian or Koweit ports. In your letter of the 10th March last Lord Lansdowne expressed the view that, in the special circumstances reported in the Viceroy's telegram of the 22nd February



February last, there was no objection to an intimation being made to the Sheikh that the right of search will be exercised by us in case of reasonable suspicion. At the same time, Mr. Brodrick is of opinion that it would strengthen our hands in dealing with the arms traffic if the Turkish Govt would consent to the exercise by British ships of war in Turkish territorial waters in the Persian Gulf outside the Shat-el-Arab of the right to search vessels, including those flying the Turkish flag, which may be suspected of carrying arms. It is, however, a question upon which Mr. Brodrick offers no opinion, whether this advantage would not be outweighed by the disadvantage of the reciprocal privilege which it might be necessary to give to the Turkish Govt, as indicated in Sir N. O'Connor's Dispatch No. 759 of the 16th November last.



He P. L. Com. w. substitute:-

"are advised"

+ would add
"not"

Q

P. L. Com. w. add
S. B.

Mr. Brodrick, however considers that it is doubtful if this position can be maintained in view of the attitude adopted by A. M. S. fort. in the case of the seizure of arms in the "Baluchistan", in which case they acted on behalf of the native fort.


(8th) A. Godley.


S. B.


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R. A. R. S.

W. L. W.









No. 76 of 1904.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET.

External.

To

THE RIGHT HON'BLE ST. JOHN BRODRICK,
His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

FORT WILLIAM, the 31st March 1904.

SIR,

We have the honour to forward a copy of the marginally noted correspondence regarding the shipment of arms and ammunition from Maskat to Koweit.

- (1) From the Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 39, dated the 19th February 1904, with enclosure.
(2) From the Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 48, dated the 24th February 1904, with enclosure.
(3) From the Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 62, dated the 4th March 1904.
(4) From the Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, No. 69, dated the 11th March 1904.

2. The strict criticism to which our proceedings of 1898, in the case of the S. S. "Baluchistan", were subsequently subjected in British Courts of Law, and the claims which have been advanced by the German Government in connection with that seizure, indicate the necessity of omitting no precaution to ensure the technical correctness of our action, and in considering the present reports we have examined the question of our rights in seizing and confiscating arms in the territorial waters of Maskat. The power of confiscation conferred by the Sultan's proclamation of the 13th January 1898, relates only to arms and ammunition which are intended for Indian or Persian ports, and which are also the property of British, Persian, or Maskat subjects, and we thus have no special rights in the case of arms consigned to a port in other territory, such as Koweit, or where the warlike munitions are the property of a subject of any Power not mentioned in the proclamation.

Copy forwarded with Secret despatch No. 86 (External), dated the 5th July 1900.

3. In view of the agreements for the prohibition of traffic in arms and ammunition which we hold from the Sheikhs of Koweit and Bahrein and from the Trucial Chiefs, and having regard to the opinion expressed by Sir Nicolas O'Connor in his despatch to Lord Lansdowne, No. 759, dated the 16th November 1903, that for the purposes of the present case we might treat as illegal the introduction of arms into any part of the Ottoman dominions, we think it advisable that the terms of the Maskat proclamation of 1898 should be revised by substituting for the words "Indian or Persian ports" the phrase "Indian, Persian, or Turkish ports, or for the territories of the Sheikh of Bahrein,



(2) the Sheikh of Koweit, or of the Trucial Chiefs", and, further, that the words "and if they are the property of British, Persian, or Maskat subjects" should be omitted.

4. The wording of the Sultan's proclamation of 1898 follows the phraseology of the instructions of His Majesty's Government conveyed in Lord George Hamilton's telegram, dated the 21st December 1897, and it would, therefore, be necessary in any case to refer the matter for your orders before addressing the Sultan of Maskat on the subject. Since we propose the addition of the words "Turkish ports", it will, no doubt, also be desirable to refer to Sir Nicolas O'Connor.

(2) 5. There is, however, another and most important aspect of the case. Even if our powers of search in Maskat territorial waters can be enlarged in the manner suggested, there will still be the difficulty that boats carrying arms may clear from Maskat for ports in the territories of the Sultan of Maskat, where the traffic is not prohibited, and thence sail for Koweit, or some other port, as appears to have been the case in the present instance. This will necessitate the adoption of measures for searching arrivals in Koweit itself. Sheikh Mubarek, in conversation with Colonel Kemball, has recognised our right to do this under the proclamation of 24th May 1900, but obviously a seizure of arms in Koweit harbour by a British ship acting under the authority of the arrangement with the Sheikh would almost certainly, if the vessel carrying the arms were a foreign ship or even a British steamer, raise the whole question of the status of the Sheikh. In the present case we were compelled by the urgency of the matter to authorise Colonel Kemball to search for the arms said to have been sent to Koweit, but, before directing our officers to take such action generally, we desire, in accordance with the instructions contained in the telegram of 11th August 1900 from your predecessor, to refer the matter for the opinion of His Majesty's Government as to the course which it is advisable to adopt. The present position of affairs in which Mons. Goguyer apparently intends to establish a branch of his business at Koweit, which seems likely to become an entrepôt for the arms trade, is eminently unsatisfactory. In view of recent declarations on the subject of the status of Koweit, His Majesty's Government may possibly be willing now to authorise seizures of arms under the proclamation. If, however, it is held to be undesirable to assert our predominant interests so openly, perhaps the Turkish Government, who are vitally interested in checking the trade in arms in Northern Arabia, may agree to our searching all vessels in Koweit waters without prejudice to the question of the authority under which the right is exercised, or to our exercising such a right of search in Turkish territorial waters in the Persian Gulf outside the Shatt-el-Arab without referring specially to Koweit. Some such arrangement would probably make our position in the matter secure against all objectors.

6. We are advised that it would not be necessary to make over arms seized in territorial waters of an Arab Chief under our sole protectorate to the Chief, so that the difficulties anticipated by Colonel Kemball would not necessarily arise. Arrangements are in progress for opening a British Post Office at Koweit in charge of an Indian Assistant Surgeon, and, as soon as this has been done, we propose to dispense with the services of our present Agent. As long as Mons. Goguyer remains at Koweit, it will be necessary to arrange for frequent visits of a Political Officer and ships of war to that place, and it may be hoped



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that these overt signs of our interest in his proceedings will induce Sheikh Mubarak to adopt a more satisfactory attitude on the subject of this arms traffic than he did on the occasion of his last interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Kemball. The attention of Major Cox, who will shortly succeed Lieutenant-Colonel Kemball on the departure of the latter on leave, will be specially drawn to the necessity for consolidating our influence at Koweit.

We have the honour to be,

SIR,

Your most obedient, humble servants,

Luzon


T. Raleigh

E. G. Law


M. Lee


A. T. Arnold

Henry M. M. M.



Enclosed







No. 39, dated Bushire, the 19th February 1904 (Confidential).

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL C. A. KEMBALL, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to invite a reference to my confidential telegram dated 28th ultimo in which I reported that the Political Agent at Maskat had informed me that the British India Steam Navigation Company's steamer *Chindwara* had sailed from Maskat on the 26th idem with 400 rifles for Koweit.

2. I despatched the *Lawrence* to Koweit with my First Assistant, whom I directed to see Sheikh Mubarak and call upon him to take the necessary action with regard to this consignment. Captain Hunt saw the Sheikh who was at Jehara. He said he had no knowledge about the consignment of arms, but promised to seize and confiscate them should they be landed and to let me know the result of his action.

3. The *Chindwara* arrived in Bushire on the 3rd February, H. M. S. *Lapwing* having arrived in the harbour a day or two before, but after the *Lawrence* had left for Koweit. I discussed the matter with Captain Oldham, and we decided that, before he left for Koweit, it would be as well that he should find out the exact facts of the case from the Captain of the *Chindwara*. Captain Oldham, prior to his departure for Koweit on the 3rd, went on board the *Chindwara* and saw the Captain, who told him that directly Captain Grey had left the ship at Maskat, 14 cases were "bundled" over the side and several of the passengers left as soon as they saw that their attempt to smuggle the arms had been discovered. A letter,*

* No. 54, dated the 31st January 1904. which I received subsequently from Captain Grey, copy of which is attached, confirms this information. Captain Oldham intended to be at Koweit when the *Chindwara* arrived there, and he promised to report to me from Basra, where he intended to proceed subsequently, whether any arms were landed at Koweit and what action the Chief took with regard to them. I have, however, not yet heard from him on the subject, and it seems probable that the consignment regarding which information was sent to me by the Political Agent at Maskat was not taken to Koweit.

4. By last mail I received information from the Political Agent at Maskat that two dhows had left Maskat with 588 Martini rifles and 81,000 rounds of ammunition. Passes had been issued by the Sultan for these arms authorizing their despatch to Sohar, but the real destination of the dhows was, Captain Grey reported, Koweit. A proportion of the arms belonged to Monsieur Goguyer's agent.

On receiving this information, I wrote both to Sheikh Mubarak and to our Native Agent at Koweit, and directed the latter to let me know if the dhows referred to arrived in Koweit and what their cargo was and how it was disposed of. I fear, however, that our present agent is to a great extent in Mubarak's hands, and I doubt if I shall get a true report from him if the dhows are really bound for Koweit and land their cargo there.

5. With regard to the consignment on board the *Chindwara* it seems to me to be an extraordinary thing that a passenger is allowed by the Company to put on board, secretly, several large boxes with the apparent consent of the Captain of the ship. The cases were presumably part of the passengers' private effects, and it must surely be against the Company's rules to allow boxes of this nature to be shipped as passengers' personal effects, I believe it is the case that small quantities of rifles are not infrequently carried by passengers in their bundles and that the Company's officers profess their inability to take any steps to prevent this. I feel inclined to doubt if arms can in this way be smuggled into Persian ports, but they probably find no difficulty in passing into Bahrein and Koweit. It is, of course, hardly to be expected that the Company's officers should inspect the ordinary personal baggage of passengers; but



I think that they are bound to take reasonable precautions to prevent large consignments of arms, which are prohibited articles now at all the Persian Gulf ports, being put on board their ships. Supposing that Persian Customs House officials had made a search of the *Chindwara* while she was in a Persian port and had found the arms alluded to above on board, the British India Company could hardly, it seems to me, have escaped responsibility had the Customs Administration proceeded against the Company for bringing a prohibited article into a Persian port.

6. Monsieur Goguyer is still, I believe, at Koweit, and it is highly probable that his business there is connected with the traffic in arms. I strongly suspect that he has some understanding with Sheikh Mubarak on the subject. The Sheikh has more than once told me that he does not allow arms to be brought into Koweit, but I am not inclined to trust him in this matter.

No. 54, dated the 31st January 1904 (Confidential).

FROM—CAPTAIN W. G. GREY, His Britannic Majesty's Acting Consul and Political Agent, Maskat,

TO—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL C. A. KEMBALL, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

In amplification of the telegrams which have passed between us this week on the subject of arms on board the S. S. *Chindwara* I have the honour to explain as follows:—

At about 4 P.M. on the 26th instant I received information that M. Goguyer's native agent had embarked 400 rifles, etc., and intended to take them to Koweit. I proceeded on board at once and found some large boxes in the man's possession of which the keys were not forthcoming. At first I thought of breaking them open, but, eventually after discussion with the Captain, returned to the shore without further action and telegraphed to you in the hope that the arms might be secured at Koweit prior to being disembarked.

Subsequently I heard that some of the arms had been re-landed before the vessel left, but on this point I am unable to give a definite assurance.



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No. 48, dated Bushire, the 24th February 1904.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL C. A. KEMBALL, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

In continuation of my letter No. 39, dated the 19th instant, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, copy of the report which I was expecting from the Commander of H.M.S. *Lapwing* regarding the consignment of arms on board the S.S. *Chindwara*.

Dated H.M.S. *Lapwing*, Basrah, the 8th February 1904.

From—A. H. OLDHAM, Lieutenant-Commander, H.M.S. *Lapwing*.

To—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL C. A. KEMBALL, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and Consul-General for Fars, etc.


I have the honour to report that I proceeded over to Koweit as requested, and, immediately on my arrival there, visited the Sheikh's son and informed him that the *Chindwara* would arrive shortly, and that, if rifles were landed, they would be as passengers' luggage, and I suggested to him that it would be advisable to have all passengers' luggage searched; this he promised to do.

2. The next day I sent ashore to ascertain the result of this procedure, and was informed that no rifles or arms of any description were landed from the *Chindwara*.

3. It is evident that the persons who attempted to run these rifles took alarm on the Consul of Maskat visiting the ship, and the 14 cases (mentioned in a private letter to you) which were bundled over the side, just after he left, were in all probability the consignment intended for Koweit.

4539 F. D.

Encl.—L. G. G





No. 62, dated Bushire, the 4th March 1904 (Confidential).

FROM—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL C. A. KEMBALL, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf,

TO—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram, dated the 21st ultimo, and to report that as directed therein I proceeded to Koweit, where I had an interview with Sheikh Mubarek on the subject of the importation of arms into Koweit.

2. Before I landed from the *Lawrence*, I sent for our news agent and questioned him about the two dhows referred to in paragraph 4 of my letter No. 39, dated the 19th February 1904. The Agent informed me that these dhows had arrived at Koweit, and that he had, in compliance with my directions, made careful enquiries as to whether they had any arms on board. He was satisfied, he said, that no arms were landed from them at Koweit.

3. I then proceeded on shore and had a long interview with Sheikh Mubarek. I informed him that I had received reliable information that arms and ammunition were being brought to Koweit. He denied that such was the case, and said that he would not allow arms to be brought in. I then referred to the question of the dhows, regarding which the Sheikh had sent a reply to me to the effect that he knew nothing about them or their Nakhodas. He told me that the dhows in question had arrived, that they were Koweit dhows, and that it was quite impossible that any subjects of his would dare to bring arms into Koweit. I informed him that my information was reliable that these dhows had taken arms on board at Maskat, and that as it had not been shown that they had called at any other place between Maskat and Koweit, the reasonable presumption was that they had brought the arms to Koweit. It was useless therefore for the Sheikh to tell me that it was the custom of dhows to bring arms from Maskat and land them at Persian ports, such as Hindiyan and Mashur, and even on the Turkish side of the river (which they did, he said, in collusion with the Turkish guards). These dhows had come to Koweit and must have had the arms on board. The Sheikh ought therefore to have seized and confiscated the arms in accordance with his agreement with us. The Sheikh's manner was not at all satisfactory while we were on the subject of these dhows. He frequently turned the conversation from the point, asking, among other things, why we did not put a stop to arms coming into Maskat. I then referred to the subject of Goguyer. I told the Chief that the man was an intriguer and was well known to be a mischievous character. He was moreover a notorious dealer in arms, and the fact of his living in Koweit was in itself sufficient to give colour to the suspicion that the traffic in arms at Koweit was being carried on. The Sheikh was reticent about Goguyer. He said that, so far as he knew, the man was there merely for purposes of legitimate trade, and that if he found that he had anything to do with the trade in arms he would not let him remain there. He did not tell me, as I understand is the case, that Goguyer is on intimate terms with him and is practically his guest. There was not much more to be said on the subject, but I reminded the Sheikh again of the agreement which he had made in 1900, and I said that it was a matter of great regret to me to think that the Sheikh was not sincere in carrying out the promise then made by him. I reminded him that he had empowered British ships of war to search vessels in his territorial waters, and that we saw no objection to the exercise of this right in case of reasonable suspicion. The Sheikh agreed that there was no objection. Finally, I pointed out to him, that he was making requests for favours from His Majesty's Government, and that he could hardly expect the Government to meet his wishes if it was believed that he was not acting honourably in the matter of agreements which he had entered into with the Government.

4. Recent information which has reached me, leaves little room for doubt that arms are being brought to Koweit. There is the case of the *Ohinducara*, referred to in my previous letter on the subject: there is also the case of the two dhows above referred to, which I cannot but believe did land arms at Koweit; and there is the fact of Goguyer's residence at Koweit which would seem to be fairly conclusive proof. The S.S. *Gulistan*,


4467 F. D.



regarding which I telegraphed to you on the 18th February, left Bushire for Basrah on the 26th February, but did not go to Koweit. It is possible that she will call there on her return journey. It is difficult to say what can be done to put a stop to this traffic, if Sheikh Mubarek will not act up to his agreement with us. It is true that the Sheikh has empowered British ships of war to search vessels suspected of carrying arms, within Koweit territorial waters, and I understand that there would be no objection to the confiscation of any arms, which might thus be discovered, for the benefit of His Majesty's Government or of the British ship of war. I am doubtful, however, whether such seizure and confiscation by us of a cargo belonging to a subject of a Foreign European Power might not give rise to difficulties. It is possible, too, that Goguyer may arrange for his consignments to be brought to him at Koweit by one of the Russian merchant ships plying to the Gulf. In such a case, even supposing the search were permissible on the authority delegated to us by the Sheikh, we could not, I believe, retain the arms which would have to be made over to the confiscating authority, that is to say the Sheikh, and if it is true that the Sheikh is conniving in the traffic nothing would be gained by such action. In order to control the traffic by native craft we should have to keep a ship of war constantly at Koweit, and even then it would, I believe, be difficult for one ship to deal effectively with this traffic.

5. In dealing under present circumstances with a person in the position of Sheikh Mubarek, it must, I think, be remembered that we have little or no power of holding him to an agreement of the nature of that which he made with us for the prohibition of the arms traffic. It will, of course, be readily understood that the traffic, if it exists, is a source of profit to the Sheikh who naturally would not allow it to continue unless it brought in revenue to him. If the Sheikh were in receipt of an allowance from His Majesty's Government, pressure might be put upon him when it was found that he had broken the agreement by withholding the allowance. Just at present, the Sheikh appears to be in financial straits, and possibly this is the reason why he has turned to the arms trade for the purpose of increasing his revenue. In all probability a large proportion of the arms which are being, or which may hereafter be, brought to Koweit, will be exported to the Persian side. It is not likely that the Sheikh will allow arms to pass into the hands of his enemies, and it is probable that after providing for his local requirements and for his friends in Nejd, his port will be used as the emporium for the Persian side of the Gulf. Koweit is well situated for supplying arms to the region of Mahommerah and the northern end of the Gulf.

6. In conclusion, I have the honour to say that in my opinion there is little use in retaining the services of our present News Agent at Koweit, and I think that as soon as the new Post Office is established there the man should be dismissed.



No. 69, dated Bushire, the 11th March 1904 (Confidential).

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL C. A. KEMBALL, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

In continuation of my letter No. 62, dated the 4th March, on the subject of the traffic in arms at Koweit, I have the honour to forward copy of a letter *

* No. 97, dated 1st March 1904.

received by me from the Political Agent at Maskat bearing on the subject.

2. His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Basra has informed me by telegram dated the 7th instant that he has heard that Goguyer expects coffee, sugar, and different goods by the Russian steamer *Jupiter*, which arrived recently in the Gulf. Mr. Crow supposes that the arms which he had heard were to be transhipped at Aden for Goguyer will be concealed among these goods. The Russian steamer, however, left here two days ago for Basrah and did not go to Koweit.

I have recently received a report from our News Agent at Koweit through the Assistant Political Agent at Bahrein that the S.S. *Chindwara* referred to in my letter No. 39, dated the 19th February, did bring two cases of arms which were landed at Koweit by Goguyer's Agent Haji Ali-al-Thahaba.

3. If it is considered desirable that we should take active measures to put a stop to the traffic in arms, I would suggest that His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief should be requested to give the requisite instructions to his officers in the matter. The only ship of war in these parts at present is H.M.S. *Lapwing*, which has been for some time at Basrah, which place she left a few days ago for Koweit. One ship will not, I think, be able to act effectively if native craft have to be stopped and searched, and at least another ship will have to be sent.

No. 97, dated the 1st March 1904 (Confidential).


From—CAPTAIN W. G. GREY, Political Agent, Maskat,

To—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL C. A. KEMBALL, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have the honour to State for your information that during the week ending February 22nd, no less than 1326 rifles (all Martinis) were sold in Maskat with over 102,000 rounds of ammunition by British merchants alone. During the week ending 29th February, 352 rifles and about 40,000 rounds of ammunition were disposed of by members of our community. In addition to this substantial increase in the trade, I am informed that Messrs. Keverkoff & Co.'s arms traffic has lately become greatly extended.

2. It is said that nearly all the arms at present sold in Maskat are exported to Koweit and its neighbourhood.

G. I. C. P. O.—No. 4763 F.D.—28-3-1904.—54 —L. G. G.





No. 86 of 1900.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.SECRET.External.

To

THE RIGHT HON'BLE LORD GEORGE F. HAMILTON,
Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

SIMLA, the 5th July 1900.

MY LORD,

We have the honour to forward, for the information and orders of Her Majesty's Government, copies of the papers noted in the enclosed list, regarding an agreement which has been concluded with the Sheikh of Koweit, whereby he has undertaken to prohibit absolutely the importation and exportation of arms into and from Koweit territory.

2. In order to explain the immediate cause of our action in concluding this agreement, we may refer to the correspondence ending with Your Lordship's telegram, dated the 11th October 1899, regarding the seizure of certain arms and ammunition, the property of Messrs. Fracis, Times & Co., by the Sheikh of Bahrein. We recently learnt from our Political Resident in the Persian Gulf that the Sheikh of Bahrein desired to restore to Messrs. Fracis, Times & Co. their property, which had been confiscated by his orders. Acting on the views indicated by Your Lordship in the telegram above quoted and in previous correspondence, we did not question the authority of the Sheikh to dispose of these arms and ammunition at his discretion, though we instructed our Political Resident to advise the Sheikh that the restoration of the goods to Messrs. Fracis, Times & Co. should be made subject to the condition that the arms and ammunition are not sold in Bahrein, El Katr, or on the Arabian Coast—a condition which, as Your Lordship is aware,* was attached to the original concession granted by the Sheikh to his Vazir, and handed on to Agha Muhammad Rahim and by him to Messrs. Fracis, Times & Co. In soliciting our instructions regarding the restoration of the arms, Lieutenant-Colonel Kemball expressed his apprehensions that Messrs. Fracis, Times & Co., if the arms and ammunition were restored to them, would probably endeavour to dispose of them at Koweit, and it was with a view to frustrate this that we took active steps to secure the conclusion of the agreement with the Sheikh of Koweit, of which we now forward a copy. We now hear that the Sheikh of Bahrein has carried out his intention, and has restored the arms and ammunition to Messrs. Fracis, Times & Co. on the condition above named.

* Vide enclosure No. 41 of Lieutenant-Colonel Meade's letter to the Marquess of Salisbury, No. 20 (Secret-Consular), dated the 29th November 1898.



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3. We trust that our proceedings will meet with the approval of Her Majesty's Government, and that we may be favoured with early instructions as to the measures to be adopted, should occasion arise for utilising the permission which has been accorded by the Sheikh of Koweit, to search Koweit vessels suspected of carrying arms within Koweit, Indian or Persian waters, and to confiscate any arms and ammunition found in such vessels. We have informed Lieutenant-Colonel Kemball that no action should be taken in the way of search or seizure of Koweit vessels, whether in Koweit territorial waters or in Indian or Persian waters, unless or until instructions are received from Your Lordship.

We have the honour to be,

MY LORD,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servants,

(Signed) CURZON OF KEDLESTON.


„ E. H. H. COLLEN.


„ A. C. TREVOR.

„ C. M. RIVAZ.

„ T. RALEIGH.

„ E. F.-G. LAW.







ENCLOSURE No. 1.

Telegram, No. 108, dated the 28th April 1900.

From—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Please refer to Bahrein arms case. Sheikh evidently does not intend holding enquiry as to whether arms were seized owing to the infringement of the concession. He now withdraws from this contention and maintains that arms were seized at the instance of Agha Muhammad Rahim, who is now dead and has no representative at Bahrein. Sheikh wishes to restore the arms to Fracis. I have reported officially to you by post, and I would suggest that orders may issue to me by telegraph on receipt of my letter.

ENCLOSURE No. 2.

No. 111, dated Bushire, the 29th April 1900.

From—CAPTAIN C. A. KEMBALL, Offg. Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I have the honour to invite a reference to the correspondence on the subject of the enquiry by the Sheikh of Bahrein into the matter of the confiscation at Bahrein of the arms and ammunition belonging to Messrs. Fracis Times.

2. Mr. Fracis, a representative of the firm, is now at Bahrein, awaiting this enquiry, but it is evident from recent reports addressed to me by Mr. Gaskin, the Assistant to the Resident at Bahrein, that the Chief has no intention of holding any enquiry as to whether the concession granted by him for the importation of arms into Bahrein had been infringed. He now withdraws this contention, and maintains that the arms were seized at the instance of Agha Muhammad Rahim, who is now dead, and has, he says, no representative at Bahrein who could proceed with the case, and he wishes to restore the arms to Messrs. Fracis Times. He has informed Mr. Fracis, through the Assistant Resident, that he is at liberty to leave Bahrein whenever he may wish to do so. It, however, appears from Mr. Gaskin's latest report, dated 22nd instant, that Mr. Fracis has now requested the Chief of Bahrein to hold an enquiry regarding the alleged theft of arms from the godown of the firm prior to the seizure, and that the Chief has consented to do so.

3. I would solicit the orders of the Government of India regarding the advisability of allowing the Chief of Bahrein to restore the arms to Messrs. Fracis Times. Her Majesty's Government having adopted the view that the Sheikh of Bahrein "as a Sovereign Ruler so far as his internal administration is concerned" was authorised to seize the arms, I do not see how he can be prevented from restoring them should he wish to do so. It does not seem to me to be clear what was the real motive which the Chief had when he ordered the sequestration of the arms, and at any rate, as a Sovereign Chief, he had just as much right to seize the arms at the request of a merchant trading at Bahrein, as because the terms of the concession, which he had granted, were alleged to have been broken.

It will be seen that Colonel Meade, in the concluding paragraph of his memorandum on the subject, forwarded with his letter No. 69, dated 21st November 1898, to your address, made the suggestion that the arms should be delivered over to the firm on certain conditions, and so far as I can see there is no objection to this course being taken. On grounds of public policy, it would seem that we have the right to insist that the Chief, if he surrenders the arms, should see that they are taken out of his territory and similarly, the coast of Persia being closed to the trade in arms, we have the right to insist that the arms, if surrendered to Messrs. Fracis Times, should be taken by them out of the Gulf.



4. The question is a complicated one, but, as I understand it, the policy which has been followed is that Government accepts no responsibility for the action of the Chief of Bahrein in seizing these arms. The Chief had the arms seized of his own initiative, and he has now to decide as to their disposal, although, in the event of the Chief deciding to restore the arms to Messrs. Fracis Times, the Government of India would claim to have an interest in this question of their ultimate disposal. Should Messrs. Fracis Times subsequently make an appeal to this Residency on account of any alleged injury done to them by the action of the Chief, they can state their case, which will then be enquired into and decided on its merits.

ENCLOSURE No. 3.

Telegram, No. 124, dated the 10th May 1900.

From—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Please see my letter of 29th April, No. 111. It is probable, if arms are handed over to Fracis, he will endeavour to dispose of them at Koweit, if they are fit for sale after long detention at Bahrein. Some arrangement with Chief of Koweit regarding importation of arms seems very desirable, and I propose to send Gaskin there in "Lawrence" to enquire into trade in arms there. I believe Chief makes considerable profit by trade and conclusion of agreement with him presents difficulties. Is there any objection to sending Gaskin? I have received your letter No. 867, dated 20th April.

ENCLOSURE No. 4.

Telegram, No. 1023 E.-A., dated the 15th May 1900.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,
To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

Your telegrams 108 and 124 and letter 111, April 29th. It seems best that Gaskin should remain at Bahrein, but you may proceed yourself or send Davis to Koweit, and endeavour to arrange agreement with Sheikh forthwith. Bahrein Chief can, at his discretion, restore arms to Fracis Times, but should be advised only to do so, subject to condition that the arms are not sold in Bahrein, Katr or on Arab Coast. If there is reasonable prospect of early agreement with Koweit Sheikh, restoration of arms to Fracis Times might conveniently be postponed pending its conclusion.

ENCLOSURE No. 5.

Telegram, No. 130, dated the 16th May 1900.

From—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

Your telegram, 15th May. I will proceed myself to Koweit shortly and endeavour to arrange agreement. I believe Sheikh imposed tax of four dollars on each import, and it would be advisable to authorise me to pay to him a sum of money equivalent to, say, one year's income received by himself from this source. This will probably not be large sum, and I will use my discretion in matter endeavouring to conclude agreement, if possible, without paying any compensation. As conclusion of agreement in view of probable increase of arms trade at Koweit in near future seems important, I should, I think, have authority to make Sheikh grant of reasonable sum, though what this should be I cannot say till I have made enquiry on the spot. I think it advisable not to delay restoration by Bahrein Sheikh of arms to Fracis Times. It is probable arms are not saleable at present, and it will take Fracis Times some time to arrange for their disposal.



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ENCLOSURE No. 6.

Telegram, No. 1063 E.-A., dated the 19th May 1900.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,

To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

Your telegram, May 16th. Grant of money compensation to Koweit Sheikh in return for agreement to prohibit or restrict importation of arms might prove embarrassing precedent. It has not been done in previous cases. We hope that Sheikh may be induced to conclude agreement without any concession, but if this is impracticable, please consider whether some inducement other than cash payment could not be offered. Before coming to decision, Government will await report from you after you have visited Koweit.

ENCLOSURE No. 7.

No. 140, dated Bushire, the 26th May 1900.

From—CAPTAIN C. A. KEMBALL, Offg. Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,


To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I have the honour to forward copy of the agreement made by the Chief of Koweit, whereby he absolutely prohibits the traffic of arms into and from the territory under his control. Copies of the notifications issued by the Chief giving force to this agreement are also forwarded.

*Agreement by Sheikh Mubarek-bin-Sabah,
Chief of Koweit.*

I agree to absolutely prohibit the importation of arms into Koweit or exportation therefrom, and to enforce this I have issued a notification and proclamation to all concerned.

Dated this ^{24th day of Moharrum 1318.}
_{24th day of May 1900.}


Seal  of

MUBAREK-BIN-SABAH.

*Notification by Sheikh Mubarek-bin-Sabah,
Chief of Koweit.*

Be it known to all who see this that, whereas it has become known to us that the traffic in arms in British India and Persia is prohibited, we have, therefore, decided to do all that lies in our power to assist the British and Persian Governments in putting a stop to this illegal traffic, and we hereby declare that from the date of this notification the importation of arms and ammunition into Koweit and the territory under my control and the exportation of the same are absolutely prohibited. All arms and ammunition imported into any parts of Koweit territory or exported therefrom in future will be seized and confiscated.

Dated this ^{24th day of Moharrum 1318.}
_{24th day of May 1900.}

Seal  of

MUBAREK-BIN-SABAH.




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Proclamation from Sheikh Mubarek-bin-Sabah, Chief of Koweit.

Be it known to all who see this that British and Persian vessels of war have permission to search vessels carrying their and our flags in Koweit territorial waters, and to confiscate all arms and ammunition in them, if these arms and ammunition are intended for Indian or Persian or Koweit ports. Koweit vessels found in Indian and Persian waters by British and Persian vessels of war suspected to contain arms and ammunition for Indian, Persian and Koweit ports are liable to be searched by the said vessels, and all such arms and ammunition found in them will be confiscated.

Dated this ^{24th day of Moharrum 1318.}
24th day of May 1900.

Seal  of

MUBAREK-BIN-SABAH.

ENCLOSURE No. 8.

No. 142, dated Bushire, the 28th May 1900.

From—CAPTAIN C. A. KEMBALL, Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I have the honour to report that, in accordance with your instructions, I visited Koweit on the 24th instant, and at an interview with Sheikh Mubarek, Chief of Koweit, I explained to him the desirability of his putting a stop to the traffic in arms within his territories. The Chief informed me that up to the present the importation of arms into Koweit had not been carried on to any great extent, and that he had already taken steps to prevent the continuance of the trade, as he himself saw the advisability of putting a stop to it in his own interests.

He readily agreed to sign an agreement, prohibiting the importation and exportation of arms so far as Koweit territory is concerned. Copies of this agreement and of the notifications signed by the Chief have been forwarded to you under separate cover.

2. Whether the arms trade in Koweit is in reality more extensive than the Chief gave me to understand I was not able to ascertain. It is possible that the Chief himself does not know the extent to which it is being carried on, though, when I suggested to him this possibility, he refused to entertain it. So far as I was able to judge, the Chief intends to abide loyally by his agreement, and in any case the agreement cannot but have a good effect, as the dealers in arms at Maskat and elsewhere will now know that the trade is prohibited so far as Koweit is concerned, and that it will, if pursued, be attended with risk.

3. I thought it advisable to obtain the Chief's consent to the issue of the proclamation, authorising British and Persian vessels of war to search vessels carrying British, Persian or Koweit flags in Koweit territorial waters. In this connection, however, it has to be considered that Koweit vessels fly the Turkish flag, and although I presume that there would be no objection to British or Persian vessels of war searching vessels under the Turkish flag in Indian and Persian waters, the search of vessels carrying the Turkish flag within Koweit waters by our ships might prove a source of embarrassment if it came



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to the knowledge of the Turkish authorities. I have, therefore, taken no steps to make this proclamation known, and I shall be glad to know the views of the Government of India on this point. I have, however, informed the Political Agent, Maskat, that the Chief of Koweit has prohibited the import of arms into Koweit territory.

4. During my interview with the Chief, he evinced a most friendly attitude and professed his desire to serve the British Government in any way he could. He informed me that all was quiet in Koweit and the neighbouring country, and he appeared to have no cause for anxiety with regard to his own affairs.

ENCLOSURE No. 9.

No. 166, dated Bushire, the 16th June 1900.

From—CAPTAIN C. A. KEMBALL, Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

In continuation of my letter No. 111, dated 29th April last, I have the honour to report that the Chief of Bahrein has now restored to Messrs. Fracis, Times & Co. the arms which he seized in Bahrein, belonging to that firm. Mr. Gaskin has informed me that Mr. Fracis has given the Chief a document by which he holds the Chief free of all responsibility in connection with the seizure, and he has forwarded to me the receipt given by Mr. Fracis to the Chief for the arms. I forward this document for your information. It is interesting in so far as it shows the line of action which the firm intends to take which is in all probability to bring an action against the British Government for damages, on the ground that the arms were seized by the Chief in accordance with the orders of this Residency. This matter has been fully disposed of in Colonel Meade's report, forwarded with his letter No. 69, dated 21st November 1898, to your address.

2. It would appear from the language in which the receipt for the arms is couched that Messrs. Fracis, Times & Co. hope to substantiate their claim against the British Government, on the ground that the Chief refused to restore the arms to them without an order from this Residency, and they apparently deduce from this an admission on our part that the seizure was made by the Chief acting under our orders. My letter to the firm, to which a reference is made in the receipt, is forwarded herewith for your information. It will be seen that this letter by no means admits any responsibility for the seizure, but is merely a reply to a letter from the firm, copy of which is also forwarded, in which they informed me that the Chief refused to deliver up the arms without my permission. Mr. Gaskin further informs me that Mr. Fracis is endeavouring to dispose of the arms locally to traders who will endeavour to smuggle them across to Persia. The Chief made it a condition of their restoration that they should not be sold in Bahrein, Katr, or the Arab Coast.

Received from Sheikh Isa-bin-Ali-al-Khalifah, the Chief of Bahrein, the undernoted arms and ammunition, all in more or less rusty and damaged condition, restored to us by him, by order of Major C. A. Kemball, the Officiating Political Resident and Consul-General in the Persian Gulf, conveyed in his letter No. 404 of 1900, dated 19th ultimo, addressed to us, which was demanded by the Chief of Bahrein in his letters, dated the 15th Zilkada 1317=17th March last, and 27th Zilkada 1317=29th March last, addressed, respectively, to the Acting British Residency Agent, Hajee Abbas-bin-Fuzzul, and to the Political Assistant to the Resident and Consul-General in the Persian Gulf,



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in Bahrein, Mr. J. C. Gaskin, and which order was elicited by our final protest of 11th ultimo, addressed from Bushire to Major C. A. Kemball, the Political Resident and Consul-General in the Persian Gulf, viz :—

- 26 (twenty-six) Pungteery (Manlicher) carbines.
- 23 (twenty-three) Kust Kapaghy (Sniders).
- 3 (three) Mahatty (Remingtons).
- 5 (five) Mahatty different kinds (Remingtons of different patterns).
- 82 (Eighty-two) Muskofiat (Enfields' muzzle-loading).
- 2,528 Martini (Two thousand five hundred and twenty-eight).
- (Martini-Henry rifles of sorts sporting and carbines).
- 2,667 in all total.

127½ (one hundred and twenty-seven and half) cases cartridges for Martini-Henry and other kind of rifles.

127½ cases cartridges were received on the 16th June 1900.

BAHREIN;
The 2nd June 1900. }

(Sd.) FRACIS, TIMES & Co.

Dated Bushire, the 11th May 1900.

From—MESSRS. FRACIS, TIMES & Co.,

To—MAJOR C. A. KEMBALL, Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

We have the honour to inform you that our Mr. Fracis has returned here after a fruitless stay of two months in Bahrein, where he had been requested to go with reference to the seizure of our arms.

From the copies of letters that have passed between us and Mr. Gaskin, the Political Assistant in Bahrein, and between the latter and the Sheikh, you must have noticed :—


1st.—The real reason why our Mr. Fracis's presence was required there, and


2nd.—That as the Sheikh contends that he seized our arms and summoned us to go to Bahrein at the request of the British authorities, and as our Mr. Fracis went there without the further instructions referred to in Colonel Meade's letter to the Sheikh, dated 14th Ramazan 1315 (16th February 1898), he, the Sheikh, is unable to release our arms, but is willing to do so if he has your permission.


Whether our arms were seized by the Sheikh at the desire of the British authorities, or on his own responsibility, is a matter with which we have nothing to do, as it is a point which must be left for you to settle between your goodselves; but as far as we are concerned, we do not see why, in the meantime, the release of our arms should be delayed any further, as you must have seen from the report made by Mr. Brander (the Civil Chief Master Armourer of the Ferozepur Arsenal, who was deputed by the Government of India, in about November 1898, to proceed to Bahrein in order to examine our seized arms there) that the arms were even then in an awful condition, of which opinion he made no secret; and every day's delay in releasing them will cause greater depreciation in their value.


As we are informed by Mr. Gaskin that this matter has been referred to you, we should like to know your final decision on the subject, if possible, before Monday next, because this matter, as far as we can see, is now unnecessarily delayed.


Thanking you in anticipation for the favour of an early reply.



























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